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ENSLAVED PERSONS WHO ARE FREE.

RAINER PAPYRUS (PER) INV. 24,552.

In *Aegyptus*, XVI, pp. 257-291 Dr. Herbert Liebesny has published with care and precision two Ptolemaic *protagmata* of the third century B. C. which were found in the Rainer collection in Vienna. The second decree is a demand for registration of all persons of a definite group in the Ptolemaic dependency of Syria-Phoenicia¹ who were at that time held in slavery. The slaves of this class are called *σώματα λαϊκά ἐλεύθερα*. Two clauses which seem to embody exceptions to the demand for registration are not actually exceptions. Rather they are definitions, embodied in the decree, which eliminate the types of persons mentioned in these clauses, in the one case from the class of "slaves" (*σώματα*), in the other from that of "free persons" (*ἐλεύθερα*), hence from the total group of "enslaved persons who are free,"² and so, in both cases from the operation of the decree.

The text of the second *protagma* is well preserved except for the fourth and fifth lines. Even there the meaning is quite clear. Because of the apparent loss of an entire column upon the left of the two preserved columns and serious damage to the first remaining column, the first decree is incomplete; and the motivation and ultimate objective of both decrees is open to conjecture. The general trend of the first *protagma*, how-

¹ *Aegyptus*, XVI (1936), pp. 258-259, col. I, 33-34 and col. II, 19, κατὰ Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην.

² Liebesny in referring to one of these clauses, col. II, 12-15, regards it as an exception rather than an elimination by precise definition. *Ibid.*, p. 274, in dealing with the concubines of soldiers in Syria-Phoenicia.

ever, is clear.³ It ordains that all herds, both taxable and "exempt" (*ἀτελῆ*), in the villages of Syria-Phoenicia must be registered within 60 days after publication of the decree.⁴ Liebesny has correctly interpreted the word *λεία* as "herds of cattle."⁵ There is no positive declaration in this decree that its sphere of application is limited to Syria-Phoenicia (which includes Palestine). But this restriction of sphere is certain because of the requirement that those who declare their possessions of cattle must appear before the *oeconomus* "appointed in each hyparchy." For the hyparchy does not appear as an administrative division in Egypt itself.⁶

In presenting the following comments arising from my interest in the second decree, that upon the *σώματα λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα*, repetition of Liebesny's conclusions in his valuable commentary will be confined to those points which are essential to the discussion or are, in my judgment, open to a different interpretation.

The second *prostagma* (col. I, 33-col. II) orders that all those living in Syria-Phoenicia who have bought, carried away, seized and held in detention, or in any other manner have gained possession of and hold free persons of the class of the *λαικὰ σώματα* (col. II, 17; *σῶμα λαικ[ὸν] ἐλεύθερον*, in the singular, in col. I, 34) must bring them in and register them before the *oeconomus* within twenty days after publication of the decree. No photograph accompanies Liebesny's publication. His dating of the *prostagma*, which was to take effect in Dystros of the year 25 of a Basileus who is not further defined by name or title, rests upon paleographic considerations. These, according to the editor, place the documents in the middle of the third century B. C.; and he has decided for Ptolemy Philadelphus rather than for Euergetes I. This gives us the spring of 261 B. C. as the time when the decree was to become effective; but

³ Liebesny, *ibid.*, p. 269.

⁴ Col. I, 2-3. Cf. 19-20, τ[ῆς] ὑπάρχ[ουσας ἐν] ταῖς κόμαις λείαν ὑποτελῆ καὶ ἀτελῆ.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269. Cf. P. Teb. III 1, 703, line 173. The registration of the *λεία* in P. Teb. III 703 was the regular and annual procedure in Egypt for the purpose of collecting the pasturage tax.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 264. The dating under Philadelphus is accepted by Ulrich Wilcken in his discussion of Liebesny's article in *Arch. f. Pap.*, XII (1937), pp. 219 and 220. Wilcken had seen a photograph of the document.

the royal decisions themselves must have been taken earlier, presumably in the latter half of 262 B. C.

Strictly speaking, the second decree is not a demand for the registration of "slaves" but of certain individuals of a class defined as σώματα λαικά ἐλεύθερα⁸ who have been bought or taken under mortgage or otherwise reduced to a condition of *de facto* enslavement. The decree itself does not contain either of the more common Greek words for "slave," δοῦλος and ἀνδράποδον, which customarily appear in the *protagmata* of the time dealing with persons of unquestioned slave status.⁹ It is clear, however, that the Ptolemaic government had become cognizant of the fact that there was a considerable body of σώματα λαικά ἐλεύθερα in Syria-Phoenicia who were being employed by the inhabitants of Syria-Phoenicia in slave services who had not been registered as slaves.

The adjective λαικά in itself brings up a primary problem. Who were these σώματα λαικά? Liebesny's interpretation of the phrase in the wide sense of the local "native population"¹⁰ of Syria-Phoenicia is certainly not precise enough. It is tempting to see in them a class bound to the soil of the royal domains and sold with the land, such as were the λαοί in Asia Minor in the precise period of this Rainer *protagma*.¹¹ But this technical use of λαοί is unknown to Egypt and Coele Syria. In the Ptolemaic papyri λαικός is sometimes used with nouns to distinguish the possessions of the peasants from those of the state régime itself or those of the temples.¹² In other places the word

⁸ Col. II, 17. The meaning of ἐλεύθερα as "free" persons, as Liebesny has accurately given it in his translation, p. 263, will appear later in the article.

⁹ P. Columbia Inv. 480 (Westermann, *Upon Slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt*, N. Y., 1929) is a part of τὸ διάγραμμα τὸ τῶν ἀνδράποδων, see ll. 1, 2. Cf. P. Hibeh 29 (= Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*, 259) recto frag. a, 1, 4, 6, 8. P. Lille 29 uses the three words for slave, δοῦλος, ἀνδράποδον, and σώμα.

Liebesny, both in his translation of PER Inv. 24,552 (*Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 263) and in his interpretation, has scrupulously avoided the use of the word "slaves," correctly following the *protagma* in its failure to use this decisive legal term.

¹⁰ *Aegyptus*, XVI, pp. 263, 272.

¹¹ W. H. Buckler and D. Robinson, *Sardis, Greek and Latin Inscriptions* (1932), I, p. 1; *OG*, I, 225, 8, 22, 34; Rostovtzeff, *Kolonat*, pp. 258 f.

¹² λαικά πρόβατα in P. Cairo Zenon III 59,349, 13, 18 are opposed to

λαοί is used as an inclusive term referring to the lower class population in general;¹³ but in P. Teb. III 701, 72-75, 80-82 it applies distinctly and solely to the peasants in the general group of lower class laborers.¹⁴ Accepting the Ptolemaic-Egyptian use of the word as applicable to the Rainer papyrus, we have the certainty that the *λαικὰ σώματα* formed the lower class farming population, with the possibility that handicraft classes may be included.

The decree begins with the order that anyone in Syria and Phoenicia who had bought, seized by force and held in detention, or had in any other manner gained possession of such a *σῶμα λαικόν*, must bring that person in and register him before the *oeconomus* within twenty days after publication of the decree. The fine to be imposed for failure to comply with the decree is extraordinarily high, from every point of view. In the broken slave ordinance of P. Hibeh 29 *recto*, which must be dated at a time close to that of PER 24,552 and deals with registration of slaves in Egypt for some fiscal purpose, the punishment for failure to conform is the customary *poena duplex*, with the addition of confiscation of the slave. In the Rainer *prostagma*¹⁵ the fine imposed, in addition to confiscation of the slave by the Crown, is sixty minas for each slave involved. This amounts to twenty times the current price of an adult slave in that period, as particularly known to us from the Zenon documents.¹⁶ Upon this provision there follows a promise of reward to an informer, the amount of which is lost. Such a reward appears also in P. Hibeh 29, with a specific arrangement for a slave informer. This last provision, reward for a slave who may give information against anyone who breaks the decree, is absent from PER Inv. 24,552.

λερὰ καὶ βασιλικὰ πρόβατα. In P. Strassb. 93, 4 it refers to the draft animals owned by the common people in general.

¹³ See the Rosetta decree, Dittenberger *OG*, I, 90, 12-13 (cf. notes 47, 48) and U. Wilcken, *UPZ*, I, 110, note to line 100 and p. 491, note 3; *BGU*, IV, 1053, col. II, 10-11; VIII, 1816, 22.

¹⁴ Order to an official of 235 B. C., P. Teb. III 701, 80-82: *μέτρησον τοῖς λαοῖς ἐ[ν] Συρ[ίᾳ] κώμη εἰς τὴν σκοληκόβροτον γῆν σπέρμα τὸ γινόμενον ἐκάστωι*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, col. II, 2-5.

¹⁶ Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *RE*, *Supplement*, VI, pp. 935-936.

The next sentence of the Rainer decree is an important one.¹⁷ It reads: "If they (the possessors of the *σώματα* who are to be registered) show that they have bought, as being actual slaves (*οἰκετικά σώματα*), any of the *σώματα* registered and brought in, these are to be given back to them." Liebesny has translated *οἰκετικά σώματα* in this passage as "household slaves."¹⁸ Whereas this translation is rigidly correct from the standpoint of the linguistic derivation of *οἰκετικός*, it is difficult to justify by analogy from the documents of the Hellenistic period. In a will of 126 B. C. published by Grenfell, the *οἰκετικά σώματα* mentioned do happen, indeed, to be women and therefore might well, in practise, be household slaves. But the meaning, even there, is merely the general one of "slaves" because there would be no occasion in the will to indicate the economic use of the four slaves mentioned.¹⁹ *IG*, XII², 653, 25, an inscription from Syros datable about the middle of the first century B. C., is even more decisive. The *οἰκετικά σώματα* are there, quite clearly, slaves of any sort.


The less rigid and better attested translation of *οἰκετικά σώματα* as "slaves" would eliminate a difficulty which Dr. Liebesny has been forced to meet by his cautious, and legally doubtful, suggestion that purchase of *σώματα ἐλεύθερα*, in good faith, as household slaves would be regarded by the Ptolemaic government as a legitimate reason for granting to the buyers the right of retention in slave status of these persons.²⁰ In such a case the conclusion would be implicit in the terms of the decree that the *σώματα λαϊκά ἐλεύθερα* who had been purchased for other economic services than household work, as, for example, for some handicraft or for agricultural employment, could *not* be retained as slaves. No decision of this character as to slave or free status is known to me from antiquity which is based upon the economic employment of the slave labor involved; and no adequate legal or logical reason is apparent in this instance for such a distinction. Differences of treatment of slaves on the

¹⁷ PER 24,552, 7-9.

¹⁸ *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 263.

¹⁹ P. Grenf. I 21, 6. Also in the petition P. Lond. II 401, 9, pp. 13-14, dated 116-111 B. C., the *οἰκετικῶν σωμάτων* must be understood as meaning merely "slaves."

²⁰ *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 273.



basis of national origin do, indeed, occur in ancient slave legislation. So, for example, in Roman Egypt houseborn slaves (*oikoyevēis*) could not be sold for export from the country. The reasons for this lay in the assumption of Egyptian nationality of the homeborn slave, at least on the paternal side, and in the application to this class of slaves of the principle of enforced connection with the place of nativity (*ἰδία*) which was enforced also for the Egyptian subjects of free birth.²¹

The explanation of the fact that certain persons who were actual slaves (*ὄντα οἰκετικά* in PER Inv. 24,552, 7-9) might be brought in and listed under an order for registration which was to apply only to the "free persons" in servitude, seems to me to lie in the still disorganized conditions which must be assumed as existing in Syria-Phoenicia. A general order for registration of all slaves might well have left cases of doubtful status which had not been registered. In fear of the enormous fine imposed in the present *prostagma* all such doubtful cases would now be brought in. If the owners could now bring legal proof that the *σώματα* brought before the officials were actual slaves (*ὄντα οἰκετικά*), these would be restored to them after the registration procedure had been carried out.

This decision leads to a different explanation of the entire document from any of the possibilities suggested by Liebesny. The ordinance upon the registration of slaves in Egypt contained in P. Hibeh 29 *recto*, just as in the case of PER Inv. 24,552,²² does not offer the possibility of an exact or provable date. The chronological relation of the two cannot, therefore, be fixed with certainty; but we may assume that the general datings assigned to the two documents by the editors are valid and that they both come from the middle of the reign of Philadelphus. It is highly probable that an ordinance demanding registration of slaves in Egypt would precede, rather than follow, any similar ordinance applying to the province of Syria-Phoenicia. It seems to me to be implicit in PER Inv. 24,552

²¹ See the *Gnomon of the Idios Logos*, § 67, in *BGU*, V, 1, pp. 27-28, and Graf Uxkull-Gyllenband's commentary, *BGU*, V, 2, pp. 66-68.

²² PER 24,552, col. I, 10 and 22 is dated under a regnal year 25, presumably year 25 of Philadelphus, but the possibility of assigning it to year 25 of Ptolemy III is present. See Liebesny, *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 264.

that a general order for slave registrations had previously been promulgated for Syria-Phoenicia, similar to that for Egypt in P. Hibeh 29 and subsequent to it in time. The suggestion, therefore, presents itself that in Syria-Phoenicia a considerable number of people had failed to observe a general decree upon registering slaves in the belief that they had bought, or were otherwise holding in their service, persons of the class who were *not* slaves but technically free (ἐλεύθερα), and for this reason not literally subject to the order for registration. The Ptolemaic government, therefore, passed the decree PER Inv. 24,552 as a supplement to the previous general regulation; and in this supplementary *prostagma* it demanded the registration of all persons of this indeterminate class of free persons of the λαϊκὰ who were held in bondage. The procedure of registration obviously offered the opportunity of determining the actual status of every person thus registered, as to whether he or she were, actually, a σῶμα οἰκετικόν or a σῶμα ἐλεύθερον. If, upon examination, any σῶμα proved to be a slave, he would be returned to the owner. A provision which appears near the end of the second decree of PER Inv. 24,552, in lines 16-18, shows that the ultimate object of the requirement of registration of the σώματα ἐλεύθερα was to do away with the legal and social anomaly of this class of "free persons" held in bondage; καὶ εἰς [τὸ] λοιπ[ὸν] δὲ μηδενὶ ἐξέστω ἀγοράζε[ιν] μηδὲ [ὑ]ποτί[θε]σθαι σώματα λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα παρευρέσει μηδ[ε]μίαι.

The conclusion that the Rainer *prostagma* was passed in an effort to obtain a list of all the σώματα ἐλεύθερα and that it was largely concerned with a problem of status is considerably strengthened by the two following sentences of the decree requiring declaration of the σώματα ἐλεύθερα. The first of these states that, if a person who had been sold through the agency of the state's auctioning system should assert that he was free, the right of ownership resting in the purchaser should not be impaired by this assertion.²³ Legally, this implies that the question of slave status had been settled by the fact that the person had been sold through action of the sovereign state. The second of these two provisions excludes from the operation of the demand for registration those women of the class of ἐλεύθερα

²³ PER Inv. 24,552, col. II, 10-12.

λαικά who were living in loose family relations with soldiers and *catoeci*: "Of soldiers in active service and others who hold catoecic lands in Syria and Phoenicia as many as are living with women of the λαικά (of the peasant and lower handicraft classes) whom they have taken up with,²⁴ let them not register (these)." Liebesny's interpretation of the exclusion of these women from the registration requirement is that the state was attempting to further the formation of such loose alliances by granting freedom from some tax which would fall upon them if they were registered as slaves.²⁵ So far as we know, the only slave tax which could fall upon them would be the sale tax and a handicraft license in case they were engaged in some form of handicraft production such as weaving.²⁶ The sale tax seems to be precluded by the entire situation and by the use of the verb ἀνελήφασιν,²⁷ which is in marked contrast with the ideas of purchase, seizure or other form of possession used in speaking of the λαικά ἐλεύθερα, who were regarded by the state as being in actual, though not legally recognized, servitude.²⁸ Liebesny's error lies in his apparent assumption that the required registration of slaves was necessarily fiscal in purpose and in his feeling that the ultimate motivation of the *prostagma* lay in some desire to ameliorate the abuses of the slave trade.²⁹

After this sentence which provides that the women called λαικά who are living in quasi-marital relations with soldiers need *not* be listed, the *prostagma* proceeds to establish, for the future, that the σώματα λαικά ἐλεύθερα are not to be subject, under

²⁴ Col. II, 12-15: ὅσοι συνοικοῦσι γυναῖξι λαικαῖς ὡς ἀνελήφασιν.

²⁵ *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 274. Wilcken gives his support to Liebesny's explanation of this passage, to the effect that the Egyptian state was thereby encouraging the formation of such households between soldiers and *catoeci* and the native women. See *Arch. f. Pap.*, XII, p. 223. Although the legislation might result in encouraging such loose unions, I cannot regard this as a motive of the government in passing the decree.

²⁶ As women they would not pay the *syntaxis*, the Ptolemaic form of the poll tax, so far as is known. See Wilcken, *Papyruskunde*, 171; *Chrestomathie*, no. 66.

²⁷ PER Inv. 24,552, col. II, 15.

²⁸ Col. I, 34, 35: ἀγοράκασιν, ἐξενεθήκασιν, κατεσχέκασιν, κέκτηνται. For the colorless and non-technical use of ἀναλαμβάνειν compare P. Cairo Zenon I, 59019, 8 and Guéraud, *ENTÉTÉLIS*, 60, 9.

²⁹ Implied, if I do not misunderstand him, in *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 272.

any pretext, to purchase or acquirement by mortgage through the action of private individuals.³⁰ In case of contravention of this legal prohibition, both seller and buyer are to be punished, and delators informing against those who may have broken the law are to receive a fixed reward for the information furnished. The right of the State to attach the persons of these σώματα λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα and to sell them into slavery is, however, specifically maintained.³¹ For the expression of this right and the details of its procedure, the *prostagma* refers to a "law upon lease."³² Liebesny, both in his translation and in his interpretation, understands this νόμος ἐπὶ τῆς μισθώσεως to be the law establishing the terms of the tax-collection privilege, allowing for the possibility also that the law may have included other lease relations of the state.³³ One observation which weighs heavily against this conclusion is that the technical expression for a law dealing with the sale of taxes would be ὁ νόμος ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν μεμισθωμένων τὰς κώμας, as it is clearly expressed in the first *prostagma* of the Rainer papyrus, upon the registration of cattle.³⁴ It appears rather that the "law upon lease" here mentioned must necessarily be one which had a direct relation to the λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα in Syria-Phoenicia, with whom alone the entire *prostagma* is concerned. It is much more likely that the νόμος ἐπὶ τῆς μισθώσεως was a Ptolemaic law upon lease of the royal domains in Syria-Phoenicia, which had been passed at a time previous to the promulgation of this decree; and that in one of its sections it fixed concretely the circumstances under which peasant renters of the *Ge Basilike* might be subject to arrest, to attachment upon the person, and eventual sale into slavery for failure to fulfill their contractual obligations toward the state. We may assume that such failure would customarily be fiscal in character.

The editor of PER Inv. 24,552 gr. has followed his analysis of the two *prostigmata* with a discussion of the bearing of the decree upon the much discussed problems of attachment upon

³⁰ Col. II, 16-18.

³¹ Col. II, 18-22.

³² Col. II, 21: ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς μισθώσεως.

³³ *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 281.

³⁴ Col. I, 18-19. Cf. P. Rev. 54, 11-12: ἕκαστος τῶν μεμισθωμένων τὴν κώμην.

the person and subsequent enslavement for private debts in Ptolemaic Egypt. Deeply involved in this discussion are the reading and explanation of lines 23-26 of P. Columbia Inv. 480, a single section of a general *diagramma* upon slaves. In the preserved section of the Columbia document the amount and the incidence of the sale tax upon slaves is fixed in accordance with differing conditions of sale.⁵⁵ The pertinent passage of the Columbia papyrus is unfortunately incomplete. It reads: τῶν δὲ ὑποχρέων σωμάτων ὅσα ἂν ἐλεύ[θε]ρα ὄντα ἐαυ[τὰ ca. 10 letters] τὸ χρέος πράττονται τὸν δα[ν]είζον[τα τῆς μνᾶς] (δραχμᾶς) (πέντε) (ὀβολὸν) καὶ τὸν δανεζόμε[νο]ν κ.τ.λ. My conviction, expressed in the original publication of P. Col. Inv. 480, was that this passage settled the problem regarding the possibility of enslavement of free persons for debts incurred under contracts of loan between private individuals. Enslavement under such conditions, I thought, was possible either through the process of self-sale into slavery (arrangement by compliance of the debtor) or by foreclosure upon the person of a debtor and eventual enslavement through legal action.⁵⁶ This conclusion was based upon the observation that foreclosures upon actual slaves, that is upon slaves who were owned by unsuccessful litigants, and enslavement of free persons because of unpaid obligations to the state had been treated in the preceding paragraphs of the ordinance.⁵⁷ Serious objections against this interpretation were first voiced by Paul Koschaker, who presented the argument that no convincing proof had appeared, in the wider range of application of Hellenistic law, for self-sale into slavery or for any application of the law of debt in private cases which led to the total extinction of the legal personality of the

⁵⁵ See Liebesny's discussion, *Aegyptus*, XVI, pp. 276-278. P. Columbia Inv. 480 was published by Westermann, *Upon Slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt*. For its date, ca. 198-197 B. C., see *ibid.*, p. 1 and note 3, pp. 22-26. No serious objection to the dating has been raised. This was determined by the character of the writing and by the appearance in the *diagramma* of one Diceaearchus, whom I identified with the Aetolian mercenary of that name mentioned by Diodorus, XXVIII, 1 and Polybius, XVIII, 7-8 and 54.

⁵⁶ P. Columbia Inv. 480, ll. 24-26 and 27-28 and the discussion in Westermann, *Upon Slavery*, pp. 20-22.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, ll. 15-19, sales by the *senikon praktor*; ll. 19-22, sales because of debts to the crown, τῶν δὲ πρὸς βασιλικὰ πωλουμένων.

debtor in enslavement.³⁸ The failure of P. Col. Inv. 480, 23-26 to convince him was based upon several grammatical and textual doubts which deserve every consideration when voiced by a student of ancient law of Koschaker's keenness, care, and thorough scholarship. The first of these was his hesitation in accepting the reading of ἐλεύ[θε]ρα ὄντα on the basis of the photograph which appeared in the monograph *Upon Slavery*. The second was his doubt that the plural ὑποχρέων σωμάτων ὅσα ἂν ἐλεύ[θε]ρα ὄντα could be taken up in the following line by "the borrower," τὸν δα[ν]ειζόμε[νο]ν, in the singular, referring to these same persons. Koschaker was thus constrained to explain the passage in some other way. He offered the suggestion that the "debtor slaves" were actual slaves which had been given in mortgage by their owners for debts incurred by those owners.

Repeated reading of this passage of P. Col. 480 confirms the correctness of the text as originally presented, with one slight change.³⁹ ἐλεύ[θε]ρα must stand as read; and it is now further assured by the appearance of the σώματα λαϊκὰ ἐλεύθερα of PER Inv. 24,552 gr., col. II 17—legally "free" persons in a condition of slavery. Koschaker's objection to ὑπόχρεα σώματα—τὸν δανειζόμενον seems to me to fall away with the observation that in the first paragraph of P. Col. Inv. 480, in referring to plural sales (τῶν σωμάτων ὧν ἂν αἱ ὀναί lines 3-4), the taxes are collected from the vendor and the purchaser, and the official document refers to each of them in the singular (τοῦ ἀποδομένου line 6; and τοῦ ἀγοράσαντος line 8).

In a recent article Ernst Schönbauer has, in the main, adopted Koschaker's objections to my original explanation of the ὑπόχρεα σώματα ὅσα ἂν ἐλεύθερα of P. Col. Inv. 480, that they were free persons enslaved through debt, accepting without hesitation, however, the reading ἐλεύ[θε]ρα ὄντα.⁴⁰ He has collected a number of examples of the use of ἐλεύθερα in the literature and inscriptions of the classic and Hellenistic periods where it has

³⁸ Koschaker, "Über einige griechische Rechtsurkunden aus den östlichen Randgebieten des Hellenismus," in *Abh. Sächs. Akademie*, ph.-hist. Kl., XLII (1931), pp. 58-59.

³⁹ I had dotted the final *nu* of δανειζόμε[νο]ν in the original edition. I now read it with certainty.

⁴⁰ *Arch. f. Pap.*, X, pp. 182-184, particularly p. 184, note 3.

the meaning of properties "free from incumbrance," and suggests this meaning for the word in P. Col. Inv. 480, 23; but he brings forward no instance of its use in this sense with reference to slaves. So far as I know, *ἐλεύθερος* with respect to human beings, as opposed to inanimate possessions, is used only in its absolute significance of "free in status," as opposed to servile in status. In PER Inv. 24,552 gr. col. II 17 (*μηδὲ [ἵ]ποσι[θε]σθαι σόματα λαυὰ ἐλεύθερα*) it cannot possibly mean slaves "free from incumbrance" because unencumbered slave properties were in any case subject to mortgage; and legislation forbidding their use as pledges for debt obligations would be senseless.⁴¹ Schönbauer in his "Rechtshistorische Urkundenstudien," *Archiv*, X, 183 has added to his observations upon P. Col. Inv. 480, 23 the statement that, in the sense of the *status libertatis*, "free slaves" never existed. "Never" is a long word. What, for example, was the status of the slave in Cuba in former days, called a *coortado* (Latin *coortatus*), who had almost completely redeemed himself from slavery, but not entirely, by partial payments to his master over a long period of time? Alexander Humboldt⁴² is authority for the information that many of them bought their freedom except for a nominal sum, so that they might be five-sixths or eleven-twelfths free, for they preferred to pay a rent to their masters for the rest of their lives upon the sum remaining due rather than be free, no matter how much wealth they might acquire. Were these men free or slave, or "free

⁴¹ The absolute meaning of *ἐλεύθερος* as "free," when applied to persons, is equally clear in an unpublished *ἐπρετις* from the Zenon group in the Columbia Library collection (P. Col. Inv. 272) which deals with a case of debt and the arrest and detention by private action of a boy, son of the debtor. In the demand for punishment the father of the boy asks that the accused meet with fitting penalty because he had held in restraint, by his own action, a boy who was free (*ἐλεύθερος*, that is, not a slave property). For the absolute meaning of *ἐλεύθερος* as contrasted with *δούλος* see also the edict of Paullus Fabius Persicus published by J. Keil, *Jahresh. des oesterr. arch. Instituts*, XXIII (1926), pp. 282 f. *ἔσοι ὄντες ἐλεύθεροι δούλων δημοσίων ὑπηρεσίαν παρέχοντα*. It is now best available in the dissertation of Fr. Karl Dörner, *Der Erlass des Statthalters von Asia Paullus Fabius Persicus* (Greifswald, 1935), VI, 13-14, p. 38.

⁴² Alexander Humboldt, *The Island of Ouba*, translated from the Spanish by J. S. Thrasher (N. Y., 1856), p. 211, note.

men" slaves? In the ὑποχρέων σωμάτων ὅσα ἀν ἐλεύθερα ὄντα of P. Col. Inv. 480 and in the *prostagma*.PER Inv. 24,552 we are faced with a similar anomaly such as may readily arise in the broad area which exists between complete freedom and complete slavery. The Hellenistic mind certainly did recognize the existence of persons in slavery whom it could designate as "free."⁴³

It is quite true that within the framework of Roman classic law this anomalous status could not exist. Nor would the phraseology be employed which would give it legal recognition.⁴⁴ It was this rigidity of the concept, attained by a corresponding elasticity of definition, which determined the attitude of the classic jurists that the act of manumission by one of his owners of a part of a slave who was held in plural ownership was without effect. The attempt to free a part of the slave left the slave, the object of this beneficence, still a slave.⁴⁵ The papyri have

⁴³ E. H. Kase in his brief notice of Liebesny's article in *Classical Weekly*, XXX (1937), p. 288 escapes the difficulty in PER 24,552 by regarding the σώματα λαϊκά ἐλεύθερα as slaves who were born free. This understanding of ἐλεύθερα is impossible in the Rainer papyrus as shown by the prohibition in its col. II, 16-17 against future sale or hypothecation of these σώματα. The source of enslavement, whether it be birth, seizure in war or peace or any other, so far as known to me, cannot in any way affect the right of the slave owner to dispose of his slave as property.

⁴⁴ See V. Arangio-Ruiz, *Personae e Famiglia nel Diritto dei Papiri* (1930), p. 1.

I have had the privilege of discussing the legal aspects of the problems raised in this paper with Professor Ernst Levy. While assuming all responsibility for the convictions expressed, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude his constant help.

To this extent I would qualify the statement made above. The Roman law did, indeed, recognize the existence of persons who had suffered diminution of full freedom for a longer or shorter time—*personae in mancipio, addicti, iudicati, nexi* etc. Cf. *Twelve Tables*, III, 4, *si volet suo vitio*, Bruns-Gradenwitz, p. 21. See the text and translation in Tenney Frank, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, I, p. 14. But it did not recognize a legal position in which a person could be at the same time part-free and part-slave, or free one day and slave the next. See L. Wenger, "Röm. oder orientalisches Rechtsgut," in *Acta Congressus Iuridici Internationalis Romae*, I, p. 222, with citations of the present literature upon the subject.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 205. The development in later Roman law was that partial manumission must lead to full manumission and to fixed regulations

shown, however, that under the Greco-Egyptian law partial manumission actually did take place and that it was legally effective respecting that portion of the slave which had been freed.⁴⁶ A concept which, under the system of strictly logical definitions set up by Roman jurisprudence, represented an impossible contradiction was, therefore, fully acceptable to the Hellenistic Greek mind. This is not strange when one considers that the legislative draftsmen of the Hellenistic period were unhabituated to the finenesses of legal perception which distinguished the Roman jurists and untutored in their processes of strict legal definition and legal logic. It is in these fields that the qualities of the Roman mind most brilliantly and distinctively expressed themselves.

In the continuation of his article Liebesny⁴⁷ discusses, at some length and with knowledge of the pertinent literature, the relations of the Rainer *prostagma* upon the slaves to the problems of execution upon the person and of self-sale into slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt. His conclusions are:

1. For the future it was not to be permitted that persons of the class of *σώματα λαϊκά ἐλεύθερα* in Syria-Phoenicia should be subject to attachment upon their persons and to eventual sale for debt, except through government action. This conclusion is correct. But his definition of the *σώματα λαϊκά* as the "*Einheimischen*,"⁴⁸ and therefore his range of application of the annulment of the right of foreclosure upon the person by private action is much too inclusive.

2. The government's sovereign right of personal execution was defined in the "law upon lease" referred to in the *prostagma*.⁴⁹ Again my objection to Liebesny's interpretation

concerning the value of the slave remainder. Cf. Wenger, *ibid.*, pp. 210, 214 ff. The post-classical legal attitude upon this point might well have been influenced to some extent by the situation in the older Roman law as it now is presented to us in the new Gaius fragment published in PSI XI 1182 B 38-42.

⁴⁶ P. Oxy. IV 722, 716; the Edmonstone papyrus reprinted in P. Oxy. IV, p. 202 f.; and PSI V 452. All are of the Roman period. The first three are reproduced by Mitteis, *Chrestomathie*, nos. 358, 360, 361.

⁴⁷ *Aegyptus*, XVI, pp. 275-288.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 278, 281.


⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282. The reference to the νόμος ἐπὶ τῆς μισθώσεως, col. II, 18-22 reads πλὴν τῶν ----- ἐν προσβολῇ διδ[ο]μένων ὧν ἡ πράξις καθήκει

is based upon the extent which he gives to the restriction of the state's right in this respect. The reference to the νόμος ἐπὶ τῆς μισθώσεως states only that execution upon the person by the Ptolemaic government was both permissible and to be expected in certain cases and that its terms were fixed in "the law upon lease."

The information derived from PER Inv. 24,552 upon self-sale into slavery, attachment of a debtor's person, and his eventual reduction to slave status is, in fact, not great in amount or decisive. It does furnish the needed confirmation of the reading ἐλεύθερα in P. Columbia Inv. 480, 23-24 and of the conclusion obtained from that reading, valid for Egypt, that there were debtors of such status that the fiscal department of the state regarded them as slaves. Yet they could be designated as "free." The loss of one or more columns at the beginning of the Rainer decrees leaves open to conjecture the problem as to how these σώματα λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα in Syria-Phoenicia had originally been reduced to slavery. Several observations may safely be made regarding them. Certainly not all, and probably only a relatively small number, of these cases of enslavement of the λαικὰ σώματα in the Syro-Phoenician population had resulted from forced sale by the state in consequence of obligations toward it which were unfulfilled. Second, those of the class of λαικὰ σώματα who were already in slavery through the state's power of personal execution were to remain in that status. Third, the state's right of enslavement of persons who were of free status was to remain unimpaired, even in the case of the λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα. This sovereign power of the Ptolemaic state to enslave the free for non-fulfillment of obligations toward it is not seriously questioned by recent scholarship.⁵⁰

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος γίνεσθαι καθότι ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς μισθώσεως γέγραπται.

⁵⁰ In the Jewish propagandist narrative, Pseudo-Aristeas, *ad Philocratem*, § 25, in the forged *protagma* of Philadelphus, this right of the state is assumed to be valid, where disobedience of the royal decree was to be punished by assignment of the guilty person to the informer as his slave. In the *Sitzungsber. Heid. Akad.*, ph.-hist. Kl., V (1914), in Plaumann's publication of P. Grad. 1, p. 15, Wilcken pointed out the keen knowledge of Ptolemaic administrative procedure displayed in the composition of this decree.



More decisive information upon the question of enslavement for debts is furnished by an *enteuxis* from the Zenon Archive, the unpublished Columbia papyrus Inv. 272 of 245 B. C., already mentioned in a previous note. It adds one point to the increasing data which enforce the conclusion that enslavement as a consequence of private indebtedness was actually in vogue in Egypt and legally permissible. The case presented in the complaint is as follows. A woman named Simon had borrowed money from one Nikon at the exorbitant rate of 6% per month.⁵¹ When she was unable to pay, in the absence of her husband the creditor, Nikon, had influenced her by threats to go with him to another town, accompanied by her young son; and he had there held them both in detention. The woman had escaped; but the boy, as the *enteuxis* alleges, was still being held as pledge for the debt. The father of the boy based his demand for punishment of the accused creditor upon two counts. The first was that the interest demanded was illegal. The second was that the creditor had seized and was still holding a free boy *by his own action*: δέομαι οὖν σου, βασιλεῦ, ----- τύχων Νίκωνα τῆς προσηκούσης τιμωρίας περί τε τῶν τόκων ὧν συγγέγραπται παρὰ τὸ διάγραμμα καὶ ὅτι τὸν ἐλεύθερον εἰρξας ἔχει δι' αὐτοῦ.⁵² Such is the formulation of the charge against Nikon, the creditor. In connection with it one must consider a previous statement of the complainant to the effect that Nikon had frightened the woman, Simon, into following him voluntarily into arrest and detention, on his own authority, by the threat that in case she did not go with him he would turn her over to the *praktor*: τὴν γυναῖκά μου ἔφη παραδώσειν τῷ πράκτορι πρὸς τὸ δάνειον ἐὰν μὴ ἔκουσα ἀκολουθῇ αὐτῷ.⁵³

One definite fact emerges from the second passage of P. Col. Inv. 272. This is that a threat of arrest by the *praktor*, i. e. execution upon the person, could be made and, in this case, with complete success, in a case of private debt. The implication is evident that arrest for private debt, if conducted by the regular authorities, was legally recognized. The plea for punishment

⁵¹ This is the case previously known from two depositions published by C. C. Edgar, *P. Cairo Zenon* III 59347 and P. Edgar 56 in *Annales du Service des Antiquités de l'Égypte*, XX, p. 183.

⁵² P. Columbia Inv. 272, 13-16.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

of Nikon, the creditor, in the first quotation above, establishes a second fact—that the *arrest and detention of a free person by action of a private person*⁵⁴ was illegal and punishable. The right of procedure, in other words, was reserved for the government agencies alone.

The legal procedure which Nikon threatened to set in motion against the debtor is exactly that established by von Woess in his study of the right of asylum in Egypt. The debtor was handed over to the *praktor* and placed under detention by him.⁵⁵ The threat of Nikon in the Columbia document implies that the competence of the creditor ceased when he had delivered the person of the debtor to the *praktor*. P. Mich. Inv. 3106 shows that the obligation for appearance of a defendant might equally rest upon his surety, if an ἑγγυος were involved in the case, and that the ἑγγυος was absolved from further responsibility in this respect when the accused had once been delivered into arrest.⁵⁶

Granting that P. Columbia Inv. 272 does not bring final and incontrovertible proof of eventual enslavement in actions for unpaid private debts, it does add another bit to the cumulative evidence which warrants the stand taken by Hans Lewald,⁵⁷ Friedr. von Woess, Leopold Wenger, Rafael Taubenschlag, Friedrich Oertel, and myself (against the view of Paul Koschaker, Ernst Schönbauer, and now of Liebesny and Mlle. Claire Préaux) that enslavement for private debt and self-sale into slavery were legally permitted and followed an established procedure in Ptolemaic Egypt.⁵⁸ This conclusion supplies the back-

⁵⁴ The emphatic position of δι' αὐτοῦ in the first quotation above is noteworthy. The defendant was punishable because both the arrest and detention of the free boy had occurred "on his own authority."

⁵⁵ Von Woess, *Asylwesen Aegyptens* (1923), p. 83.

⁵⁶ Published by C. C. Edgar in *JEA*, XIV (1928), pp. 291-293.

⁵⁷ For a complete discussion of the pertinent documents see Lewald, *Zur Personalezekution im Recht der Papyri*, pp. 30-44. The accusation against the creditor Nikon in P. Col. Inv. 272 settles, at least for the early Ptolemaic period, the question raised by Lewald, p. 37 regarding the possibility of arrest and detention by private agency. The Columbia papyrus proves the illegality of that procedure.

⁵⁸ Lewald, *loc. cit.*; von Woess, *Asylwesen*, pp. 82-85 and *Ztschr. Sav.-Stift.*, LI (1931), p. 426; Wenger, *Arch. f. Pap.*, X, p. 134; Taubenschlag, *Ztschr. Sav.-Stift.*, L (1930), p. 147 and *Atti del IV Congr. Intern. di*

ground and historical setting, in the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, for the position long since taken by Mommsen,⁵⁹ and supported by Ludwig Mitteis,⁶⁰ in respect to peregrine law (as opposed to the Roman law), that it permitted both surrender of one's own freedom and sale of one's children into slavery.

In a supplement to his article⁶¹ Liebesny has accepted a suggestion made by Rostovtzeff to the effect that P. Cairo Zenon I 59093, 10-16 of 257 B. C. is to be explained on the basis of the requirement for registration of the free lower-class population who have been enslaved, as it now appears in PER Inv. 24,552. There is nothing to warrant this except that the Zenon letter, written by Heraclitus to Zenon, comes from the Phoenician coast and is close in point of time to the preserved decrees in the Rainer papyrus. Heraclitus complained to Zenon in his letter that a certain Menecles had brought some slaves and merchandise from Gaza to Tyre, turning these goods over at Tyre, presumably to an agent of Zenon, without announcing to the tax collectors the fact of entrance of the goods and without showing an export permit. For that reason the tax collectors had confiscated the slaves. The reasons for not attempting to explain the Zenon letter in terms of the registration demand for the σώματα λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα of the Rainer papyrus are: that the *apographe* demanded in the decree published by Liebesny was not fiscal in purpose, and the tax concessionaires were, therefore, not involved as they were in the matter at Tyre; that other goods (*φορτία*) as well as slaves are involved in the Zenon letter, which would not be the case if their non-registration had had

Papirologia (Supplementi ad "Aegyptus," Serie Scient., 5, 1936, p. 262); Westermann, *Upon Slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt* (1929), pp. 48-54; Arangio-Ruiz, *Persone e Famiglia nel Diritto dei Papiri*, p. 4 ff.; Friedrich Oertel in *Gnomon*, VIII (1932), p. 655. For the opposing view—that enslavement for private obligations is still unproven—see Koschaker, "Über einige griechische Rechtsurkunden," *Abh. Sächs. Akad., phil.-hist. Kl.*, XLII (1931), pp. 58-61; Schönbauer, *Aroh. f. Pap.*, X (1932), pp. 182-185; and Claire Préaux in *Chronique d'Égypte*, no. 24 (1937), pp. 277-278. F. de Zulueta in *JEA*, XIX (1933), p. 85 seems to follow the conclusion of Koschaker and Schönbauer.

⁵⁹ Th. Mommsen, *Festgabe für Georg Beseler* (Berlin 1885), pp. 264 ff. (= Mommsen, *Juristische Schriften*, III, pp. 11 ff.).

⁶⁰ Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, pp. 358-361.

⁶¹ *Aegyptus*, XVI, pp. 289-291.

anything to do with the type of slaves mentioned in the decret of 261 B. C.; and, finally, that failure to register, under the provisions of the Rainer *prostagma*, entailed an enormous fine as well as confiscation. No threat of a fine is mentioned in the letter of Heraclitus to Zenon. Although the particular contravention of the law which caused the trouble reported in the Zenon letter is not entirely clear, Edgar's explanation is still valid.

More fortunate is Liebesny's brief suggestion⁶² that the Rainer decree upon the registration of slaves in Syria-Phoenicia has a direct relation to a decree upon the freeing of all the Hebrew slaves in Egypt which was supposedly promulgated by Ptolemy II at the time of the translation of the Septuagint. The so-called "letter" of Aristeeas in which this alleged decree appears⁶³ is a highly artificial narrative (*διήγησις*),⁶⁴ purporting to tell of the causes which led to the sending of an embassy to Jerusalem by Philadelphus for the purpose of bringing to Egypt the seventy-two Hebrew scholars who made the translation into Greek. The writer of the narrative, who calls himself Aristeeas, asserts that he was a member of the embassy to Jerusalem. He further tells of the daily conversations at table of the Jewish scholars with the King; of the admiration aroused in King Ptolemy II by his newly attained knowledge of the Hebrew law; of the favorable reception accorded the translation by the Jewish community of Alexandria; and of the return home of the translators laden with gifts from Ptolemy Philadelphus. For over three centuries there has been general acceptance of the view that the entire story is fictitious in so far as the historicity of the embassy is concerned, that the documents used in the narrative are forged, and that the alleged conversations are entirely imaginary.⁶⁵ Despite the obviously artificial character

⁶² *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 290.

⁶³ See the edition of P. Wendland, *Aristeeas ad Philocratem Epistula* (1900), §§ 22-25. See also the edition of H. G. Meecham, *The Letter of Aristeeas* (1935), with its careful parallels between the language of the Septuagint and that of the *koine*. The decree appears again in a variant version in Josephus, *Antiquities*, XII, 28-31.

⁶⁴ Elias Bickermann, "Zur Datierung des Pseudo-Aristeeas" in *Ztsch. für die NT Wissenschaft*, XXIX (1930), pp. 280-298.

⁶⁵ For an acute analysis of the entire narrative see Bickermann's article just referred to. For the errors which disprove the statement of the author that he was a contemporary of Ptolemy Philadelphus and

of the entire story, its author was certainly well versed in the mental attitudes and characteristics of the Hellenistic period and particularly familiar with official life and its procedures in Ptolemaic Egypt.⁶⁶

It is the alleged decree of Philadelphus,⁶⁷ ordering that the Jewish slaves in Egypt be bought at state expense and set at liberty, which here engages our attention. The publication of PER Inv. 24,552 brings us measurably closer to the actual model after which the forged *protagma* of Pseudo-Aristeas was freely fashioned, if we may still regard it as forged. The striking likenesses between the two, in content and expression, are here tabulated:

PER Inv. 24,552	Ps.-Aristeas 22-25
I, 33: εἴ τινας τῶν κατὰ Συρίαν καὶ Φοι[νίκην] ἀγοράκασιν.	§ 22: ὅσοι ----- εἰς τοὺς κατὰ Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην τόπους ἐπελθόντες.
I, 37—II 1: ἀπογραφέσθωσαν] πρὸ[s τὸν οἶκον] ὅμον --- καθέστηκότα.	§ 24: ἀπογραφὰς ----- ποιέσθαι πρὸς τοὺς καθεσταμένους περὶ τούτων.
II, 1-2: ἀφ' ἧς ἡμέρα[s] τὸ πρόσταγμα ἐκτεθῇ ἐν ἡμέραις κ.	§ 24: ἐν ἡμέραις τρισίν, ἀφ' ἧς ἡμέρας ἐκκείται τὸ πρόσταγμα.
II, 3 and 8: ἡ μὴ ἀναγάγῃ. --- τῷ[v] ----- ἀναχθέντω[v] ἐ]πιδεικνύωσιν.	§ 24: καταδεκνύντας εὐθὺ καὶ τὰ σώματα.
II, 7 and 9: ἐὰν δέ τινα τ[ῶν] σωμάτων ----- ὄντα οἰκε- τικά.	§ 24: ὅσα τῶν Ἰουδαϊκῶν ἐστι σωμάτων ἐν οἰκεταῖς.
II, 6: τῷ δὲ μὲνύσαντι δοθη- σόντα[ι τ]οῦ σώματος.	§ 25: τὸν δὲ βουλόμενον προσ- αγγέλλειν.

himself took part in the action, see Bickermann, *op. cit.*, p. 281 and note 3. Wilhelm Schubart, *Aroh. f. Pap.*, XII (1936), pp. 1-36, has subjected the Pseudo-Aristeas narration to a thorough analysis from the point of view of its bearing upon Hellenistic theory regarding the attributes of the Ideal King and his relation to his subjects.

⁶⁶ Schubart, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Meecham, *Letter of Aristeas*, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Pseudo-Aristeas, §§ 22-25. Wilcken, in *Philologus*, LIII (1894), pp. 111-112 called attention to the author's knowledge, displayed in §§ 297-298, of the daily memoranda (*hypomnematismoi*) of the King's utter-

The outstanding likenesses of content of the decree embodied in Pseudo-Aristeas, which ordered the mass emancipation of Jewish slaves in Egypt, with the actual one are these: the demand for registration, the requirement of presentation of the slaves before the officials in charge, the punishment for disobedience of the decree, and the reward for informers. These similarities might readily be explained as unavoidable coincidences forced upon the author of Pseudo-Aristeas in manufacturing his document upon the basis of a general knowledge of Ptolemaic decrees of like content. Three particular points, however, lend great plausibility to the theory of a direct borrowing.

At the beginning of the two decrees appear the phrases τῶν κατὰ Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην and εἰς τοὺς κατὰ Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην τόπους. "Syria" alone, or "Syria and Phoenicia" were the official terms used in the middle of the third century B. C. for the Ptolemaic possessions in lower Western Asia, including Palestine.⁶⁸ Elsewhere than in his manufactured *protagma*, when writing upon his own, Pseudo-Aristeas calls this territory τὰ κατὰ κοίλην Συρίαν ἅπαντα,⁶⁹ or he speaks of the homeland of the Jewish captive slaves as ἡ τῶν Ἰουδαίων χώρα.⁷⁰ So far as I know, the territorial phrase κοίλη Συρία does not appear in the Greek

ances at official functions and at banquets and his claim, in § 300, that he had consulted these. In his letter to G. Plauemann, *Sitzb. Heid. Akad.*, ph.-hist. Kl., V (1914), no. 15, pp. 12-13 (cf. *Arch. f. Pap.*, VI (1920), pp. 315, 414) Wileken pointed out resemblances in details between the alleged decree in Pseudo-Aristeas and the actual *protagma* regarding a tax on slaves, P. Gradenwitz 1. My own view is that the tax in P. Grad. 1 was one on slave transfers: Westermann, *Upon Slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt*, pp. 33-41.

⁶⁸ P. Rev. 54; PSI IV 324; *P. Cairo Zenon* I 59012; *OGI*, 54, 7-8. See Bickermann, *Deutsche Literatur Zeitschr.*, 1927, p. 1768. PER Inv. 24,552 proves that *Συρία καὶ Φοινίκη* was used as an official description of that political unit, contrary to Kahrstedt's statement in his "Syrische Territorien in hellenistischer Zeit," *Abh. Gött. Gesells.* ph.-hist. Kl., XIX (1926-1927), p. 22, note 1. The examples cited by Kahrstedt, p. 20, of the use of "Coele Syria" by Greek writers do not go back beyond Polybius. So also in G. Corradi, *Studi Ellenistici* (Turin, 1929), pp. 48 ff.

⁶⁹ Pseudo-Aristeas, *ad Phil.*, § 12.

⁷⁰ Once in the forged decree, § 22, and again in § 13. This is his usual custom of designating countries. See Bickermann, *Ztsch. für die NT Wissenschaft*, XXX, p. 293.

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sources until the second century B. C. It is the third century designation for the Syrian Ptolemaic possessions, *κατὰ Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην*, used by a second century writer, contrary to his own customary terminology, which most strongly argues for his direct borrowing from the *prostagma* on slaves which has now appeared as PER Inv. 24,552.

One important divergence in content between the two decrees helps to point the close connection between them. In the forged *prostagma* of Pseudo-Aristeas the order for the liberation of the Jewish slaves is stretched so as to include, in addition to those captives brought in through the wars of Ptolemy Soter, all who had been brought in previous to or after that event. There is no similar retroactive and post-active provision in the actual decree dealing with the *σώματα λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα* in Syria and Phoenicia; and there is no place in the Syrian situation for such an order. In fact in the Syrian document the *σώματα λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα* sold by the state were definitely to be retained in their slave condition. It was probably the absence of this provision in the model used by Pseudo-Aristeas in shaping his decree which suggested to the author the idea that it should be inserted at the special instance of King Ptolemy himself⁷¹ after the *pro-stagma* had been drafted and presented to him.⁷² Artistically this addition is turned into a clever literary device for enhancing that "munificence and greatness of soul" which prompted Philadelphus to accede to the original proposal of Aristeas regarding the Jewish slaves and, in this particular, even to widen its scope.

The actual decree, now published in the *editio princeps* by Dr. Liebesny, upon the free persons of the *λαϊκά* in Syria-Phoenicia who were enslaved (PER Inv. 24,552) strictly avoids the use of *δοῦλος* and *ἀνδράποδον* with reference to them, using the less decisive *σῶμα* consistently. And with good reason. For these enslaved persons were also *ἐλεύθερα*. It is to be noted that Pseudo-Aristeas follows the same procedure. The decree speaks only of *τῶν Ἰουδαϊκῶν σωμάτων ἐν οικείαις*,⁷³ although there is no valid reason in this case for avoiding *δοῦλος* or *ἀνδράποδον*. For

⁷¹ Pseudo-Aristeas, *ad Philocratem*, § 22; cf. 20, 26.

⁷² *Ibid.*, § 26: *εἰσδοθέντος δὲ τοῦ προστάγματος ὅπως ἐπαγαγνοσθῇ τῷ βασιλεὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχοντος πλὴν τοῦ: καὶ εἰ τινες προΐσαν ἢ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά εἰσιν εἰσηγμένοι.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, § 24.

these Jews appear in the Pseudo-Aristeas document as war captives;⁷⁴ and by the canons of ancient warfare and international practise they could be sold as slaves if need of money or desire for revenge impelled the conquerors to this decision and political expediency did not counsel against it.

After the arguments above had been written in confirmation of Liebesny's linking of the Rainer slave decree with Pseudo-Aristeas, §§ 22 ff., Ulrich Wilcken's commendatory discussion of Liebesny's article appeared in the *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*.⁷⁵ Emphasizing especially two of the same observations which appear above, Wilcken has come to the surprising conclusion that the decree on the Jewish slaves in Pseudo-Aristeas is a genuine official document.⁷⁶ It is not a light matter to oppose any judgment expressed by Wilcken in the field of Ptolemaic diplomatics. Nevertheless, I cannot follow him in this one.

The problem as to how a copy of a decree of the middle of the third century B. C. would survive and be available to an author such as Pseudo-Aristeas in the second century must be met and explained in either case—whether the decree in the *Epistula ad Philocratem* is genuine or is forged on the analogy of PER 24,552 or some closely similar enactment of the same period. It is not impossible, perhaps not even surprising, that copies of obsolete decrees should be preserved for generations in the archives of private families, especially those of officials, or be available in copies long after their period of application had passed.⁷⁷

The reasons which reinforce my adherence to the decision that the slave emancipation document in Pseudo-Aristeas is forged are the following: (1) The "letter" to Philocrates, as a whole, is an unquestioned and a fairly obvious forgery.⁷⁸ It would be surprising, in view of this fact, if the author should have included a true document without alteration rather than adapt it to the general intent of his pamphlet.⁷⁹ (2) The defense of Ptolemy

⁷⁴ ἀρχιδάλωτοι, §§ 35, 37.

⁷⁵ *Arch. f. Pap.*, XII (1937), pp. 221-223.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

⁷⁷ I have not been able to trace any similar decree to a provenience in a private house. But see the statement of Wilhelm Schubart in *Papyruskunde*, p. 10.

⁷⁸ Elias Bickermann in *Ztsch. für die NT Wissenschaft*, XXIX, p. 281.

⁷⁹ According to Bickermann, *ibid.*, p. 288 the letter of King Phila-

Soter and the generally moralizing and apologetic tone introduced by Pseudo-Aristeas into his alleged decree of Philadelphus⁸⁰ have no place in the pronouncement of a King who was theoretically absolute and responsible to no earthly group or power. (Compare, for example, the actual decree on the enslaved persons in Syria-Phoenicia [PER Inv. 24,552], which is a clear and bare statement of the orders to be obeyed and the procedure to be followed in the registration of the persons concerned, cut to the bare essentials). Whatever motivation was necessary in the Pseudo-Aristeas *prostagma* would correctly have appeared in a preamble as in the fragmentary decree of Euergetes II in P. Teb. III 700, 22-55. (3) Particularly I find it hard to believe that Philadelphus, or any other ruler of his time, would have made the statement, officially or even privately, that it was "contrary to justice"⁸¹ to have enslaved the Jews captured by Ptolemy Soter in a time of war. The principle of sale of war prisoners was too generally accepted as a matter determined by the political and financial expediences of the particular situation, not by considerations of abstract justice. It was not, however, beside the purpose of the Pseudo-Aristeas writer to embellish the picture of Philadelphus as the merciful and ideal King with this extraordinary sentiment. (4) According to the Pseudo-Aristeas decree, the presentation and declaration of the Jewish slaves was to be made before officials established for this purpose *within three days after the decree had been posted*. If this meant that the three days were to be reckoned in each town and village from the time of the official publication in that place, it might, conceivably, be a physical possibility to enforce this three day limit, although it would be very difficult to do so. In the genuine decree dealing with Syria-Phoenicia (PER Inv. 24,552) the time granted for registration of the persons involved is twenty days. In P. Gradenwitz 1, dealing with slaves in Egypt, the registration period is two months for Alexandria, six months in the countryside (*chora*).⁸² The three day period in Pseudo-Aristeas

delphus in Pseudo-Aristeas, § 35 ff. is not genuine. There is no material extant with which the two remaining documents in the Pseudo-Aristeas *epistula* can be compared.

⁸⁰ Section 23 and the first half of section 24. They cut the flow of the decree into two distinct parts.

⁸¹ Pseudo-Aristeas, *ad Phil.*, § 23.

⁸² Published by Gerhard Plaumann in *Sitzb. Heidelberger Akad.*, phil.-

was probably suggested by consideration of the reputed speed which characterized the entire procedure of the translation of the Septuagint. The discussion, formulation, and ratification of the *prostagma* occupied, from beginning to end, only seven days.⁸³ The translation of the Old Testament books was completed in seventy-two days.⁸⁴

(5) Two minor, but significant, points in the decree in Pseudo-Aristeas, §§ 22 ff., further serve to strengthen my disbelief in its genuineness. First, the alleged payment of a fixed rate of twenty drachmas to the owner of every Jewish slave who was freed⁸⁵ has always been a difficult matter to explain. The Ptolemaic King, who was theoretically absolute, had every right to free the slaves by fiat and without compensation to the owners. In the true decree from Syria-Phoenicia there is no hint of any remuneration to the owners of the σώματα λαικά, even if they had purchased these. The second point, and a very suspicious one, is a provision which appears at the very end of the decree. Any person who did not comply with the requirements of the royal order, in case he was informed against and proven guilty, was to become the slave of the *delator*.⁸⁶ Theoretically, an arbitrary and unprecedented punishment and reward of this kind is not outside the realm of possibility for the absolute God-King. But no similar case of compensating a *delator* with ownership of the condemned person is known to me out of the entire range of Greek and Hellenistic legislation. Nor can I find anything simi-

hist. Klasse, V (1914), Abh. 15, and by Hans Lewald in *Raccolta Lombroso* (Milan, 1925), pp. 340-342. Lewald's edition is reprinted in Westermann, *Upon Slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt*, pp. 33-34.

⁸³ Pseudo-Aristeas, *ad Philocratem*, § 25.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, § 307.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, § 22. See Wilcken's letter incorporated in G. Plaumann's discussion of P. Gradenwitz 1, *Sitzb. Heid. Akad.*, ph.-hist. Kl., V, p. 12, note 15, and Westermann, *Upon Slavery*, pp. 35-37.

The twenty drachmas per slave is not a "standard price," as stated in Pseudo-Aristeas, § 37 (τήν κατ' ἐξέτασιν ἀργυρικὴν τιμὴν). There is no slave price so low as 20 drachmas in the time of Philadelphus. Fifty drachmas, paid at the source, in Birta, east of the Jordan, for a girl seven years of age, is the lowest which we know of at that period. See *P. Cairo Zenon* I 59003, 5 of 259 B. C., and Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *R. E.*, Supplement VI, p. 935.

⁸⁶ Pseudo-Aristeas, *ad Phil.*, § 25.

lar to it in the field of punishments and rewards for informing in the field of Roman law.⁸⁷

In dealing with two problems, that of the conditions in the Syrian possessions of Egypt which led to the passage of the two Rainer decrees and that of the ultimate aim of the demand for registration of cattle and slaves, we enter the field of conjecture. As the cause of the enslavement of these *λαικὰ ἐλεύθερα* in Syria-Phoenicia, Liebeany has suggested the wars which had for a long time been disturbing that area during the Hellenistic period, which had led to slave snatching upon a wide scale.⁸⁸ We may omit the wars of Ptolemy Soter in Syria as fought too long in the past to have produced a generation of local peasants reduced to slavery who could still be called *ἐλεύθερα*. This leaves for consideration the first and, possibly, the beginning of the second Syrian Wars only, if the dating of PER Inv. 24,552 at 261 B. C. is correct, as seems to me to be the case. Other factors, however, were operating constantly in Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine at about the period of this decree to bring about enslavement of individuals of the free lower class population, as is proven by several of the Zenon papyri dated at the same time or immediately after the period of Zenon's operations in Phoenicia, Palestine, and lower Syria as agent for the dioecetes Apollonius.⁸⁹ The impression derived from these documents is that the sources of the slaves from Syria were the customary and constant ones of the slave trade—sale of children, probably self-sale under adverse economic conditions, and the snatching of children and adults as opportunity offered.

⁸⁷ If a free man was condemned to slavery under Roman law, he became a *servus poenae*, never the slave of an individual. G. Donatisti, "La Schiavitù per Condanna," in *Bull. del Istituto Diritto Romano*, XLII (1934, vol. I of the N.S.), pp. 225-227 disproves the view of Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, pp. 947-948 that the *servus poenae* became the property, even of the state, as *servus Caesaris*. Cf. Buckland, *Roman Law of Slavery*, p. 277: "*Servi poenae* themselves were not the property of anyone."

⁸⁸ *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 272.

⁸⁹ These were the years 260-256 B. C. See Edgar in *Michigan Papyri*, vol. I (*Zenon Papyri*), pp. 16-25. The important references are P. Cornell 1, 222-224; P. Col. III, *Zenon Papyri* 3 (= PSI VI 602 + P. Col. Inv. 299); P. Cairo Zenon I 59015, verso 17; 59076; probably 59077; 59093, 10-16; PSI IV 406.

There is no direct statement in either of the Rainer decrees regarding the aim which the Ptolemaic government had in view when it issued its demand for the official listing of the herds in Syria-Phoenicia and of the "free persons." But the purpose may be deduced with something approaching certainty from three points in the *prostagma* upon registration of the σώματα ἐλεύθερα.⁹⁰ The first is the statement that actual slaves, bought as such and legally proven to be of slave status, although they must be produced in person and registered, are to remain in slavery.⁹¹ The second is that all of these "free" persons in slavery who have been sold by the state are to remain as slaves. These facts point to the conclusion that those of the σώματα λαϊκὰ ἐλεύθερα who do not fall within the two groups mentioned are to be freed.⁹² The third indication lies in the general prohibition against enslavement of the σώματα λαϊκὰ ἐλεύθερα for the future,⁹³ except as execution upon the person by the state and ultimate sale of fiscal debtors is specifically provided for. If my understanding of the document is correct, it throws an additional gleam of light upon the liberal attitude assumed by the Ptolemaic régime under its earlier rulers and its care in looking after the welfare of its subjects outside of Egypt. It helps to explain the statement of Polybius that the early Ptolemies paid more attention to affairs outside of Egypt than to the government of Egypt itself.⁹⁴

If the Pseudo-Aristeas decree upon the freeing of Jewish captives in Egypt⁹⁵ stands as close to PER Inv. 24,552 as my analysis of the two documents leads me to conclude, the freeing of the slaves incorporated in the imaginary situation of Pseudo-Aristeas gives some additional support to the conclusion drawn

⁹⁰ Liebesny has not discussed this point fully, evidently because of his assumption that the purpose of these decrees was fiscal.

⁹¹ PER Inv. 24,552 col. II, 7-9.

⁹² *Ibid.*, col. II, 10-12. This is suggested by Liebesny, p. 274. One has the feeling, here presented with the caution that it is a mere guess, that the entire measure was agricultural in its purpose, perhaps to restore better conditions to these λαϊκὰ ἐλεύθερα, to the end that agricultural returns might be increased. Cf. BGU, VIII, 1812 and Walter Otto's suggestion upon it in *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLII, p. 543. Of course the motivation of the decree might also have been political.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, col. II, 16-22.

⁹⁴ Polybius, V, 34, 5-6. Cf. V, 86, 10.

⁹⁵ Pseudo-Aristeas, §§ 22-25.

above in regard to the purpose of the real decree. Whether this purpose was stated in another decree, demanding the release of all σώματα λαϊκὰ ἐλεύθερα who were not defined as permanent slaves by the terms of the *prostagma*, cannot be determined. More probably it was embodied in a preamble to PER Inv. 24,552 which is now lost.⁹⁶ If determination of the free status of the σώματα λαϊκὰ ἐλεύθερα and their emancipation from an illegal bondage was an additional object of the government, there is still no indication whether or not those in possession of them were to be reimbursed for the property loss suffered through the operation of such an enactment. The conclusion that they were to be reimbursed does not seem to be likely. Such an action on the part of an absolute government is scarcely to be expected when compensation to its subjects would necessarily involve a financial loss to its own exchequer. This would be particularly true of the Ptolemaic decree PER Inv. 24,552 because the state had apparently taken the attitude that possession of these free persons in bondage was not legally justified. In this respect the analogy of reimbursement in the Pseudo-Aristeas narrative and its forged decree would not, in my judgment, be a satisfactory guide. Its purpose was to laud the μεγαλοψυχία and the φιλανθρωπία of Ptolemy Philadelphus, as the beneficent monarch, toward all his subjects, but particularly toward the Jews.⁹⁷ In the pursuit of this purpose historicity itself was not an end sought by its author. Only the semblance of fact and truth was desired.

The interpretation offered above in the case of the second *prostagma* is to the effect that it is a supplement to a previous decree requiring registration of slaves, which sets the additional demand that all the free σώματα in servitude must also be registered. This suggests a possible explanation of the first of the two *prostigmata* which appear in PER Inv. 24,552.⁹⁸ Despite the shattered condition of the first column, it is clear that all herds of cattle, whether taxable or exempt (λείαν ὑποτέλῃ καὶ ἀτελῇ col. I, 19-20, cf. I, 3, and του [.] ἀτελεία [. δ.] πογράφω [] in line 12) must be registered,

⁹⁶ See the preamble to the *prostagma* of the king in P. Teb. III 1, 700, ll. 22-36, which contained the reasons for the enactment.

⁹⁷ W. Schubart in *Arch. f. Pap.*, XII, p. 10.

⁹⁸ *Aegyptus*, XVI, pp. 269-271.

also whatever herds the village scribes and tax concessionaries can find which have not been declared up to the twenty-fifth year (col. I, line 21: *δσην ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἀναπόγραφον καὶ ὑπάρχουσαν κ. τ. λ.*). The following provision applies to all the flocks enumerated above, those taxable, those exempt, and those previously undeclared. It states that the declarations shall thereafter be made annually and that the imposts falling upon the cattle shall be paid, as had been set out in a letter of the King, and in the months fixed in an ordinance upon the subject (col. I, lines 23-26).

The requirement of declaration of the cattle which were exempt from taxation, along with those subject to taxation, is analogous to the declaration of all persons living in any domicile for the house-to-house census of the Roman period, of whatever age they might be, whether *ὑποτελής* or *ἀτελής*.⁹⁹ The mention of the *ἐνόμιον*, the pasturage tax, in a broken passage in line 9 of this decree indicates that all of these cattle declarations are directly connected with the total object of the *prostagma*. It may, therefore, be that even the lambs, the young goats, and the calves which were not yet subject to the regular tax upon grown animals were nevertheless subject to the pasturage tax.¹⁰⁰ Or it may be a device for establishing a check upon the size of the grown herds by supplying each year a record of additions to the herds through the birth of young animals. P. Teb. III 703, datable as late in the third century B. C., supplies us with a long memorandum of instructions, written probably by a dioecetes to one of his sub-

⁹⁹ See Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, p. 194. In a *κατ' οικίαν ἀπογραφὴ* of 309 A. D. we find a three year old boy declared who is directly called an *ἀτελής*, while his father is called an *ὑποτελής*. See A. E. R. Boak, "Early Byzantine Papyri in *Études de Papyrologie*, III (1936), no. 12 and Boak's discussion, p. 25.

¹⁰⁰ Compare the payment of an "exemption" tax upon four head of cattle in Wilcken, *Ostraka*, II, no. 1257 of 121-120 B. C. It reads: *τέτακται ἀτελείας* with *εἰς τὰς ρομάς* written above the word *ἀτελείας*. Wilcken, *Ostraka*, I, p. 265 tended to regard this as a substitution for *ἀτελείας*. But there is no elision; and the inserted words look more like an explanation of the unusual term "exemption tax," meaning the tax falling on the exempted animals for the pasturage privilege. For a general discussion of the *τέλη προβάτων* see Claire Préaux, *Les Ostraca Grecs de la Collection Charles-Edwin Wilbour* (New York, 1935), pp. 22-23.

ordinates. In lines 165-174 he emphasizes the importance of the *ἐνόμιον* among the revenues of the state and tells how the registration of the cattle can best be carried out. This must mean that avoidance of registration of cattle was general enough in Ptolemaic Egypt to cause a noticeable diminution in the revenues of the government.

The decree upon the declaration of cattle gives not the slightest intimation that the herds were in any way to be freed from taxation. Liebesny has correctly stated that the object of the *prostagma* was to prevent the concealment of taxable property in cattle.¹⁰¹ Emphasizing the fact that the "exempt" cattle also were to pay the *ἐνόμιον*, it seems probable that it was exactly these "exempt cattle" which had been causing the trouble that brought about the promulgation of the decree. Just as the subject population of Syria-Phoenicia had failed to declare their *σώματα λακὰ ἐλεύθερα*, on the technicality that they were "free," so they had not declared their "exempt" cattle, and so had escaped payment of the pasturage dues. This understanding gives a similarity of purpose and intention to the two decrees requiring, respectively, declaration of cattle and of free persons in bondage, such as would warrant their promulgation at the same time and the copying of the two upon a single papyrus sheet.

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¹⁰¹ *Aegyptus*, XVI, p. 271.

DRAMATIC USES OF THE GREEK IMPERATIVE.

My object in this paper is to show that the use of aorist and present (the perfect has present force) in the Greek imperative has often a dramatic or dynamic significance. Since imperatives in general refer to the future, it is clear that the mere sequence of time—past, present, and future—cannot account for the Greek use of two tenses. English uses but one; hence in translating by an English imperative we must lose some part of the meaning that is present in Greek. It has long been generally agreed that the kind of action (*Aktionsart*) described is in Greek an important factor, often the sole factor, in determining choice of tense. Where objective temporal sequence is not decisive, the speaker's view of the act becomes important. Hence the formulation of the current aspect theory, a theory that comes near to giving a complete account of the use of tenses in all Greek moods except the imperative. I shall surprise some by my statement that the aspect theory does not adequately explain the use of tenses in the imperative; but so it is.¹ As long as the investigation concentrated on the evidence of

¹ The most recent and thoroughgoing attempt to apply canons of time and aspect to the Greek imperative is found in A. Poutsma, "Over de tempera van de imperativus en de conjunctivus hortativus-prohibitivus en het Grieks," *Verhandlingen der koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam*: Afdeeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Diel XXVII, no. 2, 1928. There is a summary in English at the end. This article is most useful for its citation of illustrations and for its references to earlier work on the subject. It also illustrates the inadequacy of any analysis that does not take dramatic forces into consideration. The author admits (p. 73): "Why the writer has chosen the tense which actually we find in the text, is frequently far from evident." He quotes similar expressions from pioneers in this field: O. Riemann, "La question de l'aoriste grec," *Mélanges Graux* (1884), pp. 585-599; and F. Blass, "Demosthenische Studien," *Rheinisches Museum*, XLIV (1889), pp. 406-430. The latter has much useful material. I have also taken points from the great work of J. M. Stahl, *Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums des klassischen Zeit*, Heidelberg, 1907. Other works that have helped me are mentioned in scattered footnotes. I have made a reasonably careful search for previous work in the field and have found no systematic attempt to analyze the dramatic uses of the imperative.

inscriptions, there was little difficulty.² In the case of literary works, however, whenever a serious attempt has been made to formulate the distinction of tenses in the imperative, there has always remained an important residue of instances where the Greek author did apparently just the wrong thing.

In any science the existence of such a residue, however small, is a challenge to the investigator. To produce such aberrations there must be a force operating that has not yet been observed and formulated. Such a tense-determining force I find in the dramatic situation; and I have made an attempt to sketch in outline the dramatic use of the Greek imperative. Just as the aspect feature of tense distinctions does not interfere with the use of tenses to indicate distinctions of past and present, so my scheme of dramatic uses of the imperative will be found to supplement rather than to supersede or contradict the aspect theory. A speaker may be either an observer or an actor. His language may be expression or it may be action. According to Malinowski³ primitive languages show conspicuously the sort of dynamic or pragmatic meanings that I postulate in my study of the Greek imperative. He says (p. 316): "Language in its primitive function and original form has an essentially pragmatic character; that is, it is a mode of behavior, an indispensable element of concerted human action. And negatively: that to regard it as a means for the embodiment or expression of thought is to take a one-sided view of one of its most derivative and specialized functions." The general principle is well put by Professor de Laguna:⁴ "Men do not speak simply to relieve their feelings or to air their views, but to awaken a response in their fellows and to influence their attitudes and acts" (p. 19).

² In inscriptional material there is little or no variety of dramatic situation and the aspect theory is adequate. Note Meislerhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, Berlin, 1900; Hans Jacobsthal, *Der Gebrauch der Tempora und Modi in den kretischen Dialektinschriften*, Strassburg, Trübner, 1907 (*I. F.* XXI, Beiheft, pp. 36-58). I have not seen Edmund Busch, *Grammatik der delphischen Inschriften*, Band 1, *Lautlehre*, Berlin, Weidmann, 1914.

³ Bronislaw Malinowski in Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1930, Supplement I, pp. 296-336.

⁴ Grace Andrus de Laguna, *Speech: its Function and Development*, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1927.

"Conversation takes place within a concrete situation and is never fully intelligible when transcribed" (p. 109).

The imperative is particularly likely to be dynamic or dramatic, to be employed to represent or enforce the will, character, feeling, or attitude of the speaker. The aspect theory assumes that language is determined by the way things look to an observer. This is often the case, but there is abundant evidence that the dramatic uses of language may be as important as the descriptive. It is not enough to consider the speaker's view of the situation; his purposive attitude must also be taken into account. I have accordingly examined all imperatives that occur in Attic drama in order to show how the use of tenses is modified by dramatic considerations—status, ethos, pathos, purpose, etc. I have utilized many hints and statements found in the work of scholars, and have frequently acknowledged my indebtedness to works cited. I refer infrequently to non-dramatic writers, for in their case my investigation is limited. It may be that Homer, Pindar, or Herodotus has special peculiarities in the use of the imperative that I have not observed. In any case there is room for many special investigations in this field.

My work is to some extent the fulfilment of a prophecy made by Meltzer⁵ in 1905: "Künftig wird man zum Beispiel bei der Unterscheidung von Imperativ praesens und aorist mehr Sinn für das entwickeln müssen, was Nietzsche das 'Pathos der Distanz' nennt. Man wird fragen: Welcher Stilgattung gehört der Schriftsteller an? Wer spricht? Zu wem? In welcher Lage, der des Über-, des Gleich-, oder des Untergeordneten? In welcher Stimmung, in welchem Ton, zu welchem Zweck, mit Helfen welches besonderen Verbs u. s. w. u. s. w.?" The impetus to a new treatment of the Greek imperative was originally provided by F. W. Mozley⁶ in 1903. He pointed out that in the Greek Bible, as a rule, only the aorist of the imperative is used in addressing the deity. To this rule there are no more than a handful of exceptions, the most notable being at Luke XI, 3 in the Greek of "give us day by day our daily bread." Matthew has the aorist and "this day" not "day by day." There are other exceptions in the book of Job, but Job's wish to argue with the deity resembles Greek rather than Hebrew wont. In classi-

⁵ *Neue Jahrbücher f. d. kl. Alt.*, VII (1905), pp. 609-13.

⁶ *Journal of Theological Studies*, IV (1903), pp. 279-282.

cal Greek gods are often addressed with a present imperative. In Pindar there are actually more presents than aorists in such cases.⁷

The only real advance along the line indicated by Mozley was made by John A. Scott⁸ in 1907. He pointed out that, where supplication in the interest of the speaker is reinforced by an appeal to the gods, the áorist is used without exception in classical literature. He refers to present imperatives as "monitory and minatory"—a phrase that Gildersleeve had employed to characterize the tone of conditions that have the future indicative in the protasis. The quotation from Gildersleeve is a useful reminder that there are other constructions in Greek besides the imperative that are determined by the attitude of the speaker rather than by anything more objective. From other languages, too, linguists cite elements whose use is determined by the status, attitude, emotion, or will of the speaker in relation to the situation or to the hearer.

I do not suppose that dramatic distinctions between present and aorist are confined to the imperative in Greek, but they are probably rare. I am content to offer one example which I do not believe that the aspect theory is competent to explain, though as a dramatic use it is readily understood. Oedipus in Sophocles' play (*O. T.* 622 f.) is asked by Creon, whom he is accusing, "do you want to expel me from the land?" "Not at all," he replies, "death, not exile, is my wish for you" (*θῆσκεν οὐ φυγεῖν*). The contrast between the heavy penalty of death and the light penalty of exile is underlined by the use of present and aorist. Both of the verbs have heavier stems in the present than in the aorist.⁹ This is not a point, however, that I wish

⁷ See E. Kieckers, "Zum Gebrauch des Imperativus Aoristi et Praesentis," *Indogerm. Forsch.* XXIV (1909), pp. 10-16. This work gives statistics and argues that the aorist is normal in prayers. I have not seen the recent attack on Kieckers' conclusions by W. Beschewliew, "Der Gebrauch des Imperativus Aoristi und Praesentis im altgriech. Gebet," *Ann. de l'Univ. de Sofia*, Fac. Hist.-phil. (Sofia, 1937), pp. 23-41. See notice in *Glotta*, XVIII (1930), p. 240. Kieckers' rather fanciful explanation is rightly set aside by Paul Kretschmer, "Der gr. Imperativus aor. act. auf -σας," *Glotta*, X (1920), pp. 112-122.

⁸ *Class. Phil.*, XI (1907), pp. 324-330.

⁹ P. Dörwald, "Zur gr. Tempuslehre," *Gymnasium*, XVII (1899), pp. 146-161, points out on page 147: "der lautlichen Verstärkung in Prä-

to dwell on here. It is convenient for purposes of exposition to point out a simple explanation of the facts as observed, namely that dramatic presents and aorists are mingled in Greek with those that mark continued, repeated, or incomplete action as distinguished from the momentary, easy, or finished. To be remembered, so psychologists tell us, a thing may either be repeated or dwelt on, or may be impressed in a moment by the operation of strong emotion or interest. Here is a reasonable hypothesis. I leave it to others to test its accuracy as a statement of historical cause and effect.

In attempting merely to formulate the dramatic uses of the imperative that are found in Attic Greek drama I am still exposed to many dangers. Since different interpretations of the same dramatic situation are often possible, there will be a subjective element in some of my explanations. I hope, however, to avoid this, as far as it is possible to do so, by basing conclusions either on crucial instances or on statements that can be made to fit a series of cases without exception or conflict. If my conclusions are correct, they may be further tested by applying them to otherwise indeterminate dramatic situations. If they lead to an enhanced appreciation of great drama, we have found a new instrument of literary appreciation.

It should be noted that I include with the imperative both imperatival infinitives and the prohibitive subjunctive. It would be possible to include also the hortatory and deliberative subjunctive under the same rules, but I have omitted to do so, because there is sufficient material for my purpose without covering so much territory. Note too that allowance must be made for peculiarities of particular verbs. Some have in other moods a penchant for the present, others for the aorist. Again each tense may have a fixed and distinct meaning. When Strepsiades uses a series of aorists, as he implores his son to study with Socrates, we must not suppose that the single present *μάνθανε* differs in

sensstemma auch eine (natürlich zeitliche) Verstärkung der Bedeutung entspricht." But why should the strengthened meaning be always temporal? If strong emotion is present, a single event is often more impressive than one that is prolonged or repeated. B. L. Gildersleeve in *A. J. P.*, XXIII, p. 250, explains an imperfect *ἔλειπε* as due to a feeling-tone: "She had to leave." The light form *ἔλειπε* would not do dramatic justice to an action that was not light to perform. Meltzer criticizes Dörwald in *Gymnasium*, XVII, pp. 329-335.

tone from the aorists, for "be a student," which is what Strepsiadēs means, can only be put in the present. The aorist means "get the lesson." If we want a present again in this sense, we must use διδάσκον (*Hec.* 299). Prevot¹⁰ is responsible for a similar statement: "Le sens de l'imperativ ὄρα est bien différent de celui que presentent ἴδε et ἴδεσθε." In general the present may for most verbs replace the aorist for dramatic reasons; it often happens that the present is not so replaceable by the aorist for any reason. Verbs meaning "go" are almost always in the present. The compounds of ἵημι are so rare in the present that no significance can be attached to the use of the aorist in their case. Such aorists as παῖσον, "strike him a blow," and μείνον, "wait a moment," must be kept if their meaning is to be recognizable. The Greek speaker took advantage of all opportunities; where language was recalcitrant, he was as impotent to fit language to the dramatic situation as a speaker of Latin would be. We are studying a linguistic force that operates in conjunction with other forces. The other forces are already known; we cannot disregard them; we must observe what happens when they are quiescent. Gravitation affects all apples; it is only the occasional apple that falls; but the falling apple enables us to study the universal force.

My classification of the dramatic uses of the imperative is not the only one possible. It has an advantage, however, in that it reduces the significant elements of a dramatic situation to three—the speaker, the hearer, and the unyielding background of fact. I do not adopt a separate category for the third and other persons because, if a third person is to be influenced, his rôle corresponds to that of the hearer; if he is taken as a fixed element of the environment, he plays the part of an impersonal fact. Again, the lightness or heaviness of the task commanded might be included as a separate element. Since, however, the difficulty of the task is relative to the strength of the hearer, this element receives sufficient consideration if it is treated as a factor helping to influence the attitude of speaker to hearer.

¹⁰ A. Prevot, "Verbes Grecs Relatifs a la Vision et Noms de l'Oeil," *Rev. Phil.*, IX (1935), pp. 133-180. See page 146. There is need of more studies of this sort. If verbs of saying and of thinking and knowing were so studied, light would almost certainly be thrown on the imperative.

I classify dramatic situations then in three groups. In the first neither speaker nor hearer is master of the situation. Both are ruled by stubborn facts or by established precedents or decisions. Here the present of the imperative is normal. In the second group the speaker is master of the situation or is expressing his will to dominate. Here again the present is normal. In the third group the impulse to action comes from the speaker; the hearer must act or decide. With a little good will all Greek uses of the imperative can be herded into these three folds. Naturally there is often no clear-cut distinction between one use and another. Allowance must be made for inevitable overlapping and gradation. Here is the scheme.

DRAMATIC USES OF THE IMPERATIVE.

1. Facts are in control. There is an appeal to, or at least no dissent from, existing facts, functions, obligations, laws of thought, or agreements. Present imperative.

a. Mimetic, sympathetic, hortatory imperatives. Indicative in function, involving expression rather than action. Action is already going on or completed.

b. Informative, reminiscent, and supplementary imperatives. Facts are important. There may be already an understanding or a decision in force. The speaker adds details, gives specific guidance, reveals the situation, gives the signal for expected action, or repeats an injunction. Often not to be distinguished from the permissive or hortatory imperative. No new decision is required.

c. Monitory, fortifying, formal imperatives. The speaker appeals to reason or duty, exhorts against weakness, or speaks as the representative of something more than personal. An obligation to obey exists or is supposed by the speaker to exist. Note, however, that in fortifying against fear, the comforting aorist is normal.

2. The speaker is assumed to be in control. Present.

a. Resolute imperatives—decision, consent, refusal, indifference or dismissal.

b. Repressive, concessive, hostile, minatory, defiant, vituperative imperatives. The speaker may show coldness or hostility by

unwilling assent or by commanding what he cannot help in a tone of self-assertion. The concessive imperative may be used to emphasize a point that is not conceded and is expressed by an aorist.

3. The speaker incites the hearer to action, adopts a tone of intimacy or friendship, or seeks to soften a hostile or resolute hearer. Aorist imperative.

a. Summonses, challenges, invitations, tentative proposals.

b. Excitement, eagerness, welcome, reassurance, kindness.

c. Submission, pretended or real, and supplication, including all attempts to soften resolution or to remove hostility.

In general, negative injunctions follow the same scheme as positive. The formula *θάππει, μὴ τρέσῃς* is an exception. It is natural that the implication of hostility in the negative present should be avoided when the purpose is to reassure the hearer. There is a tone of hostility in Antigone's *μὴ 'μοῦ προτάρβει* addressed to Ismene (*Ant.* 83). Appeals to fear are in the present whether positive or negative. Appeals to pity are in the aorist. To counteract pity or other scruples the present is used. Appeals to anger and hatred take the present; the aorist is used to dispel these emotions. The present usually emphasizes and increases distance; the aorist does the opposite. The present emphasizes details and difficulties. The aorist ignores or belittles them. It is probably for this reason that the aorist is normal in commands from masters to slaves and may, when used to others, even seem rude. Where intimacy and unquestioning obedience are not in place, the aorist may be too light-hearted. If effort is called for, to ignore the fact in giving commands is to take too much for granted. The present is nearly always used when "may, must, need, need not, should, ought" are appropriate in English. It emphasizes the traditional pattern of life and its obligations. The aorist is used when "suppose" or "please" is appropriate. It breaks through the existing pattern and attempts to escape from it by impulsive thought or feeling. Doubled presents or aorists have double force. To add a detail without doubling the force, present is used after aorist and aorist after present. In fact, this variation of tense is very common and does not usually correspond to a change of tone, though it probably

does so on occasion. Excitement, emotion, and indecision are often implicit in the aorist. The use of tenses, like that of other speech-forms, became stereotyped, often in unpredictable ways. The use of a normal form indicates nothing in the dramatic situation. An abnormal form, on the other hand, deserves attention and may throw light on character, attitude, or emotion. I pass now to illustrations.

1a. When the imperative accompanies the act that it marks, it is normally in the present tense. So Hecuba to Hector's shield (*Tro.* 1224) στεφανοῦ "receive thy wreath." So Onesimus to Habrotonon, as he gives her Charisius' ring (*Men., Ep.* 338) λάμβανε "take your ring." Sometimes the present imperative accompanying an act amounts to self-exhortation, as in the *Cyclops* (656-662): τóρνει', ἔλκε κτλ. or in the women's cry κόπτεσθ' Ἀδωνιν (*Ar., Lys.* 396). Such accompanying imperatives, if the action is momentary or rapid, as in some dances, may be in the aorist: ἐκλακτισάτω τις (*Wasps* 1525). The Greeks apparently did not show their sympathy with nature by such imperatives as Byron's "Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean." Inanimate objects are frequently apostrophized in Greek,¹¹ but they are expected to sympathize with the human actors. Cassandra's phrase (*Tro.* 323) δίδου δ', ὦ Ἑκάτα, φάος is not an exception. It is a prayer of the type "perform your function." Sympathy with the action of the Moirai is expressed by the chorus (*Ae., Cho.* 307-314), using three present imperatives. Since destiny is unyielding, prayers would be out of place, but no doubt these imperatives are not very different from hortatory and triumphant imperatives addressed to gods. Perhaps the νίκα of Admetus to Heracles (*Alc.* 1108) should be classed as a ratification. There are prophetic present imperatives as well as indicatives. In general, solemnity, majesty, destiny, require the present imperative. Hence the present imperative in oaths (ἵστω Ζεὺς), in official proclamations, and in religious and solemn moments. At such times the individual takes upon himself the greatness that belongs to permanent and mysterious forces. At *Eur., I. T.* 239 it is the religious import of the herdsman's

¹¹ I do not find any evidence to weaken this statement in A. P. Wagener, "Stylistic Qualities of the Apostrophe to Nature as a Dramatic Device," *Trans. Am. Philol. Ass.*, LXII (1931), pp. 78-100.

mission that makes him command attention (*ἀκουε*) instead of requesting it. Trygaeus is imitating the official style with his *ἀκούετε* *λεῶ* (*Peace* 551). In Dicæarchus' ceremony (*Ach.* 243 f.) there is a sudden lapse to the familiar aorist for a comic purpose. For the marriage ceremony note Hermes' words at *Peace* 706: *ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν Ὀπώραν λάμβανε γυναῖκα σαντῶ τήνδε*. By sacrificing herself Iphigeneia gains the right to speak in ceremonial tones. Note the present imperatives at *I. A.* 1398, 1469-80 in contrast with the suppliant aorists of 1211-52. Macaria in a similar situation (*Hclid.* 528, 529 f.) uses the present. So also Oedipus at the moment of death (*O. C.* 1518-55). A king or official may lay his dignity aside. He may, however, always reassume it and use the present in commands. For an example of the imposing present note *Phoen.* 40; compare line 18.

Hortatory phrases always have the present (or perfect): *ὑγίαινε, χαῖρε, εὐτύχει, ἔρρωσο, ἐγκονεῖτε* (*H. F.* 521). So a woman applauds a speech (*Eccl.* 213): *λέγε λέγ' ὄγαθέ* "hear! hear!" Compare the shouts of *νῖκα* in the famous riots under Justinian. The injunction of *Clouds* 1078 is more hortatory than permissive: *χρῶ τῇ φύσει, σκίρτα, γέλα, νόμιζε μηδὲν αἰσχρόν*. No doubt many addresses to the gods are more hortatory than suppliant. Note the confidence of the present in the refrain of the chorus in the *Agamemnon* (121): *αἴλιον εἰπέ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικᾶτω*. It is probably because Pindar and his heroes pray in a spirit of triumph and confidence that he shows more presents than aorists in addresses to gods by mortals in his work (see p. 34). He may also have preferred to base his appeals on a recognized claim to favor instead of resorting to humble entreaty. The young Pelops praying to his friend Poseidon (*Ol.* 1, 75-78) does use three impassioned aorists (*πέδασον, πόρευσον, πέλασον*), but he ends his prayer with a present (*δίδοι*) that has something of the tone of an amen. The antithesis also gives a logical tone to the sentence: "But, as for me, I shall undertake this contest; 'tis thine to grant desired achievement."

1b. When gods are addressed by mortals with a present imperative, there is often an implication that the god has his proper function, and needs, not persuasion, but merely a statement of the case or a signal as at *Soph., El.* 792: *ἀκουε, Νέμεσι*. The present in commands of the type "fulfill your function" is normal where there is formal word play. So Onesimus at *Men.*,

Ep. 554: Ζεῦ σῶτερ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ δύνατον, σῶζέ με, and Clytemnestra at *Ag.* 973: Ζεῦ Ζεῦ τέλειε, τὰς ἐμὰς εὐχὰς τέλει. So Habrotonon, when she appeals to Πειθῶ to help her make her scene convincing (*Men.*, *Ep.* 338), uses the present, because, although she does not use the word, she seeks aid in being πιθανή. Note also κηρυκεύτω of Hermes (*Ae.*, *Supp.* 221) and in the same play (815) σεβίζου δ' ἱκέτας, Ζεῦ, where the epithet ἱκέσιος is easily supplied. When Orestes arrives at the shrine of Athena (*Eum.* 236), he does not beg to be received, for her reception of him is guaranteed by the promise of Apollo (80), and he is personally conducted by Hermes (90). His δέχων is merely an official announcement of his arrival. So Homer's address to the Muse (ᾄδειε) in the first lines of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* does not deserve the stricture of Protagoras (*Aristotle*, *Poetics*, 19), who complains that Homer commands, where he supposes that he is praying. In a prayer the aorist would have been used. No prayer was required; the Muse always sang anyway if she did anything at all. She needed merely a signal and directions what to sing. The stress is all on μῆνιν and ἄνδρα, as if the Muse had asked, "What shall I sing?" In line 10 of the *Odyssey* the aorist imperative εἰπέ is an assurance of the interest of the audience in what is to come. This meaning is implicit in εἰπέ, wherever it appears in Greek, as I will show later.

Where action is determined already and only a signal is needed, the present is normal. So the watchman at *Ag.* 29; so Orestes (*Or.* 1618) ὑφαπτε δώματ', Ἡλέκτρα and Dionysus at *Frogs* 1125: λέγ' Αἰσχύλει. In the same play Charon uses παραβαλοῦ (180, 269) for the command to ship oars, but the present ἔμβαυε (188) for "all aboard." These verbs, however, have a preference for aorist and present respectively in any case. The former usually means "pelt" in the present, and the latter is a verb of motion. It might be noted here that forms in βῆθι are polite (*Lys.* 873), while κατάβα is abrupt (*Frogs* 35, *Wasps* 979). The likeness of the imperative in signals and directions to the permissive imperative (see p. 48) is obvious. Readiness to act, not by any means necessarily accompanied by impatience, is also indicated by a present imperative. So Antigone to her father: ἡκούσαμεν τε χῶτι δεῖ πρόστασσε (*O.C.* 494). Even in the Septuagint Samuel says to Yahweh λάλει (*I Sam.* III, 9 f.) "speak Lord, for thy servant heareth." Note also *Frogs* 207: κατακέλευε δή, and

Plutus 1027: φράζε καὶ πεπράζεται. There may be impatience at *Wasps* 797: ἀλλ' ὅπερ μέλλεις ποίει, certainly there is at *I. A.* 872: ἐκκάλυπτε νῦν ποτε, but the verb alone would not prove it.

The reinforcement or repetition of a request in the aorist is regularly given in the present;¹² so always I believe when the previous request is specifically recalled by ὅπερ εἶπον (*Ap.* 21a) or the like, as twice in Plato *Ap.* 30c, the second time indisputably with reference to the future. The aorist may of course be repeated when emotion continues. Io uses two aorists to Prometheus and confirms them with two presents (θρόει, φράζε, *P. V.* 605-8). It is true conversely that an admonition or rebuke in the present imperative is often followed closely by a reinforcing injunction in the aorist. It is difficult to believe in some cases that the aorist could have been used if the stronger present had not preceded it and determined the tone: μηδὲν θρασύνου μηδὲ τοῖς σαντοῦ κακοῖς τὸ θῆλυ συνθεῖς ὦδε πᾶν μέμψῃ γένος (*Hec.* 1184), μὴ θνήσκε δι' ἐμὲ μηδ' ἀποκτείνης τινά (*I. A.* 1419). The present, like the aorist, may be repeated for emphasis. A glance at Dunbar's concordance of Aristophanes will show that λέγε, φράζε, etc., regularly follow a specific question, just as εἰπέ, φράσον precede. The exceptions are readily explained. Socrates' inquisitorial εἰπὲ δή in the *Clouds* may be a comic mannerism; it sounds like a skeptical challenge. Excitement, joy, or special interest is indicated where εἰπέ comes after or in the middle of a question. So Pamphila, when she catches sight of her baby in Habrotonon's arms: γύναι, πόθεν ἔχεις, εἰπέ μοι, τὸ παιδίον λαβούσα; (*Men.*, *Ep.* 511). Habrotonon's present imperatives just preceding correspond to the impressive manner that she assumes as

¹² Blass (*op. cit.*, p. 420, see note 1) observes that a repeated request is usually in the present. For A. H. Headlam's thesis, derived from Hermann, that present prohibitions mean "stop doing something," while aorist prohibitives seek to forestall something that has not occurred, see *Glass. Rev.*, XVII (1903), pp. 294 f.; XVIII, p. 262, XIX, pp. 30-36. This view is successfully combated by H. D. Naylor, *Glass. Rev.*, XIX, pp. 26-30; XX, p. 348, and R. C. Seaton, *ib.*, XX, p. 438. I believe that Headlam's principle holds only when there is resentment, resistance, admonition, or the like. The common explanation of the succession μὴ θορυβήσητε, μὴ θορυβέετε in the *Apology*, namely, that an uproar has arisen in the meantime, is most improbable, though it cannot be disproved. The request, if repeated, would be put in the present imperative in any case.

the bearer of an important mission. For presents confirming aorists see *Birds* 175, 663-6, *Frogs* 112-7, 1379-81, *Choe.* 500-8. The negative present imperative may imply resentment, rebuke, or resistance; hence it is appropriate when action is to be stopped. The aorist is, however, used in such cases when the protest is humble, mild, or friendly; and the present is very often used to inculcate a maxim or to warn against future kindness or weakness or forgetfulness. There are naturally cases where a change of tense in verbs closely connected corresponds to a change of tone: δὸς τὴν χάριν μοι τήνδε καὶ μμοῦ τρόπους πατρὸς δίκαιον, "in granting me this favor you will also be copying your honest father as a son should" (*Helen* 940).

Information is usually requested with an aorist unless the command to speak follows the question. One who has information to give or a maxim to cite uses the present imperative. Note *Birds* 597: νυνὶ μὴ πλεῖ—νυνὶ πλεῖ. Special knowledge, especially if there is a request for guidance, puts even an inferior in a position to give directions. The present is always used where the meaning is "I assure you." So ἴσθι, δόκει, νόμιζε, etc. When the meaning is "learn the lesson," "get the idea," or "don't get the idea," the aorist is normal. So μάθε, εἰσελθέτω σε, μὴ νομίσης, μὴ ἐλπῖσης, μὴ δόξης, etc. Information is conveyed by φάσκειν (*Soph., El.* 9) and by εἶχον (*Eur., El.* 563, *I. T.* 536, *Choe.* 212). In Prometheus' directions to Io (*P. V.* 708-818) Prometheus uses the aorist to stimulate attention (703, 706, 780, 802) but elsewhere the present except twice (718, 804), when he shows concern as he warns her of special danger, explaining his concern in each case with a γάρ clause.

At *O. C.* 75, 77 the native of Colonus proffers information, "Shall I tell you how to avoid offense for the present? Stay here." οἶσθ' ὡς νῦν μὴ σφάλῃς; αὐτοῦ μένει.¹⁸ At *Helen* 1514 a messenger brings information of Helen's disappearance with the words ἄλλης ἐκπόνει μνηστέυματα γυναικός. At *Trach.* 385, 390 the question τί χρὴ ποεῖν; is put by Deianeira to the chorus, then by the messenger to Deianeira. The answers are both in the present imperative πείθου, μίμνε "you must ask," "you must stay." The

¹⁸ For a full discussion of the imperative in subordinate clauses and in interrogative clauses see J. P. Postgate, "Grammatical Annotations upon the Oedipus Rex and the Greek Imperative," *Trans. Cam. Phil. Soc.*, Vol. III (1886-93), London, Clay, 1894, pp. 50-55.

use of the present imperative by Haemon to his father (*Ant.* 705, 718) accords with his strictly reasonable plea that avoids supplication.

The use of the present imperative may show who dominates the situation. Creusa (*Ion* 970, 972, 974) is to some extent relieved of the guilt of her attempt to murder Ion by the fact that she yields to the urgent prompting of the pedagogue, who adopts a hortatory tone. To her question τί χρὴ δρᾶν; he replies ἀποτίνον (972) "you must get revenge." His τόλμησον later is more than hortatory; it is kinetic or stimulative, the difference being that the aorist implies slackness or weakness on the part of the hearer, whereas the present confirms him in his present activity or mood. The term hortatory is quite inadequate to express the spur that is applied when the aorist is used. In the *Hippolytus* there is a similar situation, but Phaedra's nurse, by her τόλμα (476) and the present imperatives following, implies (477, 517, 519) that the course she proposes is normal and right and that she knows better than Phaedra does what is good for her. Of course she also uses supplication and tenderness (289, 508). She seems to use curb and spur together at 473 f.: λῆγε μὲν κακῶν φρενῶν, λῆξον δ' ὑβρίζουσα, "you must stop brooding on your troubles, break with your lawless mood." The ἔασον of 521 is used like μὴ φροντίσης and similar expressions to dismiss a matter light-heartedly. So *Knights* 1356, *O. T.* 1056. The serious μὴ φρόντιζε is used when a difficulty is disposed of by information, logic, or courage, not just disregarded. So *O. T.* 724, 980, *Clouds* 189 (Strepsiades: ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδα). Phaedra's weakness and indecision are shown by her use of the aorist imperative (333, 504). Ajax in what Tecmessa recognizes as a tone of weakness uses the aorist (*Ajax* 396).

1c. The superiority of the informed person is sometimes that of the man who knows the rules or has a store of worldly or unworldly wisdom. This kind of superiority is not always, however, recognized by the hearer without question, so that self-assertion and conflict may arise. But in any situation, no matter how interested the speaker may be, the present imperative is sure to appear whenever there is a sententious note or the most specious appearance of logic. The speaker, since he is appealing to a power not himself, that of reason or proverbial wisdom, may succeed in avoiding self-assertion. Logical conclusions are

couched in the present imperative. So the messenger to Pentheus τὸν δαίμον' οὖν τόνδ' ὅστις ἔστ', ὃ δέσποτα, δέχου πόλει τῇδε (*Bac.* 770). Again ἦν σοι μὴ κακῶς δόξω λέγειν, πείθου, μὲν' αὐτοῦ (*Helen* 1392 f.). See also *I. A.* 1207, *Hec.* 403. Helen is sententious when she says (*Helen* 1428) μὴ δούλευε τοῖς δούλοις, ἀναξ. The idea of obligation often lurks in a noun, for instance, one indicating relationship: πατέρα νυν δέχου (*Ion* 556), ἐλέαιρε (παῖδα καὶ γυναῖκα) *Πῖαδ* 6, 431; ἐλέαιρε (τὸν ἰκέτην) *Odyssey* 6, 175; οἴκτειρε δ' ἡμᾶς, οἴκτρὰ γὰρ πεπόνθαμεν *I. A.* 985. There is a sententious note in γνώμην δίκαιον σχοῦσα τοὺς πέλας ψέγε *Soph., El.* 551; τὰ μὴδὲν ὠφελοῦντα μὴ πόνει μάτην *P. V.* 44. Often the tone of admonition is no stronger than "you had better": φθέγγου χέουσα κεδνὰ τοῖσιν εὐφροσιν (*Choe.* 109), ἀναξ, ἀπείχου *Eur., Hip.* 891.

When a fair or logical proposal is made, the present is used: πείθου· κἀγὼ γὰρ ὅσον σὺ προσχρήσεις (πείθω) *O. C.* 520; μὴδὲν ἀδίκει μὴδ' ἐλαττοῦ *Men., Ep.* 73. Meisterhans¹⁴ noted that, when a command lapses into descriptive details of the required act, the present of the imperative is used. So Hecuba, once her plea is granted, gives details and directions (874 f.). When the manner of an act is stressed, the present is normally used: σαφῶς μοι φράζε *Trach.* 349; λέγε δὴ σὺ μείζον καὶ σαφῶς τὸ χρυσίον *Ach.* 103. Patroclus uses θάπτε (*Iliad* 23, 71) because he takes it for granted that he will be buried sometime; what he wants is to be buried quickly. Polyneices, on the other hand, must use θάψον (*Phoe.* 1447) because he fears that he may not be buried at all. The equivalence of the present imperative to χρή plus infinitive is clear in Tecmessa's admonition (*Ajax* 520 f.) ἀλλ' ἴσχε κἀμοῦ μνήστιν. ἀνδρί τοι χρεὼν μνήμην προσεῖναι, τερπνὸν εἰ τί που πάθοι. At *P. V.* 264-6 the admonitory tone of the chorus' ζήτει is at once recognized by Prometheus (παραινέειν νοουθετεῖν τε). Creon's διδάσκει insists on fair procedure (*O. T.* 554). For insistence on a choice between alternatives note *I. A.* 817 δρᾶ δ' εἴ τι δράσεις, ἢ ἄπαγ' οἴκαδε στρατόν.

Admonitions or sententious remarks may be comic if the conditions are absurd. They are so in the case of the drunken Heracles at *Eur., Alc.* 787-790. So the slave Onesimus in the final scene of *Men., Ep.* uses the present in admonishing and deciding the case of Smicrines (638, 652) with comic effect. In Lucian's

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* (see note 2).

Dialogues of the Gods 2, Zeus has to listen to sermonizing from Eros. Syriacus' seriousness has its humorous side when, in rebuking Davus, he lays down the principle *μηδὲ ἐν εὐρισχ' ὅπου πρόσσεστι σῶμ' ἀδικούμενον* (*Men., Ep.* 101). Theognis regularly uses the monitory present imperative both positive and negative to Cynrus with no implication of repression or censure. He also uses the aorist, presumably for metrical convenience. In such formal precepts the aorist hardly affects the meaning. In drama, however, it means that the speaker is specially interested, feeling affection or concern, or that he is deferential, or that the admonition is expressed as a remote possibility rather than an immediate danger. Thus all suggestion of censure is avoided. So Amphitryon to his son: *πόλιν δὲ σὴν μὴ πρὶν ταραξῆς πρὶν τόδ' εὖ θέσθαι, τέκνον* (*H. F.* 604 f.); Creon to his son: *μή νῦν ποτ', ὦ παῖ, τὰς φρένας γ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς γυναικὸς οὐνεκ' ἐκβάλης* (*Ant.* 648 f.). Such warnings merge with entreaties. The use of *ποτέ* "sometime" underlines the remoteness of the danger. Hermes warning the chorus of the *Prometheus* (1073) not to blame him some day uses the aorist. So the type "don't forget" at *Ajax* 128 f. and *Lys.* 932.

There is often in admonitions a strong note of censure when the present is used: to Apollo *ἀρετὰς δίωκε* (*Ion* 440). In any case admonition may be resented. Tecmessa in her attempt to soften Ajax with suppliant aorists (494, 506 f., 588) fails. She rebukes his attitude to the gods with a conventional *εὐφημα φώνει*, which does not move him, then resorts to an admonition (594): *πρὸς θεῶν, μαλάσσου*, "be less obstinate." In his reply he retorts to the monitory tone: *μῶρά μοι δοκεῖς φρονεῖν, εἰ τοῦμον ἦθος ἄρτι παιδεύειν νοεῖς*. The classic example of a Polonius assuming the superior attitude of a teacher (*ἔμοιγε χρῶμενος διδασκάλῳ* 324) is Oceanus in the *Prometheus*. In line 329 he combines two monitory present imperatives. Prometheus uses presents to decline his offer and to awaken the terror for himself that finally sends him scurrying home. The aorist is used for a suggestion of possible danger (*P. V.* 390, *Ach.* 221). Urgent warning uses the present: *στέλλον, κομίζον, σῶξε τὸν παρόντα νοῦν* *P. V.* 394; *ἄθρει καὶ τοῦ ποδὸς παρῖαι* *Knights* 436. This example is notable because of the rarity of present imperative forms in the case of *ἴημι*. Common forms are *φεῦγε, ὄρα μή*. The tone of urgent warning at *O. T.* 1165 is sufficiently indicated

by the repeated negative. As Scott¹⁵ observes, the speaker emphasizes the danger to Oedipus, not his own concern.

The unassertive present imperative may represent not only the authority of knowledge but also that of any moral obligation included in the pattern of life. The use of the present where religion and political authority are involved has been mentioned. In a court of law the clerk has his function and needs but a signal to perform it, hence may be addressed in the present. To witnesses the deferential aorist is normally used.¹⁶ This rule is observed in the trial scene of the *Wasps* (892-1007). To the cheese-grater (= Catana, see L. and S.) are addressed the aorists (963 f.) ἀνάβηθι, λέξον, ἀπόκριναι. To the defendant, who certainly should need no coaxing, but rather permission, are addressed (944) ἀνάβαινε, ἀπολογού; to his offspring, who are only doing their duty and need direction, are addressed (977 f.) ἀναβαίνετε, αἰτέετε, ἀντιβολείτε, δακρύετε. Formal commands and admonitions are in the present (892, 894, 905, 919). The prosecutor uses stimulative language: κολάσατε (927). This is probably a regular feature of Cleon's oratorical style, for in the speech attributed to him by Thucydides (3, 37-40) I find nine aorist imperatives and no present. The word κολάσατε actually occurs at 3, 40, 7. The opposing speech of Diodotus (42-48) carefully avoids any plea for mercy. The imperatives are σκέψασθε twice, "note further," and πείθεσθε. This latter present means "be convinced by my argument" as opposed to the aorist

¹⁵ *Op. cit.* (see note 8).

¹⁶ See page 405 of C. W. E. Miller, "The Limitation of the Imperative in the Attic Orators," *A. J. P.*, XIII (1892), pp. 399-436. The same author's article, "The Imperfect and the Aorist in Greek," *A. J. P.*, XVI (1895), pp. 139-185, is to some extent a review of Friedrich Hultsch, *Die erzählenden Zeitformen bei Polybios*, Leipzig, 1891-3. I have studied but not used the statistical material in Carl Mutzbauer, *Konjunktiv und Optativ und ihre Entwicklung in Griechischem*, Leipzig, 1908; L. Schlachter, "Statistische Untersuchungen über das Gebrauch der Tempora und Modi bei einzelnen griechischen Schriftsteller," *Indogerm. Forsch.*, XXII (1907), pp. 202-242; XXIV, pp. 189-220. O. Lautensach, *Die Aoriste bei den attischen Tragiker und Komiker*, Göttingen, 1911; *idem*, "Grammatische Studien zu den attischen Tragiker und Komiker," *Glotta*, VIII (1917), pp. 188-196; J. E. Harry, "The perfect Subjunctive, Optative, and Imperative in Greek," *Class. Rev.*, XIX (1905), pp. 353 f.; C. Henze, "Der homerische Gebrauch des Imperativus dritter Person," *Zeitschr. f. Vergl. Sprachforsch.*, XLIII (1909), pp. 121-129.

"be moved by my plea." Going back to the speech for the defense in the *Wasps*, we find an impassioned plea for mercy: οἰκτίρατ' αὐτὸν ὃ πάτερ, καὶ μὴ διαφθείρητε with two aorists.

2a. The imperatives that illustrate dominance by the speaker are closely connected with those that show him merely recognizing facts and the moral pattern of life. There is often a conflict of patterns, and then the statement of principles becomes indistinguishable from self-assertion. For the sententious rebuke note *Rhesus* 482, 709; *I. A.* 143, 1539; and *Eccl.* 192: μήδ' ἐθίζου. To pass on to the various kinds of decision, let us begin with consent: ἰδοῦ, σὺ κόσμει *Bac.* 934; ἔσται τάδε . . . κοσμεῖσθε *H. F.* 333. Reluctant consent may be indicated with δ' οὖν, or without it: νῦν δ' εἰ μένειν δεῖ, μίμν' ἐφ' ἡμέραν μίαν *Medea* 355; -σὺ δ' οὖν ποίει τοῦτο *Thest.* 612, "do it if you must." When δ' οὖν is used with the aorist it means "never mind then, do something else," as at *Birds* 56. So at *Trach.* 1157 with the present σὺ δ' οὖν ἀκουε τοῦργον, "no matter then (about my mother), you shall hear the task."

Consent, when it is forced, merges with indifference, defiance, and concession. Here I deal only with indifference, which passes into unemotional permission. The type "do it if you want to" is always present: ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς αἰρεῖ, λέγε *Ach.* 495; ἔστω δ' οὖν ὅπως ὑμῖν φίλον *O. C.* 1205; λέγ' ἡγνῶ αἰτεῖ *P. V.* 617; *Helen* 1244. Sometimes the hearer's desire to act is implicitly assumed ἀλλὰ γὰρ νῦν λέγε *Ach.* 338, "but now, you know, you may speak." For willing or extravagant consent, which is indicated by the aorist, see p. 56.

For indifference note κτεῖν', σὺ σ' ἀπαιτῶ *Rhesus* 174; ἡμᾶς δ' ὁ χρήζων κτεινέτω *I. T.* 605; βλάπτεσθε, ἐμοῦ γε μὴ μαίνοντο θεοὺς *Hclid.* 264; κήρυσο' ἅπανιν *And.* 436; σὺ μὲν λέγ', ἐγὼ δὲ δράσω *H. F.* 238 f.; *Ach.* 186; *Clouds* 39. There is an indifference to fear or emotion that goes with majesty. Theseus always has it in Attic drama. Note ἔκμασσε, φείδου μηδέν· οὐκ ἀνάλογοι *H. F.* 1400. Indifference becomes defiance in Oedipus' ὅποια χρήζει ῥηγνύτω *O. T.* 1076. There are many comforting or bracing present imperatives, often addressed by strong characters to those who are weak or in danger. So Dionysus to the frightened chorus at *Bacchae* 606 ἀλλ' ἀνίστατε σῶμα καὶ θαρσείτε, and frequently elsewhere. Negatives exhorting against fear are put in the aorist. Negatives exhorting against pity are put in the

present. So always *μὴ ἐλεῖτε* in the Attic orators. When scruples about religion or conscience are felt, the present is used as in the case of fear to remove them: *σὺ δ' ἐξόριζε* *Hclid.* 257; *ἀλλ' οὐ θέμις.* (*Στρ.*) *λέγε νῦν ἐμοὶ θαρρῶν* *Clouds* 140 f.

Indifference and resistance to appeals amount to refusal. Refusal may be expressed in many ingenious ways. The type "do something else" is common and appears in the present only. Refusals are almost invariably in the present: *σὺ δὲ κέλευθον ἤνπερ ἤλθες ἐγκόνει πάλιν* *P. V.* 961 f.; *ἀπόδος.* (*Ορ.*) *θεοὺς ἀπαίτει* *Or.* 1585 f.; *Lys.* 871. For rebuffs rudely expressed note *Trygaeus' τὴν Σίβυλλαν ἔσθιε, πῶλαι βαδίζων αὐτὰ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις* *Peace* 1116, 1253. Even Euripides, depicted as an effeminate character in the *Acharnians*, twice uses rude presents to repress *Dicaearchus* (460, 479). Coolness in the presence of emotion may amount to repression, as when *Odysseus* uses six present imperatives in replying to *Hecuba* (*Hec.* 299-331). At lines 1129 f. of the same play *Agamemnon* represses *Polymestor*: *ἴσχε, λέγε.* The type "help yourself" in reply to a request for something is hardly a refusal and has the aorist: *Clouds* 220; *αὐτὸς καθελού* *Wasps* 936.

Resolution is expressed in present imperatives, as at *Persae* 403: *ἐλευθεροῦτε*, and *Medea* 401 *φείδον μηδὲν ὧν ἐπίστασαι*. When *Medea's* resolution weakens, she uses aorists (1056 f.) *μὴ δῆτα, θυμέ, μὴ σὺ γ' ἐργάσῃ τάδε· ἔασον αὐτούς, ὦ τάλαν, φείσαι τέκνων*. For a decision reached after doubt note *Orestes' words* at *Choe.* 904, 906 and the outcome of *Charisius' soliloquy* (*Men., Ep.* 577) *ἐμοὶ σύ, Σμυκρίνη, μὴ πάρεχε πράγματα*. The chorus of the *Prometheus* use the present imperative only for an admonition (264) and in stating their resolve not to leave *Prometheus* (1063). Strong and self-assertive characters are fond of the present. So always *Eteocles* of the *Phoenissae* except for a prayer (1374). *Lycus* the bullying tyrant in *H. F.* uses nothing but the present. Responsibility and vigilance take the present. Note *Lysistrata* in *Aristophanes' play* throughout and *Dicaearchus* and *Trygaeus*, once they have taken command of the situation. *Bdelycleon* in the *Wasps* uses present imperatives while mounting guard over his irrepressible father (140-200). *Peleus* in the *Andromache* uses presents (577, 639), once he has got the attention of *Menelaus*; he is consciously in command of the situation. Characters whose appeal is to pity, like *Philoctetes*, use a surprising number of aorists, but the present is

used for occasional resolute moments. Bullying questions are introduced by λέγε. So Strepsiades to the usurer at *Clouds* 1247; compare *Eccl.* 1014. In the *Plutus* (60-62), Chremylus, after rebuking Carion for bullying the blind god, himself tries the effect of a polite aorist.

A difficulty may be dismissed without a decision. This is after all a decision of a sort, and the present is used. The Pythian prophetess leaves the Eumenides to be dealt with by Apollo: αὐτῇ μελέσθω Δοξία *Eum.* 61; at *Ant.* 399 the guard uses presents in disclaiming further interest in Antigone's fate. Note the common use of χαίρόντων, as by Plato (*Ep.* 13, 361d), when he leaves to others the responsibility of his nieces' dowries, in case they are not married before he dies. There is often decision involved in the dismissal of persons. In the *Acharnians* those who would share Dicaearchus' peace try to insinuate themselves with aorists (1021, 1029, 1034, 1051) and are thrust out with present imperatives (1032, 1035, 1054). So Ion when he repels an invading bird: χωρῶν δίνας τὰς Ἀλφειοῦ παιδούργει (175).

In general, verbs that imply motion are put in the present when it is motion away from the speaker. The meaning "come" is usual for ἐλθέ, μῶλε, etc. When ἀπελθε is used, the tone is excited or suppliant. With εἶσθι, as at *Frogs* 503, strong pressure is exerted, "you really must come in." To an arriving messenger ἀγγεilon is used (*Knights* 614); to departing messengers the present is usual. Verbs implying attendance on a journey, such as ἔπου, ἤγοῦ, πέμπε, are normally in the present. The aorist leads to nearness and intimacy; the present preserves or increases distance and hostility.

2b. It is appropriate now to consider the use of the present imperative in repartee, reproach, resentment, threats, defiance, taunts, vituperation—in short, whenever a spirit of conflict is present. Note repartee τοιαῦτ' ὀνείδιζ' οἷς ἐμ' εὐρήσεις μέγαν *O. T.* 441; reproach Κρέοντ' ἐρώτα· τοῦδε γὰρ σὺ κηδεμών *Ant.* 549; resentment μηδὲν ἐγκέλευ' ἄγαν *P. V.* 72; threat κάτω νῦν ἐλθοῦς, εἰ φιλητέον, φίλει κείνους *Ant.* 524 f. The concessive imperative often is negative in effect while positive in form; it repels the invader of a province not his own: δειπνέιν με δίδασκε *Frogs* 107; σὺ τᾶξω πᾶσσε *I. A.* 740; Μυρμιδόνεσσιν ἄνασσε *Iliad* 1, 180. The stress in these cases is not on the verb; it is on the subject at *Bacchae* 496 αὐτὸς μ' ἀφαιροῦ.

When the hearer is told to cease some activity, the effect is likely to be one of repression or rebuke. The hearer may defend himself by denying the fact: Soph., *El.* 396. I have found no case of a denial in the future. Assent to a positive command is found in either future or present, whether or no the aorist or present was used in the command: *P. V.* 609; *Cyclops* 568. The present negative indicative, however, in reply to a present prohibition, is not necessarily a denial with reference to the past; it may be a prompt consent as at *I. T.* 1474-1478, where Thoas replies by οὐχὶ θυμούμαι when Athena says, "You must not be angry." When the aorist is used with μή to stop an act that is going on, there is always a tone of tenderness, reassurance, or supplication. At *And.* 1077 Peleus is already falling when the chorus say μὴ πείσης, since they continue with the words ἐπαίρεισαντόν. So the usual negative expressions, when fear and anxiety are present, are μὴ τρέσης, μὴ φροντίσης, μὴ ἐντραπής. Tenderness is more likely to be effective than sternness in dispelling terror or worry. The phrase μὴ λέξης πέρα (*Phil.* 1275, 1286) is used like παῦσαι to stop an action that is going on. For good measure I include a case where a present prohibition clearly refers to something that has not happened yet. At *Prometheus* 684 f., Io says μηδὲ μ' οἰκτίσας σὺνθαλπε μύθοις ψεδέειν. The warning against pity requires a resolute present. Gildersleeve allows the meaning "resist" as well as "desist" for the present prohibition.¹⁷

General admonitions imply no reproach to any individual. It is tempting to assume that there is a shift from the monitory to the reassuring tone in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 6, 25 and 31) when Jesus begins an exhortation with μὴ μεριμνᾶτε and ends with μὴ μεριμνήσατε, "why, you needn't worry." It is possible, however, that this is merely an example of an aorist summing up the foregoing injunction (see p. 42). Where there is a shift from present to aorist, the aorist may frequently be felt as a definite result of what goes before: τὴν θεὸν κόλαζε καὶ Διὸς κρείσσων γενοῦ *Trö.* 948. When the aorist precedes the present, there is often a time sequence. The earlier act may be a preliminary condition, something that must be finished before the second act can begin. So *I. T.* 1387 λάβεσθε κόπης ῥόθιά τ' ἐκλευκάνετε. Again: Creon to Oedipus ἴσ' ἀντάκουσον, κατὰ κρίν'

¹⁷ B. L. Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, Part I, p. 164.

αὐτὸς μαθὼν *O. T.* 544. Compare Matthew 5, 24: *πρῶτον διαλλάγηθι τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου, καὶ τότε ἔλθων πρόσφερε τὸ δῶρόν σου.* We might just as well have a future indicative as the aorist imperative in *θεῶ καὶ σκέψαι* "watch and see" (*Wasps* 1170). For a case where the aorist is used for no discoverable reason except that formally it follows the present as if it were a result, which it isn't, note *εὐστόμει καὶ μηδὲν εἴπης φλαῦρον* (*Clouids* 833 f.). I am unable to decide whether Helen in the words *μὴ κτάνης με, συγγίγνωσκε δέ* (*Tro.* 1042 f.) is saying "please don't kill me, you must pardon me," or whether the formal pattern is enough to justify the present when both verbs are suppliant in tone. I like to picture Helen in this scene as cool and insolent, begging pardon formally with no real terror.

We arrive now at the field of downright hostility and defiance, examples of which are too easily found to need much emphasis. Even the weak may indulge in taunts, as Andromache does when Astyanax is ordered to be slain: *ἀλλ' ἄγετε, φέρετε, ῥίπτετε, εἰ ῥίπτειν δοκεῖ· δαίνυσθε τοῦδε σάρκας* (*Tro.* 774 f.). Note the acerbity of tone at *P. V.* 1043-5; *O. C.* 1383; *Ant.* 83, 86; *And.* 260. Taunts come also from the stronger: *ἐνταῦθα νῦν ἵβριζε* *P. V.* 82; *θανόντες ἤδη τᾶμ' ἀφαιρείσθων δπλα Ajax* 100; *Medea* 1394-6. In altercations the present imperative is normally used; so *Medea* and *Jason* (*Medea* 600-626). When taunts are put in the aorist there is mockery or sarcasm in them. Given Antigone's "fierce temper" (*λῆμ' ὀμόν* 471), it is not surprising that she will not allow Ismene the honor of dying with her. To Ismene death appears as an honor, a light thing: *θανεῖν* not *θνήσκειν* 545; compare *Eur., Hip.* 723. Antigone to be kind should have taken the offer seriously as a grievous thing, saying, as Orestes does to Pylades: *μὴ σύνθησκέ μοι* (*Or.* 1075; compare *Rhesus* 870). Instead Ismene's offer is lightly rejected with scornful emphasis on the pronouns, but none on the verb: *μὴ 'μοὶ θάνης σὸ κοινά*, "Please, I don't want *your* company in death." There is irony again at 553: *σῶσον σεαυτήν*, "please spare yourself." An injunction to the hearer to save himself is usually in the present, because coaxing is not needed. Curses of all sorts usually have the present imperative: *ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰθέρα αἰεὶ πτεροῖσι φορεῖσθω* *H. F.* 653 f. The stimulative aorist may be used in taunts: *πράσσαι ἐτόλμας, τλήθι καὶ τὰ μὴ φίλα* *Hec.* 1251; compare *Held.* 943. Even more grim in its polite irony is Achilles' *ἀλλὰ, φίλος, θάνε*

καὶ σύ. τίη ὀλοφύρεαι οὕτως; (*Iliad* 21, 106), "but, my friend, won't you die too? Why all this wailing?" When Achilles later says to the dead Hector: τέθναθι (*Iliad* 22, 365), he means, "I am not moved to wish that I had spared you." The present would mean, "I am not moved to spare you." A refusal to ask favors may also be implied in the present imperative indicating hostility: κτεῖν', οὐ παραιτούμαι σε *Hclid.* 1026; μὴ θνήσχ' ὑπὲρ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός *Alc.* 690. This last is also an example of *quid pro quo* or the fair bargain.

3a. The aorist imperative has for the most part dramatic uses that are the counterpart of those of the present, and inevitably the two tenses have been discussed together. It seems wise, however, to present a reasoned account of the use of the aorist in the three tones: eagerness, tenderness, and supplication.

A summons normally takes the aorist: δόμων ἔξω πέρασον, ὥς κλύης ἐμῶν λόγων *I. A.* 1533; ἀνοιξάτω τις *Men., Ep.* 617; παῖ, παῖ, θύρας ἀκουσον ἐρκείας κτύπον *Choe.* 653. A single summons is usually enough and presents follow, as at *Choe.* 877-9. For the reverse case note *Lys.* 929, where the present is insistent. There is an ironical summons at *Ag.* 1671: κόμπασον θαρσῶν, "do crow unafraid!"

The stimulative aorist is often used to stimulate attention. There is grave objection to the term "hortatory" as sometimes applied to the aorist, for the aorist, unlike the present, summons the hearer to do what he is not already doing. If ἀκουσον, for instance, occurs in the course of a message, it implies that the hearer has ceased to listen: *And.* 1079. Aorists of verbs of speaking, hearing, seeing, learning, are common as an introduction to discourse or to new points of an argument. Verbs of knowing, pondering, etc., are put in the present imperative, unless the application is specific. In such cases any two aorists are likely to be nearer in meaning to each other than aorist and present of the same verb. The aorist calls for limited attention—brief, easy, or merely physical; the present demands mental activity and a more than superficial consideration. Inquisitors regularly prefix εἰπέ, φράσον, λέξον to their questions. The present is used before the question for permission, etc., and often when there is distaste or scorn for the expected answer. The chorus of the *Bacchae* rejoice at the death of Pentheus and ask for news with φράσον (1041); Agave says λέγε (1288). When Theseus

asks with *εἰπέ* for details of his son's death (*Hip.* 1171), he explains later (1258) that he was pleased at the time: compare *Medea* 1134; *Soph., El.* 671 f. There is of course such a thing as eagerness to know bad news, and this is often stated: *εἰπέ, καίπερ οὐ λέγων φίλα* (*Hec.* 517); *λέγον, κεί στένεις κακοῖς ὁμῶς Persae* 295. The aorist may have a challenging tone that implies unwillingness or inability on the part of the hearer: *κόμψασον γέρας καλόν* (you can't) *Eum.* 209; *δίδαξον Soph., El.* 534; *δείξον πρόσωπον* (you don't dare) *Eur., Hip.* 946; *ἀλλὰ τί ἐχρήν, εἶπατε Ach.* 540. In Demosthenes the aorist imperative of *δείκνυμι* is almost exclusively used; the present would imply that the other side could produce a proof if they wanted to.

Such words as *ἄκουσον, θέασαι, σκέψασθε* are very common in calling or recalling the attention of the hearer, usually to a new piece of information or argument. The aorist may imply that the hearer will be interested or that the proof will be self-evident: *πρὸς τοῖσδε νῦν ἄκουσον ὡς φανῆς κακός*, "besides these I have another argument to prove you base" *Hec.* 1217; *ἐπ'ἀκουσον καὶ μάθε*, "just listen a moment to my tale and you will see," so Jocasta eagerly at *O.T.* 708; *βλέψον πρὸς τὰ ὄρη καὶ ἴδε*, "a glance at the mountains will show you," *Xen., Anab.* 4, 1, 20; *καὶ ταῦτ' ἄθρησον εἰ κατηγγυρωμένος λέγω Ant.* 1077. In general, *ἄκουε, ὄρα, σκοπεῖτε* are a call for serious thought. The aorist is used for sensations, new ideas, and bursts of feeling. Editors should not take *ὄρατε* as an imperative, for instance, at *Soph., El.* 1228. I should take it as a question rather than as a declarative. So *κλυών* ("hear," not "attend") at *I.T.* 1323. Even Prometheus, who commonly uses defiant presents, says to Hermes *εἰσελθέτω σε*, "get awake to the fact" (1002). Even in the indicative this distinction may persist; at *Bacchae* 1113 Pentheus *ἐμάνθανε* ("realized," not "discovered") that his doom was near. At *Wasps* 1208 *προσμάνθανε* means "take some more lessons"—in banquetry and convivology. No doubt *γινῶθι σαυτόν*, "get acquainted with yourself," is either an invitation or a challenge. Oceanus (*P.V.* 311) goes deeper with his *γίγνωσκε σαυτόν καὶ μεθάρμοσόν τρόπους*, "realize your condition and adopt new ways."

If a summons implies abnormality in the hearer's conduct, it may be insulting: *τόλμησον εἰπεῖν, εἰ φρονεῖς, ὅς' ἰστορῶ Trach.* 404; compare for comic effect *Wasps* 327; *φρόνησον εὖ Ajax* 371;

αὐτὴ δὲ νοῦν σὺν ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ Soph., *El.* 1013. The aorist is normal with ποτέ "sometime" "at last." A summons may be addressed by the speaker to himself: νῦν δείξον Heracles at *Alc.* 838. The type "cry out" is common: παίωνισον *Sept.* 268. An exhortation before the fight begins may use the aorist: *Clouds* 960. At *Ach.* 483 Dicaearchus exhorts himself πρόβαυε νῦν, ὦ θυμέ, "go marching on, my soul," without effect. When he now resorts to aorists, it is not so much a summons as a coaxing entreaty.

The challenge to a foe in argument has been mentioned. Challenges in combat can be found. The embattled women of the Lysistrata provoke their opponents: καὶ μὴν ἰδοὺ παταξάτω τις, ἄψαι μόνον Στρατυλλίδος τῷ δακτύλῳ προσελθὼν (362, 365); ψαῦσον γ', ἔν' εἰδῆς, καὶ πέλας πρόσσελθέ μου *And.* 589; εἰ δ' ἄγε μὴν πείρησαι, ἵνα γνῶσι καὶ οἶδε *Iliad* 1, 302. The aorist is used for invitations and suggestions that defer to the decision of the hearer: ταῦχα δ' ἀλλήλοισι ἐπαμείψομεν (*Iliad* 6, 230). While Athena represses Achilles (*Iliad* 1, 210), she uses the present. Her new suggestion *ὀνείδισον* is in the aorist. Note the suggestion of Silenus to Cyclops (313 f.): παραίνεσαι σοι βούλομαι. τῶν γὰρ κρεῶν μηδὲν λήψης. This is the admonition of a craven flatterer, and is naturally in the aorist. The remote warnings μὴ ἐλπίσης, μὴ νομίσης "don't suppose for a minute," "don't let it enter your head" are common. The interest of the speaker and the need of attracting attention are factors. Instead of φυλάσσου "be on your guard" Clytemnestra says to Orestes φύλαξαι μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας (*Choe.* 924), because she needs and wants to move him quickly.

Even when advice is asked for and obedience promised, if there is conspicuous need for a change of conduct, the aorist may be used: ἐλθὼν κόρην μὲν ἐκ κατώρυχος στέγης ἄνες, κτίσων δὲ τῷ προκειμένῳ τάφῳ *Ant.* 1101. This is almost supplication. When attention is concentrated on the completion of a desired act, the aorist is used, even though details are mentioned: γόου δὲ μηδὲν εἰσὶτω δάκρυ, ἀλλ' ἀστένακτος κἀδάκρυτος, εἴπερ εἰ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός, ἔρξον *Trach.* 1200 f.; ἄγ' οὖν μ', Ὀδυσσεῦ, καὶ διέργασαί μ' ἄγων *Hec.* 369. Interest in the accomplishment of an act regardless of the means produces the causative aorist: ἐκδίδασθαι τινα, "get someone thoroughly instructed" (Plato, *Ep.* 13, 360e). Verbs indicating mental activity appear in the aorist only when a definite object

or terminus is expressed or implied. So *διάκρινον* at *Knights* 747 f.; *διάλυσον* *Men.*, *Ep.* 11, where a definite verdict is requested; *ἐκφρόντισόν τι* *Clouds* 695, where emphasis is laid on results. Sometimes the specific thing requested is thrown into relief by using a present imperative to indicate by contrast what is not asked for: *ἐμοὶ σὺ τῶν σῶν, Μενέλεως, μὴδὲν δίδου, ἂ δ' ἔλαβες ἀπόδος*, "I'm not asking you to give me anything of yours, but to give me back what you took from me" (*Or.* 642 f.). Repression along other lines may add to a positive command: *ἀπόκριναι—μὴ λέγ'* *ἄλλα* *I. A.* 1133, 1135. Specific orders to servants are usually in the aorist, while commands involving a journey or indefinite activity take the present. There is a good illustration of the effect on the tense of the kind of act ordered at *Birds* 837-843: *ἄγε νῦν σὺ μὲν βάδιζε πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τοῖσι τειχίζουσι παραδιακόνει, χάλικας παραφόρει, πηλὸν ἀποδὺς ὄργασον, λεκάνην ἀνένεγκε, κατὰπεσ' ἀπὸ τῆς κλίμακος, φύλακας κατὰστησαι, τὸ πῦρ ἔγκρυπτ' αἰεὶ, κωδωνοφορῶν περίτρεχε καὶ κάθειδ' ἐκεῖ, κήρυκα δὲ πέμψον*. In such orders, as in laws and in commands of a recognized superior, dramatic considerations are practically non-existent.

The aorist is used when the speaker would show unusual generosity or willingness: *χοῖσαι κακοῖσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς* *I. T.* 1034; *τάξον μ' Ἀχιλλέως καὶ στρατοῦ κατὰ στόμα* *Rhesus* 491; *P. V.* 780; *ἀπόκτεινόν μ' ἄγων* *Frogs* 617; *Soph.*, *O. T.* 606; *Clouds* 456. The fair, not generous, proposal has the present: *κλήρον τίθεσθε παῖδ' ὅτου θανεῖν χρεών. ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ ἦν τόδε* *I. A.* 1198 f. Proposed bargains sometimes combine a concessive present with a suppliant aorist: *κτείνόν με παίδων πάρος—τάλλα δ' ἢ πρόθυμος εἰ πράσσει* *H. F.* 322, 326. More often the speaker puts his concession in the future indicative and his stipulation in the present: *I. A.* 336; *Iliad* 22, 259. For the present imperative in both parts of the bargain see *Medea* 313 f. Where a limited concession is made, the type "you must do the rest" has the present imperative: *Medea* 729; *Hec.* 861. If the hearer's part of the bargain must be performed first, the aorist is used: *ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον* *Plato, Rep.* 337d; *σὺ δὲ σύνθεο καὶ μοι ὁμοῖον* *Iliad* 1, 76; *πίστιν ἀλλήλοις δότε* *Lys.* 1185; *Ecc.* 1030-3.

3b. Since the interest of the speaker is shown by the aorist, that tense is particularly appropriate where excitement, welcome, and tenderness are to be shown.¹⁸ Even death may be welcome:

¹⁸ H. Elmer in "The Latin Prohibitives," *Proc. Am. Philol. Ass.*,

ἐλθέτω μόρος, πρὸ κοίτας γαμηλίου τυχών Ae., *Supp.* 804 f. The warmth of Clytemnestra's greeting to Achilles (*I. A.* 831 f.) is undisguised: μέινον. δεξιὰν σὺναψον. Helen shows heartfelt kindness to a wanderer: εἰσελθε καὶ λουτρῶν τύχε ἐσθῆτά τ' ἐξάλλαξον *Helen* 1296 f. Children and the old are likely to be addressed with tender aorists. Admonitions are likely to follow in the case of children: *Ajax* 1171 f.; 1180 f.; *O. C.* 1104-15; *Medea* 1070. Heracles (*H. F.* 621-8) first exhorts his children with the present, then, realizing that theirs is no ordinary emotion, uses the tender aorist in an effective scene. Creusa's servant uses the comforting aorist to her, though he is enjoining her to desist: μήπω στενάξῃς *Ion* 769; compare *Tro.* 458, where Cassandra comforts Hecuba with an aorist. We often find μή σαρτὸν προδῶς as at *Thes.* 210. The chorus of the Agamemnon use the comforting aorist (1071) to Cassandra; not so Clytemnestra (1035, 1039, 1059), though she is deferential enough to Agamemnon (aorists at 931, 937, 943). In general, the hidden foe uses the aorist until he is unmasked. So Creon to Oedipus (*O. C.* 741, 757, then in contrast 836, 839). So Lichas, when he attempts to deceive Deianeira by feigned innocence at *Trach.* 434. The gentleness of the lady appears in her use of the aorist μή ἐκκλέψῃς λόγον. She turns the deserved rebuke into an entreaty. Dionysus lures Pentheus on with an aorist (*Bac.* 821). So Electra entices Hermione to her doom with aorists (*Or.* 1337, 1341). Observe the ironic technique of Socrates in his con-

XXIV (1893), pp. vi-xii, notes that the perfect is accompanied by emotion. See also *A. J. P.*, XV (1894), pp. 133-153. It is not impossible that we may have here a feature of Latin comedy that is derived from the Greek original. I have not seen M. M. McElwain, *The Imperative in Plautus*, Diss. Cornell, 1910.

J. Donovan in *Glass. Rev.*, XX (1895), pp. 145-149, effectively disposes of the rule that still disfigures our Greek schoolbooks and works of reference, namely, that the aorist refers to a single act and the present to habitual or continued action. He cites several prohibitions with the aorist that mean "never do this." They are what I call remote warnings: "don't some day forget and do this." The same writer in the same volume (page 61) has some remarks on the imperative, and on pp. 289-293, 342-346, 444-447, he discusses "German Opinion on Greek Jussives." Not knowing Russian, I cannot discuss his equation of the Greek present with the Slavic continuative forms. It is unlikely that usage in any two languages would be exactly the same.

versation with Glaucon (Xen., *Mem.* 3, 6). At the beginning there is just the right tone of deferential interest: *μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκρύψῃς ἀλλ' εἰπον ἡμῖν* (3). When Socrates unmasks his batteries, he uses monitory presents (16-18). For open flattery, wheedling, and coaxing the aorist is used: *φάγε τουτί, ἔντραγε τουτί* *Wasps* 611 f.; *μὴ πολακτίσῃς λέχος τὸ Ζηγρός, ἀλλ' ἐξέλθε* *P. V.* 651 f.; *Lys.* 873-923. The polite or submissive aorist needs no further illustration.

3c. The use of the aorist in prayer and supplication is too common to require illustration. At *Thes.* 65, Euripides uses an aorist to Agathon's servant, who replies, "Entreaty isn't necessary; he's coming out soon anyway." The forms *πρὸς θεῶν* and *ικετεύω* may be used like their English counterparts in rebukes that are prayers only in form: *Ἀβρότονον, ἱκετεύω σε, μὴ μ' ἀναπτέρον*, "Habrotonon, I implore you, you mustn't excite me" (*Men., Ep.* 590). Often the warning aorist is stronger than the present because of its emotional tone, showing a strong distaste for something that is to be kept at a distance: *ἡ γυνὴ δ' ἀπελθέτω* *Alc.* 1104; *μηδέ σε κωησάτω τις*, "let no one budge you" *Ajax* 1180 f.; *μὴ ψαύσῃ τις* *I. A.* 1559. There is supplication in the appeal of Andromache's maid: *μηδὲν τοῦτ' ὀνειδίσῃς ἐμοί* *And.* 88; she could hardly use the present without impropriety, for that would involve self-assertion in face of her mistress. The intimate and emotional tone of Jesus' discourses is often lost in translation because distinctions of tense in the imperative cannot be rendered: *μὴ ὀμῶσαι ὅλως*, "not to take an oath at all."

There is sometimes irony or sarcasm in a supplicating aorist. Oceanus does not need to be coaxed to do nothing at *P. V.* 334; he is famous for doing nothing anyway. So Hermes' request of Prometheus at *P. V.* 951 to save him trouble, as if his ease was the most important thing in the world, betrays him as the saucy errand-boy that he is. Athena's cruelty to Ajax comes out strongly when she pretends to beg for mercy for the captive chiefs: *μὴ αἰκίσῃ* (*Ajax* 111). So Clytemnestra to Agamemnon: *μὴ κάμῃς λέγων*, "please don't tire yourself explaining" (*I. A.* 1143).

A word may be said about some equivalents of the imperative. The negative future indicative exerts strong pressure whether it is used by a bully or by a suppliant: *O. T.* 1154; *Clouds* 1298; *Orestes* 1346; *Bacchae* 253 f.; *H. F.* 1043-54; *Alc.* 794-6. The

potential optative may be used in any situation where a non-committal hint or signal to act is possible. It excludes all dramatic expression, since it is quite impassive: *Chor.* 105, 108, 513; *Phil.* 674. The hortatory subjunctive has the same distinctions of tense-meaning as the imperative. The present indicates obligation or decision, the aorist doubt or emotion. The deliberative subjunctive, being the interrogative form of hortatory subjunctive and imperative, is similar. The present means, "what shall we do, what is our decision." The aorist is rather, "what can we do." This is a field, however, for further study.¹⁹

If my article succeeds in provoking further study in the whole field of dramatic implication, it will be sufficiently justified. It is intended as an introduction, not as anything definitive.²⁰ I hope nevertheless that the main distinctions that I have drawn in the course of my analysis will be found to hold. At any rate it seems certain that to some extent at least the tone and purpose of the speaker are an important factor in determining the tense of the imperative.

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¹⁹ For one kind of deliberative subjunctive see A. R. Anderson, "Repudiative Questions in Greek Drama and in Plautus and Terence," *Trans. Am. Philol. Ass.*, XLIV (1913), pp. 43-64. The deliberative subjunctive serves as the interrogative form of the imperative and of the hortatory subjunctive. Where an imperative is queried, the tense of the subjunctive is that of the preceding imperative.

²⁰ I have not had access to the following: J. Flagg, *Outlines of the temporal and modal Principles of Attic Prose*, Berkeley, Cal., 1893; Sergius Sobolewski, *Syntaxis Aristophaneae Capita Selecta*, Mosquae, 1891; Konrad Ziegler, *De precatationum apud graecos formis quaestiones selectae*, Breslau, 1905; H. Kluge, *Syntaxis Graecae Quaestiones Selectae*, Diss. Berlin, 1911 (on *ἄγε, φέρε, ἴδοι, ἴθι*, etc.); E. Hermann, "Aspekt und Aktionsart," *Nachr. gött. Gesellschaft* (1933), pp. 470-480; Arvid Svenson, *Zum Gebrauch der erzählenden Tempora im Griechischen*, Lund, Gleerup, 1930; K. Kunst, "Die Aktionsarten in ihrer wechselseitigen Beziehungen," *Z. f. öst. Gym.*, LX (1909), pp. 683-704, 865-885.

NOTES ON THE LAWS OF MOTION IN ARISTOTLE.

I

Aristotle's philosophy of nature is basically concerned with the subject of motion and change in the broadest sense. The treatment is, in latter-day terminology, metaphysical, and the culmination is the theory of the prime mover. Yet in the course of the rearing of the metaphysical structure arguments are introduced from time to time that are based on what may be called "laws of motion," statements of quantitative relations, equations, in which Aristotle describes phenomena of nature, for it is in the phenomena of nature that Aristotle seeks to ground his philosophy and his science. These equations of Aristotle are in certain ways erroneous, if we may judge by the results of modern science. They may even be said, in a sense, to be not really essential to the Aristotelian system, as a philosophical system, but they do reflect, however imperfectly, the state of scientific thought in an important school of antiquity, and have had an historical importance which it would be difficult to exaggerate. It will prove instructive to reexamine the passages in which Aristotle sets forth these "laws" of motion, particularly in the sphere which we call dynamics, to consider to what extent they are comparable to the analogous formulations of subsequent science, and to try to grasp the basic causes of error, that we may the better evaluate the achievement of Aristotelian science. Uncritical evaluations, neglectful of the historical researches of the last fifty years, are still most common;¹ in fact, the sharpest divergence on some points is found even among such skilled investigators as Mach, Duhem, Boutroux, Milhaud, Cornford, Carteron, and others, as we shall see.

Are we permitted to impute any science of mechanics to Aristotle? Why were the Greeks, whose genius was so successful in a deductive science like mathematics or in the descriptive and classificatory aspects of biology, unable to achieve more in combining observation and deduction in physics, and particularly in dynamics? Were the Greek philosophers and scientists not fundamentally interested in change as a series of quantitatively

¹ See, for example, C. T. Chase, *A History of Experimental Physics* (New York, 1932), p. 15, and H. T. Briccoe, *The Structure and Properties of Matter* (New York, 1935), pp. 6-9.

measurable phenomena or in the formulation of such quantitative relationships but rather in purely qualitative aspects of matter and change? Did the essentially qualitative treatment of matter which entailed for Aristotle and others a cleavage between what they called natural and unnatural motion and between sublunary and supralunary phenomena constitute the barrier to fruitful science? Was it inaccurate observation which led to the Aristotelian principle that a constant force produces a uniform velocity (rather than a uniform acceleration), or was it too slavish an adherence to observation? Was the cause of the failure the essential complexity of physical phenomena which required for successful handling a degree of analysis and of abstraction unattained by Aristotle? Are we permitted, in any sense, to see in his work an attempt at what we should today call theoretical physics, that is, a deductive body of quantitative propositions based on postulates suggested by experience? These are some of the questions on which my discussion will bear.

It is impossible to understand Aristotle's treatment of motion except in connection with his metaphysical system. The kinds of motion, motion as a bridge between the potential and the actual, the relation of matter, form, and substance, the doctrine of causes, the qualitative differentiation of the four terrestrial elements and of the celestial element, the bearing of these differences on the natural motion of the elements (i. e. the doctrine of the heavy and the light, and of natural places), the theory of the formation and of the natural motion of compounds, the doctrine of unnatural or forced motion, the finiteness of the universe, the doctrine of time, space, and the void, the ultimate deduction of a prime mover—this background must be kept in mind throughout the whole discussion of the "laws" of motion. But if this is done and the particular context of each passage is noted, and if we are careful not to read into the language of Aristotle ideas which such words as "force," "mass," etc. have attained in the subsequent course of history, I think we may fairly examine those quantitative formulations to which I have referred.

II

In the case of external forces acting upon bodies (i. e. what Aristotle calls forced or unnatural motion, as opposed to a case of natural motion such as the free fall of a heavy body toward its

natural place) Aristotle states in numerous passages a law of proportionality connecting the force applied, the weight moved, and the time required for the force to move the weight a given distance. I cite typical examples.

I. (a) "If, then, a mover A has moved a body B a distance C in time D, the same force (*δύναμις*) A will, in the same time, move half of B double the distance C, and

(b) A will move half of B the distance C in half the time D . . . , and

(c) If a given force (*δύναμις*) moves a given <weight> a given distance in a given time, <it will move the weight> half the distance in half the time,² and

(d) Half the force (*ισχύς*) will move half <the weight> the given distance in the given time. Thus, let E be half of force (*δυνάμειος*) A, and Z be half of <weight> B; the ratio of force (*ισχύς*) to weight (*βάρος*) is in both cases the same, so that the respective forces will move the respective weights the same distance in the same time" (*Physics* VII, 5, 249 b 30-250 a 10).

II. (In the course of the refutation of the possibility of a body of infinite extension). (a) "Let it be assumed that the smaller and the larger <weights> are acted upon in shorter and in longer time, respectively, by the same <force>, the weights being in proportion to the time" *De Caelo* I, 7, 275a 32-275b 2).

(b) "Let an equal <force> produce an equal alteration in an equal time, a smaller <force> a smaller alteration in the same time, a greater <force> a greater alteration, the alterations in the last two cases being to each other as the greater <force> to the smaller" (*De Caelo* I, 7, 275a 7-10).³

(c) "For the greater <force> was assumed <to effect a given alteration> in a shorter time" (*De Caelo* I, 7, 275a 20-21).

III. (In the course of the argument that the prime mover is

² This clause may be considered also as part of the protasis.

³ Although alteration alone is mentioned here, the applicability of the principles to the other types of motion, i.e. increase and decrease, and locomotion, is indicated in *De Caelo* I, 7, 274b 34-275a 13. In *Physics* VII, 5, 250a 28-250b 6 not only is the applicability of the proportions to all types of motion set forth but the proportionalities are given *in extenso*.

without magnitude, since infinite extension is impossible and infinite force cannot reside in a finite magnitude)

(a) "For if a given <force produces a movement> in a given time, a greater <force will produce the movement> in a lesser, but definite, time, in inverse proportion" (*Physics* VIII, 10, 266b 17-19; the same principle is applied in 10-12).

(b) "For the greater <weight> is moved in greater <time>" (*Physics* VIII, 10, 266a 18).

(c) "For let it be assumed that the greater force (*δύναμις*) is that which always produces a given effect in less time, as in heating, sweetening, hurling, or moving in general" (*Physics* VIII, 10, 266a 26-28).

IV. (In the course of an argument that all bodies have finite weight or lightness) "The smaller and the lighter body will be moved further by the same force (*δυνάμεις*) <in a given time> . . . for the speed of the smaller body will be to that of the larger as the larger body is to the smaller" (*De Caelo* III, 2, 301b 4-5, 11-13).

In addition to these passages, what really amounts to a definition of average velocity in terms of distance traversed and time required is frequently referred to by Aristotle.⁴

The passages I have cited above may be considered from various points of view. But first, perhaps, reference should be made to a view such as that of Carteron,⁵ that the character of Aristotle's formulations precludes our considering them as indicative of anything like a science of mechanics, that the concept of force, for Aristotle, remains essentially a qualitative concept,⁶ that

⁴ E. g. throughout the discussion in *Physics* VI, 2, 233a 31-b 15. See also VI, 4, 235a 20-22 and VI, 7, 237b 23-28.

⁵ Henri Carteron, *La Notion de Force dans le Système d'Aristote* (Paris, 1923), *passim*, but particularly pp. 1-32.

⁶ Those who stress the distinction between quantitative and qualitative interests often set up what is essentially a false distinction. Aristotle, for example, seeks at times to treat qualitative differences quantitatively (*Physics* VIII, 10, 266a 26-28). That he does not succeed better is evidence not of a lack of interest in such quantitative treatment but of an inability to deal with certain matters without the proper groundwork, i. e. without precise methods of ordering qualitative differences. What is manifested in phenomena are complexes of qualities, and science progresses when it is able to abstract from such complexes one quality for special consideration, and is able then to find some

force is inherent in substances and inseparable from them, that the passages in which force is considered quantitatively and as productive of motion in a body external to it are tentative and not really essential, that the proportions are to be treated not as precise mathematical relations, but as merely suggestive of the idea that the greater force produces the greater effect, in short that there is no precise idea in Aristotle of velocity, of kinematics, of the distinction of statics and dynamics. If Carteron means that there is no definitive system of mechanics, or that the concepts are not those of modern science, or that the purpose of Aristotle is something quite different from the purpose of one who to-day writes a textbook on physics or on mechanics, he is quite right. But, even if it be granted that these ideas are a subordinate element in the Aristotelian system, they can not be dismissed entirely, for they do represent an early attempt at the quantitative formulation of the phenomena of dynamics.⁷ The language in which Aristotle speaks of velocity and of force in the sense of *δύναμις ποιητική*, quite external to the body moved, is unequivocal, and conclusive against Carteron's extreme view.

In the Newtonian system the fundamental postulate is the continuance of a body in its state of rest or in rectilinear motion of uniform velocity (the principle of inertia) unless—here I shall use the popular expression⁸—it is acted upon by a force, in which case the rate of change of its momentum is proportional to the force impressed, the change taking place in the direction in which such force is impressed. This is to assert that force is proportional to the product of mass⁹ and acceleration, in other words

means (e. g. the thermometer or the spectroscope) of reducing the consideration of the quality in question (which may be, itself, non-additive) to a metric basis.

⁷ The *Mechanica* is generally held to be not by Aristotle, but to represent ideas current in the Peripatetic School at that time. It is concerned at many points with problems growing out of the principles set forth in the passages I have cited. The theory of the lever is developed from dynamical postulates in a manner analogous to that in which modern mechanics derive both dynamics and statics from one set of assumptions.

⁸ It is customary to avoid the "anthropomorphic" connotation in this use of the term "force," and to consider the latter as a convenient term for the product of the mass and the acceleration, the units being properly chosen. I do not speak here of relativity physics.

⁹ The notion of "mass" as separate from that of "weight" need

that a uniformly accelerated motion is produced during the application of a constant force. From this postulate is deduced a remarkable body of propositions in accordance with which the observed movements of bodies in nature may, within limits, be described. The system is based upon equations representing what is never realized in nature, the motion of an ideal body without friction in a medium devoid of resistance, encountering no force whatever except the single force under consideration.

Two millennia of scientific thought after Aristotle's day were required before the degree of abstraction necessary to arrive at a clear understanding of the principle of inertia could be achieved.¹⁰ The Aristotelian formulations do, however, reach a certain degree of abstraction in removing from consideration, as irrelevant, differences in the bodies moved other than weight (and, by implication, shape), by considering the medium as perfectly continuous and homogeneous, which it never is in nature, and most of all by defining force, at least in one sense, quantitatively in terms of the effect produced. Aristotle does not completely pass to the ideal case, the only one upon which a fruitful science of dynamics could be based, the case in which a single force is isolated for separate consideration; his view of the basic case of motion does not eliminate the resistance of the medium, does not eliminate friction, and involves, therefore, intricate complexes of force which are not analyzed into separate components. The failure to make this analysis renders fruitful advance in dynamics impossible. This complex case of motion is, in fact, that which is observed in nature; it is not insufficient observation of nature, but insufficient abstraction from the phenomena of nature that paralyzes the Aristotelian dynamics. For Aristotle, therefore, as reference to the passages cited above will

not detain us; in connection with the dynamical equations of Aristotle we may equally well speak in terms of weight. The distinction is no sudden appearance in Newton: see G. Vailati, "Sullo Sviluppo Storico della Distinzione tra 'Peso' e 'Massa,'" *Archiv für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften*, I (1908), pp. 48-51.

¹⁰ See e.g. E. Wohlwill, "Die Entdeckung des Beharrungsgesetzes," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, XIV (1883), pp. 365-410, XV (1884), pp. 70-135, 337-383; E. Mach, *The Science of Mechanics* (Eng. trans., Chicago, 1919), *passim*; P. Duhem, "De l'Accélération Produite par une Force Constante," *Congrès International de Philosophie*, II (1904), pp. 859-914.

show, a constant force will produce during the time of its application not a uniformly accelerated motion but a motion of uniform velocity, and, conversely, a changing velocity will imply a changing force, not a constant force.

Aristotle, however, did take an abortive step toward a law of inertia. In the course of his argument against the existence of the void he adopts the axiom that the times required for a body to traverse a given distance in various media are proportional to the respective densities¹¹ of the media (*Physics* IV, 8, 215a 31-215b 12).¹² But the void is of no density; hence the velocity of a body moving through it would be greater than any assignable quantity, and all bodies would move with equal speed through it, since there is nothing in the void to hinder one body more than another. The impossibility of assuming an infinite velocity in a finite universe leads to the argument showing that the assumption of a finite velocity of motion in the void would make it possible for a body to traverse a void or a plenum at equal speeds. This dilemma is one of the arguments which Aristotle uses against those who assume a void.¹³

Had Aristotle correctly considered resistance as a term to be subtracted from velocity under ideal conditions¹⁴ rather than as

¹¹ The notion of density is considered quantitatively in *Physics* IV, 8, 215b 8, but precisely on what basis is not declared, unless the proposition there set forth be itself considered as a definition of the measure of density. Density based on weight per unit of volume seems not to have been in Aristotle's thought in this particular connection, although, as we shall see in the discussion of freely falling bodies, there are in other passages vague indications of a notion of specific gravity.

¹² Though the argument is at first concerned with the natural fall of heavy bodies in media, its applicability to other types of locomotion is indicated (216a 20).

¹³ For a criticism of this type of argument see G. Milhaud, "Aristote et les Mathématiques," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, IX (1903), pp. 367-392. But the fundamental error is not, as Milhaud seems to think, in the reasoning, but in the assumption, without restrictions, of velocity as inversely proportional to the density of the medium (so H. Chernias, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* [Baltimore, 1935], p. 152, and, not so clearly, W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* [Oxford, 1936], p. 61).

¹⁴ As did Philoponus, *Commentaria in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros*, pp. 680-682 (Vitelli); see P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde* (Paris, 1913), I, pp. 351-371. But Philoponus held that, if there were a void, bodies would not fall in it with equal velocity. On the other hand, the

a factor by which to *divide* the velocity under ideal conditions, and had he therefore been able to assume as the ideal condition, not necessarily as an entity of nature but as a limiting case for the purposes of a mathematical treatment of motion,¹⁵ a medium devoid of resistance, he could then have deduced that all heavy bodies fall naturally in this ideal medium with equal and finite speed; in short he could have deduced a principle of inertia. Such a principle of inertia for just such a medium he formulated precisely enough,¹⁶ only to reject it; from this a sound deductive science of dynamics would not have been a far step. But Aristotle would not approach the problem by way of a hypothetical limiting case; his logic was concerned only with finite classes of existing things. This shows itself in his horror of the indefinite in nature, and in the rejection of the void and of the infinite of extension. For the same reason he was not primarily interested in a mathematical treatment of physical phenomena, though he does take tentative steps along these lines.

But the rejection of the void not only as an entity in nature but as a help for a mathematical science of motion, as well as the adoption of the principle that the speed of a body varied inversely as the density of the medium, made impossible a successful treatment of dynamics. Resistance of the medium was viewed as a deterrent to motion, in the same sense as increasing weight of a body to be moved by external force, and was consequently included in the rules of proportionality, so that, for Aristotle, the average velocity of a body acted upon by a force varied directly as the force and inversely as the product of the weight moved and

atomists (and perhaps, too, Straton of Lampsacus), whose basic assumptions would seem to promise most for a fruitful science of dynamics, did not treat quantitatively with any success the factors involved.

¹⁵ I have in mind the assumption, as a limiting case, of a medium devoid of resistance in a manner analogous to Aristotle's assumption in *geometry* of the possibility of indefinite extension (*Physics* III, 8, 207b 27, 34), despite his denial of both the actual and the potential infinite of extension. But with Aristotle the science of mechanics could not be sufficiently divorced from nature, to put the case paradoxically, to be fruitful.

¹⁶ *Physics* IV, 8, 215a 19-22: "Further, no one would be able to say why a body, set in motion <in the void>, would stop at any place, for why should it stop in one place rather than in another? Hence, a body must either remain at rest or be moved *ad infinitum* unless something stronger obstructs it."

the density of the medium. The failure to consider the resistance offered by friction and by the medium as a term to be *subtracted* from velocity under specified conditions rather than as a factor of proportionality resulted in inconsistencies in the system of Aristotle which could be remedied only by express amendment. Thus, a rigid application of Aristotle's theory would demand that, whatever be the ratio of the factors tending to promote motion to those tending to oppose it, the velocity could never be zero so long as any force, however small, was applied to a body. Aristotle, knowing empirically that, unless the force was large enough, there was no motion, was constrained to amend his laws of proportionality (*Physics* VII, 5, 250a 12-19) so that motion of translation is asserted only in the case where the ratio of the moving force to the weight moved is not less than a definite quantity. This idea is extended (250b 2-5) to cover other types of motion.¹⁷

Various reasons are assigned for the failure of Aristotelian dynamics. In one sense it is true that the differentiation of natural and unnatural motion and the distinction between the motion of terrestrial elements and the motion of the celestial element contributed to the failure.¹⁸ Such a classification tended to restrict the search for analogies which facilitate discoveries in science. It was the motion of the heavenly bodies that gave the

¹⁷ A similar proviso is implied in connection with the resistance of the medium; otherwise Aristotle's theory may be interpreted as requiring that if wood, for example, falls with a given velocity in air, it falls with a lesser velocity in water but does not rise (see Galileo, *Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences* [Eng. trans., New York, 1914], p. 66). Of course, Aristotle intended that the formulation should hold only if a body is known to fall in both media that are being compared. Hence, we may consider as implied: "If A falls through medium B with velocity C, it does not follow that A will fall through a medium twice as dense as B with velocity C/2; it may not fall in the new medium at all."

On the passage referred to above, *Physics* VII, 5, 250a 12-19, see F. M. Cornford's discussion in *The Classical Quarterly*, XXVI (1932), pp. 52-54, and Ross, *op. cit.*, *ad loc.* Regardless of the precise reading, the point of the passage is clear. It is to be understood, of course, that, where the weight may be separated into parts each of which may be moved by the force, the proviso is unnecessary (cf. 250a 25-28).

¹⁸ See G. Lewes, *Aristotle* (London, 1864), p. 125; P. Boutroux, "Histoire des Principes de la Dynamique avant Newton," *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale*, XXVIII (1921), pp. 661-663; Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

most striking confirmation of the principle of inertia to those who first based their systems on this principle in the seventeenth century. At the same time it should be remembered that a perfectly consistent science of dynamics might still retain the Aristotelian distinction between natural and unnatural motion. For it will not affect a mathematical theory of motion whether the fall of a heavy body and the rise of a light body be referred to an internal striving on the part of the body to unite itself with its kind and to actualize its potentiality, or this motion be referred to a force external to the body. As a matter of fact, the tendency of the last fifty years has been to remove from physics any idea of force other than as a mathematical symbol for the product of mass and acceleration, and, more recently, to view in the fall of a heavy body its natural behavior in a region where the presence of matter involves a type of space which makes this the natural course of action. Certain it is that the cause of the failure of Aristotelian dynamics was not the absence of accurate measuring instruments;¹⁹ Aristotle's instruments were the equal of Galileo's. Again, to view as the cause of that failure the error, from our point of view, of Aristotle's assumption of force as proportional to average velocity²⁰ is to mistake a symptom for a cause. Nor is the fundamental cause the denial of the void *in nature*. The cause is rather an adherence to the phenomena of nature so close as to prevent the abstraction therefrom of the ideal case, where a single force is isolated for separate treatment.

¹⁹ As held e. g. by A. Fröhling, *Die Begriffe "Dynamis" und "Energie" bei Aristoteles und die moderne physikalischen Begriffe der Kraft und Energie* (Koblenz, 1929), p. 48. On the Greeks as accurate observers of nature, see W. A. Heidel, *The Heroic Age of Science* (Baltimore, 1933), Chap. V.

It is, in a sense, true that Greek science of the fifth and fourth centuries was not so much concerned with quantitative laws of temporal succession as with qualitative aspects of nature, and was content to consider motion from the point of view of general maxims (e. g. "like tends toward like"). On this matter F. M. Cornford has written most interestingly (*The Laws of Motion in Ancient Thought* [Cambridge, 1931]). But is it not precisely in Aristotle that we see a marked effort away from this and toward a quantitative treatment of all the aspects of motion? See also n. 6, above.

²⁰ This is the view of A. E. Haas, "Die Grundlagen der antiken Dynamik," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften*, I (1908), pp. 43-44.

It is this which prevents Aristotle from arriving at a fruitful principle of inertia.²¹

III

Some features of Aristotle's quantitative formulations cited above (under I) may now be considered from the point of view of the measure of force of which the passages constitute a definition. In Aristotle, forced motion involves the application of the force *throughout the whole duration of the motion*.²² Thus, in the case of a missile, where we should consider the motive force as ended when the original agent loses physical contact, Aristotle considers the air set in motion by the original force at the projection of the missile as continuing to act upon the missile. The theory of projectiles must, then, be formulated on the basis of the Aristotelian principle that the mover and the moved must always be in contact. Aristotle, however, has no extended quantitative treatment of the precise rate at which the effect of the original force is lost; he merely gives an account of the stages by which the missile comes to rest,²³ or passes from a forced motion to a natural downward motion. This being the case, when we come to compare the modern formulations of the effect and the measure of force, we shall consider only the case where a single agent acts continuously during the whole course of the motion.²⁴

Now the four propositions of Aristotle cited above under I may be taken as typical. They may be stated as follows:

²¹ The fruitfulness consists in the ability to deduce new significant propositions and to predict phenomena of nature with greater accuracy. It is in this sense that, though theoretical dynamics no longer reifies the notion of "force," a theory assuming the proportionality of force to acceleration is incomparably superior to one like Aristotle's, which assumes the proportionality of force to velocity (see e.g. B. Russell, *The Analysis of Matter* [London, 1927], p. 161; H. Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis* [New York, 1905], pp. 67-78).

²² See *Physics* VII, 2, 244a 3-245b 2.

²³ See *Physics* VIII, 10, 267a 2-12.

²⁴ It is to be noted, however, that the case of hurling is included in *Physics* VIII, 10, 266a 26-28. The implication is that a force twice as great sends the missile a given distance in half the time. For certain features of Aristotle's theory of projectiles, see my note in *Classical Weekly*, XXIX (1936), pp. 93-96.

- If force A moves weight B a distance C in time D, then
 I (a) force A moves weight B/2 a distance 2C in time D,
 I (b) force A moves weight B/2 a distance C in time D/2,
 I (c) force A moves weight B a distance C/2 in time D/2,
 I (d) force A/2 moves weight B/2 a distance C in time D.

In considering wherein the Aristotelian methods and results differ from those in the modern treatment of the case of the vertical lifting of weights or the hauling of weights over horizontal or up inclined surfaces, we shall, to avoid complexity, neglect the resistance of the medium (which would vary at different velocities) and shall consider the force required to keep a body moving at a uniform rate (i. e. to overcome the resistance due to gravity and to friction) as proportional to its weight.²⁵

We may note three cases.

(1) If the force exerted is insufficient to overcome the forces tending to prevent motion, then neither in the Aristotelian nor in the Newtonian system will motion of translation take place.

(2) If the force exerted is greater than that required to overcome the forces tending to prevent motion, we shall have, in the Newtonian system, uniformly accelerated motion. Thus, if A is the excess of force over that required to overcome the forces tending to prevent B's motion and if A moves B a distance C in time D, then

- I (a) A moves B/2 a distance 2C in time D,
 I (b) A moves B/2 a distance C in time $D/\sqrt{2}$,

²⁵ As an approximation this is justified, since the vertical component is measured by weight, and the horizontal depends on total friction, which is, within limits, proportional to total pressure (we must deal with weights of the same material in these cases). The proportionality not only of kinetic but also of the so-called static friction to the weight of bodies of the same shape and material is also, as an approximation, justified. Aristotle does not, in the formulations we are examining, take account of the difference between static and kinetic friction, though the difference is referred to in *Mechanica* XXXI, 858a 4-12. Since the coefficient of friction changes, beyond certain limits, with varying loads and varying speeds, our assumptions are only approximations. Finally, we may consider as the bodies moved not only such as would slide over the surface but such as would roll, for rolling resistance may, as a first approximation, be considered proportional to the weight of the load.

I (c) A moves B a distance $C/2$ in time $D/\sqrt{2}$,

I (d) $A/2$ moves $B/2$ a distance C in time D , or in general xA
moves yB a distance of zC in time $D\sqrt{\frac{yz}{x}}$.²⁶

The systems of Aristotle and Newton cannot here be compared, since for Aristotle an accelerated motion would involve not a constant but an increasing force productive of the motion.²⁷

(3). Where the force (A) exerted is just sufficient to keep B moving at a uniform rate, the methods of accelerated motion no longer apply. We are confined to a consideration of cases like I (c) and I (d): the initial assumption would not fit cases like I (a) and I (b). Both systems would, under these circumstances, yield equivalent results as to the measure of the force and its effects.²⁸ The same holds in the case of the vertical lifting of weights at uniform speed.

It is in connection with this last case that we may find a better basis of comparison between the two systems. If we omit the time element from consideration or consider equal units of time, then A, to which Aristotle gives at times the name *δύναμις* or *λόγος* and at other times no specific name, will measure, in the Aristotelian formulations, not what we call "force," but what we

²⁶ More generally, if A is a force in the Newtonian sense operating continuously during the course of the motion, and P the force required to keep B moving at a uniform rate, the time required in I (a) would

be $D\sqrt{\frac{2(A-P)}{2A-P}}$ and in I (b) $D\sqrt{\frac{A-P}{2A-P}}$; the results in the text are for

the case where $P = 0$. In general P is a function of the weight moved, the angle of inclination of the plane to the horizontal, and the coefficient of friction between the weight and the surface of the plane.

²⁷ Aristotle recognizes the accelerated motion of bodies rising or falling naturally, without the application of external force, a case not relevant here; see n. 37, below.

²⁸ I. e. time $D/2$ in I (c) and time D in I (d); I do not refer in the case of I (c) to the beginning of the motion where, in achieving any finite uniform velocity, acceleration is involved, as in (2), above. It may be noted in this connection that the proposition of *Physics* 250a 25-28 (if A moves B the distance C in time D, and E moves F the distance C in time D, then $[A + E]$ moves $[B + F]$ the distance C in time D) is true for Aristotle and in the modern formulation under case (3), only if A is to B as E is to F.

call "work." Aristotle, of course, has no generalized notion of "work" such as is found in modern mechanics, into which the modern notion of "force" enters. But the notion of "work" in the special sense of the product of a weight lifted by the distance through which it is lifted may be applied to the translation of the Aristotelian equations into modern terms.

Again, if we include the time element, we may, under similar circumstances, e. g. in the case of the vertical lifting of a weight at a uniform rate of speed, consider A in the Aristotelian formulations as equivalent to the term "power" in modern mechanics, i. e. the product of "force" by the average speed over a given distance. Thus, the "power" represented in lifting a weight B a distance C in time D is equal to that represented in lifting a weight $B/2$ a distance $2C$ in time D (I [a]), or in lifting a weight $B/2$ a distance C in time $D/2$ (I [b]), etc.

Of course, no fruitful dynamics could result merely from this limited idea of "power" in the absence of a generalized notion of "force" and "work."²⁹ But in the field of statics even these elementary concepts of Aristotle could and did have some success. The principle of the lever and of other machines was deduced with their aid,³⁰ and a first step was taken toward the

²⁹ The history of mechanics from the sixteenth century shows the interplay between the systems which emphasized work and energy as basic and those which emphasized force and momentum. The relations of force, momentum, work, energy, etc. are all deducible from the principle of inertia: see the work of Mach cited in n. 10, above.

³⁰ P. Duhem has shown that the law of the lever as stated in *Mechanica* III, 850b 1-2 (as well as in numerous other passages of that work), "as the weight moved is to the moving weight, so, inversely, is the length to the length," is deducible from the dynamical formulations discussed above; see *Les Origines de la Statique* (Paris, 1905), I, pp. 5-12, 356, II, pp. 291-301; P. BOUTROUX, pp. 657-660 of the article cited in n. 18, above; and EDMUND HOPPE, *Geschichte der Physik* (Braunschweig, 1926), pp. 9-10. It may be doubted whether Aristotle himself made this precise deduction, but, in any case, assuming that the *Mechanica* is representative of Aristotelian thought, even if not by Aristotle, we have here the beginnings of a science of statics based on principles of motion in a sense analogous to the method of modern mechanics in viewing equilibrium as a limiting case of motion. For the proof of the principle of the lever given in the *Mechanica* is concerned with the velocities with which the weights or their points of application would move in any disturbance of the equilibrium. (See *Mechanica* I: compare, in the matter of radial velocities, *De Caelo* II, 8, 289b 15-16, 34-290a 5. The

deduction of the parallelogram of forces in the special case of the rectangle (or parallelogram) of displacements.⁸¹

IV

We now come to Aristotle's treatment of the laws describing the motion of what we should call freely falling bodies. It will be profitable, however, to reverse the chronological order and recall first the formulations of the Galileo-Newtonian system: (1) that all bodies in a medium devoid of resistance fall with the same speed; (2) that in a resisting medium whatever difference of speeds there is is due to the resistance of the medium; (3) that the basic equations of the motion are those of a body acted upon in a vacuum by a constant external force, i. e. the equations of uniformly accelerated motion.

For Aristotle, the motion of a freely falling body was a case not of motion due to an external force but of motion due to the natural tendency of the body toward its natural place. The motion is never considered as taking place in a medium devoid of resistance⁸² but, as it occurs in nature, in a resistant medium.

Now a perfectly sound quantitative treatment of this subject could have been based on Aristotle's theory of natural places; it was not this that prevented success. It was, as we saw in the

Mechanica may be viewed as the first step in the development of the method of virtual velocities; see G. Vallati, "Il Principio dei Lavori Virtuali da Aristotele a Erone d'Alessandria," *Atti della R. Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*, XXXII [1896-1897], pp. 940-962.) The applicability of the theory of the lever to other machines is noted (*Mechanica* I, 848a 14-15), and is carried out in other sections of that work. Duhem contrasts the method discussed of deducing the theory of the lever with that of Archimedes, in which velocities play no part, and describes the history of statics as the interplay between these two schools of thought.

To deny, with Carteron (pp. 12-15 of the work cited in n. 5, above) that there is any science of statics, any notion of equilibrium in Aristotle is to go counter to the evidence. At the same time, it should be pointed out that Duhem does not always distinguish what may be inferred by a modern scientist and what was inferred by Aristotle.

⁸¹ See *Mechanica* I, 848b 9-35, which is preliminary to a discussion of the lever. The question of the deducibility, on Aristotelian principles, of the parallelogram of forces from the proposition on displacements is discussed by Duhem and Carteron in the passages cited in n. 30, above. See also T. L. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* (Oxford, 1921), I, p. 346.

⁸² Except to refute the possibility of a void in nature.

case of forced motion, an insufficient degree of abstraction which kept Aristotle from considering the simple case of a freely falling body in a medium devoid of resistance and kept him from treating the retarding influence of the medium correctly. As a result he had to deal here, as in the case of forced motion, with phenomena of the greatest complexity. Galileo, on the other hand, to cite but a single example, by going further in his hypothetical assumptions and in his analysis of factors arrives at a much simpler and more fruitful basis for his science of motion, the frictionless motion of a body in a medium devoid of resistance.

The propositions of Aristotle on the subject of freely falling (and rising) bodies are a reasonable sequel to the theory of natural places and, as we shall see, are by no means as strange as they are often declared to be.

In the case of the elements, since the natural motion, for example, of earth and water is toward the center of the universe, and since the tendency of the former toward the center is stronger than that of the latter, as evidenced by the circumstance that the ultimate destination of the former is nearer the center than is that of the latter, what more natural than to suppose that earth falling freely would fall more rapidly than water? But the objects of our environment are not pure elements; they are compounds in which one or another of the elements predominates. What, then, more natural than to proceed thus—objects endowed with weight, e. g. those in which earth or water predominate, will, if unimpeded, fall in a lighter medium, and those with more weight will fall more quickly than those with less, and in proportion to the degree of weight; ²² corresponding propositions hold for compounds which are light in comparison with the medium?

The results of Aristotle's doctrine of falling bodies (analogous propositions hold for bodies naturally rising in a given medium) may be summed up as follows:

- (1) Of two bodies of different substances but of equal volume

²² This is analogous to the case of unnatural motion, where speed is proportional to the moving force. Here the impulse (*ῥοπή*) is of a different kind, yet treated quantitatively in a similar way. This is a step toward the generalization of the notion of force, toward the linking in one system of natural and unnatural motion. Carteron is wrong in denying any such generalization (*op. cit.*, p. 235).

and alike in shape,³⁴ both falling through the same medium from the same point, the heavier will fall more quickly and the ratio of the velocities will be the ratio of the respective weights.³⁵

The reason for the greater speed of the heavier body is that it is better able to divide the medium (*Physics* IV, 8, 216a 13-18).

(2) Of two bodies of the same substance, alike in shape but differing in volume, both falling through the same medium from the same point, the larger volume will fall more quickly and the ratio of the velocities will be the ratio of the respective volumes, or, what in this case amounts to the same thing, of the respective weights. (*De Caelo* I, 8, 277b 4-5; II, 13, 294b 6; IV, 2, 309b 12-15; III, 5, 304b 14-19. See also analogous propositions for upward motion alone: *De Caelo* IV, 1, 308b 18-19, 27-28.)

The reason for the swifter movement of the greater volume of the substance is, apparently, the same as for the swifter movement of the heavier of two different substances of equal volume and shape, (see [1] above).³⁶

(3) Of two bodies of different substances, of different volumes but of the same shape, both falling through the same medium from the same point, the heavier will fall more quickly and the ratio of the velocities will be equal to the ratio of the respective weights of the bodies—not weights per unit of volume, but total weights. This follows from (1) and (2), above, and in this sense we must read *Physics* IV, 8, 216a 13-16; *De Caelo* I, 6, 273b 30-274a 2, II, 8, 290a 1-2 (compare also III, 2, 301a 28-33).³⁷

³⁴ I. e. geometrically similar. This condition is to be kept in mind even in passages where Aristotle does not specifically mention it. The matter is referred to by Aristotle in *Physics* IV, 8, 216a 14 and in *De Caelo* IV, 6, as well as by the commentators.

³⁵ As a matter of fact, this very action is made the basis of the definition as to which of two bodies is lighter. See *De Caelo* IV, 1, 308a 31-33: "of two bodies having weight and equal in bulk that one is relatively light, or the lighter, than which the other naturally moves downward more swiftly." The precise reading is uncertain, but the meaning is clear: a similar definition may be made of the relatively heavy. See Simplicius, *In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria*, 678, 28-29 (Heiberg).

³⁶ See, however, Cherniss, p. 212, n. 255, of the work cited in n. 13, above. It is to be noted that any two of propositions (1), (2), and (3) imply the third. In (2) it seems necessarily implied that the substance in each case is the same state of compression.

³⁷ Reference may be made here to the passages where the acceleration

Before we consider the theory of Aristotle further, let us recall the analysis, in the Newtonian system, of freely falling bodies in a medium. As the velocity increases, the effect of the resistance of the medium becomes, in general, progressively greater, so that, instead of attaining the full constant acceleration which it would attain *in vacuo*, the body approaches a constant velocity as a limit, since the acceleration tends to be annulled. This constant velocity is known as the terminal velocity. Where the shape of the bodies is the same (i. e. geometrically similar), the terminal velocity of the heavier of two bodies of equal volume but of different material is greater than that of the lighter; the terminal velocity of the larger of two bodies of the same material is greater than that of the smaller.³³

of a body falling (or rising) to its natural place is stated: *De Caelo* I, 8, 277a 28-29, 277b 2-8, III, 2, 301b 19-21, *Physics* V, 6, 230b 24-25, VIII, 9, 265b 12-14. The various theories about the cause of this acceleration may be found in Simplicius, *In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria*, p. 264, 9-267, 6 and are summed up in P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde*, I, pp. 388-398, in the article of Duhem cited in n. 10, above, and in that of Haas cited in n. 20, above. For a different view see Carteron, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

The fact that Aristotle considers acceleration in *forced* motion as due to increase of force would seem to indicate that for Aristotle the cause of acceleration in natural motion was increase of weight in the falling body which strives more eagerly to attain its goal the nearer it approaches the goal.

In none of the passages that deal with acceleration is there any limitation such as would support the idea that Aristotle, in his theory of the ratio of the velocities of falling bodies, has any precise notion of terminal velocities.

³³This agrees with the corresponding Aristotelian formulations (1 and 2) so far as it indicates which body falls more quickly; the error of Aristotle is in the statement of the ratio of the velocities. The determination of the precise way in which air resistance varies with velocity has long concerned scientists (see e. g. Newton's *Principia*, II, Sections 1-3). The problem is most complex, depending not only on the velocity, mass, and shape of the body but on the density, pressure, etc. of the air. For some results reference may be made to *Physikalisches Handwörterbuch*³, s. v. *Fallbewegung* (Berlin, 1932); F. R. Moulton, *New Methods in Exterior Ballistics* (Chicago, 1926), pp. 29-39; *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*¹⁴, s. v. "Ballistics," pp. 1003-1006. Textbooks on dynamics contain the mathematical theory.

The terminal velocity of a raindrop of average size is about 8 meters per second (approached in about a second of fall), and that of a heavy,

In order to make Aristotle's strange theory of the relative velocities of bodies falling in a medium seem not quite so contrary to the evidence of our senses, it has been suggested that he was thinking in terms of terminal velocity.³⁹ Not only, however, is there no evidence in Aristotle that this was his thought (see F. Cajori, "Aristotle and Galileo on Falling Bodies," *Science, New Series*, LI [1920], pp. 615-616), but the absence of any such reference from the discussion of acceleration would seem to preclude the notion of terminal velocity. Furthermore—though this seems not to have been stated by those who made the suggestion—the ratio of the terminal velocities of two bodies can by no means be said, as a general proposition, to equal or closely to approximate the ratio of the weights of the bodies. As a matter of fact, Aristotle's theory does not always correctly state which of two bodies of different material and different volumes falls more swiftly.⁴⁰ In any case, therefore, it is impossible to vindicate Aristotle on this point. It is, however, a very superficial view of the problem to say, as textbooks often do,⁴¹ that Aristotle had only to drop two objects to see that his principles

pointed piece of granite may be several hundred meters per second and may take a fall of about 30 seconds and several kilometers to approach, according to P. A. Haas, *Mechanik* (Leipzig, 1926), p. 69.

In the familiar case of the fall of an object from relatively small heights the fall ends, generally, before terminal velocity is approached. This was the case in the experiments ascribed to Galileo at the Tower of Pisa, though, of course, Galileo was quite aware of the retarding effect of air resistance (see pp. 65, 74-77 of the work cited in n. 17 above).

³⁹ See e. g. J. H. Hardecastle, "Professor Turner and Aristotle," *Nature*, XCII (1914), p. 584; the suggestion has had the approval of Ramsay, Lodge, Ostwald, and Greenhill (*ibid.*, p. 606). The passage of St. Thomas (commenting on Aristotle, *Physics* 216a 12-21) relied on by Hardecastle not only does not show that Aristotle entertained the idea of terminal velocity but not even that St. Thomas did. Nor is there anything in Aristotle, so far as I know, to justify the ascription to him of a formula such as Hardecastle's (*Nature*, XCIII [1914], p. 428).

⁴⁰ If the retardation due to air resistance is directly proportional to the area of the cross section of the body and inversely proportional to the mass, it will be seen that of two bodies of the same shape that with the greater total weight will not necessarily encounter smaller retardation if the specific gravity of the other is sufficiently large in relation to that of the first.

⁴¹ E. g. F. Cajori, *A History of Physics* (New York, 1929), p. 5.

were erroneous. Aristotle had not only made this particular observation but had also observed the different rates of descent, for example, of large raindrops, small raindrops, snow flakes. Without a definite idea of terminal velocity Aristotle may still have been thinking of longer falls.⁴² His theory is in any case erroneous, but in a matter so complex as rates of fall in resistant media, on which experimental investigation is still conducted, his failure is easily understandable.

The fundamental cause of the error in Aristotle's whole theory of falling bodies was, as we have seen, his preoccupation with a matter of profound complexity in dealing with a fall in a resistant medium instead of passing to a much simpler basis, that of a falling body in a medium devoid of resistance. The failure to consider the resistance of the medium as a term to be subtracted from the velocity which would have been attained *in vacuo* vitiated the theory as to the ratio of the velocities of falling bodies.⁴³

It seems to me a mistake to say⁴⁴ that the fundamental cause of Aristotle's error in the treatment of the laws of falling bodies was the lack of clear notions on density and specific gravity. The chief error was in the formulation of the *ratio* of velocities of falling bodies; this could not be cured merely by a consideration of specific gravities.⁴⁵ What determines the rise or the fall of a body in a medium, for Aristotle as for us, is the weight of the body relative to that of the medium, as is clear from a consideration of the theory of natural places. In this determination Aristotle is thinking along the lines of a natural weight which we should call weight per unit of volume but of which Aristotle did not develop a quantitative treatment (see e. g. *De Caelo* IV, 1, 308a 31-33, cited in n. 35, above). This is not to be confused with the consideration of *total* weight in the comparison of the

⁴² This is the view Galileo puts into the mouth of Simplicio (p. 65 of the work cited in n. 17, above).

⁴³ See the reference in n. 14, above, to Philoponus, to which may be added E. Wohlwill, "Ein Vorgänger Galileis im 6. Jahrhundert," *Physikalische Zeitschrift*, VII (1906), pp. 23-32.

⁴⁴ As does W. C. D. Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science* (Cambridge, 1929), p. 36.

⁴⁵ Thus Galileo in his earlier work adopts the Aristotelian theory of the ratio of the velocities of falling bodies, with a clarification from the point of view of specific gravity (see P. Duhem, pp. 888-889 of the article cited in n. 10, above).

ratio of the velocities of two bodies in a medium in which both are known to fall; Aristotle never suggests finding the total weight of the *medium* (*De Caelo* IV, 4, 311a 28-29). The difficulties of *De Caelo* IV, 2-6 are occasioned, first, by the lack of the precise language of specific gravity, though the ideas are present (see e. g. *De Caelo* IV, 4, 311a 15-311b 13; Simplicius, *In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria*, pp. 709-712 [Heiberg]) and, secondly, by the fact that Aristotle is attempting to do what modern scientists have generally, perhaps wisely, declined to do, namely to give a causal explanation of gravitation in terms of the ultimate constitution of matter.

V

I shall refer only briefly to some of the other topics which bear on the theory of locomotion. Intimately connected with the question of falling bodies is that of projectiles, referred to at the beginning of part III, above. Precisely how the projectile is acted upon after the original projector has lost contact with it seems not to have been very clear to Aristotle. There is a hesitant notion of *vis impressa*, a step in the direction of a generalized, abstract view of force, but with Aristotle it is to a portion of the medium that the original projector imparts the power to cause motion, this portion of the medium in turn affecting the next, and so on, but each portion ceasing to be moved, though not to exert its *vis motrix*, on losing contact with the portion to which it owed its motion (*Physics* VIII, 10, 266b 27-267a 20).

This whole matter is widely discussed by the ancient authors; it is often connected with the question of action at a distance, e. g. in connection with phenomena of magnetism. The development of the theory of *vis impressa* (e. g. in Philoponus, in whose theory the power is imparted to the projectile itself) is of interest in connection with the modern notions of inertia, energy, and momentum.⁴⁰

The arguments for the immobility of the earth (*De Caelo* II, 14), based ultimately on the natural circular motion of the

⁴⁰ References to the main sources from Plato and Aristotle to Simplicius and Philoponus are to be found in Haas (pp. 36-41 of the article cited in n. 20, above), P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde*, I, pp. 371-388,

heavens, which necessitates the assumption of an immobile center (*De Caelo* II, 3, 286b 9⁴⁷), show, despite the conclusion as to absolute motion, an appreciation of features of relative motion.⁴⁸ Throughout the discussion in the *Physics* the ideas of motion and rest are ideas of mutual implication. For Aristotle the absolute motion of the heavens was necessitated by the requirements of his metaphysical system; it is interesting to note that many modern scientists who, so far from being constrained by any metaphysical system, boast of their complete independence of metaphysics, can not dispense with the idea of absolute motion in some form or other.

Though Aristotle's arguments for the immobility of the earth are erroneous, they are of the highest interest. Those fixed stars which are observed, from a given point on the earth's surface, to rise and set, always rise and set at the same respective places (*De Caelo* II, 14, 296b 5-6). This fact furnished a plausible argument against a motion of translation on the part of the earth relative to the fixed stars until annual stellar parallax was first observed; the tremendous distance of the stars was not, of course, conceived by the ancients.

The fact that missiles which have been thrown straight up seem to descend to the point from which they were thrown (*De Caelo* II, 14, 296b 23-24) confirms Aristotle's conclusion of the immobility of the earth, though it is difficult to see how he could have performed accurate experiments of this nature.⁴⁹ Of course, by the principle of relativity (based on the principle of inertia)

Carteron, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-27, and Wohlwill (pp. 23-28 of the article cited in n. 43, above).

⁴⁷ This assumption is strengthened by the consideration that the rotation of the sphere of fixed stars cannot be due to any motion of the earth, since such a motion could not be natural to the earth, and the apparently eternal character of the motion in question seems to require that it be natural (*De Caelo* II, 14, 296a 27-34).

⁴⁸ The post-Aristotelian work *De Xenophane* also has an interesting passage in connection with relative motion (977b 12-17); in connection with the idea of the inseparability of action and reaction see *De Motu Animalium*, 1-3.

⁴⁹ The same may be said of the argument (*De Caelo* II, 14, 297b 17-20) for the sphericity of the earth, to the effect that heavy bodies fall to earth not in parallel lines but in such a way as "to make equal angles" (i. e. along perpendiculars to different tangent planes at the points of contact).

in the physics of Galileo and Newton—that a uniform rectilinear motion of an enclosed system cannot be detected by a mechanical experiment performed within that system—the effect of the argument is annulled so far as motion of translation is concerned. The effect of the earth's *rotation* on the apparent trajectories of missiles and of freely falling bodies was not observed until comparatively recent times.

The arguments for the sphericity of the earth (*De Caelo* II, 13-14), and for the sphericity of the surface of water in equilibrium⁵⁰ (*De Caelo* II, 4, 287b 14, in the course of an attempt to prove the sphericity of the heavens), the relations of the various types of motion, uniform and non-uniform, rotatory, circular, and rectilinear, the whole theory of time, the problems of continuity of time, space, and motion, the problems and paradoxes of the infinite and the infinitesimal, are some of the other matters treated by Aristotle in his discussion of motion.

VI.

In examining Aristotle's attempts to represent quantitatively certain phenomena of nature, we have seen wherein his shortcomings lay. We have seen that from one point of view success was impeded not by insufficient observation and excessive speculation but by too close an adherence to the data of observation and by insufficient analysis and insufficient abstraction, a condition which was not overcome until two thousand years later.⁵¹ Those who discredit Aristotelian science would do well to remember that the quality of Aristotle's work must be estimated not merely by comparison with that of his successors but also by comparison with that of his predecessors.

We may think of Aristotle as having joined to the deductive and mathematical analysis of Platonic science a realization that the validity of a science of nature is ultimately tested by empirical observation. We see in Aristotle's work an appreciation of

⁵⁰ This demonstration is considered by Duhem (*Le Système du Monde* I, p. 214) the beginning of theoretical hydrostatics.

⁵¹ But it is to be noted that Galileo's advance over Aristotle was not due to a basically different methodology but to a more successful analysis of the individual factors in phenomena (see P. P. Wiener, "The Tradition Behind Galileo's Methodology," *Osiris*, I [1936], pp. 733-746).

the importance of abstraction, an attempt, though hesitant and incomplete, to look beyond the mere description of phenomena, to the formulation of mathematical equations applicable to physical relations, even the groping toward a simplicity postulate in the use (and abuse) of proportionality in the formulations. From one point of view, that portion of the scientific corpus of Aristotle which is concerned with the classification and the report of observations is most valuable; but, from another point of view, the attempt to do what Aristotle recognizes as necessarily involving a lesser degree of certitude, to organize and systematize this knowledge, to find underlying principles, and to bring all together under an integrated view of all existence is of even greater significance.⁵²

Aristotle happened to be both scientist and metaphysician, but it is an all too common error to say that he confused the two fields. That the description of what is observed and the attempt to formulate these descriptions quantitatively are procedures quite different from the search for ultimate causes underlying phenomena was as clear to Aristotle as it was to Newton when he penned the famous passage at the end of the *Opticks*. That certain basic metaphysical assumptions must underlie even the simplest scientific description or abstraction seems to have been clearer to Aristotle than to many modern scientists.

There is great danger in pressing comparisons between ancient and modern science, in asserting that in such and such a Greek philosopher we have the germ of such and such a modern theory. Yet it is instructive to note elements of continuity in the history of human thought. The fruits of comparatively recent study in the history of science have served to make us more aware of this continuity in a particular field of thought, though occasionally this factor has been overemphasized. I do not propose at this time to catalogue the achievements of Aristotelian science from this point of view.⁵³ We may note, however, in passing, the anal-

⁵² The modern tendency in some quarters to praise Aristotle's biologic treatises and not the purely physical is partly due to the fact that modern progress in reducing science to a mathematical basis has not been as great in biology as in physics.

⁵³ I have, in passing, indicated certain considerations and references of this sort in connection with motion. Since my treatment has not been concerned with the animate, I shall make no reference to biology, but reference should be made in the field of chemistry to E. O. Von

ogy between the Aristotelian theory of natural places together with the distinction of natural and unnatural motion and the view of relativity physics in which the fall of a heavy body is described not in terms of external force but in terms of the geometric properties of space.⁵⁴ More recently certain analogies have been pointed out⁵⁵ between Aristotelian metaphysics and the quantum theory (though elements of discontinuity in the latter would seem inharmonious with the former).

It must, nevertheless, be remembered that the chief significance of Aristotle for modern science and modern thought in general comes not from lasting achievements from the point of view of the substance of science, but from those of spirit and method, not from points of detail and isolated instances where analogies may be drawn, but from the rational ideal, the patient and painstaking analysis and observation which pervade the whole system in all its varied yet integrated parts.

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Lippman, "Chemisches und Alchemisches aus Aristoteles," *Archiv für Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften*, II (1910), pp. 233-300, and to P. Duhem, *Le Miroir et la Combinaison* (Paris, 1902), where instructive analogies are drawn between modern views of chemical phenomena and the Aristotelian theory as set forth in *De Generatione et Corruptione*. The work of W. A. Heidel cited in n. 19, above, has an account of substantive and methodological achievements of Greek science. See also my article, "An Appraisal of Greek Science," *Classical Weekly*, XXX (1936), p. 57.

⁵⁴ See e.g. P. M. Kretschmann, "The Problem of Gravitation in Aristotle and the New Physics," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXVIII (1931), pp. 260-266. I have indicated above that, from the point of view of the mere description of phenomena—I do not now refer to metaphysical theory—the precise nature of the forces causing motion is irrelevant, provided that the forces in question may in some way be compared. Aristotle seems to have taken tentative steps along this path (see n. 33, above).

⁵⁵ See C. Bialobrzeski, "Sur la Mécanique Quantique," *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale*, XLI (1934), pp. 83-103.

AN UNREPORTED *CULEX* MANUSCRIPT.

Vollmer in the introduction to his edition of the *Appendix Vergiliana* gives a list of all the manuscripts, so far as he knew, which contain any or all of the minor poems attributed to Virgil.¹ Although he lists several fifteenth century codices in the Laurentian Library in Florence, he omits one (Aed. lat. 203), which investigation proves to be of more worth than any of those which he has included. This is a paper manuscript which once was part of the library of Giorgio Antonio Vespucci. Among other things it contains the *Culex*, *Copa*, *Dirae* and *Lydia*, and the *Moretum*. While the text of the other poems is substantially that of the late manuscripts labelled *deteriores*, that of the *Culex* is derived from a better source and is well worth a close study.²

For the text of the *Culex* Vollmer regards as his best authority a fourteenth or fifteenth century humanistic collection now in the Biblioteca Corsiniana (43 F 5), which he calls Γ. His next best manuscript is Vat. lat. 2759. (V), of the thirteenth century, in which, as in Aed. 203, the text of the other minor poems is of little worth, but the *Culex* comes from a source which he considers equally authoritative with that of Γ, but which, unfortunately, is freely interpolated.

A study of Vollmer's apparatus to the *Culex* shows that V has indeed contributed very substantially to the text. Although there are over one hundred and fifty readings reported as peculiar to Γ alone, only thirteen of them seem to the editor worthy of being adopted. On the other hand, fourteen readings which are found in V alone have been introduced into the text. In fifteen cases the combination of Γ V as against all the other manuscripts establishes the correct reading, and in seven other instances the combination of V and one other manuscript as against all the others (including Γ) is the favored version. Thus it is clear that although V is given second place in Vollmer's enumeration of codices, it plays a very important part in the establishment of the text.

¹ *Poetas Latini Minores*, I (Leipzig, Teubner, 1927), 37-42. These pages are reprinted in identical form in the 1930 Teubner edition, edited by Willy Morel.

² This is found on ff. 17-25v.

Now Aed. 203 is the only manuscript of the *Culex* yet discovered which comes from the same archetype as V.³ The following selection of readings peculiar to V and Aed. will make this relationship clear.⁴

- 47 colles Ω flores V Aed.
- 119 pernigre morantem Ω pernix remorantem V Aed.
- 199 obc(a)ecaverat Ω excecaverat V Aed.
- 236 incendere *or* incendere Ω rescindere V Aed.
- 280 viridi *or* viride *or* viri Ω radiis V Aed.
- 310 paratos Ω paratas V Aed.
- 362 camilli *or* melli *or* belli Ω metelli V Aed.

That Aed. 203, however, is not a copy of V is clear from the fact that it lacks the following readings peculiar to V alone: 18 nemoris; 29 ensem; 37 Hec; 70 tunc; 71 novo; 81 agnoscit; 87 Panchasia; 96 pastori; 108 condensas; 116 que *om.*, chorosque; 161 soporem; 170 corpus; 174 late; 177 quisque; 214 eclalibus; 232 acerbans; 246 In quibus; 252 Quare; 273 obtemptu; 276 indicat; 285 tennistis; 319 *vs. om.*; 322 hic; 332 zanclea cariddis; 361 Fobii; 381 moriturus; 397 lapidem; 398 acanthus; 403 *vs. om.*; 406 amaratus. In all these cases Aed. agrees with Ω , the consensus of the other manuscripts, except in 244 *acerba*, where it agrees with C alone, and in 232 and 276, where it has distinctive readings. An important deviation from V is found in verses 332 and 402 where the Vatican manuscript has interpolations from two verses in Ovid's *Fasti*. Aed., however, has the traditional text as found in Ω .

Of the two verses omitted in V but found in Aed. (319 and 403) the latter supports the reading *roris* found in Γ alone and included in Vollmer's text on that authority. Of new readings found in Aed. and not reported from any other manuscript, the following are significant, as they occur where there is a diversity of readings in the other codices or where modern scholars have felt the need of emendation:

³ Voss. in Oct. 81, which Baehrens considered of importance seems to have been copied from V, and thus is of no significance. Cf. Housman, *Transactions of the Cambridge Philol. Soc.*, VI (1908), 1-11; Vollmer, *Sitzungsber. Kgl. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss.*, Phil.-hist. Kl. (1908), No. 11, p. 36.

⁴ For a complete list see the collation which follows.

= adopted by Vollmer.

- 23 *astra* Ω , #*antra Heyne*, *arva* Aed.
 66 #*gratum* Ω *Exc.*, *Graium Heinsius*, *grata* Aed.
 93 *licet* Ω , #*leuet Exc.*, *liget VW*, *locet* Aed.
 133 #*defende puellis* Ω , *defende puellis Scaliger*, *dicende puellis Leo*, *taedende puellis Vollmer (in apparatu, non in textu)*, *defende puellam* Aed.
 163 *id(a)e* Ω , *yde VE*, *idem s.*, #*isdem Bembus*, *hydrę* Aed.
 192 #*ab arbore* Ω , *ab ore VCL*, *aure V²*, *orno* Aed.
 226 #*rure Bembus*, *iure* Ω , *iura V*, *vita* Aed.
 232 *cim merios I*, *cumerios V*, *cum meritos S*, *cum innerios C*; *cum merios L*, #*Cimmerios Vollmer*, *cumanos* Aed.
 251 *Pandionias* Ω , #*Pandionia Housman* Aed.

It is to be noted that in the last item Aed. supports Housman's emendation which Vollmer had adopted against all manuscript authority.

A complete collation with Vollmer's text follows. It is clear that the second hand (also of the fifteenth century), which entered interlinear and marginal variants, was using one of the current late manuscripts known as *deteriores*, from which he made his "corrections." The work of the original scribe is indicated as *m*.

Titulus P. V. Maronis ad Octavium de culice liber incipit
 1 *camena m* *talia i. m. m¹* 3 *dicta* 4 *lusum m* 1' *per ludum i. m. m¹* 10 *dignato* 13 *recanente m* *recinente m¹* 14 *Alma*
 15 *astrigeri* 21 *fetura m* *setura m²*; *cura m* *aura m¹*; *tenente m*
canente m¹ 22 *siliquasque* 23 *arva* 27 *Triste Iovis* *ponitque*
canit non pagina bellum m *vacat i. m. m²* 28 *Flegra*; *quo*
 29 *enses* 32 *Leta meam*; *volumina famam* 37 *memorable m*
memorabilis m¹; *certet m* *al' restet l'* *constet i. m. m²* 41 *lucens m*
liceat s. s. m² 42 *penetrarat* 47 *flores* 51 *desertis errabant m*
al' herebant i. m. m¹; *rupis* 55 *Hęc* 56 *sentes* 60 *pretiis m*
spretis i. m. m¹ 64 *angit* 65 *nec* *non* 66 *grata* 68 *bacca*; *at*
 72 *recanente m* *retinente m²* 73 *invidię*; *et om. ac add. s. s. m²*
 74 *Pellentemque*; *lucem* 77 *nemus m* *al' venus i. m. m²*; *intus m*
imis s. s. m² 83 *Non m* *al' Quo s. s. m²* 84 *nec*; *transcendit*
 90 *huc m* *huic m¹* 91 *dirigit* 93 *locet* 96 *poeta* 101 *inevectus m*
etevectus m² 103 *Qua m* *Dum s. s. m²*; *rapaces m* *capaces m²*
 109 *Ut m* *l' Et m²* 111 *nictelium m* *nictileum m²* 114 *de m*
al' se s. s. m²; *futuram* 115 *Hęc* 116 *choros* 118 *rivis m*
ripis m² 119 *pernix remorantem*; *diva m* *dive m²* 124 *platani m*
platanus m²; *quas inter et imp.* 127 *Et m* *A s. s. m²* 129 *amplexę*
 130 *teneris* 132 *perfida* 133 *et* *i*; *puellam* 137 *navis*; *aedita*
 138 *Proceras* 140 *leta* 142 *ictus m* *artus s. s. m²* 143 *excedunt*
 148 *superat m* *siberat m²* 149 *orta* 150 *Et quamquam*; *obstre-*

pat *m* obstrepit *m*²; aures 151 Ac *m* l'Hanc *m*²; voces referunt
 152 nympha *m* lymphā *m*² 155 super; quæ 161 corde *om. m.*
*add. i. sp. rel. m*² 162 fons *m* fors *m*¹ 163 isdem) hydrex *m*
 l'isdem l'idem *s. s. m*² 165 sub syderis 167 orbes 168 visus *m*
 nisus *m*² 171 caput *m* capit *m*² 173 micat *om. m. add. i. sp.*
*rel. m*²; flammæ *m* flammantia *m*²; lumine *m* lumina *m*²
 174-176 *vss. om. i. t. add. i. m. inf. m*²; 176 torvo 177 infrin-
 gere *m* infrendere *s. s. m*² 179 intonat 180 torquetur c. orbis
 182 paranti 184 acumina *m* culcumina *m*² 187 cum *m* tum *m*²
 188 discitus *m* dissitus *m*² 189 sensim *m* sensus *m*² 192 dextra
 truncum detraxit ab orno 193 sotiaret; numen ne *m* ve *s. s. m*²
 194 voluit 196 crebro *m* crebris *m*² 197 cristam *m* criste *m*²
 198 omni; remoto 199 Nescius *m* Namque eius *i. m. m*²; aspi-
 ciens *m* arripiens *s. s. m*² al' subiens *i. m. m*²; exceperat *m*
 l'occeperat *s. s. m*² 202 herebo cis equos *m* cit eq. *m*² 203 aurato
 205 in fessos *m. litt. f. i. ras. m*¹ erat *s. ?* 210 Inquit quid meritis *m*
 Impie q. *m. m*²; delatus *m* dilatus *m*² 211 me; ipso 215 tranare
 216 charonis *m* charontis *m*²; ut 217 translucent *m* collucent *m*²;
 telis 219 poenæ *m* poena *m*² 220 et 221 arent qui *m* cui
*s. s. m*¹ 222 Sanguineique *m* Sanguineaque *m*² 226 vita *m*
 rure *s. s. m*² l' victa *i. m. m*² 227 Iustitiæ pr. 230 fit *m* sit
*s. s. m*² bis; voluptas *m* voluntas *m*¹ 232 cumanos *m* cim-
 merios *m*² 234 victus 235 devinctus moestus 236 conati cum
 sint quondam *m* conati quondam cum sint *m*²; rescindere cælum
 237 tuæ memor anxius iras 238 alitis *m* unius *s. s. m*² 241 Restat
 243 Qui *m* Quid *m*²; de monte *m* qui *m. m*² 244 quæ
 quem *m*¹; acerba *m* acerbus *m*² 245 ceu rite *m* simul ite *m*²
 248 turbas *m* turmas *m*² 251 pandionia 252 vox iteratur ithim
 quo *m* al' vox querula est superat quod *i. m. m*² 254 sanguine
 258 Heu heu mut. 259 nomina *m* numina *m*² 256 adversatus
 262 perferre 263 vacant *m* vacat *m*² 264 calcedoniis 265 icha-
 riotis *m* l'icharionis *m*² 268 recesi *m* recessit *statim corr. m*¹
 268 Peneque *m* Penæque *m*¹; orpheus 271 ullum *m* ulli *m*¹
 274 Effossasque 276 vindicet 279 orpheus *m* orphei *m*¹ l'orphea
*i. m. m*² 280 radiis *m* tot. *verb. exp. et viridi s. s. m*² 281 Quer.
 hum. steterant amnes sil. son. 282 amara 283 Lambentes *m*
 Labentes *m*¹; biuges; luna 284 torrentis *m* currentis *m*²
 287 ultro; non *m* nam *m*² 289 manes 290 Præceptum *m*
 Præceptum *m*²; intus *m* inter *m*² 291 Lumina *m* Limina *m*²;
 munere *m* munera *m*¹; linguam *m* l'lingua *s. s. m*² 295 graves
 vos *m* 300 Hunc 302 excelsum *m* excusum *m*²; ignes 303 turba
m torva *s. s. m*²; refusa *m* repulsos *i. m. m*¹ 305 graii 308 ducis
m duos *s. s. m*² 309 Videre *m* Viderit *i. m. m*¹ 310 neces ignes;
 paratas 311 vagis *m* magis *m*²; ab *m* et *s. s. m*² 312 cupide *m*
 cupidis *m*² 318 Fulminibus veluti fragor est a turbine ni se
 319 hab. aigeaque præter 322 Hoc; vultu; honore 324 Hec-
 tore *m* Hectora *m*²; lustravit victor de corp. *m* al' Hectoreo
 victor lustravit corpore *i. m. m*² 325 fremunt *m* fremuit *m*²;

pars *m* paris *m*²; huic pars destinat illi *m* Paris hunc quod letat et huius *i. m. m*² 326 quoque *m* quod *m*² 327 Hinc 329 tremiscit 330 lestrygones ipse 334 atride 337 gravius; furenti 338 obituro *m* obiturus *m*² 339 Illa hom. vires *m* Illa vices hom. *m*² 340 Nec *m* Ne *m*²; proprio 342 deus *m* decus *m*² 343 argoa 345 ad undas 346 super *m* supra *m*²; icta 351 minantur 352 letum *m* leta *m*² 354 saxa pherei *m* capherei *m*² 356 perempta *m* peracta *m*² 358 sidunt 361 Hinc; gracchia virtus *m* oratia virtus *i. m. m*¹ 362 metelli 365 Mutius 366 Legitime cessit cui fracta 368 Flamineus 369 talis 370 Scipiadisque 371 Moenia yapio... (*sp. duar. litt. rel.*) *m* romanis *i. m. m*¹ 374 maxima 375 Cum scelerata; discernit 376 Ergo quam; dic *m* discere *statim corr. m*¹ 377 a 379 tolerabilius 380 vadas; dimittere somnia 381 fontes 383 Et; rapiuntur 390 propter 393 gr. vir. fodiens 399 crescens 402 decus surgens 403 et *om.* 404 priscas; sabinas 407 pinus 408 illic 411 fronde 412 eulogium.

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HERACLITUS ON THE NOTION OF A GENERATION.

(Vorsokr. 22 A 19)

The relevant evidence is the following:

(1) PLUTARCH, *Def. orac.*, 11, 415e: . . . ἔτη τριάκοντα . . . τὴν γενεὰν καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ γεννῶντα παρέχει τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννημένον ὁ γεννήσας.

(2) PHILO, frag. Harris (Cambr. 1886), p. 20 = *Qu. in Gen.*, II, 5: Not in vain did Heraclitus call it a generation, when he said: δυνατόν ἐν τριακοστῷ ἔτει τὸν ἄνθρωπον πάππον γενέσθαι. ἡβᾶν μὲν περὶ τὴν τεσσαρεσκαίδεκατῇ ἡλικίαν, ἐν ᾗ σπείρει, τὸ δὲ σπαρέν, ἐνιαυτοῦ γινόμενον, πάλιν πεντεκαδεκάτῃ ἔτει τὸ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ γενᾶν.

(3) CENSORINUS, 17, 2: Hoc tempus (*scil.* triginta annos) genean vocari Heraclitus auctor est, quia orbis aetatis in eo sit spatio; orbem autem vocat aetatis, dum natura ab sementi humana ad sementim revertitur.

All interpreters agree that Heraclitus assigned 30 years to a generation because 30 is the minimum age, in theory, for a man to have a grandchild. Now the number 30 is unimpeachable; but the reason given for that number is at variance with what any sensible people, the ancient Greeks not excluded, have ever meant when using the term generation. Instead of one period from birth to reproduction, two are introduced. On the same

basis one could, when inquiring what the normal weight of an egg is, expect to be told that it is so many ounces, because two eggs, the tiniest that can possibly be found, will weigh at least that much. Many scholars have justly wondered why the obscure philosopher made such a strange statement. But no one seems to have noticed that the allegedly Heraclitean definition of a generation runs contrary not to reason alone but also to two-thirds of the evidence from which it is supposedly derived. According to both Plutarch and Censorinus, Heraclitus has said a very different thing, viz.: "A generation takes 30 years and represents a cycle of human nature, for such is the (average) span of time between a son being begotten by his father and a son being begotten by that son." This is simple and obviously correct. Philo, on whom alone the current interpretation is based, has grossly blundered. Misunderstanding his source, he has ventured into an explanation for which he alone is responsible. Maybe he was misled by the triple recurrence of the verb γεννᾶν into the belief that Heraclitus spoke of three, instead of two, begettings; maybe the word χρόνος had already begun to be used in everyday language with the connotation of "year," so that Philo took ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ to mean "in his thirtieth year." Maybe he was just careless and thoughtless.

What Heraclitus actually did mean and say could have been stated in several different ways, e. g. that 30 years is the average distance in age between a son and his father. But this would be less dramatic and impressive than the way in which Heraclitus has put it. Furthermore, the pattern of the geometric mean, as it were, is a favorite one in the reasoning of Heraclitus. The formula is $a:b = b:c$, or else $b:a = c:b$. The latter form, with the same magnitude at the beginning and the end, shows more clearly the existence of the "cycle" (orbis) of which Heraclitus seems to have spoken. The cycle of shifting generations is completed once after the lapse of 30 years, because then the relation of father to son repeats itself, with the former son in the position of a father. The pattern is found again, either directly or implied, in Heraclitus B 79 (man: god = child: man); 82 and 83 combined (man: ape = god: man); 1 (man asleep: man awake = man awake: man who has waked up to the realization of what the logos is); 117 (man, drunk: immature boy = immature boy: man, sober). In the last case, there is the further aggravating

circumstance that not only the child but the man as well may be the identical person on both sides of the equation. The very same man, when intoxicating himself, falls, in his relation to a childish boy, from high superiority to equally deep inferiority.

The core of Heraclitean doctrine is the coincidentia oppositorum, and the geometric mean implies opposite qualities in the same subject. He who had been only a son now becomes a father as well. Man is like a god when compared to an ape but like an ape when compared to god. The man who has no understanding is physically present and awake and hearing but spiritually absent or asleep or deaf (frags. 1 and 34 combined).

But we shall not allow ourselves here to be led away from frag. A 19 and to go deeper into the theory, interesting though it may be, of the geometric mean in Heraclitus.

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AUGUSTUS, VERGIL, AND THE AUGUSTAN ELOGIA.

When we consider the interest of Augustus in the poetry and art of his day, we may safely assume that there were frequent interchanges of ideas between the patron and the producers. The very intense interest in republican ideals and in old Roman history, which is so prominent in Vergil's pageant of heroes in the sixth book of the *Aeneid* and in the portrait gallery of heroes with their *elogia* in the Augustan forum, seems to be reflected in the thought of Augustus when he "restored the Republic" between 27 and 23 B. C.

Augustus' sincerity in claiming that he had given the *res publica* back to the *populus* has often been questioned on the ground that in his later years he frequently showed impatience with the senatorial administration and at times behaved like an autocrat; but all that he did between 27 and 23 points to a genuine desire to bring back republican traditions. His division of the provinces between himself and the Senate, his refusal of the consulship and the dictatorship despite all urging, his nomination during 23 of the consuls, Sestius and Piso, of strong republican leanings, his increasing reliance upon Agrippa for advice and coöperation in place of Maecenas who had favored an

autocratic government, these and much else would seem to prove that he was not merely pretending. Of course it has been pointed out that the murder of Caesar the Dictator and the revulsion of the Roman people against the behavior of Antony must have made Octavian aware of the wisdom of avoiding their mistakes; but we seem to have here something more than political prudence: in fact a real enthusiasm for the old republic, its heroes, its stories, and its ideals.

It would be venturesome to try to decide whether Vergil's pageant of republican heroes influenced Augustus or whether the ruler's advocacy of republican ideals suggested such themes to Vergil. Perhaps the two men were thinking on similar lines at about the same time. Both had apparently changed their former ways of thought before 23; for Vergil, who had grown to manhood under Julius Caesar, was in his youth ready to salute Octavian as *deus*, while Octavian during the triumvirate had had no regard for constitutional forms. Later when Vergil was writing the *Aeneid* he frequently speaks of the great Augustus, but never as *divine*. It is Rome's past that he glorifies; and when he passes the heroes in review he begins with the first Brutus who drove out the tyrants *pulchra pro libertate* and includes in his list even Pompey, who so recently had died in his struggle to save the republic. We know that Vergil read the passage to Augustus, and we may well believe that the poet had enough confidence in Augustus' sincere intentions to assume that the prince would not take offense.

We do not know just when Vergil wrote this part of the sixth book. He seems to have worked on his epic from 29 to 19 B. C. In 25 when Augustus then in Spain asked to see some portion of his epic, he answered that no part was as yet far enough advanced to be worth reading. At the end of 24 Augustus arrived in Rome. Later, after the death of Marcellus (23 B. C.), the poet read books II, IV, and VI to him and Octavia. Since Augustus left Rome in September of the next year and did not see Vergil again till he met him in Athens just before the poet's death, we may be quite sure that the sixth book of the *Aeneid* was read to Augustus during that very eventful year of 23-2; and it probably was written in 23.

Perhaps it would be fair to assume that the poet knew before he wrote the famous passage that Augustus had promised to

govern Rome according to the forms of the old constitution, but we can also be sure that Augustus was wholly in sympathy with the poet's outspoken republicanism of that passage. It was he who saved the volume from destruction. Vergil's sixth book, written at the time when Augustus was offering Rome a restoration, seems therefore to guarantee the sincerity of Augustus' enthusiasm for the republic.

There is less certainty regarding the time when the portrait gallery of republican heroes was planned for the Augustan forum, but we are not wholly at a loss for an approximate date. We must of course assume that Augustus and his personal friends—including doubtless such men as Agrippa, Maecenas, Vergil, Horace, and perhaps Livy—would concern themselves about the selection of the heroes who were to be honored. The choice allowed of no party bias. The son of Julius would, of course, and did include such inflexible democrats as the Gracchi and Marius, but the old senatorial heroes, the Valerii, the Papirii, the Fabii, the Scipios, the Aemilii, the Caecilii, and the like were most prominent.

In *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1933, pp. 455-61, Paribeni has provided the texts of the *elogia* recently found, while *CIL*, I², pp. 184 ff. gives those that were known before. Probably a half are still unknown, but we have enough to be certain that it is not merely a collection of *triumphatores* but rather the *statuae summorum virorum*, as Lampridius said. It is in fact a gallery of the distinguished men of the old republican government. Naturally many of the same names occur in Vergil's abbreviated list and on the fragmentary list of the *Elogia* which we happen to have. But it seems significant that Vergil and Augustus were both thinking at about the same time of glorifying the old republican heroes, and that this was about the time when Augustus was offering a restoration of the republic.

The dates of the Augustan forum are not very well defined. (The known data may be found in Platner-Ashby.) The temple of Mars Ultor was promised at Philippi in 42 B. C. It was not dedicated till 40 years later. Many things delayed the construction of the forum: for a long time Octavian was harassed by the lack of funds; he had little to devote to buildings till after he secured the treasures of Egypt in 30. Even the relatively small temple to Julius, which was a political necessity, could not be

dedicated till 29; and the very important temple of Apollo, vowed at Actium, remained unfinished for several years. Then too he had much trouble acquiring land for his forum; indeed he never secured some of the lots that he needed. Yet it is likely that the decision to have statues of heroes came fairly early in the planning of the forum, for the massive back wall of the forum which contains the niches for the statues was built before the temple of Mars Ultor was begun, since the temple walls back up against the great wall of Gabine stone. Considering the delay in procuring the land for the boundary wall and then the length of time that we must allow for the elaborate construction and decoration of *Mars Ultor* after the wall was finished or near completion, we may assume that the niches, and the selection of heroic personages to be portrayed, must be assigned to the twenties of that century. This is in fair agreement with the orthography and lettering of the fragments of the *elogia* actually found in the Forum (e. g. Dessau, *I. L. S.*, no. 59, on Marius: *apsens, ieis, quei, Jugurta*; *ibid.*, no. 58: *Graccus*; probably *Cerces[inam]*, *A. J. P.*, 1937, pp. 90-4. The lettering (cf. *Not. Sc.*, 1933, p. 459) shows good Augustan cutting that has gone quite beyond the rough work of the early Augustan years. Taking these things together, we may assume that the artists had planned the niches not many years after Augustus came back from Egypt and that they were at work on the statues about the time that Vergil was composing his pageant of heroes and Augustus was planning the reformed republican constitution.

That is about all we can say regarding the dates of these projects; we cannot assign priority of idea. But it seems clear that the period 27-22 was one of wide-spread enthusiasm for the republican régime, its heroes, and its spirit; and that while Vergil was giving luster to that subject in one of the finest passages in literature, Augustus was constructing a government that was to honor its precedents and was also requesting the sculptors of Greece and Rome to place before the Romans a portrait gallery of the great men of the republic whom he promised to emulate. Whatever Augustus may have done in later years, it is difficult to convince oneself that he was not sincere in his republicanism in 23.

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REVIEWS.

E. BENVENISTE. Origines de la formation des noms en indo-européen 1. Paris, Librairie Adrien, 1935. Pp. 224.

Although Benveniste's new book deals chiefly with noun formation, its fundamental thesis cuts far deeper than that. The title itself suggests a preoccupation with very early prehistoric times, and the preface begins with a protest against the neglect of "le problème de la structure des formes indo-européennes elles-mêmes . . . Là est sans doute la cause principale du malaise actuel de la grammaire comparée: si la recherche proprement comparative tend à s'éparpiller en travaux de plus en plus menus, c'est qu'elle a oublié les questions fondamentales; et si bien des linguistes se détournent de la comparaison, c'est pour s'être laissés aller à croire que l'on n'avait plus de choix qu'entre le connu et l'inconnaissable."

Benveniste accepts without question Meillet's well-known dictum that accent was not the cause of quantitative ablaut, and develops a theory of the Indo-European roots and their extensions which conflicts at almost every point with the systems that have been based upon the contrary opinion. He sums up his fundamental doctrine in five paragraphs (pp. 170 f.):

1. La racine indo-européenne est monosyllabique, trilitère, composée de la voyelle fondamentale ϵ entre deux consonnes différentes.

2. Dans ce schème constant: consonne + ϵ + consonne, les consonnes peuvent être de n'importe quel ordre pourvu qu'elles soient différentes; seule est exclue la coexistence d'une sourde et d'une sonore aspirée.

3. La racine fournit, avec un suffixe, deux thèmes alternants: I racine pleine et tonique + suffix zéro; II racine zéro + suffix plein et tonique. <In Benveniste's terminology a suffix is any extension of a root or stem consisting of $\epsilon/o-$ + consonant alternating with the consonant alone.>

4. Au suffixe peut se joindre un seul élargissement, soit ajouté après le suffixe du thème I, soit inséré entre l'élément radical et le suffixe du thème II (infixation). <By *élargissement* Benveniste means a consonant without a vowel or a vowel without ablaut that extends a root or stem.>

5. L'addition supplémentaire d'un élargissement ou d'un suffixe à un thème déjà suffixé et élargi constitue une base exclusivement nominale.

It is perhaps worth while to have before us another detailed analysis of Indo-European words, if only to show that the system

developed by Hirt is not the only one possible. It must be added, however, that in proportion as Benveniste's analysis goes farther than Hirt's it is less likely ever to be confirmed by comparative data.

For the plain truth is that comparative grammar can operate only with independent developments from a common source. As long as we have only descendants of Primitive Indo-European, comparison merely enables us partially to reconstruct the latest phase of Primitive Indo-European. Attempts to infer earlier stages of Indo-European may be more or less plausible, but they must remain entirely hypothetical until we find evidence that can be equated with our reconstructed Indo-European on the basis of an earlier parent speech; such evidence would enable us to use the comparative method again and partially to reconstruct a linguistic stage earlier than Primitive Indo-European. Until then there can be no satisfactory criterion for choosing between Hirt's system and Benveniste's and some other that may appear tomorrow. At the moment Hirt's system, with certain changes necessitated by Sievers' Law and by the discovery of Hittite *h*, seems to me more usable than Benveniste's, but that may be because I am more familiar with it.

When Benveniste turns his attention to reconstruction of Primitive Indo-European (in some cases I should say Indo-Hittite), he exhibits the comparative method at its best. I shall illustrate by two problems of Hittite grammar which I had tried (*HG*, pp. 149-52) in vain to solve, but which here find their complete and final solution.

The Hittite nouns in *-tar*, gen. *-nnas* (<*-tnos*), rarely *-tannas*, are verbal nouns or, in relatively few cases, abstract nouns from nouns or adjectives. Benveniste (pp. 103-8) is surely right in identifying the suffix with that of Lat. *iter*, gen. *itineris*, Osc. *etituns* 'itiones,' Lat. *gluten* 'glue,' Old Persian infinitives in *-tanaui*, and Vedic infinitives in *-tari*. In the Indo-European languages we more frequently meet extended forms of the suffix, such as *-tno-* (e. g. Skt. *ratnam* 'jewel'), and *-tnd-* (e. g. Gk. *βράννη*). I was prevented from seeing this certain equation by the fact that Hittite *-tar* is regularly written with a single *t* (e. g. *pa-ap-ra-tar*, *ap-pa-a-tar*); for such spelling ordinarily indicates original *d* or *dh* (see *HG*, pp. 74-83). At that time I did not know of the forms *hal-ki-it-ta-an-[ni]*¹ 'harvest' (dat.) and *kar-ša-at-tar* 'castration' (*KUB*, 13, 4.1.37; 4.56). Few as they are, these forms justify the connection of Hittite *-t(t)ar/n-* with IE *-ter/n-*; cf. rare *ši-ip-pa-an-ti* beside frequent *ši-pa-an-ti* 'pours a libation': Gk. *σπένδει*.

¹ Since no other form of this word is known, some may prefer to assume a nom. **hal-ki-it-ta-tar*, but there is no evidence for a stem **halkitta-* or the like beside *halkis* 'grain.' Probably the missing nominative was **halkit(t)ar*.

The Hittite suffix *-ssar*, gen. *-snas*, is precisely parallel in use and meaning to the suffix just discussed. I could find no similar forms in Indo-European, and so I sought for an analogical origin in Hittite itself. Benveniste (pp. 100-3) aptly compares the Vedic infinitive ending in *-sani*, Gk. *-ειν* < *-εειν* < *-εσεν*, the suffixes *-sno-* (e. g. Skt. *kṛtsnās* 'complete') and *-snā-* (e. g. Lat. *cēna* < **kert-snā*).

In both instances it is to be observed that Hittite retains in full vigor suffixes that have left only scattered traces in the Indo-European languages. We have here two more archaisms of Hittite, to be added to those that I pointed out in *Lang.*, IX (1933), pp. 1-11. Another that I neglected to mention there is the lack of the comparative degree, except in one word of the primitive semi-comparative type of **supero-* 'upper,' **ndhero-* 'under,' etc., namely *katteras* 'lower, inferior' beside *katta* 'down.' In *HG*, p. 131 and, in more detail, in *Lang.*, XIII, No. 4, I have equated the Hittite particle *-be* in *2-be*, *2-uš-be*, *2-aš-be*, etc. 'both' with IE *-bhe-*, *-bho-*, in Goth. *bai*, Skt. *ú-bhau*, Gk. *ἄμφω*, Lat. *am-bo* 'both.' While Hittite preserves the (necessarily original) use of the particle, the Indo-European languages all show a transfer of the inflection to the end of the phrase (cf. Lat. *eum-pse* > *ipsum*). In my opinion these Hittite archaisms have now been established in such numbers that the Indo-Hittite hypothesis is reasonably certain.²

Benveniste, without himself accepting the Indo-Hittite hypothesis, has, in my opinion, done his part to give us an earlier basis for the comparative attack; but the Indo-Hittite period cannot be set back to anything like the immense antiquity of the origin of noun formation in our group of languages. On that subject we can still do no more than make guesses.

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PAUL CROCHÉ. Démosthènes et la fin de la démocratie athénienne. Paris, Payot, 1937. Pp. 334. 36 fr.

Demosthenes, like other great figures of antiquity, must be interpreted anew by each generation, and until recently it has seemed that our generation could not interpret him, but only use him as a lay figure on which to hang its shibboleths and prejudices, or as a man of straw to suffer vicariously for its enemies. These misgivings happily are now being dispelled by a perceptible trend toward objective historical interpretation, a trend which undoubtedly will be given added impetus by this most recent study.

² Otherwise Bonfante, *IF*, LII, p. 221.

The French are peculiarly suited by temperament and habit of mind to understand Demosthenes, and Cloché's long years of distinguished work in the history of the fourth century B. C. have given him a knowledge of sources and problems such as few men possess. Having these qualifications he has been able to produce a book of more than ordinary value and interest.

After a brief comment on the prevailing diversity of opinion, Cloché presents a clear, concise summary of the political situation of Athens, both foreign and domestic, in the times when Demosthenes was entering upon his public career, a somewhat sketchy account of the orator's early life, rhetorical training, and activities as a writer of speeches, and some interesting suggestions, based mainly on the later speeches, regarding the circumstances in which his political sentiments were developed and his knowledge of the actual problems acquired. With the ground thus prepared, the orator's policies and political activities are discussed, concisely but circumstantially, with abundant citations of the sources and occasional references to modern works. Chapter III, covering the years from 354 to 351 B. C., emphasizes the consistency of Demosthenes' earlier policies with his later position and shows that he has already acquired a thorough understanding of both the needs and the resources of Athens. Until 346, however, he must be viewed merely as a leader of the opposition, and it is only in the period following the Peace of Philocrates that he can be thought of as shaping Athenian policy.

The methods and conclusions of the study should approve themselves to competent, disinterested students of the period. Perhaps its strongest point is the sober common sense with which the author looks behind the narratives of Demosthenes and Aeschines and asks what actual facts could have given rise to accounts so divergent and so often flatly contradictory. Cloché never forgets that he is dealing with pleaders, not judges or historians, but he also remembers that their statements were addressed to audiences which had a very considerable first-hand knowledge of the facts. He normally considers all the possible explanations of a difficulty and is cautious about insisting upon one possibility to the exclusion of others. He is singularly dexterous in avoiding personal polemic by veiling in anonymity the scholars whose theories he rejects, and here it must be confessed the volume lacks a certain spice to which our philological appetites have become addicted. In general the book is a straightforward attempt to see clearly and to make clear to others the policies of Demosthenes in their relation to the facts of history and to fundamental principles of politics.

Since this volume is presumably addressed to Hellenists, as the abundant citations of original sources indicate, its usefulness would have been increased at many points by a word of warning in regard to the more important cruxes and controversies, espe-

cially controversies which involve the authenticity of primary source material. As it is, the reader who is not a specialist will not always understand the relation to the text of the studies listed in the bibliographies. The propriety of dismissing the political forensic speeches as a mere detail in Demosthenes' career as logographer (28) is at least debatable; the Leptinean oration is not even mentioned, I believe, in the text, though passages are cited once or twice on minor points. The attempt (282) to reconstruct the defense of Demosthenes in "l'affaire d'Harpale" from passages in the speeches of Hyperides and Dinarchus which are simply stock rhetorical commonplaces is, in my opinion, futile. Cloché accepts the time-honored belief that Demosthenes recovered little or nothing from the guardians, but grew rich so fast from his earnings as a logographer that within four years he was in the trierarchic census (27 f.); both assumptions might profitably be tested by the actual evidence. I note a few minor inadvertences. The statement (25) that the elder Demosthenes entrusted his cutlery business to "l'affranchi Milyas" is inaccurate, since we learn from Dem., xxix, 26 (which on p. 27 is treated as authentic) that Milyas was manumitted only when his master lay dying. Two or three years preceding the trial of Demosthenes *vs.* Aphobus could not have been consumed in discussions "devant l'arbitre public" (27), since those officials functioned only after filing of the complaint; possibly the author is thinking of the conferences mentioned in Dem., xxx, 6. There seems to be a confusion (76) of the reserve force of fifty triremes (Dem., iv, 16) with the field army of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry, to be supported by ten fast triremes (*ib.*, 20-22). The translations, which usually are from the *Collection Budé*, occasionally suffer from being stripped of context; "pour le moment" (88) will scarcely do for *εἰς τὸ παρόν* (iii, 10), and "pour l'ombre d'un avantage à Delphes" (120) emasculates the fine close of the speech *On the Peace*.

The printer has allowed an attractive format and clear typography to be marred by many misprints and misspellings.

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LOTTE LABOWSKY. *Die Ethik des Panaitios (Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Decorum bei Cicero und Horaz)*. Leipzig, F. Meiner, 1934. Pp. 124.

In her attempt to present the ethical system of Panaetius, Miss Labowsky chooses as her main theme the conception of decorum because of its decisive importance for Panaetius' philosophy and because of its great influence on later centuries (p. 4). The purpose of her interpretation is not to sum up the various testi-

monies in a doxographical form but rather to elucidate the basic principles of Panaetius' thinking in their inner relation and balance (p. 3).

Miss Labowsky starts her attempt at reconstruction with a passage from the only treatise which can with certainty be traced back to Panaetius (p. 2), Cicero's discussion of decorum in *De officiis* (I, 93-151). She is aware of the fact that even here it is necessary to separate the thought of Panaetius from the transformation or addition made by Cicero, and it is especially this that she wants to achieve in her analysis (p. 3). Her conclusion is that the passage, in the main, gives the original sentences of Panaetius, only abbreviated by Cicero, who also inserted the Roman examples (pp. 67 ff.). This conclusion is primarily based on internal evidence, on the interpretation of the text and its coherence. It may very well be that the difficulties which the reader notes in perusing the argumentation can be explained by Cicero's hasty and careless method of working. Miss Labowsky, in general, does not think too highly of Cicero as a philosophical writer; she expressly adopts Usener's unfavourable judgment about him (p. 3). Yet, granted that consistency has been proved, this would not permit any conclusion about the source of Cicero's text. He himself admits that in writing this book he is often (multum, II, 17, 60) or mostly (potissimum, III, 2, 7; cf. Labowsky, p. 2, n. 3) following Panaetius. But it is precisely in the introduction to the *De officiis* that he defines his method of following the Greek examples thus: sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos; non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro quantum quoque modo videbitur hauriemus (I, 2, 6). Cicero was not such a bad writer as not to be able to compose out of divergent material a correct sequence of ideas. Starting from the internal evidence that the text is intact, one can prove that it is the text of Panaetius only by presupposing his authorship. If one does so, one can agree with Miss Labowsky and take the whole Ciceronian passage, without any limitations, as a reproduction of Panaetius' philosophy.

Next, the *Ars poetica* is discussed from the point of view of the conception of decorum and from that alone (pp. 74 ff., p. 76). Referring to Kroll's more general assertion (p. 75, n. 8) Miss Labowsky proves in detail that this conception is a constituent factor of the disposition; furthermore, she explains how it was possible for Horace in adhering to such a philosophical idea still to achieve a work of art (pp. 77, 98). The line of reasoning in the *Ars poetica* thus becomes much clearer. Horace, so far as he is concerned with ethical decorum, is considered by Miss Labowsky to be determined by Panaetius' shaping of the subject (p. 98). Nothing new can be concluded from his poem in this respect, but the aesthetical decorum which he stresses gives her

the opportunity to bring out more sharply an aspect of the decorum conception which she deems to be significant for Panaetius' thinking.

For in the last part of her book Miss Labowsky, after having outlined the history of decorum,—her study was published shortly after Pohlenz' essay on decorum had appeared (p. 4, n. 14)—characterizes the ethics of Panaetius as an *ars vitae* in the proper sense of the word (p. 113). Unity of action and influence on the spectator are characteristic of the work of art as well as of the moral attitude of human beings; the dynamic power can be realized in the individual form alone, yet it coincides with, and is subordinated to, the general rule (p. 112). The aesthetical and moral values are fused into one, into the old conception of *καλοκαγαθία* (p. 121). In this sense Panaetius is viewed as the last Greek philosopher (p. 1). His doctrine historically must be understood as a Platonizing of Stoic theories (p. 116). But it is no mere external combination of opposite ideas; it is the expression of the "ursprüngliche, aller dialektischen Zerspaltung vorausgehende Lebens- und Wertgefühl" of the later centuries, and in this sense it is more than an individual conception (pp. 1-2).

The interpretation which Miss Labowsky gives is subtle, sometimes, I am afraid, even exaggerated and sophisticated. Thus, for example, she expresses in seven lines the meaning which an *enim* in the text of Cicero is supposed to have (pp. 18-19). But generally her remarks are very illuminating. She always traces the late ideas to their origin, and she connects the single facts with the general trend in the development of philosophical thought. Her interpretation reads like a commentary on the discussion with which it deals and as such is indispensable for everyone interested in these texts.

I must restrict myself here, however, to that problem which is the main object of the book and of which the analysis of Cicero and Horace is meant to be only the first step: the representation of the ethical system of Panaetius. And for this point I do not feel that Miss Labowsky has proved her thesis. I accept those testimonies which she uses as the only basis for a reconstruction and do not inquire into how far it would be possible to come to conclusions taking into account the other fragments of Panaetius as well as his whole philosophical system of which the ethics, after all, is only a part. Even then there arise great difficulties.

Miss Labowsky credits Panaetius, first of all, with separating the ethical reflection from the contemplation of the wise man, with speaking only of the average individual who is perfecting himself in virtue. The proof for this statement is found in the ironical and contemptuous answer given by Panaetius to a young fellow who asked him whether the wise man should love or not: "De sapiente, inquit, videbimus: mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sa-

piente longe absumus, non est committendum, ut incidamus in rem commotam . . ." (Seneca, *Epistle*, 116, 5; fr. 56 [Fowler]; Labowsky, pp. 115-16). Even if one is inclined to find in this anecdote an indication that Panaetius' belief in the wise man was not that of the other Stoics—a conclusion which is by no means necessary and convincing—, what exactly is meant by the words "de sapiente videbimus" nobody can tell; it would be hard to assert that Panaetius did more than doubt the existence of the wise. For his scepticism never leads him to anything more than doubt in all the important problems in which he disagrees with the old Stoa. It is, therefore, not at all certain that Panaetius denied the reality of the existence of the wise man, that he rejected, from the beginning, every argument concerning his attitude as being wrong (p. 115). And what evidence is there that he ascribed to the wise man and to the idea of honesty transcendental existence alone (p. 116)? Miss Labowsky emphasizes the importance of the reference made by Cicero-Panaetius to the Platonic *Phaedrus*: formam quidem ipsam . . . et tamquam faciem honesti vides, "quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores" ut ait Plato, "excitaret sapientiae"; and she declares these words to be the motto of the ethics of Panaetius (p. 116). The idea of honesty cannot be seen, but it becomes apparent in the individual human actions (pp. 116; 9). Yet, this is not a Platonic solution of the problem of how the world of the phenomena and that of thinking are related to each other; it is not the transformation of the *πρῶτον φῶλον* and its dynamics into Stoic philosophy—at least as long as the idea is understood to be the Stoic *ἐννοια* and the nature of man is interpreted as rational only. And that this is the case, Miss Labowsky herself states (pp. 116-17). It is the old Stoic doctrine, I think, expressed perhaps in a terminology similar to the Platonic one: Panaetius was a great admirer of Plato; Cicero was an Academic philosopher. But if there were any real relationship between the *προκόπτων* of Panaetius and the *φιλόσοφος* of Plato (p. 116), Panaetius would have had to change the psychological dogmas of the Stoics and their definitions of virtues and vices as Posidonius did later on.

I do not believe, therefore, that the ethical system of Panaetius, as a whole, has been adequately reconstructed by Miss Labowsky. It is the historical interpretation of detail which makes her book valuable.

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Papers Presented to Sir Henry Stuart Jones. Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. XXVII, 1937, Part I.

The bibliography of Sir Henry Stuart Jones' works which prefaces this collection of papers in honor of his seventieth birthday recalls the wide range of interest of a scholar who has distinguished himself in both Greek and Roman studies. The series of papers contributed by scholars whose names guarantee the importance of their work emphasize Sir Henry's association with Roman history, religion, and archaeology. Questions of constitutional history are dealt with by Mattingly, Buckland, and Cary. Mattingly, carrying further the consequences of his attempt at redating the Roman denarius from 269 to 187, assigns to a source of Sullan date the property qualifications of the Servian classes as recorded by Livy and Dionysius. He promises a further study of the *comitia centuriata*. Buckland poses the question whether civil suits could be instituted against an ex-magistrate for acts committed in the exercise of his *imperium*. He shows the lack of evidence for Mommsen's belief that there was provision for such action, and, in view of Cicero's silence about any such suits against Verres, suggests that when Cicero implies that such suits were possible (*Div. in Caec.*, 17-18) his words are "a mere rhetorical flourish." Cary shows that Rudolph's ingenious arguments (*Stadt und Staat im römischen Italien*) have not established the author's view of the wide scope of Caesar's municipal legislation; there was probably a more gradual evolution than Rudolph is disposed to admit. Occurrences of the titles *duoviri* and *quattuorviri i(ure) d(icundo)* in republican inscriptions tell against Rudolph's theory of Caesar's sweeping judicial reforms in the municipalities.

The composition of Caesar's senate is discussed in Syme's article on Decidius Saxa. Saxa's position as an officer in Caesar's army in 49 B. C. indicates that he was not a newly enfranchised citizen but a Roman of Spanish origin. Cicero's allegations against Saxa are not to be taken at their face value, and the statements about the low origin of Caesar's senate are probably exaggerated. The checkered history of Armenia Minor in the late republic is dealt with in Adcock's article. He suggests that Armenia Minor was given by Pompey to Brogitarus, the son-in-law of Deiotarus of Galatia and that the date when Deiotarus received it from the senate (Cicero, *De Div.*, II, 79; *Phil.*, II, 94) was about 52 B. C. After Caesar's settlements the region may have been taken in whole or in part from Deiotarus and added to Cappadocia.

Economic questions are discussed by Frank and Anderson. Frank continues his studies of the sherds from Monte Testaccio which indicate that Spanish oil and wine had captured the western markets in the second century after Christ. The pres-

ence of many ex-slaves among the shippers whose names are recorded on the sherds leads to the suggestion that such men entered service on state contracts in order to secure full rights of citizenship. Anderson quotes from the notebook of Dr. Schönewolf an inscription which proves his earlier contention that a region of N. W. Galatia which he visited some years ago was an imperial estate. The inscription shows that the region had once been a private estate, a fact which provides support for Broughton's view that imperial estates in Asia were not mainly derived from crown lands and temple lands of the Hellenistic period.

Charlesworth's series of notes entitled *Flaviana* contains fresh and interesting material. Vespasian was influential in fixing the tradition of Nero's infamy and in rehabilitating the reputation and strengthening the cult of Claudius; contrary to the usual belief, the cult of Claudius had not been actually annulled by Nero (the omission of *divus* before his name in the *lex de imperio Vespasiani* is explained as an indication of the influence of senators who hoped for greater power in the government) and it seems to have continued until the end of the second century. Finally there is an ingenious explanation of the meaning of *cerdonibus* in Juvenal's reference to the death of Domitian (IV, 153).

Macdonald returns to his contention that the Scottish conquests of Agricola were not abandoned before 105-6 A. D. This time Macdonald discusses the meaning of Tacitus' *perdomita Britannia et statim omissa* (*Hist.*, 1, 2) which he renders, "Britain was completely conquered and left to look out for itself." The discussion of the meaning of *omissa*, a conjecture of Lipsius, has less point because the manuscript (cf. p. 94, no. 5) reads *missa*. The Orelli-Baiter revised edition (1877) keeps the original reading and interprets the passage very much as Macdonald does.

Three papers deal with documents from Egypt. Wilcken's discussion of Octavian after the fall of Alexandria concerns the two types of Augustan eras recorded in the papyri—the regnal years and those described by the phrase *τῆς Καίσαρος κεραιῶνος θεοῦ υἱοῦ*. The second form of dating is Roman rather than Egyptian in character but it has now appeared in a demotic papyrus of the priests of Buchis from Hermonthis, which belongs to the first year of Octavian. The new document shows Octavian as the victorious Roman general, whose position as the successor of the Pharaohs the priests of Buchis, perhaps from hostility to his rule, have not yet acknowledged. Wilhelm brings his wide knowledge of epigraphical language to the restoration of Papyrus Tebtunis 33, a copy of a letter giving instructions for the reception to be accorded the senator Lucius Memmius on a visit to the Fayum in 112 B. C. H. I. Bell publishes a Latin registra-

tion of birth preserved on a tablet, a portion of a diptych similar to the one published by Sanders in *A. J. A.*, 1928, 309 ff. These documents report the birth of children while the father was in military service, and such children were illegitimate even if the father had been married before his term of service began.

Several papers deal with religious questions. Last interprets the persecutions of the Christians in the light of republican religious history. He opposes Mommsen's view that apostasy from the gods of Rome was a recognized offence. He sees in persecutions of the republic, such as the action against the Bacchantes in 186 B. C., simply the suppression of groups who threatened the morality of the state. The same attitude supplied the pretext for the persecution of the Christians under Nero: though some change had taken place before the time of Trajan, even then, perhaps the *flagitia cohaerentia nomini* are more important than the *nomen ipsum si flagitiis caret*. Nock discusses the genius of Mithraism. Its character as a private cult without priestly hierarchy (the debatable evidence on this point is treated in some detail), its peculiar eschatology, its distinctive and unchanging iconography, the figure of Mithra who served as an exemplar, the association with solar worship, all gave to Mithraism a strong appeal which was, however, limited in range. If Christianity had perished, we should not, Nock believes, have had a Mithraic world. Cumont, supplementing his recent studies of the Acts of St. George (*Rev. Hist. Rel.*, 1936), shows the survival of Mithra the cattle thief in the annual miracle which is attested as late as the middle of the nineteenth century from the monastery of Ilori in Georgia. Every year at the Feast of St. George an ox, supposedly stolen by the saint, mysteriously appeared for sacrifice in the monastery church. The pagan traditions behind this miracle are abundantly illustrated from Cumont's incomparable knowledge of the religious traditions of ancient Anatolia. Baynes deals with a story of the death of Julian the Apostate preserved in the Armenian history of Faustus of Byzantium. Here the emperor, who appears as King Valens, was killed by two saints, Sargis and Theodorus. This story which, Baynes believes, came to Armenia from Antioch through Caesarea is an example of the rapidity with which Christian triumph over the hated emperor found its expression in legend.

The famous bas-relief of the Ara Pacis which Van Buren identified as Italia rather than Tellus or Terra Mater is the subject of Mrs. Strong's paper. She shows, with rich illustrations from Roman, mediaeval, and Renaissance art, that the bas-relief conforms to the traditional representation of the Earth Goddess. "In other instances in which the Tellus type was taken over to represent a province," Mrs. Strong says (p. 122), "some detail was brought in to indicate the transformation: a rabbit and an olive branch for Hispania (pl. IV, 2), an elephant head-dress

for Africa, a standard for Dacia, and so on. A simple device of this kind might surely have been found for an Italia of the Altar of Peace." It seems to me that the device is to be found in the scene of Aeneas' sacrifice. Opposite the earth goddess on the altar was the figure of Roma connected by a procession with a slab on the opposite side showing figures symbolic of the founding of Rome—Mars, the sacred fig tree, and probably the Lupercal. The earth goddess was connected by a similar procession with a slab on the other side which showed Aeneas about to sacrifice Tellus' characteristic victim, the pregnant sow. Aeneas made the sacrifice when he reached the promised land, and the land was Italy.

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HANS KURT SCHULTE. Orator, Untersuchungen über das ciceronianische Bildungsideal (Frankfurter Studien zur Religion und Kultur der Antike Band XI). Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1935. Pp. 147.

The best that may be said of this book is that it takes a step in the right direction. It has evidently been inspired by a feeling that Cicero's *De Oratore* has in the last few decades been approached in a rather one-sided fashion. It should not be suggested that scholars like von Arnim and Kroll, when trying to work out the connection between the *De Oratore* and the philosophical doctrines of Cicero's Academic teachers (Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon), were blind to other aspects of the work; but it is probably true that their investigations have led others to over-emphasize this point of view practically to the exclusion of all others. I agree with Dr. Schulte that this line of approach wants supplementing by some others. He upholds a good cause, but I am not sure that he has done it good service.

Some weaknesses of his method are conspicuous at the very opening of the book where he deals with the glorification of λόγος found in *De Or.*, I, 30 ff. Enthusiastic appreciations of the power of λόγος, *ratio*, *oratio*, philosophy, etc. are found everywhere in Greek and Roman literature from the time of the Sophists on, and in collecting a vast material Dr. Schulte has succumbed to the danger of losing sight of his immediate objectives which were: 1) to trace the really relevant antecedents of this exaltation of λόγος in the proëm of a work on rhetoric and 2) to assess Cicero's own contribution to this topic. With the latter problem I do not propose to deal here; as regards the former, the passages that really matter are Isocrates, *Nic.*, 5 ff. (= *Antid.*, 253 ff.), *Rhet. ad Alex.*, 1421 a, 7 ff., Cicero, *De Inv.*,

I, 2, 2; *De Orat.*, I, 30 ff., and from these it may be inferred (and in fact has been inferred; cf. H. M. Hubbell, *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, etc.*, New Haven, 1913, pp. 27 f., and my paper in *Hermes*, 1932, pp. 151 ff.) that certain ideas which were current in the time of the Sophists, e. g. that it is the λόγος which distinguishes mankind from the animals, that the λόγος caused primitive men to organize themselves into political communities, etc., froze into τόποι to be used in proëms and that out of this fossilized existence Cicero brought them again to life.

As regards the relation of Cicero's *De Oratore* and Plato, Dr. Schulte is probably rash in maintaining (p. 67) "die Argumentation des Crassus ist eine Verschmelzung der Beweisführung des Gorgias mit der des Phaidros," and he practically retracts this later (p. 69). The discussion about the τέχνη quality of rhetoric and similar topics which we get in *De Oratore* I and II clearly echoes contemporary Greek discussions between philosophers and rhetoricians. *De Oratore*, II, 45 ff., 82 ff. unmistakably point in this direction; and we have some further echoes of these disputes not only in Philodemos (Schulte, pp. 36 and 68) but also in Sextus, *Adv. Rhet.* (10, 20, 43 etc.) and, perhaps, in Quintilian (II, 15 ff.). To be sure, these discussions turned largely upon the same questions as the *Gorgias*, that is to say the τέλος ῥητορικῆς, ἔργον ῥητορικῆς, the question whether or not rhetoric is a τέχνη, may be learned, is morally unimpeachable, etc.; but this was more or less inevitable and the resemblances must not be regarded as proving an influence of the *Gorgias* on the *De Oratore*.

An indebtedness to Plato is in fact acknowledged by Cicero; I, 28 and III, 228 ff. in combination with III, 138 (cf. *Or.*, 15 and Plato, *Phaedr.*, 269 E f.) are indicative of the nature of this indebtedness. They show that it has nothing to do with either arguments or technical precepts but is based on something much more general, namely, the spirit of philosophy which according to both Plato and Cicero should permeate a man's oratory. Besides the passages mentioned, we find in III, 21 a reference to *Epin.*, 990 A for the idea of a philosophical synthesis, a δεσμός binding together the various arts and sciences. Dr. Schulte has found good parallels to the ideas occurring here in Vitruvius, I, 1 (pp. 80 ff.) and argues with skill that both point back to Posidonius. Of course we all have become rather hesitant to invoke this sacred name, but it must be conceded that Posidonius has a better claim than any other Greek philosopher to the distinction of having made this new adaptation of the idea found in the *Epinomis*.

The indebtedness of the *De Oratore* to Aristotle is of a different nature, resulting as it does from the adaptation of important technical conceptions and methods. Cicero's intimation, *Ad Fam.*, I, 9, 23, that the *De Oratore* embodies the *ratio Aristotelica* and

the *ratio Isocratia* is perfectly true and may be substantiated from the actual work, though Dr. Schulte and many before him have failed to do so. Yet any comparison of the *De Oratore* with the *De Inventione* must bring this to light. I hope to prove it in *Classical Philology* for a particular point (the theory of the *affectus*), but the same still remains to be done for other sections of the work. Cicero got from Plato the idea of a philosophical rhetoric and he learned from Aristotle a considerable amount about the ways and methods by which he might come up to this ideal.

Evidently Dr. Schulte has the right feeling that the Romans laid a far greater emphasis on the subjective side of oratory, the orator's personality, whereas the Greeks were exclusively concerned with the right structure and the correct handling of the *τέχνη*. Surely this is a new and characteristically Roman element. In Chapter II Dr. Schulte makes this point explicit and distinguishes four stages in the development from Plato to Cicero. The first is Plato's philosophical penetration of the realm of human knowledge, the second is Aristotle's philosophical departmentalism, the third the concentration of *σοφία* in the personality of the Stoic sage, and the fourth Cicero's ideal of the great orator with his all-embracing knowledge. His account of these stages is on the whole correct, though I doubt whether the Stoic sage has anything to do with Cicero's ideal orator.

I must pass over the author's speculations on the Stoic *σοφός*, the Roman *vir bonus*, the *artes liberales*, isagogic and protreptic literature, etc., for none of these things is really of help towards a better understanding of the *De Oratore* and much that we read here has not reached the degree of maturity that would make discussion fruitful. I fear Dr. Schulte has not succeeded in bringing out the Roman atmosphere of the work. For a future attempt in this direction I should like to make two suggestions, hoping that they will be found to deserve development. The one is that the feeling of pride so palpably permeating the work springs from a conviction that in the political life of the Roman republic oratory has attained a power and a position it had not had with the Greeks since the times of Demosthenes. The other is that the use made of Roman models and examples, the rôles assigned to Crassus, Antony, Caesar, and others, and the references to famous Roman orations suggest that Cicero was anxious to build up a Roman tradition of oratory worthy to match the Greek.

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GEORGES DAUX. Delphes au II^e et au I^{er} siècle depuis l'abaissement de l'Étolie jusqu'à la paix romaine 191-31 av. J.-C. Paris, Libraire des Ecoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 1936. Pp. iii + 745; plates 5, figures 8.

The period of Delphic history treated by Mr. Daux is only a little less arid than the Roman imperial period that immediately follows. On the one hand the city, the sanctuary, and the Amphictyony no longer had an important rôle to play in intercity and international affairs. On the other hand the sources are especially dull and unattractive. Literary sources are extremely rare: merely a very few passages in Polybius and Livy and a notice or two in Plutarch and Pausanias. There are numerous inscriptions, especially for the second century; but nearly all are either acts of manumission or honorary decrees of the city of Delphi granting *proxenia*, *promanteia*, and the like. In the Pythaid inscriptions, however, and in the arbitrations and state letters we have documents of greater value.

Yet Mr. Daux has made a very interesting and sound book; he has converted a waste land into an ordered landscape. He treats even the driest subjects, such as the chronological data found in the acts of manumission, in a manner that holds the interest and attention of the reader. The work is careful and thorough; to anyone who wishes to learn the proper method of dealing with epigraphical data I can recommend the reading of the first 200 pages and the appendices.

Mr. Daux divides the book into three parts: chronology, the rôle of Delphi and the Amphictyony in the international history of the period, the internal life and institutions of the city and its ordinary relations with other cities. There is a long introduction that discusses the plan of the study, the sources used, and the bibliography; and there are twelve appendices that treat special problems. The whole development of the Delphic complex (city, sanctuary, Amphictyony), in so far as it can be known, is presented in detail from the end of Aetolian domination to the beginning of the empire. But the author refrains from treating problems that would take him beyond these temporal limits; problems of cult are therefore not discussed.

Mr. Daux has done a job that needed to be done, and he deserves the gratitude of all who are interested in Delphi or in Hellenistic history. There is but one place where I should question his interpretation: on page 579, note 1, quoting F. D. III 2. 50 (καὶ εἴμεν) πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐποποιοῖς συναγμένοις κατὰ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ χρ[η]σμὸν προξενίαν καὶ προμα[ν]τείαν, κτλ.), he refers κατὰ . . . χρησμὸν το εἶμεν, believing that the oracle had recommended honors for the epic poets that took part in the Pythaid. I think it more probable that the phrase is to be taken with

συναγμῆναι: the oracle that sanctioned the Pythaid festival called for the presence of an assembly of epic poets. This interpretation is suggested by the word-order and rhythm of the sentence; and comparison with other inscriptions that cite Delphic oracles indicates that this is more likely to be part of the content of an oracle.

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GEORGES DAUX. *Pausanias à Delphes*. Paris, A. Picard, 1936. Pp. ii + 203; plates 9, figures 6.

In this book Mr. Daux has written a worthy companion to his recent *Delphes au II^e et au I^{er} Siècle*. In it he presents the text and translation of Pausanias' *Delphica*, an archaeological commentary upon it, and a concluding essay on Pausanias' method (chapter VII). The text presented is Pausanias, X, 8, 6-32, 1, from which are omitted the four long digressions on the Sibyls, Sardinia, the Gallic invasion, and the paintings of Polygnotus. The edition of Hitzig-Blümner is followed. The translation *en regard* is accurate and, in view of the original, as good as can be.

Mr. Daux's purpose is to follow in Pausanias' footsteps at Delphi and to confront his description with the archaeological facts that have become known since 1892. He wants to know what Pausanias saw, in what order he saw it, and whether he is worthy of credence. His conclusions are favorable to Pausanias. In every case where Pausanias' description can be tested by archaeological facts he finds that Pausanias is verified. It is true that Pausanias' description is incomplete and that he makes some mistakes; but the mistakes are those of an actual observer. He was honest and objective; he used earlier writers only for the historical background of monuments. But it is not always possible to tell whether he got the *logos* of a monument from an inscription *in situ* or from something that he had read or heard.

The archaeological study shows that Pausanias' description is strictly topographical in method, that it mentions the monuments in the order in which Pausanias saw them. Pausanias took notes as he went through the sanctuary and followed the order of his notes when he wrote the *Delphica*. He felt that his book should have literary value and not be merely a bare, monotonous sequence of names and facts, so that he varies his transitions, attempts to make logical connections between neighboring monuments, and uses all the tricks of the literary trade of his time. But he was not successful; his literary devices are merely clumsy, and they serve to obscure his method. Against his honesty and genuine antiquarian interests must be set his mediocre talents as a writer and observer.

In his introduction Mr. Daux presents a useful critical bibliography. He justly praises Bourguet's *Les Ruines de Delphes*, which has been neglected in favor of Poulsen's *Delphi*, which is also excellent but gives most of its attention to sculpture. Bourguet's book presents a complete picture. Mr. Daux notes its omission from the bibliography on Delphi in Wycherley's *Companion Volume* to the Loeb Pausanias. As in his other recent book Mr. Daux warns against Pomtow's careless method and hasty conclusions. He also states that Frazer's commentary on the *Delphica* is no longer of any value; Hitzig-Blümner's is much better.

The volume contains excellent plates and figures. Plate VIII, taken from De la Coste-Messelière's *Au Musée de Delphes* (1936), is the only accurate map of the Delphic sanctuary to be had. Those in other works must be used with caution.

The archaeological commentary is extremely interesting, especially to anyone who knows the site of Delphi. Any student intending to visit Delphi will do well to read this book first along with Bourguet's and Poulsen's.

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J. WRIGHT DUFF. *Roman Satire: Its Outlook on Social Life.* (*Sather Classical Lectures*, Volume XII.) Berkeley, University of California Press, 1936. Pp. 205. \$2.25.

Professor Duff's discriminating account of satire and the satirists in his two volumes on the literary history of Rome and in Volume VIII of the Cambridge Ancient History leads the reader to expect an able treatment of the subject in the present volume, and the expectation is not disappointed. The eight lectures printed here give a view of the whole field, starting with the distinction between satire and the satiric, touching on the Greek precursors of Roman satire, then taking up, one by one, the great representatives of the type in Rome, and ending with the brief mention of certain writers of the late Empire, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance who carried on the satiric tradition.

"What gives satire its vital importance in Latin literature," Professor Duff says, "is . . . its faithful representation of contemporary life and its comments thereupon" (p. 6). This outlook upon contemporary life is accordingly taken as the criterion of satire, and authors who have the satirist's point of view, like Phaedrus and Martial, are included in the volume, even though their works are not actually satires in form. The fixed limits of a lecture period, with the necessity of making all the lectures of a series equal in length, are undoubtedly responsible for some combinations which are not in themselves ideal; so the heading

of the chapter on "The Greek Precursors of Roman Satire" adds, after a half-apologetic dash, "and Ennius"; and Phaedrus and Persius are grouped together under the sub-title, "Beast Fable and Stoic Homily." The lecture method and the general audience for whom the lectures were intended perhaps justify the inclusion of a certain amount of elementary material, such as fairly well-known facts about Horace's life, and a certain amount of repetition, such as the explanation of the rôle played in Lucilius's satires by Collyra and Hymnis, which is given in practically the same form on two successive pages.

In dealing with the vexed *satura* question, Professor Duff accepts the "prevailing sense of mixture" as the original sense of the word, adding: "It is not difficult to transfer it to that sense of a literary medley which was never wholly dissociated from the term *satura*." Without actually committing himself to a belief in the dramatic *satura* described by Livy, he states that "on the whole, the tendency recently has been to accept Livy's account" and that "the dramatic traits which are universally recognized in Roman satire are to many eyes a testimony to its descent from this haphazard, varied, and plotless type of early farce" (p. 20). He reconciles the clash between Quintilian's *Satura quidem tota nostra est* and Horace's *Hinc omnis pendet Lucilius* with the sane remark that, although "the Greeks had used for satiric purposes their gifts of parody and irony, their sharp *iambi*, their mocking comedies, their philosophical dialogues, their ethical discourses . . . , the separate genre was a Roman invention" (pp. 20-21). He thinks that the term *satura* was actually used by Ennius, Lucilius, and Varro for their writings, arguing: "It is hard to believe that grammarians, when they explicitly referred words and phrases to such-and-such a book of the Satires of Ennius or Lucilius, were not quoting original titles but only employing a late interpretative classification" (p. 15; cf. p. 39).

In addition to admirable characterizations of individual satirists—Lucilius, holding the mirror up to the Roman life around him with "vigor and a wonderful variety," Horace, "the greatest and most versatile of Roman satirists," who, "by a prevailing spirit of geniality and tolerance toward human imperfection, . . . without seeming too obviously to preach or denounce, succeeds in pointing out to an errant society the more excellent way"; Juvenal, with his "angry pessimism," the "marvelous range in his figures," his graphic pictures of "the bustle and danger of the streets, the tottering state of some of the house property in Rome, and the dingy hovels occupied by the poor"—, there are illuminating discussions of general questions—the satirical elements in Greek drama and the Greek Anthology, for instance, or the kind of period which "seemed to invite a satirist," an age like that of the younger Scipio, "permeated with a

ferment of new ideas, and impelled toward criticism of private and public life by the growth of social and political discontent" (p. 45). Perennial themes of satire, like the dinner-party and the legacy, receive appreciative treatment, and thought-provoking comments are thrown out along the way. The suggestion is made that the *sermones* of Lucilius were based on actual conversations (pp. 45-46). Interesting parallels are noted between scenes in Lucilius and in Greek and Latin comedy (p. 57 and n. 29). Fiske's tendency to see an excessive number of borrowings from Lucilius in Horace calls forth a passing comment (p. 55 and n. 26), and Horace's relation to Lucilius is more justly summed up in the oxymoron "independent dependence" (p. 73). The satiric quality of the *Epodes* is clearly brought out, as well as the importance of this group of poems in Horace's training as a writer of satire (p. 73). The chapter on Menippean Satire is especially delightful. Here we find a vivid reconstruction of Varro's satires that goes far toward making up for the loss of that work (pp. 86-90); an interpretation of the *Apolococytosis* as not only a satire on deification but also a parody on the writing of history, the point of the sting being that Claudius prided himself on being a historian (pp. 91-92); and a full account of the most amusing scenes in the *Satyricon* of Petronius, ending with the dictum: "Whatever its borrowings,—and in an author of wide culture like Petronius they were many,—the novel stands on its own merits as a creation of independent genius" (p. 103).

One need not comment on the charm of Professor Duff's own style—the grace of his rendering of phrases like *curiosa felicitas*; the subtle suggestions of Shakespeare and the King James version. The notes contain considerable bibliographical material, and there is a full index.

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A Medieval Latin Version of Demetrius' *De Elocutione* (Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin, Vol. 5, The Catholic University of America). Ed. by BERNICE VIRGINIA WALL. Washington, 1937. xiv + 125 pp.

The "Patristic Studies" of the Catholic University of America to date comprise forty-nine volumes, and the "Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin" with this dissertation come to five. This book is one of the best I have examined in either series. Dr. Wall edits a unique mediaeval Latin version of "Demetrius," *Concerning Style*, contained in a manuscript of the fourteenth century in the Library of the University of Illinois.

The translation, in her opinion, most probably belongs to the latter half of the thirteenth century. The anonymous version is fragmentary and deficient, containing only 151 of the 304 sections which form the Greek original; and of the 151 sections only 15 are complete. Nor is the order of the sections always the same as in the Greek. There is no clue to indicate why precisely these sections were chosen by the translator, or by the copyist of this particular manuscript, for the omitted sections are certainly as important as those which are included. It is a very "close" translation, often imperfect and confused.

Dr. Wall prints a facsimile of the manuscript. I have not compared this with the text throughout, but a test at a number of places gives one confidence in the complete accuracy of her transcription. She has, I believe, done wisely to retain in her text the orthography of the manuscript but to relegate major distortions to the Critical Apparatus (yet *Ylidiadem*, for *Ἰλιάδα*, is kept on p. 63, l. 4). The Critical Notes, below the text and Apparatus on the page, supply the pertinent readings in the Greek text and appropriate observations arising from the comparison. A complete exposition by means of the Greek reading I miss in only one passage where the obscure Latin rendering requires it—on p. 72, l. 14: *Synonne Scolonne polikinonne*. Indeed the arrangement of the text by sections and lines makes reference to Rhys Roberts' text easy, just as the folio numbers on the margin facilitate comparison with the facsimile; and, at the end of the book, the *Index Verborum Latinorum*, including the Greek equivalents, combines with an alphabetical check-list of Greek words to lighten the task of cross-reference.

The Introduction describes the manuscript and offers a well-ordered discussion of the spelling, the pointing, and kindred matters, a detailed study of the translator's method, and a treatment of the character of the Latin version and its place in the Greek manuscript tradition. Dr. Wall is cautious, and sees clearly how limited are the contributions which this fragmentary version is expected to make towards the construction of the Greek text. Yet her book furnishes some information on the methods used by mediaeval Latin translators of Greek works, will doubtless provide material for the new Du Cange and for a much-needed dictionary of rhetorical and literary critical terms (which it is hoped may some day be compiled), and may also encourage a thorough study of the Greek manuscripts of "Demetrius" other than *Parisinus* 1741.

The reader is struck by the curious spelling of words of Greek origin and the extent to which the translator retained Greek words instead of translating them. Interesting, too, is his choice of Latin words. For example *λόγος* is rendered by *sermo*, *oratio*, and *dictum*, but also, as is to be expected for this period, by *dictamen* (see p. 24). *Διλογία* (see p. 25) is transliterated

as *dyalogia*, although the translator correctly uses *dyalogicus* in two places (see p. 29). Dr. Wall takes *compositio* to stand for λέξις at Sect. 116, 27 (see p. 24), but it may perhaps be taken to represent σύνθεσις at the beginning of Sect. 117. Laudable care was exercised in the proof-reading; I have caught only οικείος for οικείος (pp. 27, 112, 113, 122).

It is well to know that this Greek treatise, noteworthy for its critical good taste, was of some interest, however limited, in the thirteenth century. We are gradually learning more about the popularity in the Middle Ages of the ancient writers on prose and verse; and we shall also know more about the methods which the mediaeval translators followed when the work of the collaborators on the *Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi* appears. In the Bibliography at the beginning of this volume is a list of studies concerning mediaeval Latin translations of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works. Some day, too, and soon perhaps, additional and complete manuscript copies of this translation may turn up, and, for all we know, of other mediaeval Latin versions of "Demetrius."

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CASSIODORI SENATORIS INSTITUTIONES. Edited from the manuscripts by R. A. B. MYNORS. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1937. Pp. lvi + 193. 12s. 6d.

It is surely astonishing, when one considers the importance of Cassiodorus' library for the transmission of classical and post-classical writers and of Cassiodorus himself for the development of monastic education, that the treatise in which he described his collection of books and instructed his monks in their proper use should have found no editor since Garet, who published his very faulty edition of the *Institutiones* in 1679. This deficiency has at last been made good, and in a highly competent manner, by Mr. R. A. B. Mynors of Balliol College, Oxford.

The difficulties of his task were formidable. Books I and II of the *Institutiones* became separated very early and the number of manuscripts containing both is very small. Book II, being a brief handbook of the seven liberal arts, had a wider appeal and was soon augmented by excerpts from other writers, so that, besides the authentic text, there still exist an earlier and a later interpolated version. Thus the editor had to undertake not merely to collate numerous manuscripts wholly or in part but, in the case of Book II, to present the text to his readers in such a way that the three strata could be clearly distinguished. Mr. Mynors has surmounted these difficulties with conspicuous success and the result is a thoroughly reliable text. References to

many of Cassiodorus' sources have been given by the editor at the foot of each page, but he modestly admits that much can still be done. And so future students, while they will accept Mr. Mynors' text as authoritative, have now, thanks to him, the opportunity of investigating further the materials from which Cassiodorus built up his work, as well as various more general questions to which a study of the *Institutiones* may give rise. The Latinist will find much that is of interest, such as words like *modernus* and *contropabilis* that were still neologisms in Cassiodorus' day or usages and forms unknown to classical Latin. Thus Cassiodorus, presumably following Hilary of Poitiers, treats *abyssus* as a noun of the fourth declension and, though in one case (p. 8, 4) the MSS are not agreed, they are unanimous in the other (p. 58, 3). Or, again, we find *carpienda* and *carpiat* vouched for by the best MSS (p. 45, 21; 60, 27). In order to lighten his *appendix criticus* the editor has brought together in one section of his Introduction (pp. lii-lv) the orthographical peculiarities of his manuscripts, but he records few variants in the matter of Hebrew names. Such unanimity is very surprising; and we wonder, for instance, at the consistent Old Latin use of *Moses* when Jerome seems to have preferred *Moses*.

One or two queries suggested by a perusal of this fascinating volume may here find a place. On p. 72 Cassiodorus instructs his readers about the works of Columella and Palladius, whom he calls Emilianus. The MSS differ regarding the number of books on agricultural subjects written by Columella. Mr. Mynors prints *sedecim* in the text, while in the case of Palladius all MSS give *xii*. These figures have long since given rise to various explanations. Cassiodorus' edition of Columella has been supposed to have been a different recension to that which we now possess, the sixteen *libri* being made up of twelve *de re rustica*, three *de arboribus*, and the single book addressed to Eprius Marcellus. Again, to account for Cassiodorus' figure *twelve* for Palladius' work, it is necessary to assume that he ignored the introductory first book and the versified *de insitione*. May not the explanation simply be that at a very early date the figures *fourteen* (the reading of *Bambergensis* for Columella) and *twelve* were interchanged, and that what Cassiodorus wrote was *twelve* for Columella and *fourteen* for Palladius? If that were so, then his text of these authors was substantially the same as ours. Mr. Mynors cites no reference for the *quadriga* of Messius (p. 45, 7). Presumably the allusion is to Mettius and his ghastly end (Livy, 1, 28), and it must have become proverbial, otherwise Cassiodorus' readers could not have been expected to understand it. When Cassiodorus describes (p. 77, 15 ff.) the *mechanicas lucernas . . . ipsas sibi nutrientes incendium*, we may guess that he derived the idea from the *candelabrum arte mechanica factum* which, as we learn from the preface of Sozo-

men's *Ecclesiastical History*, enabled the Emperor Theodosius II to continue his studies long into the night. The passage in Sozomen is duly translated in Cassiodorus' *Tripartite History* (Migne, *Patr. lat.*, 69, 882C).

Mr. Mynors has provided his book with excellent indices, the third (*index auctorum*) being especially valuable because it enables one to see in the clearest way the truly remarkable collection of volumes brought together at Vivarium. We congratulate him heartily on the completion of what is in every way a first-class piece of work.

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CHARLOTTE E. GOODFELLOW. *Roman Citizenship. A Study of its Territorial and Numerical Expansion from the Earliest Times to the Death of Augustus.* Lancaster, Pa., Lancaster Press, 1935. Pp. 124. (Bryn Mawr Diss.)

When Philip V of Macedon, in his letter to the people of Larissa,¹ commended Rome's liberal policy of extending its citizenship to manumitted slaves and to its numerous colonies, he laid his finger on a political innovation of Rome which created a dynamic force operating centripetally (i. e. numerically) and centrifugally (i. e. territorially) for the building of a great empire. Three periods of the process of expansion of Roman citizenship may be discerned: I) from earliest times to 338 B. C. (end of the Latin League); II) from about 338 B. C. (beginning of the establishment of Roman citizen colonies and *civitates sine suffragio*) to 90/89 B. C. (extension of citizenship to all Italy south of the Po), with a transition period to 49 B. C. (extension of full citizenship to Transpadane Gaul); III) 49 B. C. (beginning of the establishment of colonies and *municipia* in great numbers outside Italy) to 212 A. D. (*Constitutio Antoniniana*).

Miss Goodfellow has undertaken to trace this process from earliest times to the end of the reign of Augustus—an illogical division of the subject, due to "limitations of both time and space"—showing how Roman citizenship was extended by the manumission of slaves, by the institution of colonies, of *civitates sine suffragio* and of communities with Latin rights; by the Social War; by the grants of citizenship by *imperatores* during the Republic; by the activities of Roman traders in the provinces; by the creation of a standing army; by the establishment of colonies and *municipia* outside Italy; and by the grants of

¹ Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, No. 543.

citizenship by Caesar, Antony, and Augustus to favored individuals.

Recent scholarship has shown that the date (188 B. C.) given by Miss Goodfellow (p. 14, following Mommsen) for the extension of full citizenship to the last of the half-citizen communities should probably be modified to 109 B. C.² Miss Goodfellow has not fully discussed the important problem of multiple citizenship, a principle which signalized the completion of the transformation of Roman citizenship from a city-state citizenship into an imperial citizenship (the remarks on pp. 12, 13, 24, 41-43 concerning this subject are inconsistent with one another). The statement (p. 42) that there were 215 Roman citizens in Cyrene in 6 B. C. is based upon a misinterpretation of a passage in the first of Augustus' Cyrenean edicts, in which Augustus states that there were on the census rolls in 6 B. C. 215 Roman citizens in Cyrene who had the property qualification for jury duty. While there is ample evidence for illustrating Augustus' policy of bestowing Roman citizenship upon the royal families of vassal kingdoms of the Empire (the evidence adduced is not exhaustive),³ Miss Goodfellow has over-emphasized Julius Caesar's share in granting the franchise in Gaul (pp. 90-93). Of a total of fifteen prominent Gauls cited who in the first century A. D. bore the *nomen Iulius* few can actually be shown to have had an ancestor who was granted citizenship by Julius Caesar. The author has drawn the conclusion (pp. 115-116) that Suetonius' statement (*Augustus*, 40) that Augustus was not liberal in extending Roman citizenship is not to be taken at its face value. Taking into consideration the period of confusion preceding Augustus and the mass naturalizations of later emperors, we can have slight quarrel with Suetonius, especially if we take his statement to mean that Augustus restricted the citizenship qualitatively, not quantitatively. It is true that our information concerning the activity of Roman citizens in Egypt before the annexation of Egypt is scanty, but Miss Goodfellow has neglected important material in the papyri illuminating the life of Roman traders, officials, soldiers, Romanized Greeks, and imperial freedmen (especially in Alexandria)⁴ during the reign of Augustus.

² See E. Fabricius, *Sitzb. Heid. Akad. Wiss., Philos.-hist. Kl.*, 1924/25, Abh. 1, p. 32.

³ To the evidence should be added the granting by Augustus of citizenship to Segestes, Arminius, Flavius, and Italicus, nobles of the Cherusci (Tacitus, *Annales*, I, 58; XI, 16; Velleius, II, 118, 2). See J. Klose, *Roms Klientel-Randstaaten am Rhein und an der Donau* (Breslau, 1934), pp. 50, 138-139. Concerning Rhometalces of Thrace see also P. Collart, *B. O. H.*, LVI (1932), p. 203, and concerning Samsigeramus of Emesa see R. Paribeni, *Bull. Com.*, XXVIII (1900), pp. 33-43; J. Cantineau, *Syria*, XII (1931), pp. 139-141.

⁴ See W. Schubart, "Alexandrinische Urkunden aus der Zeit des Augustus," *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, V (1913), pp. 115-118. For

Limitation of space has made it impossible for me to do more than single out a few inadequacies of this monograph. It will be useful as a partial collection of the source material but can hardly be considered as a definitive treatment of the subject. A careful study of the extension of Roman citizenship during the third period indicated above, from 49 B. C. to 212 A. D., would be welcome.

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DAVID M. ROBINSON. *Pindar, a Poet of Eternal Ideas.* (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology, No. 21.) Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936. Pp. viii + 118. \$3.00.

This book contains much interesting matter, especially about modern imitations and translations of Pindar, of which Robinson has made a wide and sympathetic study. The bulk of it consists of a somewhat meandering progress through the whole of Pindar's poetry, in the traditional order of the odes, mainly in search of the "ideas and aphorisms" which they contain. Robinson has a strange enthusiasm for the commonplace, and the following sentences are typical: "There are no masterpieces among the Isthmian odes, but they have many good and eternal ideas. In the First Isthmian . . . , l. 5 asks: 'What is dearer to the good than noble parents?'" (p. 94). "Here are many immortal ideas on the posthumous verdict of public opinion, and what is the end of life, etc." (p. 71). Some good points are made, but there is little general grasp of Pindar's thought, and the whole work is marred by tasteless writing, of which two or three examples will be enough: "He knew as fine specimens of brawn and beauty and of brains as the world has ever produced, not yet debased by malaria, materialism, and military might" (p. 30); "that great Rooseveltian Rough Rider, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff" (p. 32); "but Hieron is lucky to come through life with fifty-fifty" (p. 74); "the frigid British or the sniffy Germans" (p. 23).

The book is full of irrelevant information: "This island was to be *stara Rhodos* (Hor., *Od.*, I, 7), a name adopted for the beautiful new Italian archaeological journal sponsored especially by Rhodes or the modern Rodi with its fine archaeological society and museum and Hotel des Roses" (p. 61, in an account of the Seventh Olympian); "these lines suggested to Horace his *exegi monumentum aere perennius* (*Od.*, III, 30, 1), words which

Roman citizenship in Laconia see H. Box, *J. R. S.*, XXI (1931), pp. 200-214; XXII (1932), pp. 165-183.

appear on the Horace medal made by Mr. Simpson for the American Classical League" (p. 89).

The detailed account of the editions of Pindar on pp. 22 ff. is disfigured by some inaccuracies. In Boeckh's edition only the commentary on the *Nemeans* and *Isthmians* is the work of Dissen; the "edition . . . of Ernst Diehl (2nd ed. 1910)," of which we are told that, as in those of Schroeder, "the emphasis is on textual criticism, due to which we at last have a sound text free from nineteenth century foolish emendations," is nothing more than the *Supplementum Lyricum*, to which such language is inapplicable; and there is an unwarrantable attack on Bury, who is said to have "adopted without acknowledgment Gildersleeve's system of strophic structures." Bury mentions Gildersleeve's treatment of Pindar's metres on p. li of his *Nemeans*, and Gildersleeve (who deals almost entirely with the *Olympians* and *Pythians*) borrowed his metrical schemes, as he twice states, from J. H. H. Schmidt. Bury's debt is to the same German sources, and his approach is independent.

Finally the "unknown fragment of one of Pindar's hymns, quoted by Joh. Chrysostomos, XLVII, 347 (with the new Pindaric word *αἰσθησιν*)," which Schroeder and Bowra are blamed for omitting (p. 99), is merely one of the passages in late prose writers which attempt to quote two words (*ἐλπίδα γηροτρόφον*) from the famous fragment 214, preserved by Plato, but get one wrong (*κουροτρόφον*). Boeckh (II, 2, p. 672) refers to this passage of John Chrysostom, but Schroeder lumps him with others equally negligible in the phrase "ut alios omittam."

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PAUL GOHLKE. *Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik.*
Berlin, Junker und Dünhaupt Verlag, 1936. Pp. 128.
5.50 M.

In this monograph Dr. Gohlke attempts to distinguish within the text of the *Organon* the different strata which mark the stages of development in Aristotle's logic. This development, he believes, is essentially the history of Aristotle's discovery of the quantity of judgments and the ever increasing rôle of the particular proposition, which means the gradual emancipation of logic from its metaphysical (i. e. Platonic) background. In the development of the doctrine of modality Dr. Gohlke finds a second means of distinguishing different chronological strata and a third in the changing theory of method, particularly in the supposed alteration of Aristotle's attitude toward the object of demonstration.

The *Categoriae* and *De Interp.* are defended as genuine, the first having been written before the development of the doctrine of quantity, the second representing in its original draft a stage intermediate between *Categ.* and the *Analytics* and being the first attempt to master the problem of quantity. At no stage of the development can *Anal. Post.* be earlier than *Anal. Prior.*; but Aristotle frequently corrected or augmented the older writing without extending these changes to the whole work (p. 114), and *Anal. Post.* does go back to a very old original in which the absence of the doctrine of quantity forbids the assumption of the syllogistic of *Anal. Prior.* This leads Dr. Gohlke to assert that the passages on the indemonstrability of the definition are late and contrary to Aristotle's original doctrine. The assertoric judgment was invented only to disguise the fact that the syllogistic had been largely developed before Aristotle noticed the difference of modality and the indefinite judgment for the similar purpose of excusing the neglect of quantity in all that had been written before this distinction occurred to him.

Much of Dr. Gohlke's thesis depends upon his interpretation of *De Interp.*, chap. 7, which he considers as the key to the origin of the doctrine of quantity. His interpretation of the example, *ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος—οὐκ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος* (17 B 10), as a clumsy attempt to express the particular proposition, which in the "more elegant formula of the *Analytics*" is *ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος λευκός*, will hardly commend itself as a possible rendering of the Greek; that it is the *indefinite* proposition is proved by the fact that, instead of being replaced by the "more elegant" formula for the particular in 18 A 4-7 (which Dr. Gohlke brands as a later addition), it occurs *along with* the particular and the universal, as it does also in 18 A 14-17. Similarly in distinguishing the stages of the theory of modality in *Anal. Prior.* A, chap. 15, the phrase *τὸ μηδενὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν* (35 A 1-2) is taken to indicate "die Notwendigkeit des Nichtzukommens" (p. 86). In 34 B 36-37, however, Aristotle expresses the necessity of non-inherence by *τὸ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ*, and in 35 B 35-36 he says: *ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ ὑπάρχειν*. The *μηδενὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* of 34 B 28 is Aristotle's own equivalent for the *ἐνδέχου* *ἂν* *τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ* of 34 B 25-26 (which Dr. Gohlke mistakenly translates: "Daher kann wohl das A keinem C zukommen" and then calls "recht missverständlich"; not *τὸ Α* but the whole phrase *τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ* [*scil. ὑπάρχειν*] is the subject of *ἐνδέχου* *ἂν*). It is clear, then, that 35 A 1 and 34 B 28 both express the "non-necessity of the attribution." If this is so, Dr. Gohlke's analysis of four stages of development in the chapter is entirely mistaken.

All too often are important conclusions drawn from misinterpretations of which the above are, I think, fair examples. In addition it seems to be assumed that Aristotle could never

pass over in silence a distinction which he had previously made, could never be guilty of an oversight, could never at a single stage of his career have given both a "dialectical" and an "analytical" proof or refutation of one and the same proposition. On *Anal. Post.* 73 B 27-28 (It is therefore clear that all universal attributes inhere in their subjects necessarily) Dr. Gohlke says (p. 95): "He who speaks in this fashion does not yet know anything about universal problematic or necessary particular judgments." H. W. B. Joseph in *An Introduction to Logic*, pp. 175-6, writes: "A particular judgment refers to part only of the denotation of some conceptual subject, an universal to all; but this is because in the latter the relation of concepts is taken to be necessary, and therefore the subject-concept sufficiently determines the application of the judgment, in the former it is not, and we indicate by the word *some* that the application of the judgment is not completely determined." Yet Dr. Gohlke believes that the sentence of Aristotle makes it clear that in all the older draft of *Anal. Post.* neither the theory of quantity nor that of modality was presupposed.

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FRANZ STOESSL. Die Trilogie des Aischylos. Baden bei Wien, Rohrer, 1936. Pp. 264.

This work is a study of the structure of Aeschylus' trilogies, beginning with the *Oresteia*, and extending to the other trilogies represented by extant plays. In connection with this study, the author wishes to establish a technique for reconstructing the lost plays, with particular emphasis on finding, in extant plays, elements borrowed from a predecessor.

Stoessl finds that the lyric form of strophe, antistrophe, and epode governs the structure of the trilogy and that the middle play determines the structure to be used, while the first play is built, usually by padding, to fit the "antistrophic" second. In the *Agamemnon* and *Choephores* he finds "duplication" of both scenes and characters to be a cardinal principle of structure. He arrives at interesting reconstructions of the lost plays.

The principle of strophic construction seems to this reviewer to be built on worthless grounds. In order to arrive at his odd conclusion that the *Agamemnon* is built to fit the *Choephores* (and he acknowledges that the fit is not close), Stoessl misinterprets the *Agamemnon* by regarding at least half of it as functionless; he makes no allowance for emotional exposition, the display of character beyond minimum hints, for the use of minor

acters for their intrinsic interest, for the exposition of secondary background, or for the explanation, in the interests of similitude, of incidental points in the story—for nothing, in fact, but a bare plot of largely physical action. In view of these judgments one cannot accept his analyses, on which his reconstructions are based. While Stoessl attempts to be objective and radical, his method is founded on aesthetic judgment, and his own judgment is unsound, except where, as with the *Choroebos*, it is not warped by a theory. His reconstructions, though attractive as guesses, actually consist of one hypothesis set against another, till a sort of card-house is constructed which the author regards as entirely solid. In spite of Stoessl's best efforts, then, there is no satisfactory basis either for his reconstructions or for his theory of strophic structure in the tragedy.

Nevertheless, against these unfavorable criticisms it should be said that Stoessl's industry is admirable, that he shows a thorough knowledge of European literature bearing on his subject, that he frequently rejects strained or overcritical theories about the plays—probably in his defense of the conclusion of the *Seven*—, and that he brings out several thought-provoking and attractive minor details. Stoessl's book fails in its major purposes—it is no book for the inexperienced or uncritical; but students of tragedy will find this laborious study occasionally interesting and suggestive.

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KENNETH SCOTT. *The Imperial Cult under the Flavians*. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1936. Pp. 204. RM 9.

The book is divided into fifteen chapters, three of them devoted to a discussion of the politico-religious basis for the Flavian dynasty and the religious policies of Vespasian and Titus, the remaining twelve to Domitian's policies in deifying his family and in extending the divine basis for his own rule. A notable contribution of the opening chapter is Scott's illustration of the use of omens for purposes of propaganda. The author treats all types of evidence—literary, archaeological, epigraphical and numismatic, but his approach to most of the problems is chiefly literary. He gives us, for example, an excellent survey of the adulatory passages in Flavian literature and the divine honors used there.

In treating the epigraphical material Scott is prone to select the conclusions of others on the basis of plausibility, without analyzing in detail the individual inscriptions of the municipal community or of the semi-priestly groups, the municipal *seviri*,

and the Roman *sodales*. As for the titles of the Flavian *sodales*, they are so complicated that scholars have been led to assume the existence of several separate *collegia* of Flavian *sodales*. Scott accepts an elaborate theory which postulates four Flavian *collegia*. Now about half of these *sodales*-inscriptions can for one reason or another be dated under the Antonines. In this period, which is well removed from the Flavian era and gives us the advantage of perspective, there was at least one *Sodalis Flavialis*, one *Titialis Flavialis*, one *Flavialis Titialis*, and one *Titialis*. Is it possible that these men represent four separate groups? Perhaps Dessau's interpretation (Scott, p. 81) was nearer the truth.

On the numismatic side Scott quotes Mattingly's descriptions of coin-types at length. There is a stimulating discussion on the interpretation of various types. I believe that a study of the change or development of individual types would throw more light on the policies of the several emperors. The various *Aeternitas*-types, for instance (pp. 24, 30-31, 42, 95; recently treated in Sauter's *Der römische Kaiserkult bei Martial und Statius*), deserve closer observation; I am sure that the problems arising out of Scott's discussions will provoke further study.

The book ends with an account of the circumstances and omens attending Domitian's death. It would have been useful if the author had devoted a few closing paragraphs to a summary of the conclusions reached in the course of his study. Throughout the work Professor Scott displays a remarkable familiarity with the vast bibliography of the imperial cult, and one may readily see, by a casual perusal of his foot-notes, how great are the ramifications of his subject.

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PIETRO ERCOLE. *Studi Giovenaliani*. Lanciano, Giuseppe, Carabba, 1935. Pp. 355. L. 15.

These studies, for the most part reprinted from Italian journals of philology, constitute a résumé of the results of Juvenalian scholarship to December, 1931 (the date of the author's introduction), combined with original contributions. Of particular interest are Ercole's appreciative remarks on Juvenal's style and his discussions of literary influences, including the influence of Juvenal on writers of Italian.

Posthumously published, the volume opens with an account of the author's life by Bruno Lavagnini. Chapter I deals with

uals and classes satirized, Juvenal's relations to earlier and contemporary writers, his style, and the dominant rôle of Domitian in the Satires. Agreeing with the general opinion that the Second is the least skillful and the earliest of the Satires, Cole thinks it probable that the greater part of it was composed while Domitian was still alive and that the derogatory allusions to the emperor were added after his death. Chapter III discusses the Fourth Satire and Juvenal's relation to Statius. Chapter IV is a very careful study of the Sixth Satire, with incidental consideration of the Second. Chapter V deals with the Bodleian fragments of the Sixth Satire and the three verses attested by Giorgio Valla. Chapter VI treats of the Sixteenth Satire. In Chapter VII, which is here published for the first time, Cole traces the transmission, influence, editing, and interpretation of the works of Juvenal and draws a stemma of the manuscripts. He ascribes considerable importance to the *Bodleiensis* (eleventh century) and advances a theory of contamination to account for its peculiar features. Eight previously unreported manuscripts are mentioned (p. 310, n. 1)—four in the communal library of Siena, three in the *Biblioteca Forteguerriana* at Arezzo, and one (x) in the Laurentian Library—, all of which, on cursory examination, are assigned to the class of inferior manuscripts.

This collection of studies would be a most useful work of reference were it not for the lack of an index, the brevity of the table of contents, and the indefiniteness of the cross-references. The following misprints have been noted: p. 58, n. 5, *sportulat* for *rtula*; p. 74, n. 5, and *Georg.* for *ad Georg.*; p. 163, *das wächster* for *das Schwächste*. On p. 46, n. 1 the reference to Löschhorn should read: "*Philol. Woch.*, 1920, col. 262." p. 206, n. 5, the *Journ. of Phil.*, XVI, 63 is cited, but the citation and the name of the author, Nettleship, are not given. p. 290, n. 3, a work by Wright is referred to as "*The Poems in.*"

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J. W. KOSTER. *Traité de métrique grecque suivi d'un précis de métrique latine.* Leyde, A. W. Sijthoff, 1936. Pp. II + 326.

The recent developments in metrical science and the acquisition of new literary material in the papyrus fragments have created a need for a general treatment of Greek metric designed to include matters not accounted for in such older standard

works as those of Christ and Masqueray. In attempting to supply this need Koster appears to me to have succeeded particularly well. The description is clear and orderly and illustrated by numerous examples, which are indexed. The doctrines followed agree quite closely with those of White as found in his *Verses of Greek Comedy*; for example, the logaoedic and Aeolic rhythms are regarded as distinct types, and the latter is treated in considerable detail and made to include certain forms which by some scholars are otherwise analysed. With regard to the origins of the various rhythmical types Koster has cautiously abstained from offering theories, believing as he does that scarcely any certain knowledge can be reached. He suggests a possible explanation of the origin of dochmiac verse (pp. 230 f.) but only after mentioning the divergent views of various scholars as a warning against undue dogmatism in the historical study of metrics. The treatment of Latin verse is hardly more than an appendix to the main body of the work, though the metres of Catullus and Horace are treated at some length. For the Latin authors he has not listed the texts used; from the references to the Vergilian *Catalepton* given at the top of p. 278 it appears that he has used the old Teubner text of Ribbeck and not the newer one of Völlmer. Attention should be called to a few minor errors in explanation, metrical analysis, and typography. Ἀπόλλωνι (pp. 29 f.) even with the initial syllable short is not altogether impossible in epic verse: the ι may be long by position, as in φ 267. The statement on p. 75, "*ici nous nous bornons à constater, etc.*" is not clear; the author probably meant to say that iambic trimeter verses containing only iambs are less common than those containing some spondees. On p. 103 Ar., *Vesp.*, 317 φίλοι, τήκομαι μὲν is used as an example of an ithyphallic colon with anaclassis; it is probably better taken with White and Schroeder as bacchiac. On p. 92 read *le trochée se compose* for *le spondée se compose* and *rythme descendant du trochées* for *rythme ascendant du trochées*. On p. 205 (beginning of § 35) read (— — — | — — — | — — — | — — —) for (— — — | — — — | — — —). On p. 293 (§ 21 ▲ 5) read *lecythia* for *ithyphalliques*.

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TWO NOTES ON THEOPOMPOS, *PHILIPPIKA*, X.

1. KLEON AND THE ASSESSMENT.

In volume LVII of this *Journal* (pp. 377-394) Meritt and I sought to establish that Kleon came back from Pylos about the end of the second prytany of 425/4 and that Thoudippos (who sponsored the motion for the remarkable tribute-assessment of that year) had expected him back in time to get the business finished within the prytany, but that in fact the bill was not passed until the third prytany had begun.¹ The crux was that whereas Thucydides leaves in everyone's mind the impression that Kleon had been notoriously punctual, there was nevertheless this unexpected delay. We argued, therefore, that the actual capture of the Spartans was achieved in an absolute minimum of time; so that, if Kleon took things easier on his way home, he might have fulfilled his twenty-day promise and yet have been later than Thoudippos calculated. We could, however, give no direct evidence that Kleon had relaxed his pace.

Yet there is, I believe, evidence that Kleon did cause delay which Thoudippos could hardly have foreseen. It was not quite as we imagined, *sc.* on the way back (*A. J. P.*, LVII, pp. 392-393), but after his return to Athens.

Theopompos is cited (fr. 92 Jacoby = sch. Lucian, *Timon*, 30) for the palmary instance of Kleon's effrontery: "Once when the Athenians had assembled, he came to the Ekklesia with a wreath on his head; and telling them to postpone the meeting (since he was sacrificing and had to entertain guests) he dismissed the Ekklesia." The story finds its perfect context

¹ *I. G.*, I², 63; see Meritt and West, *The Athenian Assessment*, pp. 44-45, lines 3, 34.

if this is the meeting summoned so urgently by Thoudippos, if Kleon's sacrifice is the thanksgiving for Pylos, if his behavior is the licensed effrontery of the hero of the hour.³ I have given the flat version of the Lucian scholiast. Plutarch tells the story with more gusto (*Nicias*, VII, 7; *Moralia*, 799 D): Kleon kept them all waiting;³ when he came, he said, "I am busy today. I am going to entertain guests and have sacrificed to the gods"; and the assembly broke up in laughter and applause. The laughter was no doubt due to high spirits, but was there a joke as well? Were Kleon's guests (ξένους) his Spartans?

Thoudippos fixed the time for debate on the assessment *ἐπει[δαν ἡκεῖ ἡ] στρα[τια] ἐς τρίτην ἡμέραν* (Meritt and West, *The Athenian Assessment*, p. 45, line 34). This is not unlike a clause in the "resolution of the allies" touching the debate on the peace with Philip in 346 B. C. (Aeschines, II, 60: *ἐπειδὴν ἐπιδημήσωσιν οἱ πρέσβεις καὶ τὰς πρεσβείας ἀπαγγείλωσιν - - προγράψαι τοὺς πρυτάνεις ἐκκλησίας δύο*). Here, too, a debate is to be postponed till certain individuals can attend it, not in their official capacity (it is to be "after they have reported") but because their presence might make some difference.⁴ The clause was in fact disregarded (*ibid.*, 61) since the allies' resolution bound no one; nor in any case need we suppose that if they had been late the Ekklesia would wait for them. But imagine such a clause, when joined to Kleon's exceptional standing after Pylos: in the story, he comes from his private affairs (not from the council-house) and has evidently no official position, yet the Ekklesia waits for him. Thoudippos' clause, *plus* Kleon's personal standing at the moment, explains this. It surely cannot have been usual.

³ Compare the tone of his notorious dispatch beginning "Dear Boule and Demos" (cf. *A. J. P.*, LVII, p. 391, note 35).

⁴ *τὸν μὲν δῆμον καθήμενον ἄνω περιμένειν πολλὸν χρόνον ὥσθ' εἰσελθεῖν ἐκείνον*. In this, and the laughter, Plutarch need hardly be suspected of embroidering Theopompos. The laughter at any rate is what makes the story a *propos* in *Nicias*, VII. The incident is no doubt glanced at Arist., *Bq.*, 929 ff., and Kleon must have suggested leniency for Miletos. The Sausage-seller hopes that next time he will burst.

⁴ Similarly, Thoudippos does not enact that an Ekklesia be called "for the strategos" (cf. *Andocides*, I, 11) in which case Kleon would be on duty (which he clearly is not); but simply, that the Ekklesia be at a time when the strategos can attend.

Plutarch does not cite Theopompos by name; the scholiast commenting on the two names Ὑπερβόλῳ and Κλέωνι in Lucian's text quotes Theopompos three times: fr. 95, Θεόπομπος ἐν τῷ περὶ δημαγωγῶν; fr. 96, Θεόπομπος πάλιν ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ Φιλίππικῶν; fr. 92, Θεόπομπος. All three have always been ascribed to the "Demagogue" section of *Philippika*, X (see below), no doubt rightly. This might be taken as further proof that the Ekklesia in question was due to consider the assessment, since "reckless treatment of public finance by demagogues" was the subject of that section. But this is not cogent: a pejorative anecdote did not, for Theopompos, have to be strictly relevant.

2. DATE OF JURYMEN'S PAY.

The introduction of pay for Jurymen was dated 462⁺ by Busolt (*Gr. Gesch.*, III, p. 263; cf. p. 255) but there has been a tendency to lower the date a little⁵ or a lot. Unquestionably this has been due to a sense that Ephialtes should be off the scene before Perikles appears in full career, and Walker in *Cambridge Ancient History* (V, p. 101) puts this explicitly (the italics are mine):

The only indication of date is afforded by the statement of Aristotle ('Αθ. Πολ., XXVII, 3) that the measure was brought forward by Pericles as a bid for popular favour, and in order to counterbalance the wealth of Cimon. This would point to a period when Pericles *had succeeded to the leadership* of the popular party, and Cimon was still the leader on the other side. The date, therefore, *cannot be before the ostracism* of Cimon, for Ephialtes, not Pericles, was then the leader of the popular party; and it cannot be during the exile of Cimon, for Aristotle's statement implies his presence at Athens. It must, therefore, fall between his return from exile, which happened probably in 451 B. C., and his sailing for Cyprus in 450 B. C.

Like too many arguments from residue, this will not bear scrutiny. Put the plain question, cannot this story of rivalry belong to the time before Kimon's ostracism? I seek to show that it not only can but does. The story occurs first, for us, in

⁵ Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alterthums*, III, pp. 571-573, Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, II², p. 155, Glotz, *Histoire Grecque*, II, p. 138, Berve, *Gr. Gesch.*, I, p. 273, all imply, without argument, that it is *after* Ephialtes' anti-Areopagite laws, but not much after.

Theopompos, and he (I seek to show) put it before both Kimon's ostracism and Ephialtes' legislation.*

The closing chapters of *Philippika*, X (all our fragments are from these "closing chapters") existed separately as a pamphlet called "The Demagogues at Athens."† As an excursus to Bk. X,⁸ it is evidently motivated by the comptrollership of Euboulos in Athens. This is described in fr. 99, 100, not flatly; he has completed the ruin of Athens' morale by his administration of the Theorikon. So far Theopompos' judgment does not differ materially from Demosthenes', nor indeed from the truth: men like Euboulos make a "power-policy" impracticable for the state they serve. But what Demosthenes thought was treason to Athens' past, Theopompos thought the due culmination of a century or more of Athenian demagogy.

* This means that fr. 89 should stand before fr. 88. The traditional (but arbitrary) inverse order, already in Müller's *F.H.G.* (I, p. 293), has I imagine helped the tendency to lower the date of fr. 89. This will not prove that Theopompos is right. Walker indeed puts the legislation after the ostracism, ἐν δ' αὖ πᾶσι. I insist only that the "rivalry" story cannot be used to support the 451 date. Bonner and Smith, *Administration of Justice*, pp. 226-230, discuss the two dates 462 and 451, and advance (but finally reject) two considerations for the latter: (1) If (what they rightly think very doubtful) Aristotle, *Αθ. Πολ.*, XXVII, 1, records a second anti-Areopagite law dated 451, Plutarch might mean this as the law which succeeded the invention of pay. But Plutarch "specifies" the law which caused Kimon's ostracism. (2) The Jurymen, if already paid, might have resented the circuit justices of 453/2. But the new courts were not really a form of poor-relief, and anyway (see the acute remarks of Calhoun, *Growth of Criminal Law*, pp. 102 sq.) it was not the dikastai but the thesmothetai who were relieved of work thereby. I once thought Aristophanes, *Eccles.*, 303-308, rather favoured 451, the 'fifties being Myronides' great time: but Aristophanes is thinking of Ekklesia pay. For the date in the early 'fifties I can find no reason except compromise: its constant repetition (note 4) seems to be a matter of habit.

† Fr. 100 Jacoby = Athen., 166 D. Fr. 95 is quoted as from the pamphlet. The *Philippika* cannot have been published before Philip's death (fr. 27, which stood ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς Φιλίππου συντάξεως, seems to me to prove this as clearly as the more scandalous passages: see further Jacoby's judicial comments on fr. 330, 340, *ad loc.* and also p. 358), and I imagine this pamphlet, and the similar one in Bk. XXV, had earlier separate circulation: this one in the late 'fifties, the other in the early 'forties.

* Theopompos' narrative had reached the later 'fifties: fr. 52, 63, 78, 101.

The thesis, then, is that this vicious system, the use of the state revenues for the pleasures of the poor, was rooted in Athens' past. There are named Kimon, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Kallistratos, Euboulos: these all with reference to Bk. X or to the pamphlet. Fragments 85-87, on Themistokles, are from Plutarch, who never gives book numbers: not strictly relevant to the thesis, they speak of bribery and peculation; cognate themes which Theopompos did not disdain.⁹ There is little of Perikles in our fragments: he and his rival Thucydides¹⁰ are named in 91 (cf. 261: neither gives the book number): but clearly Perikles must have been one of the main villains of the piece, and Kimon and Thucydides were there as foils. This can, I think, be proved.

Fragment 89 tells the well-known story of Kimon's great personal generosity, and concludes "*it was to this that he owed his position of first citizen in Athens.*" Its bearing on the thesis is clear: what Kimon achieved by personal liberality, his successors had to achieve by *misthos*. This is made explicit by Aristotle ('Αθ. Πολ., XXVI), who tells the same tale as motivation for Perikles' invention of Jurymen's Pay. The 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία is probably later than Theopompos' pamphlet (see note 7) but does not of course derive from it. Theopompos has told the story in more detail, but Aristotle in one respect more carefully (Kimon, he says, kept open house *for all his demesmen* of Lakiadai, where Theopompos says *for all Athenians*). We have to posit a common source, which each has used in his fashion: I suggest it is Kritias (see note 9).

Plutarch twice tells the story, in *Pericles*, IX, 2-3, and in *Cimon*, X, 1-3. He follows Theopompos, not Aristotle, having the greater detail and also the error. But he (or his original) has checked Theopompos by Aristotle: he notes, in the *Cimon*, that Aristotle says "demesmen only," and in the *Pericles* he quotes Aristotle for Damonides' name. This is his regular way

⁹ E.g. fr. 94 (no book number, but not to be separated from 93 which cites Bk. X) on Kleon's peculation. In fr. 90 "Kimon" is needed for Cyril's context, but Theopompos must have said "Kleon" and Cyril has confused the names. These peculation passages are probably (fr. 86 certainly?) from Kritias: I hope later to develop the case for Kritias as a major source for *Philippika*, X.

¹⁰ Theopompos calls him son of Pantainos: but that he means the son of Melesias is made virtually certain by fr. 261.

with a secondary source, and it is generally recognized that his primary source, here, is ultimately Theopompos.¹¹ Now a little later (*Pericles*, X, 1; for the *Cimon* see below) he has a second bit which is recognizably Theopompos (fr. 88), and the narrative between is consecutive and coherent; it may, I think, rank as certain that this narrative is all, in its main lines, Theopompos.¹² It is as follows, *Pericles*, IX, 2-X, 1 (I condense it to the essentials): "Perikles competing with Kimon could not compete with his wealth and generosity [here comes Theop. fr. 89], so he bribed the masses with theorika and Jurymen's and other Pay,¹³ and used them against the Areopagites. By his power with them he destroyed that Boule's¹⁴ standing, and in consequence Ephialtes reduced their jurisdiction and Kimon was ostracized. Such was Perikles' power. Yet Kimon did not stay away his full ten years, but was recalled under stress of war [Theop. fr. 88]."

In the *Cimon* the same material is split up. Kimon's generosity (X, 1-3), the Areopagites' loss of jurisdiction *owing to Perikles' power with the masses* (XV, 2), the ostracism (XV, 3-XVII, 3 [a digression on Ithome, as contributing to his fall, makes this so long, but XVII, 3 = *Pericles*, X, 1 *init.*]), Tanagra and the recall (XVII, 4-8). The order is identical, but the story has lost its coherence. Perikles the villain, not Kimon the hero, was the central figure in Theopompos; so that in a life of Perikles the story stays coherent, in a life of Kimon it is a framework to be filled out with other matter.

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¹¹ E.g., Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen*, I, p. 300; Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, p. 36; Jacoby, *Frag. Gr. Hist.*, comm. on 115 F 89. The reckless exaggeration of VII, 8 (Ephialtes was Perikles' *homme de paille*) is not of course Theopompan: nor XVI, 3.

¹² Note that Theopompos is nowhere named: if he had been used for two isolated bits in a consecutive narrative, this would be most surprising.

¹³ Is this accumulation due to Plutarch or Theopompos? We can hardly say, but it does not matter. Here, as in the matter of the demesmen, the careful Aristotle corrects the recklessness of our other witnesses: it is clear that the common source spoke of Jurymen's Pay, not of the other *misthoi*.

¹⁴ So. the Areopagites. The verb *katestraxase* is Theopompan, cf. fr. 240.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF AENEID VIII-X.

There are numerous references in the *Aeneid* to the passage of time which enable the reader to gain an approximate idea of the length of time required by the action of the poem. As in the Homeric epics, both nightfall and dawn are frequently mentioned, and it is possible to arrange most of the events of the narrative in a day-by-day sequence. Chronological lists have been drawn up for the *Aeneid*, but these differ in many details; and books VIII-X in particular present several interesting problems in chronology, the explanations of which do not seem entirely satisfactory.¹

The major problem concerns the relation of VIII to IX. In VIII Aeneas visits Evander at the site of Rome, and on the following day goes on to Caere; this action requires a day, a night, and a day.² In IX Turnus' attack on the ships, the night expedition of Nisus and Euryalus, and the attack on the Trojan

¹ I shall in this paper limit myself primarily to the four important treatments of the chronology of VIII-X: R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik* (ed. 3, Leipzig, 1915), p. 342; M. M. Crump, *The Growth of the Aeneid* (Oxford, 1920), pp. 98 f.; A. Cartault, *L'Art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* (Paris, 1926), p. 640; R. Mandra, *The Time Element in the Aeneid of Vergil* (Williamsport, 1934), pp. 167 ff. For a summary of their views see below, pp. 138 f.

² I am excluding the beginning of VIII, in which is described the appearance of Tiberinus. The *nox* of VIII, 26 is not the night preceding the arrival at Pallanteum. A day intervenes; cf. 67: *nox Aeneas somnusque reliquit*; 68 f.: *aetherii spectans orientia solis lumina*. After a day of preparation (cf. 79-85) the journey is made on the following night (cf. 86, 94), and the Trojans arrive at Pallanteum at noon on the next day (97). This is the view of Heinze, Cartault, and Mandra. Miss Crump (*op. cit.*, p. 98) is therefore incorrect in assigning to the same night both the apparition of Tiberinus and the departure for Pallanteum. This inaccuracy is found also in Heyne-Wagner, *Aeneid*, Excursus I to *Aen. XII* (ed. 4, Leipzig, 1833), p. 837; J. Carcopino, *Virgile et les Origines d'Ostie* (Paris, 1919), pp. 450 f.; J. W. Mackail, *The Aeneid of Virgil* (Oxford, 1930), p. 302; cf. Mackail, "Notes on Aeneid VIII," *Glass. Rev.*, XXXII (1918), pp. 103 f. Cartault states (*op. cit.*, p. 597) that the journey would take more than twelve hours and that, in order to arrive at Pallanteum at noon, the departure on the previous night was necessary. This accounts also for the fact that there is insufficient action to fill out the day of preparation (79-85).

camp the next day likewise require a day, a night, and a day. The question now arises: should this action of VIII and IX be synchronized, i. e. are the day, night, and day of VIII identical with the day, night, and day of IX? Heinze, Miss Crump, and, more recently, Mandra believe that this is the case and therefore synchronize the action of the two books;³ in other words, they view VIII and IX as a striking instance of simultaneous action.

According to this chronological scheme the night spent by Aeneas at Evander's home in VIII is the same night during which Nisus and Euryalus strive in vain to get word to Aeneas of the plight of the Trojan camp; the morning mentioned in VIII, 455-456 is therefore the same morning described in IX, 458-464. Of this Mandra says: "It is the only instance in the *Aeneid* where we find two openings of the day for the same day."⁴

There is, however, a serious objection to the synchronized scheme which has been described above—an objection which suggests the possibility of an entirely different chronological arrangement. The vital passage in this connection is IX, 8-11, the words of Iris to Turnus:

Aeneas urbe et sociis et classe relicta
sceptra Palatini sedemque petit Evandri.
nec satis: extremas Corythi penetravit ad urbes
Lydorumque manum, collectos armat agrestis.

If the first day of IX corresponds to the day in which Aeneas arrives at Pallanteum, how can Iris say this to Turnus? If, on the contrary, Iris means what she says here, Aeneas has already at this time arrived in Etruria; *extremas Corythi penetravit ad urbes Lydorumque manum*; therefore the first day of IX corresponds, not to the day of Aeneas' arrival at Pallanteum, but to the final day of VIII (454-731). The two books still overlap,

³ See below, p. 138. Cf. Mandra, *op. cit.*, p. 115, n. 245 and p. 140 for minor criticisms of Heinze's chronology.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 143. In a footnote Mandra adds: "For those who read the *Aeneid* to find incongruities, this may be one." But if Vergil has synchronized the action in VIII and IX, as is generally believed, it is difficult to see why the double reference to the same dawn should be troublesome. Moreover, according to Heinze's interpretation of the chronology of X (*op. cit.*, p. 388), there is a daybreak implied before X, 1 which is identical with that described in X, 256 f.

but only to a slight degree; and *ea* in IX, 1 refers, not to the events in VIII, 97 ff., but merely to the events described by Vergil in VIII, 597 ff.⁵

Confirmation for the acceptance of IX, 10 as decisive for the chronology of VIII and IX is found in the fact that IX, 1-167 give to the reader the impression of taking place late in the day. Book IX apparently begins with the day partly gone, for there is no reference to the break of day, as so often occurs. The attack on the ships cannot have occupied a very long interval, and in the speech of Turnus which follows immediately after the metamorphosis of the ships we find the phrase: *melior quoniam pars acta diei* (156). Soon after night falls (166). It seems therefore very possible that Vergil conceived of the attack on the ships as occurring in the afternoon of the day in which Aeneas arrived at Caere.

As a result of this arrangement the episode of Nisus and Euryalus does not take place on the night which Aeneas spends at the home of Evander. The correspondence of these two events is perhaps one of the main reasons for the belief in the synchronization of VIII and IX.⁶ But is it necessary to assume that

⁵ Cartault accepted this interpretation of IX, 10 and placed Turnus' first attack in IX in the second day of Aeneas' absence (*op. cit.*, p. 659; cf. p. 640), but his chronology is vitiated by the fact that he assigns the expedition of Nisus and Euryalus and the night voyage of Aeneas from Etruria (described in X, 146-255) to the same night; see below, pp. 139 ff. Heinze himself admits (*op. cit.*, p. 387) that the normal interpretation of IX, 1 is "während der zuletzt geschilderten Ereignisse" and says that IX, 10 agrees with this; but he believes that Vergil is attempting to conceal the simultaneous action, and refers to T. Zielinski, "Die Behandlung gleichzeitiger Ereignisse im antiken Epos," *Philol.*, Suppl. VI² (1899-1901), pp. 432 ff. Zielinski discusses numerous instances of synchronized action in Homer, where he believes the apparent chronology differs from the real chronology. But, without questioning the validity of many of Zielinski's conclusions, the examples which he cites are not good parallels to *Aen.* VIII-IX. In only one passage does a problem similar to that raised by *Aen.* IX, 10 appear—in *Il.* IX, 77, where there is a reference in the second of two synchronized assemblies (VIII, 489-565; IX, 1-79) to a situation subsequent in time to the first. And this is not really parallel to *Aen.* IX, 10, for the reference occurs *at the end of the second assembly* and therefore creates no real inconsistency, even though the two assemblies take place simultaneously.

⁶ Heinze (*op. cit.*, p. 387) finds the synchronization of VIII and IX necessary to avoid the improbability that Juno would let Turnus remain

Aeneas was at Pallanteum on the night that Nisus and Euryalus thought he was? On the contrary there is much more irony in the situation if the expedition of the two young men was doomed to failure from the very start—if Aeneas was no longer with Evander but had already gone on to Etruria.⁶

The hypothesis which has been set forth above must now be examined in connection with the chronology of X. Two more problems emerge at this point: 1) the time of the council of the gods and 2) the time of Aeneas' return. Although Heinze, Miss Crump, and Mandra all accept the synchronization of VIII and IX, they differ from each other in their treatment of the events in X. I shall therefore give briefly in outline form the various theories concerning the action of VIII-X. I have arranged the action by days and nights in order to show more clearly both the similarities and the differences of the chronologies.⁷

	<i>Heinze</i>	<i>Crump</i>	<i>Cartault</i>	<i>Mandra</i>
Day	VIII, 94-368 IX, 1-158	VIII, 94-368 IX, 1-158	VIII, 94-368	VIII, 94-368 IX, 1-158
Night	VIII, 369-453 IX, 159-458	VIII, 369-453 IX, 159-458	VIII, 369-453	VIII, 369-453 IX, 159-458
Day	VIII, 454-731 IX, 459-818	VIII, 454-731 IX, 459-818	VIII, 454-731 IX, 1-158	VIII, 454-731 IX, 459-818 X, 1-145
Night	X, 146-255	IX, 159-458 X, 146-255	X, 146-255

inactive until the second day of Aeneas' absence. Cartault's remarks on this (*op. cit.*, p. 660) hold good only if his chronological scheme for IX and X is accepted. It is noteworthy, however, that Juno in VII in like manner is inactive until the day after Aeneas' arrival. Vergil in VII, 288-291 is clearly referring to the Trojans' second day in Latium, described in 148 ff.

⁶ Cf. D. R. Stuart, *O. P.*, XXXII (1937), p. 175, who accepts Cartault's interpretation of IX, 10-11.

⁷ I include VIII (94 ff.) and IX to show the manner in which X is linked to the earlier books. I have omitted numbering the days, for the various writers differ in their methods. Heinze and Cartault number from the night of VIII, 26; and Heinze includes under each night the events of the following day. Miss Crump and Mandra include the events of the night under the preceding day; but, while Mandra counts from the beginning of VIII, Miss Crump counts the days from VII, 25-147, i. e. she does not interpose at the end of VII a period of undetermined duration as do Heinze, Cartault, and Mandra.

	Heinze	Crump	Cartault	Mandra
Day	X, 1-145 256-908	X, 1-145	IX, 459-818 X, 1-145 256-908	X, 256-908
Night		X, 146-255		
Day		X, 256-908		

Mandra differs from Heinze only in his belief that the events of X, 1-145, i. e. the council of the gods (1-117) and the fighting (118-145), are part of the action of the previous day.⁸ Heinze had assigned the assembly of the gods to the beginning of a new day,⁹ and so, according to his scheme, Vergil paused in his description of the battle in X and told of the events of the preceding night (X, 146-255) in order to explain the arrival of Aeneas and the Etruscan fleet; in other words the council of the gods, described at the opening of X, does not, according to Heinze, take place until after the night described in X, 146 ff.

An even more serious inversion of the time element appears in Cartault's arrangement. To avoid the synchronization of VIII and IX he finds it necessary to ascribe to one and the same night both the Nisus-Euryalus episode and the night journey of Aeneas from Etruria. Thus X, 146-255 describe the events prior to the morning mentioned in IX, 459 ff., and not only the remainder of IX but all of X (excluding, of course, 146-255) takes place in the same day. The day in this case seems unnecessarily overburdened with activity, and also the dawn described in X, 256 ff. is then the dawn already mentioned in IX, 459 ff. This seems much more improbable than Heinze's belief that VIII, 455 f. and IX, 459 ff. refer to the same morning. Moreover, how can Aeneas be said to arrive at dawn (X, 256 ff.), if already on this day the events of IX, 459-818 and X, 1-145 have taken place?

Both Miss Crump and Mandra correct this inversion of the time element. Miss Crump makes the assembly of the gods begin a new day (as does Heinze), but, unlike Heinze, she does not push back Aeneas' night journey to the previous night. In

⁸ Mandra's chronology, as given above, is identical in every respect with that found in Heyne-Wagner (*op. cit.*), pp. 837 f.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 387 f. Heinze believes that *hodie* (107) and *pulsi pristina Turni gloria* (143 f.) indicate that a night has passed since the *aristeia* of Turnus.

order to gain this result she inserts an extra night of which nothing is said—apparently a night is spent by Aeneas at Caere. I shall speak of this again.

Mandra is correct, I believe, in including the events of X, 1-145 in the day of IX, 459-818.¹⁰ Mandra was anticipated in this by Heyne, Cartault,¹¹ and Reinmuth.¹² There seems no necessity to accept Heinze's belief that X, 1 begins a new day and that X, 146-255 give a picture of the events prior to the opening of X, and we may therefore assume that the happenings in X are described in their correct chronological sequence.¹³

But during which night does Aeneas return? Cartault, as I have pointed out, believes that Aeneas' journey by sea occurs during the night immediately following the arrival in Etruria

¹⁰ Most editors, however, follow Servius on X, 1 and believe that the council of the gods took place on the morning of a new day; cf. Benoist (1872), Forbiger (ed. 4, 1875), Conington (ed. 3, revised by Nettleship, 1883), Sidgwick (1890), Papillon and Haigh (1892), Ladewig and Schaper (III, ed. 9, revised by Deuticke, 1904).

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 713; cf. p. 640. Cartault adds in a note (p. 755) that X, 22-24 appear to refer directly to IX, 766-770.

¹² O. W. Reinmuth, "Vergil's Use of *Interca*, A Study of the Treatment of Contemporaneous Events in Roman Epic," *A. J. P.*, LIV (1933), pp. 325 ff. Reinmuth cites X, 118 to show that at the close of the council the Rutullians are still attacking the Trojan camp as they were before and during the convening of the council. Of 107 and 143, usually cited to prove that X, 1 begins a new day, he says: "Jupiter's use of *hodie* in X, 107 is as appropriate late in the day as it would be at daybreak, since the contest has come to no decision as yet, and *pulsi pristina Turni gloria* would very properly refer at the close of a long day's fighting to Turnus' prowess earlier in the day." In XII, 424 *pristina* likewise means simply "former." Cf. also Sen., *Hero. Fur.*, 1081.

¹³ Vergil's use of tenses in X, 146 f. supports this conclusion: *illi inter sese duri certamina belli contulerant: media Aeneas freta nocte secabat*. The use of the pluperfect *contulerant* implies that the fighting just mentioned has now ceased, while *secabat* describes the action of the following night. If Heinze is correct in his assumption, one would expect some paraphrase of *conferebant . . . secuerat* to denote the priority of the journey. Conington (*op. cit.*) on X, 147 believes that *contulerant* indicates that the battle was over. Cartault (*op. cit.*, p. 753) accepts the priority of *contulerant* but limits the action to the opening of hostilities. According to Cartault's theory only the attack on the ships (IX, 1-158) has occurred prior to the night when Aeneas sets sail. This is highly improbable; Vergil in X, 146 f. is clearly referring to the fighting of X, 118-145.

and that this is the night of the Nisus-Euryalus episode. But there is another serious difficulty here. When the nymph Cymodocea appears to Aeneas, it is midnight;¹⁴ she says (X, 238-239):

iam loca iussa tenet forti permixtus Etrusco
Arcas eques.

In other words the cavalry has already reached its assigned position on the night when Nisus and Euryalus make their ill-starred excursion. This appears very unlikely. It is true that the cavalry has not joined the Trojans in the camp (cf. X, 239-240), but it seems somewhat strange that the Trojans would have no knowledge of the arrival of the reinforcements.¹⁵ Even more unlikely is the fact that on the following morning (IX, 459 ff.) Turnus attacks the Trojan camp, utterly disregarding the Arcadian and Etruscan cavalry which is now present, according to Cartault's theory.¹⁶ The obvious explanation of this surprising disregard of the cavalry is that the cavalry has not yet arrived, and we have therefore an additional argument against Cartault's ascription of IX, 159-458 and X, 146-255 to one and the same night.

Both Heinze and Mandra likewise believe that Aeneas sets sail the evening of his arrival in Etruria, but they think that the night of X, 147 follows the events of VIII, 454-731 and IX, 459-818.¹⁷ If the departure of Aeneas by sea follows immediately

¹⁴ Cf. X, 147, 216. These lines clearly allude to the same night. Cf. Mandra, *op. cit.*, p. 145; the time reference in X, 215 marks the resumption of the narrative after the digression. Conington (*op. cit.*) on X, 215 is therefore wrong in stating that 215 f. do not refer to the same night as 147 but that the sea voyage lasted two nights and a day. Cartault (*op. cit.*, pp. 760 f.) is also troubled by the double reference to midnight in 147 and 215 f. and concludes: "146-162 ont été rédigés postérieurement à 215-255."

¹⁵ Had the Trojans in the camp had any inkling of the presence of the cavalry, the expedition of Nisus and Euryalus would have been pointless. The same problem arises if the ships from Pallanteum had arrived the afternoon or evening before Nisus and Euryalus set forth. But it is not known when the ships arrive. Vergil wisely says nothing of them after their departure from Pallanteum in VIII, 548-550.

¹⁶ Cartault (*op. cit.*, p. 762) is conscious of this difficulty but says merely: "Virgile n'est pas sorti absolument à son honneur des difficultés de la chronologie des événements."

¹⁷ Mandra adds X, 1-145 to this same day.

upon his arrival at Caere, the synchronization of VIII and IX makes it possible to avoid the difficulties which have been discussed in connection with Cartault's chronology. There still remains, however, the difficulty of the surprisingly quick arrival of the Etruscan and Arcadian cavalry that same evening (X, 238 f.). And this suggests the question: why was it necessary to assume that Aeneas set sail on the night of his arrival in Etruria? When the Trojans approach Caere, they are *fessi* (VIII, 607), and we gain the impression that it is already late in the day;¹⁸ it is difficult to believe that there was sufficient time for the meeting with Tarchon, the necessary arrangements, and the departure of the fleet that same evening, even though the Etruscans are described as prepared and awaiting a foreign leader (VIII, 494 ff.).¹⁹ But if we assume that Aeneas spent the night in Etruria, this difficulty disappears, as does the troublesome arrival of the cavalry that same evening. The next day is then devoted to final preparations (cf. X, 154: *iungit opes foedusque ferit*), the departure of the Etruscan cavalry, and the sailing of the fleet. That such a period of preparation intervened seems logical and probable.²⁰

Miss Crump is therefore correct, I believe, in assigning a night in Etruria to Aeneas.²¹ Vergil's failure to mention this night is

¹⁸ Mandra says (*op. cit.*, p. 144): "Vergil had in mind the end of the day when he wrote VIII, 605-607." Cartault, however (*op. cit.*, pp. 619 f.), thinks that VIII, 605-607 refer to mid-day. This seems impossible unless Aeneas started from Pallanteum early in the morning, for the journey would require at least four or five hours. But Vergil gives the impression that Aeneas' departure was very leisurely; it is difficult to compress the action of VIII, 454-593 into the early hours of the morning. If Aeneas, on the contrary, left Pallanteum toward noon, it would be late in the afternoon before he could arrive at Caere.

¹⁹ Cf. X, 148 ff. Vergil's phraseology in 153-156 implies haste, but we must remember that Vergil is here swiftly summarizing the events which have not been described earlier. If Aeneas spent the night at Caere, the voyage may have been begun during the following day, and in this case the phrase *haud fit mora* would not be inappropriate.

²⁰ Cf. the day which is commonly believed to intervene between the appearance of Tiberinus and the journey up the Tiber in VIII (see above, n. 2).

²¹ Cf. Ladewig and Schaper (*op. cit.*) on X, 147; they too believe that Aeneas spent a night at Caere; "dass die Verhandlungen mit König Tarchon gleich am Abend noch stattgefunden haben, ist zwar möglich,

not surprising when we consider that he passes over with great rapidity the events between Aeneas' arrival in Etruria and the latter part of the return journey by sea. As Reinmuth says:²² "The poet leaves the first action at a point at which the succeeding stages are easily inferred, then passes over to the second action and follows it out *exclusively* until it converges with the first action."

Thus the addition of the night in Etruria solves the difficulties which have been considered above. It is no longer necessary to synchronize the action of VIII and IX, for the objections to Cartault's arrangement of VIII and IX now disappear. The advantage of this hypothesis is that the chronological sequence of VIII-X becomes much clearer; with the exception of the overlapping of IX, 1-158 with the end of VIII, the action advances steadily with only minor interruptions and digressions; there is no inversion of the time element with X, 146-255, and the double announcement of the same dawn disappears; IX, 10 receives its normal interpretation, and there is no unnecessary crowding of the time element in the arrival of the Etruscan cavalry.

By way of summary, therefore, I offer below a revised chronology of the events in VIII-X as a substitute for the one recently given by Mandra.²³ I feel that this arrangement, while perhaps not free from flaws, provides a more satisfactory solution of the problems involved, and it will at least have, I trust, the merit of presenting a possible alternative.

Day (VIII, 1-25 —Embassy sent to Diomedes; anxiety of Aeneas).²⁴
Night VIII, 26-66 —Apparition of Tiberinus.

aber nicht gerade wahrscheinlich." Although here Ladewig and Schaper depart from Heinze, they accept the synchronization of VIII and IX and also the priority of X, 146-255 to X, 1-145 (cf. their notes on IX, 1 and X, 215); this leads them to the curious position of having a day of complete inactivity at the Trojan camp, of which Vergil says nothing. Conington, believing that X, 147 and X, 215 f. refer to two different nights (see above, n. 14), was likewise compelled to assume a day of inactivity for Turnus. But, while I believe that Vergil lets the reader infer the passage of a night and a day in Etruria of which nothing is said, I consider it highly improbable that a day of inactivity can thus be inserted into the events at the Trojan camp.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 338.

²³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 167 ff.

²⁴ Mandra says (*op. cit.*, p. 167): "Only the night of this day is

THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF KLEON AND THE ATHENIAN CALENDAR IN 422/1 B. C.

I. THE FIRST CYCLE OF METON.

Students of the fifth century Athenian calendar will recall that Meton's first nineteen year cycle extended from 432/1 B. C.¹ to the end of 414/3 B. C. and, according to plan,² should have contained seven intercalations.³ Meritt, after establishing a definite synchronism,⁴ P. I, 1 = Hek. 10, 422/1 B. C., demonstrated convincingly that the period from 432/1 to 422/1 B. C. included three intercalations.⁵ Thus we should expect four further intercalations between 422/1 and the end of the cycle in 414/3 B. C.

For 411 B. C. we are fortunate in possessing a certain synchronism, provided by Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*:⁶ P. I, 1, 411/0 = Skir. 14, 412/1 B. C. Between the two equations mentioned, therefore, there are eleven intervening years:

422/1 B. C.	P. I, 1 = Hek. 10, 422/1
411/0	P. I, 1 = Skir. 14, 412/1

It is obvious that during this eleven year period in the civil calendar from Hekatombaion 1, 422/1, to Hekatombaion 1,

¹ Diodoros 12, 36.

² Geminos 8, 53-6; Censorinus 18, 8.

³ All modern work on the Athenian calendar must start from Benjamin D. Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar in the Fifth Century* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1928), an exhaustive study of *I. G.*, I², 322. The most lucid analysis of Meton's cycle is that of William Bell Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931), 309-343. Meritt's most recent revision is in *Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1932), 128-179, including tables. Except where otherwise stated, it is these tables which I use throughout for the synchronisms cited in the text. The abbreviation P. represents Prytany.

⁴ *Ath. Cal.* (see note 3), 84 f.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 86-88. Cf. Dinsmoor, *Archons* (see note 3), 327.

⁶ *Δθ. Πολ.* 32, 1: *ἔδει δὲ τὴν ἐλληναῖαν τῇ κοινῇ βουλῇ εἰσιέναι τετράδι ἐπὶ δέκα Σκιροφοριῶνος*. Dinsmoor, *Archons*, 328 f., rejects this evidence; but see Meritt, *A. F. D.* (see note 3), 154-156.

411/0, there must have been four or five intercalations. Four intercalations would give a total of 4014 days⁷ whereas five intercalations yield a sum of 4044 days.⁸ It is now possible to deduce the exact length of the conciliar calendar over the same length of time by subtracting the first nine days of Hekatombaion, 422/1, and the last sixteen of Skirophorion, 412/1, from the figures given above for the civil calendar. The result is 3989 or 4019 days, from which we can calculate an average conciliar year of $362\frac{7}{11}$ or $365\frac{4}{11}$ days. But Meritt has already shown⁹ that the term of the *boule* approached the solar year in length and averaged $365\frac{1}{2}$ days. The unavoidable conclusion is that, of the two averages given above, $365\frac{4}{11}$ must be right and that, as a result, the eleven year span saw five intercalations.

The above calculations take us two years beyond the end of the first Metonic cycle, but epigraphic evidence gives us a point of departure in 414/3 and enables us to establish the character of 413/2 and 412/1 B. C. From *I. G.*, I², 328 we know¹⁰ that in 414/3 both the seventh and twenty-fifth of Gamelion fell in the seventh prytany. Now from P. VII, 1, 414/3, to P. I, 1, 411/0, we can reckon twenty-four prytanies, which, with $361\frac{1}{2}$ days as the average prytany length, totalled 876 days. Again, if both 413/2 and 412/1 were ordinary years, then Gam. 1, 414/3, to Skir. 14, 412/1 (P. I, 1, 411/0), covered sixteen days short of thirty months, that is, 869 days. In other words, P. VII, 1, 414/3 B. C., fell about Posideion 23 and the demands of *I. G.*, I², 328 are satisfied. On the other hand, if one of the intervening years was intercalary the length of the same period is increased to 899 days. But the latter supposition places Gam. 7, 414/3, in the sixth prytany and is therefore impossible, since it contradicts our data. It follows then that the period in question contained 869 days and that 413/2 and 412/1 must be restored as ordinary years.

The significance of this computation lies in the fact that, if there were five intercalations between 422/1 and 411/0, and

⁷ $(7 \times 354) + (4 \times 384)$.

⁸ $(6 \times 354) + (5 \times 384)$.

⁹ *Ath. Cal.*, 123.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 93; *A. F. D.*, 156 f.; Meritt, "The Spartan Gymnopaïdia," *C. P.*, XXVI (1931), 71; Dinsmoor, *Archons*, 342.

413/2 and 412/1 were ordinary, then there must of necessity have been five intercalations between Meritt's equation¹¹ of 422/1 and the end of the first cycle of Meton. In other words, the first Metonic cycle was irregular, in that it actually contained eight and not the theoretical seven intercalations planned by its constructor.¹²

II. THE PROBLEM OF 422/1 B. C.

The crucial problem of the first Metonic cycle in Athens lies in the correct placement of these five intercalations, but it is with one year only, 422/1 B. C., that I propose to deal here. Meritt, restoring 422/1 as intercalary, gives the following scheme for the period from 425/4 to 421/0 B. C.:¹³

Year	Intercalation	P. I, 1
425/4	0	Skir. 5
424/3	0	Skir. 19
423/2	0	Skir. 29
422/1	I	Hek. 10
421/0	0	Skir. 22

It seems to me, however, that the evidence at our disposal would be better satisfied if 422/1 were restored as ordinary. Such a thesis demands a re-examination of Meritt's reasons for making 422/1 intercalary and a consideration of the historical events pertinent to our enquiry.

Meritt rests his case upon the following foundations:

1. The three years previous to 422/1 were ordinary, as Meritt has proved beyond reasonable doubt. A further ordinary year in succession, it is implied, is highly incredible.¹⁴

2. Thucydides gives two synchronisms between the Athenian and Spartan calendars:

¹¹ See p. 145 above.

¹² Meritt, *Ath. Cal.*, 103. Dinsmoor, *Archons*, 328, disagrees, but Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 154-158, has convincingly demonstrated the fallacy of Dinsmoor's argument. Cf. *Ath. Cal.*, 84 f., 93 f., 115 (table); *A. F. D.*, 155-157, 176 and 178 (tables).

¹³ *A. F. D.*, 176, 178. Dinsmoor, *Archons*, 331, agrees.

¹⁴ *Ath. Cal.*, 104.

Athenian Elaphebolion 14 = Spartan Gerastios 12, 424/3 B. C.¹⁵

Elaphebolion 25 = Artemisios 27, 422/1 B. C.¹⁶

These figures prove an irregularity, and therefore intercalation, at either Athens or Sparta in one of the two years 423/2 and 422/1. Meritt places the intercalation at Athens and thus, reverting to Hermann¹⁷ against Boeckh,¹⁸ makes Gerastios precede Artemisios at Sparta.¹⁹

3. According to Meritt, Kleon set out for Thrace after the Pythian festival of 422/1,²⁰ a celebration which fell in the Delphic month Boukatios,²¹ generally equated with the Athenian Metageitnion.²² The scholiast to Aristophanes' *Peace* tells us that Kleon perished at Amphipolis eight months before the production of the Aristophanic play at the Great Dionysia of Elaphebolion, 422/1 B. C.²³ Thus, by inclusive reckoning, Kleon's death may be placed in Metageitnion or Boedromion, according as 422/1 was ordinary or intercalary. If Kleon left Athens after the Pythian games, however, that is, late in Metageitnion, then his death cannot have occurred before Boedromion because of the time necessary for his operations in Thrace.²⁴ Therefore the battle of Amphipolis, in which Kleon met his death,²⁵ was fought in Boedromion, a conclusion which, according to the above reasoning, once more implies intercalation in the year 422/1 B. C.

If we are to make 422/1 ordinary, then our first task is to assure ourselves that the consequences are not at variance with

¹⁵ Thuc. IV, 118, 12; 119, 1. ¹⁶ Thuc. V, 19, 1.

¹⁷ *Ueber Griechische Monatskunde* (Göttingen, 1844), 124.

¹⁸ "Zur Geschichte der Mondeyclen der Hellenen," *Besonderer Abdruck aus den Jahrbüchern für classische Philologie*, N. F. Bd. I, Heft 1, 86-92 (Leipzig, 1855).

¹⁹ *Ath. Cal.*, 111 f.; *A. F. D.*, 146-149.

²⁰ Thuc. V, 1; V, 2, 1; Meritt, *Ath. Cal.*, 114.

²¹ Pauly-Wissowa, *Real Encyclopädie*, "Delphoi," IV, 2532; A. Kirchhoff, *Monatsb. der Berlin Ak. d. W.*, 1864, 129 ff.

²² Meritt, *loc. cit.*

²³ The scholiast (ed. Dindorf) to *Peace* 48 quotes Eratosthenes: "Ερατοσθένης γὰρ ἐπὶ Θράκης τὸν θάνατον Βρασίδου καὶ Κλέωνος ὀκτὼ μῆσι προγεγονέναι φησὶ."

²⁴ For Kleon's activity in the north cf. West and Meritt, "Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign and the Assessment List of 421," *A. J. A.*, XXIX (1925), 59-69.

²⁵ Thuc. V, 10, 9.

the historical evidence cited by Meritt. Meritt's strongest argument lies in the evidence advanced from Thucydides' report of the end of the truce and the subsequent departure of Kleon from Athens. The first two points in Meritt's case are in fact quite negligible if we can prove that the last is not cogent. For a sequence of four ordinary years is by no means incredible²⁶ when we bear in mind that even three successive ordinary years formed an irregularity in Meton's plan.²⁷ We know of one irregularity in the form of three consecutive years, 425/4, 424/3, and 423/2, without intercalation; we cannot, therefore, without convincing proof, ignore the possibility of further abnormality.²⁸ Again, I cannot be convinced that the evidence from the Spartan calendar is at all conclusive as to the nature of 422/1 in Athens. Meritt is compelled to change the order of the Spartan months. If, however, the intercalation occurred at Sparta and 423/2 and 422/1 were ordinary at Athens, then Artemisios preceded Gerastios at Sparta and the Thucydidean equations can still be reasonably explained; for we have no independent testimony to solve the problem of the Spartan months. Considered alone, the Thucydidean equations are at least open to either interpretation.

To proceed constructively, I shall now assume that 422/1 B. C. was ordinary and I shall test that assumption by all the evidence bearing on the problem. I give below a table of correspondences resulting from the restoration of 422/1 as an ordinary year:

Year	Intercalation	P. I, 1
425/4	0	Skir. 5
424/3	0	Skir. 19
423/2	0	Skir. 29
422/1	0	Hek. 10
421/0	I	Hek. 22

²⁶ See p. 147 above.

²⁷ Meritt, *Ath. Cal.*, 101 f.; *A. F. D.*, 150 f., 177; Dinsmoor, *Archons*, 320 f. Both Meritt and Dinsmoor point out that intercalation was not decided scientifically but was entirely at the whim of the state.

²⁸ Cf. the years 413/2 to 410/09 (Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 176).

III. KLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN.

The question of intercalation in 422/1 is linked with the departure of Kleon from Athens to take charge of military operations in Thrace. This is usually dated in Metageitnion, after the Pythian games of 422 B.C., a date which, in my opinion, is based on a misinterpretation of the opening words of the fifth book of Thucydides. Meritt,²⁹ accepting the common understanding of Thucydides and counting the Aristophanic scholiast's statement³⁰ inclusively, must place Kleon's death in Boedromion, 422/1 B.C., for quite obviously the Athenian general could not have perished in Metageitnion, the very month in which he left the city. But to place Kleon's death as late as Boedromion Meritt is forced to make 422/1 intercalary. The crux of the problem, therefore, clearly lies in the actual words of Thucydides, for upon the meaning of this passage depends the solution to the chronological difficulty. I now propose to reconsider the evidence of Thucydides which has led critics to accept the Pythian games as the *terminus post quem* for Kleon's departure from Athens.

Thucydides states³¹ that Kleon left Athens *μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν*. This *ἐκεχειρίαν* takes us back to the opening sentence of the book,³² which reads as follows: τοῦ δ' ἐπιγεγονόμένου θέρους, αἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτοὶ σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀγρίους ἀνέστησαν. . . . This passage has often proved difficult to editors and translators. The Loeb editor renders:³³ "The next summer the year's truce continued till, and ended with, the Pythian games." In a footnote, however, there is offered a variant, of which the editor does not approve: "The next summer the one year's truce was ended and the war was renewed until the Pythian games." Jowett agrees with the first interpretation and Meritt³⁴ followed him in extending the truce to the time of the Pythia. Thus the *ἐκεχειρία* becomes the holy truce of the Pythian games. This the Loeb editor calls the

²⁹ See p. 148 above.

³⁰ Scholiast to *Peace* 48. See note 23, p. 148 above.

³¹ V, 2, 1.

³² V, 1, 1.

³³ Charles Forster Smith, vol. 3, p. 3.

³⁴ *Ath. Cal.*, 114.

natural interpretation of the Greek, a statement open to serious doubt.

If, however, the phrases *ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ* and *μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν* refer back to the *ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαί*, then Kleon is represented as having left Athens after the official termination of the truce, some time after Elaphebolion 14,³⁵ 423/2 B. C. This *terminus post quem* for the departure of Kleon is earlier by about five months than that already mentioned, the Pythian festival of 422 B. C.

To me it seems impossible that the word *ἐκεχειρία*, in its present context, could be used of the holy truce of the Pythian festival; yet this must be its meaning if the current interpretation of *διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων* be true. There is certainly no such indication in the text of Thucydides, and it would be perfectly reasonable to expect one, in accordance with his regular custom.³⁶ If Kleon really left the city after the Pythia, then one would expect that fact to be stated definitely, *μετὰ τὰ Πύθια*, in accordance with Thucydides' well-known usage.³⁷

³⁵ Thuc. IV, 118, 12.

³⁶ Whenever Thucydides writes of a holy truce, in existence for the duration of one of the great festivals, he always designates it as such. He never uses *σπονδαί* or *ἐκεχειρία* absolutely to mean a holy truce. Cf. V, 49, 1-3, where an account is given of the dispute between Sparta and Elis which arose as the direct result of an alleged violation of the Olympic truce of 420 B. C. Here, it is true, *σπονδὰς* and *σπονδαῖς* are found without qualification but not before the author has introduced the topic by *ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπιακαῖς σπονδαῖς*; and the holy truce is the very point at issue, hence the unqualified use of the word. Cf. also VIII, 9, 1, *τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδὰς*; VIII, 10, 1, *τὰ Ἰσθμια ἐγένετο καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ αἱ σπονδαί) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά*. B. alone of the mss. gives *αἱ σπονδαί* in this passage and is supported by P. Oxy. 1247 (*The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* X [London, Egyptian Exploration Fund, 1914], p. 127). If *αἱ σπονδαί* is accepted, the context is quite sufficient to qualify the noun. Thucydides uses both words, *ἐκεχειρία* and *σπονδαί*, interchangeably of military and holy truces; cf. V, 49, 1-3 (holy) and IV, 123, 1 (military).

³⁷ Thucydides appears to have employed the great Panhellenic festivals as chronological pegs. The following, all his references to the games, will illustrate his usage: V, 47, 10, *τριάκοντα ἡμέραις πρὸ Ὀλυμπίων*; V, 49, 1, *Ὀλύμπια δ' ἐγένετο . . . ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπιακαῖς σπονδαῖς*; V, 50, 5, *μετὰ τὰ Ὀλύμπια* (all the foregoing refer to the Olympic festival of 420 B. C.); III, 8, 1, *ἣν δὲ Ὀλυμπιάς*; III, 8, 2, *μετὰ τὴν ἐορτήν* (festival of 428); VIII, 9, 1, *πρὶν τὰ Ἰσθμια . . . τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδὰς*; VIII,

This, I hope, clarifies Thucydides' usage and the meaning of *ἐκχειρία*. We can now study the passage from another point of view, namely, can the Greek words *διαλύω μέχρι* bear the strain put upon them by the interpretation which we are here challenging?

The word *μέχρι* means "until" and can quite properly be used of time. In passing let us observe that the translation disputed makes *μέχρι* mean "until after," but despite such parallels as Herodotos III, 160 (*νέμεσθαι μέχρι τῆς ἐκείνου ζόης*) this interpretation would appear strange in the present context. Or perhaps the commentators take for granted a *ieroμηνία* which is not mentioned by Thucydides; but this is far too difficult.

The verb *διαλύω* means "to put an end to," "to part asunder," "to break off," and is equivalent to the Latin *dissolvere*, *dirimere*. All derived senses of the verb can be traced back to this original meaning. So *αἱ σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο* must be rendered "the truce had come to an end." The whole clause *αἱ μὲν . . . Πυθίων* can mean only "the year's truce had been broken off and remained so until the time of the Pythian games"—the natural and logical interpretation. It follows that from the end of the truce (Elaphebolion, 423/2) to the beginning of the Pythia (Metageitnion, 422/1) there existed a state of war, terminated by another cessation of hostilities, a holy truce, lasting for the duration of the festival. The festival over, the state of war resumed.

The chief difficulty, apparently, the reason for evolving from the passage a meaning exactly contrary to that intended by Thucydides, lies in the fact that a pluperfect (*διελέλυντο*) is immediately followed by an aorist (*ἀνέστησαν*).

Now the perfect stem of a Greek verb denotes action completed with permanent result. So the pluperfect, the past or

10, 1, τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγένετο; VIII, 10, 2, μετὰ τὴν ἐορτήν (Isthmian celebration of 412). Thucydides does not mention the Nemean games and the passage under discussion contains his only allusion to the Pythia. If he had meant "after the Pythia" here, he would surely have written μετὰ τὰ Πύθια or μετὰ τὴν ἐορτήν, for this was his regular custom in dealing with the festivals; he anticipates the celebration, then records its actual occurrence, and finally writes down what took place after the festival. Cf. V, 75, 2 and V, 76, 1 for his similar treatment of the Karneia.

secondary tense of the perfect system, presents action in the past, the effects of which continued. As an instance, *ἡνθήκει* means "had bloomed and was in flower," a past action continuing with more or less permanent result.³⁸ *διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων*,³⁹ then, implies that the truce had come to an end and remained at an end until the time of the Pythian games.

Again, the pluperfect may be employed when an action occurred in the past so immediately or suddenly that it almost coincided with another anterior action.⁴⁰ The aorist, on the other hand, merely denotes the occurrence of past action.⁴¹ In view of these several considerations I suggest that the opening of the fifth book of Thucydides should be construed as follows: "In the following summer the year's truce was broken off and remained at an end until the Pythian festival; and (immediately preceding the end of the truce) during the truce the Athenians had expelled . . ." Thucydides opens by mentioning the end of the truce, the really important event of the spring, then retraces his steps momentarily to include in his account the Athenian activity on Delos, which had slightly preceded the sundering of the truce.

It is my opinion that the interpretation of this passage, quite apart from the chronological and historical problems involved, but on purely linguistic grounds, must be as I have outlined it. We must now fit our chronology to Thucydides and not succumb to the allurements of forcing Thucydides to agree with our chronology.

I think it probable that in using the phrase *μέχρι Πυθίων* Thucydides had in mind the clause in the truce whereby the Delphic sanctuary was once more thrown open to the Athenians.⁴²

³⁸ Smyth, *Greek Grammar for Colleges*, 1852 b, 1952.

³⁹ Cf. Thuc. IV, 23, 1 for a similar use of the form: ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν διελέλυντο (Cobet, for διελύοντο of the mss.) εὐθὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ αἱ περὶ Πύλον.

⁴⁰ Smyth, *op. cit.*, 1953; cf. Thuc. IV, 47, 1, ὡς δὲ ἔπεισαν καὶ μηχανησάμενων τὸ πλοῖον ἐκπλέοντες ἐλήφθησαν, ἐλέλυντό τε αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ. . .

⁴¹ Smyth, *op. cit.*, 1923.

⁴² Thuc. IV, 118, 1, περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαρτείου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου δοκεῖ ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἀδόλως καὶ ἀδυσῶς κατὰ τοὺς πατέριους νόμους.

The implication is that so far during the war the Athenians had not enjoyed this privilege.⁴³ After the termination of the truce, however, both sides leaned towards peace; ⁴⁴ it is for this reason unlikely that any Spartan influence at Delphi barred the Athenians from the festival of 422/1 B. C. Thucydides, therefore, pointedly refers to the Pythia, to accentuate Athenian participation.⁴⁵

The terminus post quem for Kleon's departure from the city is now established as Elaphebolion 14, 423/2, rather than the Pythia of 422/1. This suggests that Kleon was *strategos* in 423/2 B. C. Though we are told ⁴⁶ specifically by Thucydides of only two generals for this year, Nikias and Nikostratos, Wade-Gery ⁴⁷ has used the epigraphic evidence to demonstrate that Eurymedon, of the deme Myrrhinous, was also a member of the *strategia* for 423/2. Since Kleon was of the same tribe as Eurymedon, the former could hardly have held office in the same year. On the other hand we know that Kleon was *strategos* in 422/1 B. C. In other words, Kleon, after his election to the *strategia* for 422/1, must have persuaded the Athenians (Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας . . . Thuc. V, 2, 1) to allow him to sail for the Thraceward region as *strategos extra ordinem* (a position which he had held with extraordinary success in 425/4 B. C.),

⁴³ Aristophanes' silence may be significant, in view of *Wasps*, 158 f., his only reference to Delphi:

ὁ γὰρ θεὸς

μαρτυρομένη μούχρησεν ἐν Δελφοῖς ποτέ.

It has already been remarked that V, 1, 1 is Thucydides' sole mention of the Pythia (see note 37, p. 152 above).

⁴⁴ Thuc. V, 15-17.

⁴⁵ Classen marks the text of Thuc. V, 1, 1 corrupt and suggests that the Greek should read, e. g., . . . αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελλύντο ἄλλαι δ' ἐπεγεγέρθητο μέχρι Πυθίων. . . . He believes apparently that the truce was prolonged by agreement until the Pythia, and refers the *ἐκχειρία* to this further armistice. I find it difficult to credit that such an extension would be dismissed so casually, to say nothing of my reluctance to obelize the passage, except as a last resort. And, granting Classen his thesis, what of the *τερομηνία* (see p. 151 f. above)? Cf. J. Classen, *Thukydides*, 3rd. ed., revised by J. Steup (Berlin, 1912), note *ad loc.*

⁴⁶ Thuc. IV, 129, 2.

⁴⁷ "The Year of the Armistice, 423 B. C.," *O. Q.*, XXIV (1930), 33-39; *I. G.*, I², 324, line 38; Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 129, 139 (text of *I. G.*, I², 324).

before the official beginning of his term of office.⁴⁸ Elaph. 14, 423/2, is to be equated with P. VII, 32,⁴⁹ a date which probably fell after the elections for the following year.⁵⁰ Kleon, therefore, at the time when the armistice ended, was in all likelihood general-elect.

The activity of Kleon and his party in Athens at this time is to be closely connected with events in Thrace, where Skione had revolted to Brasidas during the truce.⁵¹ After the failure of Kleon's imperialistic policy, which finally came to grief at Delion,⁵² the victor of Pylos was in ill repute at Athens.⁵³ The revolt of Skione and the failure of Athens to recover the town immediately gave Kleon his great chance to recuperate his slipping fortunes. It was Kleon who urged the Athenians to destroy Skione,⁵⁴ "posing henceforward as an ardent advocate of imperial defense against Brasidas."⁵⁵

Waving the banner of Perikles, Kleon gradually regained his lost prestige and was elected *strategos* in the spring of 422. In the meantime the siege of Skione had dragged on, the Athenian operations in Thrace against Brasidas having proved ineffectual.⁵⁶ The stage was set perfectly for Kleon. He was general-

⁴⁸ Phormion's status in 430/29 B. C., when sent around the Peloponnesos to Naupaktos, probably at the request of the Akarnanians, may have been similar. Cf. Androtion, *ap. schol. Ar. Peace* 347; Thuc. II, 69 and 81, 1. Adcock (*Cambridge Ancient History*, V, p. 211) seems to have no adequate foundation for placing Phormion's disgrace in 428 B. C., after his successes in the West, rather than in 430 B. C., after his return from an uncaptured Poteidaia.

⁴⁹ Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 176.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *'Aθ. Πολ.*, 44, 4.

⁵¹ Thuc. IV, 120, 1; 122, 3.

⁵² Winter of 424/3 B. C. (Thuc. IV, 89 ff.).

⁵³ For a convincing analysis of Kleon's position in Athens during this period see West and Meritt, "Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign and the Assessment List of 421," *A. J. A.*, XXIX (1925), 59-69; see particularly 59-62. Kleon's fall from favour and the odium which his policy was suffering in 423 make it all the more unlikely that he was a regularly elected general for 423/2 (see p. 154 above).

⁵⁴ Thuc. IV, 122, 6, Κλέωνος γνώμη πισθέστερος. Note the use of *πείθω* and cf. V, 2, 1.

⁵⁵ West and Meritt, *op. cit.* (see note 53 above), 61.

⁵⁶ Operations against the rebellious Skione began in the summer of 423, probably at the beginning of the Athenian year 423/2 (Thuc. IV,

elect, the Athenians were worried about Skione⁵⁷ and their Thraceward empire; here was the grand chance for the victor of Pylos to play in Thrace the part he had so successfully performed at Pylos, the scene of his greatest triumph.⁵⁸ The parallelism of the two situations is striking. All that remained was for Kleon to persuade the Athenians to send him Thracewards without waiting for the new *strategic* year—and Pylos was his precedent. He could point to his highly satisfactory termination of the Pylos campaign, when he had actually fulfilled his mad promise;⁵⁹ from the point of view of the Athenians, Kleon's bravado had turned out advantageously once, why not again? Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε . . . (Thuc. V, 2, 1).

If this is the truth, then the whole incident has the Kleon touch, familiar to us from the Pylos episode, where Thucydides treats events in some detail; and the verb *πείσας* assumes a new significance.⁶⁰

It does not follow that Kleon left Athens immediately after his election. He was forced to win over the Athenians, to await the end of the truce and to obtain the necessary troops, money and supplies. Thucydides does not suggest haste—he merely writes ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν (there is no εὐθύς). We know from the *logistai* inscription that a payment of one hundred talents⁶¹ was made by the treasurers of Athena Polias this year on P. VIII, 25, a conciliar date which may be equated with Mounichion 15, one month after the armistice had come to an end. This sum is suitable⁶² for an expedition such as that of

129). The town was not finally taken until the summer of 421 B. C. (Thuc. V, 32, 1).

⁵⁷ At the Lenaia of Gamelion, 423/2, Aristophanes' *Wasps* was produced. That the lengthy siege of Skione was a byword in Athens this spring is suggested by lines 209 f.:

ῥῆ Δ' ἡ μοι κρεῖττον ἦν
τηρεῖν Σκιώνην ἀντὶ τούτου τοῦ πατρός.

⁵⁸ For Kleon and Pylos see Thuc. IV, 27-39.

⁵⁹ Thuc. IV, 39, 3, καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καίπερ μανιώδης οὔσα ἡ ἐπόσχεσις ἀπέρη.

⁶⁰ Cf. note 54, p. 155 above.

⁶¹ *I. G.*, I², 324, lines 43 f.; Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 139.

⁶² The payment of about eighteen talents (*I. G.*, I², 324, lines 44-46; Meritt, *loc. cit.*) made on P. X, 3 (Skir. 6), although possible, is not

Kleon and the season is opportune for the opening of military operations; should we assign this payment to Kleon for his campaign in Thrace?⁶³ In any case we may assume that Kleon left Athens some time before his legal term of office began, possibly late in Mounichion, 423/2 B. C.

It will be recalled that the Aristophanic scholiast places⁶⁴ Kleon's death in Metageitnion or Hekatombaion, according as we count inclusively or exclusively (reckoning 422/1 ordinary). We know from Thucydides that the battle of Amphipolis was fought when summer was on the wane.⁶⁵ Kleon's death, therefore, must be assigned to Metageitnion. This fits well enough with Thucydides' seasonal dating, for summer can draw to a close over a period of two or three weeks or more. When Thucydides writes *τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα* he means that the campaigning season was almost over; he has no intention of indicating a fixed civil date, though the latter would tend to fall about the same time each year. Thus, if military operations concluded in any year somewhat earlier than usual, his chronological dismissal is still *καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα . . .*, the summer was drawing to a close.⁶⁶

Kleon then left Athens, let us say, late in Mounichion and died in the following Metageitnion, after an absence from Athens

equally suitable. It is rather small and it dates nearly three months after the end of the truce.

⁶³ But see Wade-Gery and Meritt, "Pylos and the Assessment of Tribute," *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), 378 f. In writing of the payment of one hundred talents made in 426/5 Wade-Gery and Meritt remark "... the payment itself was merely part of the routine borrowing by the state from the treasure of Athena Polias. We know that similar loans of one hundred talents were made in the spring of 424, of 423, and of 422. There would doubtless have been the same loan of one hundred talents in 425 with or without Eurymedon's expedition. . . ."

⁶⁴ See note 23, p. 148 above. Meritt, of course, considering 422/1 intercalary, places Kleon's death in Boedromion (see pp. 148, 150 above).

⁶⁵ Thuc. V, 12.

⁶⁶ It should be noted that in the clause *τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα* the verb is in the imperfect tense and must be translated "the summer was drawing to a close," to denote a gradual process over a period of time. The Loeb rendering ("and so the summer ended") is incorrect. Jowett's "and so the summer came to an end" is at least ambiguous, since it makes no distinction between aorist and imperfect. Thucydides never used the aorist *ἐτελεύτησεν* with *τὸ θέρος*.

of about three months. Of Kleon's full activity in Thrace we cannot be sure for Thucydides probably neglects to tell the complete story.⁶⁷ It does not seem to me that three months is an overlong period to assign to the campaign in Thrace.⁶⁸

IV. THE TWO FIRST SECRETARIES.

Indisputable epigraphic evidence can be cited to prove that in the archonship of Aristion, 421/0 B. C., there were two first secretaries to the *boule* at Athens. Difficulty arises when an attempt is made to fit their terms of office into the conciliar calendar.

I. G., I², 311 is a record of receipts for the first fruits from Eleusis. Its first preserved entry is dated by the civil year in which Aristion was archon and by the conciliar year in which Prepis was first secretary (lines 8 f.). I reproduce here the first half of the inscription as it is printed in the *Corpus*:

I. G., I², 311

CTOIX. 38

- 1 [ἐπὶ τῆς βολῆς ἡεῖ . . . ? . . . (πρῶτος) ἐγραμμάτευε]
 [ἐπ' Ἀλκαῖο ἀρχοντος, ἐπιστάται Ἐλευσιν-]
 [όθεν, ἡοῖσι Φιλόστρατος Κυδαθenaus]
 [ἐγραμμάτευε, παρέδéchσαντο παρὰ ἡερο-]
 5 [ποιῶν] Ἐλευσί[νι¹⁹]
 [καὶ] χσυναρχόντον, [ἀργύριον ἀπὸ τῷ σίτω]
 [τέ]ς ἀπαρχῆς τοῖν [θεοῖν . . . ? . . .] [ἐπὶ τῆς]
 [βολ]ῆς, ἡεῖ Πρέπις π[ρῶτος ἐγραμμάτευε, ἐ-]
 [π' Ἀρ]ιστίο[ν]ος ἀρχοντος, ἐπ[ιστάται Ἐλευ-]
 10 [σιν]όθεν, κτλ.

I. G., I², 370 unquestionably belongs to the fifth prytany, in the archonship of Aristion, but during the *boule* for which Menekles was first secretary (lines 5 f.).⁶⁹

⁶⁷ See Meritt and West, *op. cit.* (see note 53, p. 155 above), for a reconstruction based on the assessment of 421 B. C.

⁶⁸ There is always the possibility that the Delphic Boukatios did not correspond to the Athenian Metageitnion this year. Further, one must not overlook the admitted fact that the scholiast to Aristophanes is not an infallible source. These uncertainties, however, should not affect the analysis of Thucydides which I have developed here; and it is upon Thucydides, our best source, that we should build.

⁶⁹ See also *I. G.*, I², 220 where the name Menekles is to be restored in the prescript, line 2 (cf. West καὶ Meritt, 'Ο Φορολογικὸς Κατάλογος τοῦ 421-0, 'Αρχ. Ἐφ., 1924, 48; Meritt, *Ath. Cal.*, 113).

Now the obvious conclusion to be drawn from the two inscriptions is that Prepis really held office in the first prytany of the conciliar year 422/1, to which he gave his name and which overlapped the civil year of Aristion, 421/0; and that Menekles entered office with the *boule* of 421/0, which functioned during the major part of Aristion's archonship. A glance at my calendar (p. 149 above) will show that, with 422/1 restored as ordinary, the first day of the conciliar year 421/0 is equated with Hekatombaion 22. The last twenty-one days of the conciliar year 422/1, therefore, fell during the civil year 421/0; that is, the demands of the epigraphic evidence are satisfied.

Meritt, however, restoring 422/1 as intercalary, equated P. I, 1, 421/0, with Skirophorion 22, 422/1 B. C.⁷⁰ It follows that, according to Meritt's scheme, Prepis and Menekles must both have been first secretaries for the same *boule*, that of 421/0. Some explanation of the apparently contradictory epigraphic evidence, then, is necessary. It was Meritt's view⁷¹ that Prepis either died or was forced to resign, for some reason or other, in the first prytany. The conciliar year now became that of Menekles, the successor to Prepis.

In reply it is pertinent to emphasize the fact that the first secretaries of the Athenian *boule* at the period were eponymous. It seems to me, therefore, that even if Prepis' term of office lasted for only a few days, if he died or resigned, the conciliar year would nevertheless have continued to bear his name, even after Menekles replaced him.

Further, Meritt believed that, even if Prepis did hold office for the conciliar year 422/1, we should expect to find him dated (in *I. G.*, I², 311, lines 8 f.) along with the archon for that year and not with Aristion, archon in the following year; this despite the overlapping of the conciliar year 422/1 and the civil year 421/0.

Now the very reason for the double dating of Attic inscriptions at this epoch lies in the fact that the civil and conciliar years were not coterminous. But Meritt, who in his Athenian Calendar convincingly and conclusively established the principle first advanced by Keil,⁷² appears to me to break it when he affirms that,

⁷⁰ *A. F. D.*, 176, 178.

⁷¹ *Ath. Cal.*, 112-114.

⁷² See bibliography in Meritt, *Ath. Cal.*, 129.

if Prepis was secretary for 422/1, the archon for that year, Alkaios (not Aristion of 421/0), should have been cited in line 9 of *I. G.*, I², 311. If this were indeed the case, there would have been no particular reason for the double dating, which existed for just such contingencies as the present one. Archon and *boule* did not hold office concurrently, and Prepis' conciliar year still had twenty-one days to run when Aristion assumed his magistracy for the civil year 421/0. The two dates were entirely separate and so we observe that by conciliar dating the second payment of *I. G.*, I², 311 occurred in the year of Prepis, while by civil dating the year was that of the archon Aristion. The clear-cut distinction between the two forms is important. Each is absolutely correct according to its own system, even though Prepis' term of office actually expired in a few days.

Meritt's final objection is that, if Prepis was first secretary for 422/1 B. C., then we have no receipts for the first fruits from Eleusis for 421/0, since in the inscription the year 420/19 follows immediately upon the year of the *boule* for which Prepis was eponymous secretary.

It will perhaps be advantageous to examine the inscription, as printed in the *Corpus* (see p. 158 above), somewhat more closely. It is at once obvious that the upper half of the stone is missing and that the first entry in the four year record is restored. To judge from what is preserved on the stone, what we have is a record of a board of *epistatai* who apparently held office over a Great Panathenaic period of four years. Their duties were discharged at Athens (*Ἐλευσινόθεν*, lines 9 f.) as opposed to the *hieropoioi*, who operated at Eleusis (*Ἐλευσίν*, line 5). This document does not determine the annual responsibility of the *epistatai* holding office as a sub-committee of the *boule*, but the entries represent a bookkeeping account, with each bearing the actual date of payment in its introductory formula. To judge from similar records,⁷⁸ therefore, there is no foundation for the restoration of the opening lines of the inscription as they appear in the *editio minor*. Rather, a supplement along the lines of the opening of the *logistai* record, *I. G.*, I², 324,

⁷⁸ For example, *I. G.*, I², 276, 280, 286, 324.

should be attempted. The following version does not pretend to reproduce the lost opening lines of *I. G.*, I², 311, but it is offered as an example of the type of introduction that undoubtedly stood at the head of the stone:

- 1 [τόδε τὸ ἀργύριον ἀπὸ τοῦ σίτου τῆς ἀπαρχῆ-]
 [ς τοῖν θεοῖν παρεδέχσαντο ἡοὶ ἐπιστάτ-],
 [αι Ἐλευσινόθεν ἐν τοῖς τέτταρον ἔτεσ-]
 [ιν ἐκ Παναθηναίων ἐς Παναθήναια] ἐπὶ τῇ-]
 5 [ς βολῆς ἡεὶ Πρέπιδος πρῶτος ἐγραμμάτευε]
 [ἐπ' Ἀλκαίου ἀρχοντος κτλ.⁷⁴

The difficulties of the first line of the *Corpus* text are at once removed and it becomes evident that there is not the slightest objection to assuming that Prepis was first secretary when the first payment of the document was made. The archon of course was Alkaios, eponymous for 422/1 B. C. Meritt's objection has now disappeared, since the receipts cover four consecutive years by archons (422/1-419/8 B. C.), although, as a result of the clumsy calendar, Prepis may have been first secretary on the occasion of two payments while no instalment at all was received during the regime of Menekles, Prepis' successor.

If the payments of *I. G.*, I², 311 (with the restorations as printed above) were made regularly, as they appear to have been, in Hekatombaion of each year, then they may be tabled as follows:

⁷⁴ With *I. G.*, I², 276, 280, and 286 as models I print the following variant, which has the merit of not repeating in the prescript details which are found in each year of the account:

- [τόδε τὸ ἀργύριον παρεδέχσαντο ἐπιστά-]
 2 [ται Ἐλευσινόθεν ἡοὶ ἐδίδοσαν τὸν λόγον-]
 [ς ἐκ Παναθηναίων ἐς Παναθήναια] ἐπὶ τῆς]
 [βολῆς ἡεὶ Πρέπιδος πρῶτος ἐγραμμάτευε ἐ-]
 [πὶ Ἀλκαίου ἀρχοντος κτλ.

The hiatus ἐπὶ Ἀλκαίῳ is awkward but not impossible. I do not, however, claim word for word accuracy in restoration, but I do feel that the general content, as suggested in this note and in the text above, is right. It is of course quite possible that the payment of Alkaios' archonship, 422/1, if made before Hek. 10, was received during the previous conciliar year, 423/2, which overlapped the civil 422/1 (see table, p. 149 above).

Archon	Civil Year	Payment Date	Conciliar Year	First Secretary
Alkaios	422/1	After Hek. 9 ⁷⁵	422/1	[Prepis] ⁷⁶
Aristion	421/0	Hek. 1-21	422/1	Prepis
Astyphilos	420/19	After Hek. 3	420/19	Charinos
Archias	419/8	After Hek. 15	419/8	[.... ⁷⁷]

From the above chart it is perhaps fair to observe that the payments concerned, if made on a specific day each year, fell between Hek. 15 and Hek. 21, some ten days before the Pan-athenaia and the beginning of the new financial year. We might even determine the exact date when the yearly first fruits were received at Athens if we care to see any significance in the fact that the festival of the Synoikia began on Hekatombaion 16.⁷⁷ A more appropriate day would be difficult to find.

The epigraphic evidence must now be considered a weighty argument in favour of an ordinary year at Athens in 422/1 B. C.

V. ARISTOPHANES AND THE CALENDAR.

If the year 422/1 is restored as ordinary the complaints of the gods, as represented by Aristophanes, can be viewed in a new light. I quote the *Clouds*, 615 ff.:

- 615 ἄλλα τ' εὖ δρᾶν φησιν. ὑμᾶς δ' οὐκ ἄγειν τὰς ἡμέρας
οὐδὲν ὀρθῶς; ἀλλ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω κυδοιοπαῖν.
ὥστε ἀπειλεῖν φησιν αὐτῇ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκάστοτε
ἡνίκ' ἂν ψευσθῶσι δείπνου, καὶ ἀπίωσιν οἴκαδε
τῆς ἐορτῆς μὴ τυχόντες κατὰ λόγον τῶν ἡμερῶν.
620 κἄθ', ὅταν θύειν δέῃ, στρεβλοῦτε καὶ δικάζετε.
πολλάκις δ' ἡμῶν ἀγόντων τῶν θεῶν ἀπαστίαν,
ἡνίκ' ἂν πενθῶμεν ἢ τὸν Μέμνον' ἢ Σαρπηδόνα,
σπένδεθ' ὑμεῖς καὶ γελᾶτ', ἀνθ' ὧν λαχὼν Ὑπέρβολος
τῆτες ἱερομνημονεῖν καὶ ἔπειθ' ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν θεῶν
625 τὸν στέφανον ἀφηρέθη. μᾶλλον γὰρ οὕτως εἴσεται
κατὰ Σελήνην ὥς ἄγειν χρὴ τοῦ βίου τὰς ἡμέρας.

⁷⁵ The date of payment is governed by the day on which the opening of the new conciliar year fell. See my calendar, p. 149 above, for 422/1 and 421/0; and Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 170 for 420/19 and 419/8.

⁷⁶ In line 5 of the restoration suggested on p. 161. The other first secretaries in the chart come from lines 8, 15, and 22 of *I. G.*, I², 311.

⁷⁷ Cf. L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (H. Keller, Berlin, 1932), 36.

From 425/4 to 422/1 inclusive there had been no intercalation at Athens, a lapse which of itself would have been sufficient to throw the calendar out of norm by a month. It is quite conceivable that Aristophanes, in the *Clouds*, was criticizing this error just as much as the discrepancy of a few days, which we are sure existed at this time, in relation to the true lunar month.⁷⁸

We know that the *Clouds*, although first produced at the Great Dionysia in Elaphebolion, 424/3, was later revised and in its present form contains references dating at least as late as 421.⁷⁹ We are not, however, in a position to decide how much of the play, as it stands now, belongs to the original version.⁸⁰ Meritt⁸¹ would assign the quoted passage to the first production and refer the complaints to calendar irregularities in 423 B. C., corroborated by Thucydides' dates for the armistice of 423 and the peace of 421. "I see no escape from the conclusion that in either Athens or Sparta, or in both, the actual civil year showed variations from the astronomical lunar year. The divergence is most pronounced in the spring of 423."⁸² With Meritt's first sentence I fully agree, but I cannot convince myself that the divergence

⁷⁸ Thucydides' dates for the signing of the armistice and the peace are sufficient evidence (see p. 148 above; Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 148-150). There may also be some significance in the fact that Demosthenes miscalculated his assignation with Hippokrates in the winter of 424/3 by a few days (Thuc. IV, 89, 1, . . . γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς ἃς ἔδει ἀμφοτέρους στρατεύειν . . .). Again, there was a dispute, which may be traced to calendar irregularities, over the revolt of Skione in the spring of 423 B. C.; the Athenians claimed that at the time of the revolt the truce had already been signed, whereas Brasidas' defense was that Skione came over to him before the signing of the armistice (Thuc. IV, 122, 3-6, 'Αριστάνυμος . . . Σκιωναίους δὲ αἰσθόμενος ἐκ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν ὅτι ὕστερον ἀφαστήκοιεν . . . Βρασίδας δὲ ἀντέλεγε πολλά, ὡς πρότερον . . . εἶχε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δικάζουσιν: δύο γὰρ ἡμέραις ὕστερον ἀπέστησαν οἱ Σκιωναῖοι).

⁷⁹ In *Clouds* 553 there is a reference to the *Marikas* of Eupolis. The scholiast (on 522) tells us that Eupolis' comedy was produced two years after the first *Clouds* of Aristophanes, namely, 421 B. C.

⁸⁰ See Roger's *Clouds* (second edition, 1915), introduction, 10-18. The sixth Greek argument to the play (Oxford text numbering) is also helpful.

⁸¹ *A. F. D.*, 149 f.

⁸² *Op. cit.*, 149.

is any more pronounced in the spring of 423 than in the spring of 421.⁸³

But suppose the passage from Aristophanes was written for the revised and later edition of the *Clouds*.⁸⁴ I think that in such a case the complaints of the gods might be understood as falling under two heads:

(1) The festivals come at the wrong time of the year.

(2) Mortals have failed to realise *κατὰ Σελήνην ὡς ἀγαθὴν χρὴ τοῦ βίου τὰς ἡμέρας*.

Now a discrepancy of a month would throw the calendar out of harmony not with the moon but with the seasons. A seasonal inaccuracy of one month is a large irregularity, something more than the petty disagreement between lunar and civil years which

⁸³ "This portion of the *Clouds* belongs to the original version of the play . . . and so falls at exactly that time when we have evidence from Thucydides that there were irregularities of some sort in the calendar . . ." (*op. cit.*, 149 f.). But the same argument applies equally well to the revised version, in or after 421 B. C.

⁸⁴ Meritt's note (*loc. cit.*) is not conclusive. I maintain that we cannot definitely determine the dates of individual passages unless we have credible information (from the Greek argument, for instance; see note 80, p. 163 above), or sure datable references, as, for example, the mention in line 584 f. of an eclipse. Meritt states that the naming of Hyperbolos (623) is no evidence for a late date. The scholiast to 624 observes that there was no record of Hyperbolos as *hieromnemon* in 424/3. Meritt deduces from this that Hyperbolos was chosen but did not serve; as corroboration of his belief he cites lines 624-5. But I think that these two lines are much more amusing and characteristic if, with Rogers, we interpret them literally. We must understand that in some way Hyperbolos' garland was publicly dislodged, in such a manner as to make him cut a ridiculous figure. The incident would have been chuckled over wherever Athenians gathered to gossip and hence was well suited to Aristophanes' type of humour. Meritt attaches little importance to the additional comment of the scholiast, *οὐδέπω γὰρ διέπρεπε Κλέωνος ἐν τῷ τῷ μετὰ γὰρ τὸν ἐκείνου θάνατον ἠξιώθη*. There is a further point worth mentioning. If the passage dates in 423 then Hyperbolos must have been chosen *hieromnemon* to the meeting of the Amphytyonic council in the autumn of 424. But we have already learned (p. 153 f. above) that in all probability the Athenians had no access to Delphi at this time; would they have elected a representative to the Amphytyonic council under these conditions? Such a proceeding is much more understandable two years later, in the autumn of 422, when peace was in the air.

certainly existed. With Meritt's conclusions on the latter score (complaint 2 above) there is no arguing: "... the actual civil calendar of Athens from 423 to 421 cannot be equated with the true astronomical lunar calendar."⁸⁵ The doubt in my own mind is whether such a divergence would adequately account for the complaints in the *Clouds*, lines 618-623. I fully realize that the interpretation of the passage is a subjective matter. The complaint concerning the lunar irregularity is admittedly present and I do not insist upon a further protest on the part of the gods about the seasons. I merely wish to point out the possibility of reading Aristophanes in this light. We now have good reason to believe that, with 422/1 an ordinary year, a seasonal inconsistency did exist at Athens. The question that occurs to me is, would an inaccuracy of two or three days have found the gods feasting while mortals sacrificed, the gods expectant while the Athenians romped in the courts? On the other hand, could not such a condition of affairs have been caused by the error of a month? Then the hungry gods of Aristophanes, who were constantly missing their sacrifices, would have had good reason to be wrathful.

VI. THE JULIAN DATES FOR ARMISTICE AND PEACE.

The armistice of 424/3 was signed Elaphebolion 14, ἄμα ἤρι τοῦ ἐπιγεγνομένου θέρους εὐθύς.⁸⁶ Elaphebolion 14 unquestionably represents the Julian March 23.⁸⁷

The peace of Nikias was ratified Elaphebolion 25, 422/1, τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἄμα ἤρι ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθύς τῶν ἀστικῶν.⁸⁸ Meritt equates the signing of the peace with April 10,⁸⁹ whereas my revised calendar gives March 12.⁹⁰

Since Thucydides' seasonal dating is fairly stereotyped it seems to me unlikely that the two Greek expressions that I have quoted refer to exactly the same time of year. That is, "at the very

⁸⁵ A. F. D., 150.

⁸⁶ Thuc. IV, 117, 1.

⁸⁷ Meritt, A. F. D., 176, 178.

⁸⁸ Thuc. V, 20, 1.

⁸⁹ Meritt, A. F. D., 176, 178.

⁹⁰ See tables, p. 168 below.

beginning of summer" must indicate a time slightly later in the year than "at the very end of winter," and one phrase is not used as a synonym for the other. The distinction is a slight one, but one which, in my opinion, does exist. We know that March 23, a date which cannot be disputed, fell ἅμα ἤρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθύς. I now propose, therefore, that March 12 is more suited to τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅμα ἤρι than is April 10.

Moreover, the date March 12 for the peace of Nikias demands that 422/1 be considered ordinary. Thucydides once more, therefore, opposes intercalation in 422/1 B. C.

VII. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES.

I give below a calendar showing the chronology of the period from 424/3 to 421/0, presented according to the views urged in this paper, and based upon the belief that 422/1 B. C. was an ordinary year at Athens.⁹¹

CIVIL YEAR

Year	Archon	Days	Date of Hek. 1	Intercalation
424/3	Isarchos	354	July 17	0
423/2	Ameinias	355	July 6	0
422/1	Alkaios	354	June 26	0
421/0	Aristion	384	June 14	I

CONCILIAR YEAR

Date of P. I, 1	Days	First Secretary
Skir. 19 — July 5	365	Epilykos ⁹² 424/3
Skir. 29 — July 5	365	Demetrios 423/2
Hek. 10 — July 5	366	Prepis 422/1
Hek. 22 — July 5	366	Menekles 421/0

⁹¹ These tables are based on Meritt, *A. F. D.*, 176, 178. Since we cannot tell the exact nature of the irregularity which existed at this time, I have restored the months as if no such variation occurred (see Meritt, *op. cit.*, 177).

⁹² *I. G.*, I², 324, line 26; Meritt, *op. cit.*, 138.

ORDER OF MONTH WITH PERTINENT EVENTS ⁹⁸

423	Jan.	10 + Gam.	
	Feb.	9 — Anth.	
	Mar.	10 + Elaph.	14th. (March 23, P. VIII, 6, Spartan Gerastios 12) : armistice with Sparta. Great Dionysia : Aristophanes' <i>Clouds</i> , first version.
	April	9 — Moun.	} Armistice.
	May	8 + Thar.	
	June	7 — Skir.	
<hr/>			
	July	6 + Hek.	} Armistice.
	Aug.	5 — Met.	
	Sept.	3 + Boed.	
	Oct.	3 — Pyan.	
	Nov.	1 + Maim.	
	Dec.	1 — Pos.	
	Dec.	30 + Gam.	Lenaia : Aristophanes' <i>Wasps</i> . Armistice.
<hr/>			
422	Jan.	29 — Anth.	Armistice.
	Feb.	27 + Elaph.	Kleon elected general. 14th. (P. VIII, 32) : armistice expires. State of war.
	Mar.	29 — Moun.	15th. (P. VIII, 25) : payment of one hundred talents made to Kleon? At the end of the month Kleon leaves Athens. State of war.
	April	27 + Thar.	State of war.
	May	27 + Skir.	State of war.
<hr/>			
	June	26 — Hek.	State of war.
	July	25 + Met.	Delphic month Boukatios. Kleon dies before Amphipolis. Pythian festival : holy truce. After the Pythia war is resumed.
	Aug.	24 — Boed.	} State of war.
	Sept.	22 + Pyan.	
	Oct.	22 — Maim.	
	Nov.	20 + Pos.	
	Dec.	20 — Gam.	

⁹⁸ This chart, reading across, gives the year B. C., the Julian equivalent for the first of the Attic month, a plus sign denoting a full month (thirty days) or a minus sign indicating a hollow month (twenty-nine days), the Attic month, and the events discussed in this paper, listed, as far as possible, in chronological order.

421 ⁹⁴	Jan. 18 + Anth.	State of war.
	Feb. 17 — Elaph.	Great Dionysia: Aristophanes' <i>Peace</i> .
		25th. (March 12, P. VI, 37, Spartan Artemisios 27): peace of Nikias signed.
	Mar. 17 + Moun.	
	April 16 — Thar.	
	May 15 + Skir.	
<hr/>		
	June 14 + Hek.	
	July 14 — Met.	
	Aug. 12 + Boed.	
	Sept. 11 — Pyan.	
	Oct. 10 + Maim.	
	Nov. 9 — Pos.	
	Dec. 8 + Pos. ⁹⁵	

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⁹⁴ We must allow for Julian intercalation in this year.

⁹⁵ Before the final revision of this paper I was fortunate to have the opportunity of discussing the problems involved with B. D. Meritt and H. T. Wade-Gery, both of whom were kind enough to read the draft and assist me with critical advice and specific suggestions.

THE TERMINAL DATE OF CAESAR'S COMMAND.

The date at which Caesar's command terminated is one of the most famous cruxes in ancient history. It is now eighty years since Mommsen's article appeared and the most recent disputant¹ warns students that their solutions cannot hope to succeed. As to that, one can only try and see, fortifying oneself by the knowledge that there is an answer to the problem, Caesar's command did terminate on a definite day—both Cicero and the Gauls knew that^{1a}—and by remembering that this is not one of those problems where lack of evidence makes solution hopeless; the trouble is that there is far too much. That Caesar's first quinquennium ended in March of 54 is now generally conceded;² furthermore a body of secondary evidence imposing in array asserts that the second period of government authorized by the *Lex Pompeia Licinia* was also a quinquennium:³ indeed this secondary evidence is reinforced by Cicero who twice uses language that can only by violence be differently interpreted.⁴ From this Mommsen constructed a theory magnificent in its simplicity. He applied the doctrine of the second quinquennium with literal exactness, taking Caesar's command to March 1st 49. Now Cicero had argued that, since Caesar was legally secured in his province until March 1st 54, he was practically secured there until the end of the year, for according to the *Lex Sempronia*, if his provinces

¹ Adcock, *Class. Quart.*, XXVI, p. 14. The bibliography of the subject is extensive: the most important works are Mommsen, *Ges. Schriften*, IV, 92-145; Hirschfeld, *Kleine Schriften*, 310-329; Hardy, *Problems in Rom. History*, 150-206; Holmes, *Roman Republic*, II, 299-310; Marsh, *Founding of Roman Empire*, 280-4; Stone, *Class. Quart.*, XXII, 193; Adcock, *Class. Quart.*, XXVI, 14. As is apparent from Marsh's summary, the problem has now reached the point where the objections to all standard theories are known. Thus it is permissible, I hope, in this article to limit the discussion and refutation of previous attempts at solution to points on which they directly affect my own.

^{1a} *Att.*, vii, 7, 6; 9, 4; *B. G.*, viii, 39, 3: passages, which as Adcock points out (*C. Q.*, xxvi, p. 14), seem decisive against Hirschfeld's view.

² The decisive passage is Cicero, *prov. cons.*, 15, 37.

³ Velleius, ii, 46, 2; Plutarch, *Pompey*, 51, 4; 52, 3 (inaccurate); *Caesar*, 21, 3; *Cato minor*, 41, 1; 43, 5; Suetonius, *Caesar*, 24, 1; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 18.

⁴ Cicero, *Att.*, vii, 6, 2; *Phil.*, ii, 10, 24.

were declared consular in 56 to be administered in 54, the consuls of 55 for whom they were intended would be unable to go until March of their proconsular year. It was undignified, said Cicero, for a man to be thus docked of two months' administration: and if they were declared praetorian (which would mean that Caesar could be superseded there and then), there was the objection that praetorian allotments could be vetoed.⁵ Thus there was a reason for exempting Caesar's provinces from the allotment for magistrates of 55. Mommsen applied Cicero's argument to March 49 and assumed, therefore, that Caesar was practically secured until the end of that year. This was important because by an old enactment re-stated by Sulla Caesar could not be consul again until 48.⁶ It was essential, therefore, if he was to avoid prosecution, that the gap between March and December of 49 should be bridged. Bridged it was, said Mommsen, not only by the corollaries of the Sempronian Law as interpreted by Cicero, but in another way. A passage in a letter of Caelius of October 51 tells us that Pompey said that he could not without wronging him raise the question of Caesar's provinces before March 1st but would not hesitate to do so afterwards.⁷ From this Mommsen deduced that there was a clause in the *Lex Pompeia Licinia* forbidding discussion until March 1st 50. This would, of course, operate as another guarantee, for Caesar's provinces would thus be unavailable for allotment to any consuls earlier than those designated in 50, who would not govern them until 48. It only needed leave for Caesar to stand for the consulship in his absence—and this he gained by the Law of the Ten Tribunes in 52⁸—for his position to be secured almost for perpetuity. It was only because these ideal arrangements were upset by subsequent legislation that there was any *Rechtsfrage* at all.

I think it is fair to say that only the dazzle of Mommsen's name could have blinded men to the slight foundations of this

⁵ Cicero, *prov. cons.*, 7, 17; 15, 37.

⁶ Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 32, 2; Livy, vii, 42, 1; x, 13, 8; Plutarch, *Marius*, 12, 1; Appian, *B. C.*, i, 100; Dio, xl, 51, 2.

⁷ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 9.

⁸ Cic., *Att.*, vii, 3, 4; 6, 2; 7, 6; viii, 3, 3; *Phil.*, ii, 10, 24; Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 9, 2; 32, 3; Livy, *Ep.*, cvii; Suetonius, *Caesar*, 28, 1; Florus, ii, 13, 16; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 25; Dio, xl, 51, 2.

solid structure. For the alleged guarantees have no existence at all. Cicero's argument is contained in a controversial speech aimed at preventing the Gauls being made consular in the allotment of 56. We know that he gained his point; but he had other arguments. We do not know which convinced his audience. We may suspect that the forces of the triumvirs weighed more than any of them.⁹ This one is not so placed in the speech as to lead us to think that Cicero regarded it as decisive. And what a lame thing it is! If Cicero could have clinched his point by saying that a man holding imperium after the first of January was automatically and legally entitled to stay there till the end of the year, why did he not say so? All he can say is that the state of affairs whereby the next proconsul must wait two months for his office is undignified. This is not a statement of law; it is an advocate's plea and, if Caesar thought that an advocate's plea which—with other arguments—had succeeded in 56 would serve his turn against an audience in 51, he was more foolish than we usually suppose. Nor is it better with the other guarantee. In May of 51 it was reported that the consul M. Marcellus was about to introduce a motion on the succession of Caesar;¹⁰ it was postponed, Caelius tells us, again and again, and in September he suspected that it would not be heard of in 51 at all.¹¹ As far as Caelius is concerned he is right, and it will cost us much labour to explain why we do not hear of it from him. Secondary authorities, however, and a passage in Cicero tell us what the motion was. Marcellus proposed that Caesar should be superseded 'ante tempus'—before the 'legis dies,' that is:¹² and the day of that supersession was to be March 1st.¹³ We shall have presently to go very deeply into this motion of M. Marcellus. For the moment, however, we are merely concerned with the fact of it. Here was Marcellus endeavouring day after day to raise a question which, we are assured by Mommsen, he was

⁹ *Fam.*, i, 7, 10.

¹⁰ *Fam.*, viii, 1, 2.

¹¹ *Fam.*, viii, 4, 4; 5, 3; 9, 2.

¹² Suetonius, *Caesar*, 28, 2; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 25; Dio, xi, 59, 1. Mommsen (p. 139) appeals to Hirtius, *B. G.*, viii, 53, 1. But his expression—*contra legem Pompei et Crassi retulerat ante tempus*—is of the type that only gives support, if the truth is known already. Hirtius is a vague writer, and it is possible that he is only expressing with clumsy brevity the facts set out by the secondary authorities.

¹³ *Att.*, viii, 3, 3.

debarred from raising anyway by the *Lex Pompeia Licinia*. Here was Caelius maliciously recording the ill-success of his efforts, and neither the one seems to know nor does the other see fit to mention that it was illegal all the time. Can we really believe this? In fact a quite different interpretation of Pompey's declaration can be found, and will presently be put forward.

It is necessary, therefore, to throw away all this complicated doctrine and return to what we really know. This is simply that in 52 Caesar found himself with an imperium for five years granted to him by a law of 55 and with the right to stand for the consulship *in absentia*. It remains, however, to ask when he proposed to use it. Dio,¹⁴ indeed, informs us that in the very law under which Caesar had the privilege it was laid down that he should only enjoy it after the legally prescribed interval—in 49 that is. Not much weight is to be placed on this, however; Dio's dependence upon Caesar's works as a source is well known, and it is permissible to suspect that here, as elsewhere, he has larded the narrative with explanations of his own. For Caesar¹⁵ in strong and even impassioned language congratulates himself before the world on only asking for the consulship at the legal time. The protestation in very truth is so earnest that a critic who was on the alert might almost persuade himself (though he might not perhaps persuade his readers) from this passage alone that there was something behind it. And in fact there is. According to Suetonius,¹⁶ Caesar in 52 demanded leave to stand for the consulship with two privileges, one that he could stand without being at Rome for the election, the other that he could stand when his period of imperium was beginning to run out: the purpose of this was that he might not be halted inconveniently early with a campaign still in progress. Students of the *Rechtsfrage*, who can teach dictators a lesson in burking inconvenient witnesses, do not always examine this passage.^{16a} It shows clearly that the consular elections preceded, though not by a very long period, the day on which the imperium termi-

¹⁴ Dio, xl, 51, 2.

¹⁵ *B. C.*, i, 32, 3.

¹⁶ *Caesar*, 26, 1. On the traditional theory, it may be remarked, the supplement *quando imperii tempus explevisset* becomes quite otiose. On the theory adopted it locks with the evidence of Hirtius, viii, 39, 3; cf. note 76.

^{16a} And, when they do, they mistranslate it, as Mommsen (p. 129), 'nachdem die Zeit seines Commandos verstrichen.'

nated: it further gives the hint that that day itself was at the end of a campaigning season. Moreover it bears hardly against those who assert that the *ratio* was intended to be used in 49; they can only save themselves by submitting unconditionally to the slavery of the guarantee doctrine, and taking the final day of the imperium to be not March 1st but the end of 49. Indeed the shrewdest advocate of the 49 theory sees that this must be done,^{16b} for he may be presumed to recognize that, even if Suetonius' language had not directly pointed that way, it would naturally be expected that leave to canvass *in absentia* would connote leave to waive attendance at Rome during the time that a command was still existing, not after it had already legally expired. I hope, however, to have shown what unworthy masters these guarantees are and to have persuaded my readers to shake off their yoke. If they trust me, we must believe that, whether the *legis dies* was March 1st 49 or earlier, the elections in question cannot, alike on Suetonius' statement and on juristic sense, be those of 49, but must antedate it. In fact, if Suetonius' language correctly expresses the facts, there was no need to specify a year at all; it was enough to say that, to prevent the loss of a campaigning season, the *ratio absentis* should be allowed; nevertheless the year of the elections would in fact be 50, the elections would antedate the *legis dies*, and all would be clear and sensible. Nor is this all. In October of 51 Caelius¹⁷ prognosticates the future and tells Cicero that Caesar may, if he can be designated, be consul 'hoc anno.' I fear I cannot scale those peaks of sagacity where men can say that 'this year' means 'next year,' and, delighted with the correspondence of Caelius and Suetonius, I take 'hoc anno' in its natural sense of candidature at the elections of 50. And we need not be dismayed by those who insist on the sanctity of the ten year interval: we shall not forget that Caesar in 50 would only be enjoying the privilege which the Ten Tribunes were willing to give him in 52¹⁸ and which Pompey enjoyed in that year. If, then, Caesar

^{16b} Hardy, p. 152.

¹⁷ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 9. In *Att.*, vii, 8, 4 'hoc anno' means what it says. Moreover on the postulates of the traditional theory the words are quite needless, could perfectly be left out, and introduce a quite purposeless ambiguity.

¹⁸ Suetonius, *Caesar*, 26, 1; Dio, xl, 50, 3.

ended his command on the *legis dies* (whenever that was) as already consul designate, his position, even if separated from his army, was legally secure: he could remain outside the city with his lictors, enjoying the imperium, as Cicero did, or, even if he laid it down by entering, it is doubtful whether even as consul designate he could be prosecuted for offences committed in his tenure of it.^{18a} Naturally, however, Pompey's law of 52, which demanded that all candidates should appear in person, was an attack upon his security,¹⁹ and naturally Caesar's supporters procured for him the codicil which confirmed his own *ratio*. But when Hardy says that it is not disputed that but for Pompey's other law of 52, the *Lex de Jure magistratum*,²⁰ there would have been no 'Rechtsfrage' at all,^{20a} I fear that I must start disputation. Whatever the detailed provisions of this law may have been—and we shall presently have to discuss them—there is nothing in its essential clause—that a five year interval should elapse between magistracy and provincial command—to impugn Caesar's position, as we have interpreted it, in the least. That is as it should be; with this we remove the protagonists from that fog of irrational conduct in which they are compelled by students of the Rechtsfrage to walk. Caesar's supporters, says Holmes,^{20b} of course protested that either of these laws was enough to ruin his career—for this he quotes no evidence and there is none—and then, according to Holmes, they protested with success against one law and said nothing about the other. Were all the Ten Tribunes asleep?

Of course not: but Caesar's position secured by the *Lex Pompeia Licinia* and the Law of the Ten Tribunes was not very easy to attack. Its Achilles heel was the grant of the *ratio absentis* for the election of 50, but even here the attack was difficult. It was the obvious interest of the optimate party to drive a wedge between Caesar and Pompey, but to question the *ratio absentis* on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the

^{18a} I follow here Adcock's argument. We might suppose, it is true, that Caesar would be unseated for irregularities in the election, but it is clear that such a development in the situation was not anticipated by contemporaries (cf. *Att.*, vii, 4, 3; 9, 2).

¹⁹ Suetonius, *Caesar*, 28, 3; Dio, xl, 56, 3.

²⁰ Dio, xl, 30, 1; 56, 1.

^{20a} Hardy, p. 153.

^{20b} *R. E.*, ii, p. 237.

consular law would connote questioning Pompey's own tenure of the consulship in 52 and its *Acta*. Pompey, who well remembered the events of 59 and the embarrassments which he had suffered over the Campanian allotments, could understand what the impugning of *Acta* involved and was unlikely to favour such an attack. Nevertheless, as Suetonius assures us, Marcellus did attempt it, but on grounds less exceptionable.²¹ Perhaps in April of 51²² he raised the point that the *ratio absentis* had been annulled by Pompey's subsequent legislation and that the exception in Caesar's favour was legally invalid. He might have carried the senate in this, perhaps he did, but the motion was vetoed by tribunes.

An attack on the *ratio absentis* only warded off by the tri-

²¹ Suetonius, *Caesar*, 28, 2-3. The exact meaning is obscure and the text may be corrupt, but the general sense is clear and not, I think, disputed. It is usually supposed from Suetonius' language that the other proposal of M. Marcellus was made at the same time, if not in the same motion. The matter is not essential to my theories upon the Rechtsfrage, but I prefer to explain rather than to abandon Suetonius' statement that a motion of M. Marcellus was vetoed by tribunes. My interpretation will give point, then, to Suetonius' words (29, 1), *partim per intercessores tribunos, partim per Ser. Sulpicium consulem*. Here he is remembering that there are two proposals, not one, and contrasting sensibly and correctly, as we shall see, the agents of their rejection. Moreover in mentioning the name of Sulpicius he has the support of Dio, xl, 59, 1.

²² The letters of Caelius contain no mention of an attack on the *ratio* by M. Marcellus; I assume therefore that the attack antedates June 51. In point of fact, I take the *auctoritas perscripta* of *Att.*, v, 2, 3, which was such a concern to Caesar, as referring to this motion on the *ratio absentis*. To argue the point would involve—horror of horrors!—tying up with the Rechtsfrage the question of *Novum Comum*, and it is not, as I have said, essential to my theory. I will merely say that the structure of Cicero's sentence (*nondum satis huc erat adlatum quomodo Caesar ferret de auctoritate perscripta, eratque rumor de Transpadanis, eos iussos iiii viros creare*) suggests to me that the first member does not refer to anything that has to do with Transpadanes. Furthermore, if Marcellus' decree had, as is implied in Suetonius' account (*Caesar*, 29, 3), gone through without veto, it would make his subsequent action less outrageous as well as giving point to Cicero's comments (*Att.*, v, 11, 2). The trouble was that the outraged party was a Transpadane; if he had been merely an inhabitant of *Novum Comum*, Marcellus could have claimed justification on his own decree. Why Caesar's supporters let it through is another matter.

bunician veto must naturally have caused Caesar concern, and we shall see in good time that that concern expressed itself in action. But for the moment he was safe. Marcellus, therefore, tried to attack the *ratio* indirectly. As our examination proceeds, we shall learn more clearly how he went about it. For the moment it is sufficient to take the words of Cicero who informs us that he proposed to terminate Caesar's command on March 1st.²³ If this is March 1st 50, it would mean that Caesar was recalled before he had a chance to use the *ratio*, and March 1st 50 it must be. Adherents of the 49 hypothesis save the credit of March 1st 49 by supposing that Marcellus' motion cut away the guarantees, and that before the guaranteed date. We, of course, can have nothing of this; and, even if we admitted that the terminal date of Caesar's command was March 1st 49, we should find it hard to see why a motion simply declaring Caesar's command ended on the day on which it was appointed by law to end should have raised such fuss and been rejected by the senate. For us March must be March of 50, and thus we are compelled to say that M. Marcellus was attacking a date fixed by the *Lex Pompeia Licinia*. We are told that such an idea is inconceivable, and the secondary authorities who support our surmise²⁴ are duly made to walk the plank. I propose to keep them in the ship. One of them, Suetonius, purports to tell us Marcellus' argument: he claimed that Caesar should go because Gaul was at peace and his work was done. I fancy that I have heard a variation on this theme elsewhere. That Caesar should stay in Gaul until his work was done is one of the Leitmotifs of the *de Provinciis Consularibus*.²⁵ It is tempting therefore to suppose that in the *Lex Pompeia Licinia*, which in a manner implemented the speech, some such phrase occurred. If so, Marcellus' case becomes at once sensible: if the Law contained such a clause as a grant of five years imperium to pacify Gaul, or to complete the conquest, Marcellus was entitled on the principle—*cessante legis ratione cessat ipsa lex*—to challenge it. I am, of course, under obligation to show why March 1st was the date chosen; but again I must ask my readers for patience: we shall learn presently that March 1st is a most significant date. But there is

²³ *Att.*, viii, 3, 3.

²⁴ Suetonius, *Caesar*, 28, 2; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 26; Dio, xl, 59, 1.

²⁵ See 12, 29; 14, 35.

still something to do: the other secondary authorities whose lives have been spared must like Suetonius pay for the privilege by revealing truth. One of them, Dio, contributes an observation of the consul Sulpicius, which helps to elucidate Suetonius' account,²⁶ and is so much to the point that it confirms the accuracy of Dio's own interpretation. Appian does even more. Pompey, he says, asserted that Caesar ought not to be insulted over the matter of a short interval of time. And here we have our second—the passage in Suetonius referring to the Law of the Ten Tribunes being the first—our second hint that the terminal date of Caesar's command was in 50.

That the motion never went through is clear from Cicero's evidence alone, but the precise manner of its demise we must leave for a moment. Pompey had, however, explained that he wished Caesar to leave his province after March 1st.²⁷ Pompey's ambiguity was proverbial,²⁸ and the phrase involved in itself nothing more than an expression of opinion against Marcellus' proposal that he should go on that day. But it might mean far more and accordingly, on Sept. 29th, a series of resolutions was tabled, some of which were definitely hostile to Caesar. The first of them, however, the vigilant tribunes felt themselves justified in letting through, a motion which may almost be said to arise out of Pompey's speech, that on or after March 1st of 50 the question should be settled in debate what provinces were to be declared consular.²⁹ Upon these motions Caelius has comments which are as precious as gold. Men's confidence, he says,³⁰ was restored to hear Pompey say that, while he could not without offending Caesar decide the question of Caesar's provinces before March 1st, he would not hesitate to do so afterwards. When asked what would happen if a motion was vetoed, he replied that if Caesar procured a tribune to veto a senatorial resolution it would be equivalent to disobeying the senate. 'And what,' someone asked, 'if Caesar wishes both to be consul and to

²⁶ See note 21 above.

²⁷ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 4. The traditional view takes this March 1st as of 49, and as Hirschfeld pointed out (*Kl. Schr.*, p. 327) does not shrink from supposing that Caelius used the words *Kal. Mart.* without warning in the same letter, twice of 49 and once of 50.

²⁸ *Att.*, iv, 9, 1; *Q. fr.*, iii, 8, 4; *Fam.*, viii, 1, 3.

²⁹ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 5.

³⁰ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 9.

have his army?' 'What,' replied Pompey, 'if my son wants to hit me with a stick?' . . . Hence, says Caelius, as I see matters, Caesar will either stay in his province without using the *ratio* this year or, if he can be designated, he will go away. The dots in the quotation mark a sentence which I have omitted because it needs separate discussion. The Latin has—'his vocibus ut existimarent Pompeio cum Caesare esse negotium effecit.' Tyrrell and Purser translate 'this led people to think that there is a quarrel between Caesar and Pompey.'^{30a} But why so? Apart from the fact that the nearest parallel to the expression *esse negotium Aulo cum Caio*—Terence *Adelphi* IV, 25, 8—has nothing to do with quarrelling, look at the context! Pompey thought that it was as unlikely that Caesar would take the consulship for 49 and keep his army as that a son should beat his father. And why? Evidently because Pompey regarded the relations between himself and Caesar at this moment as comparable to those of a father to a son. But this relation no more normally expresses itself in a son quarrelling with father than in his beating him: the normal relation is of affection and obligation. Give 'negotium' then its normal meaning, and Pompey's remark becomes that of a sane man. There had been not a quarrel but a *deal* between Caesar and Pompey. Caesar was under an obligation to Pompey, and it was as improbable that he should infringe its terms as that a son should beat his father. With this passport we can speak out loud and bold on passages which students of the *Rechtsfrage* leave in silence. On 22nd of July, when the motion for the pay of Pompey's troops was raised, he was asked what was the exact status of that legion which he had lent to Caesar and was compelled to say that he would fetch it back. So off he went to Ariminum, on the borders of Caesar's province³¹—and came back without it! Students of the *Rechtsfrage* dare not ask the reason for such conduct, nor need we, for we know it. Pompey had gone to Ariminum to the borders of Caesar's province to do the deal with Caesar. In August the name of Cornelius Balbus, Caesar's confidential friend, appears in the correspondence³² and his remarks to Pompey's father-in-law are reported. The observations themselves, as we shall see, are most remarkable and need very careful elucidation, but the appearance

^{30a} III, p. 116.³¹ *Fam.*, viii, 4, 4.³² *Fam.*, viii, 9, 5.

then and there of Caesar's confidential friend does not surprise us at all. No more need we be surprised to find that Pompey's protégé Plancus is at Ravenna, in Caesar's province, in June.³³

But we can draw yet more profit from these precious words of Caelius: they told us that there was a deal, they shall now put us on the way of discovering its provisions. We learn that under certain circumstances Caesar might wish to stay in his province, and should in that case be entitled to do so. This must mean that he could stay there beyond the *legis dies*, whenever it was, for the validity of Caesar's tenure up to that date was clearly implied in the rejection of M. Marcellus' proposal. Caelius does not tell us how much longer, but his words give us a start towards finding out. Anxious enquirers suspected that a result of Pompey's provisos might be that Caesar could, and would stay with his army until the day of his consulship—until the end of 50—that is; to this Pompey made the reply of the son and the stick. We have not finished with it yet. Sons do not often beat their fathers with sticks, if they are proper sons: but there is nothing to stop them if there is a stick about. In other words there was nothing in this deal which, strictly interpreted, prevented Caesar from keeping his army as consul designate until the end of 50, but so to interpret it would practically be monstrous double dealing. In the ordinary way he could only so keep it, as Caelius saw and said, if he renounced his candidature for 50. So much then we can claim to know: Pompey wished Caesar, under certain conditions, to keep his command until at least the end of 50. Nevertheless, while my readers, if they follow me still, know that there was a deal between Caesar and Pompey, the senate, though they strongly suspected it, did not. All they could see was that Pompey had forbidden discussion until March 1st and that by this action Caesar was automatically secured until at least the end of the year.³⁴ Caesar's supporters assented to this interpretation by making no objection to a law authorizing discussion to take place on or after Pompey's date. Thus this advantage was automatically gained under the existing system of provincial allotments,

³³ *Fam.*, viii, 1, 5.

³⁴ *Fam.*, viii, 9, 5 perhaps made some such point to Cicero, but the negligence of copyists prevents it coming through to us. What can be got out of it confirms *Fam.*, viii, 8, 9.

as fixed by the *Lex Pompeia de Jure Magistratum*. If only we knew the exact provisions of that Law, we might crack the nut of the Rechtsfrage: Let us try. The main provision of the law set out that a five year interval should elapse between the tenure of a magistracy and a provincial command.³⁵ These provincial commands were allotted, as before, to ex-consuls and ex-praetors, and the first stage of appointment was to decide which provinces should be consular and which praetorian.³⁶ This was done by *senatus consulta*, and the whole arrangements could be brought to a standstill by the veto which, though regarded as scandalous,³⁷ was not technically illegal.³⁸ Provinces were then assigned, theoretically by lot³⁹ but sometimes, as was alleged, by deliberate and specific appointment.⁴⁰ For consular provinces a law of the People⁴¹ prescribed the length of the command, separately, as it appears, for each.⁴² The normal term was a year, which commenced from the day that the governor entered his province.⁴³ This Law was passed for the first governors sent out under the new legislation, but it was felt, as it seems, unnecessary to repeat it in after years,⁴⁴ unless perhaps the length of the appointment was changed; this Lex could not, apparently, be vetoed. A specific *senatus consultum* defined the conditions of the governor's tenure,⁴⁵ his duties, the size of his army,

³⁵ Dio, xl, 56, 1; cf. 30, 1.

³⁶ Cf. *Fam.*, viii, 8, 8. This point will become clearer as the argument develops.

³⁷ *Fam.*, viii, 4, 4. Again the relevance of this passage to the point under discussion will become clear in a moment.

³⁸ *Fam.*, viii, 5, 2; 8, 8, 9; 9, 2; 11, 3; *Att.*, vii, 7, 5.

³⁹ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 8; Caesar, *B. O.*, i, 6, 5; Plutarch, *Cicero*, 36, 1.

⁴⁰ Caesar, *B. O.*, i, 6, 5; 85, 9.

⁴¹ It would, therefore, benefit Cicero to have tribunes on his side who could 'agere cum populo.' Cf. *Att.*, v, 2, 1; 18, 3; vi, 1, 11; *Fam.*, ii, 7, 4; xv, 14, 5.

⁴² *Fam.*, ii, 7, 4; xv, 9, 2; xv, 14, 5.

⁴³ *Att.*, v, 14, 1; 15, 1; 16, 4; 21, 9; vi, 1, 14; 3, 1; 4, 1; 6, 3. *Fam.*, ii, 11, 1; 12, 1; 17, 1.

⁴⁴ So I interpret the last clause of *Fam.*, viii, 8, 5. Nobody can possibly have believed, as Hardy is driven to suppose, that the *Lex Sempronia* was still in force.

⁴⁵ Else why did not Cicero have his own allotment vetoed? Nor does he assume that the tribunes to whom he appeals will assist him in this way. As far as prorogation goes *Att.*, v, 21, 3 is categorical.

etc.⁴⁶ and, as the imperium of the ex-magistrate had lapsed, a formal *Lex Curiata* was necessary to restore it to him.⁴⁷ If no successor had been appointed when his time was up, he had to leave, unless prorogued, appointing normally the quaestor but occasionally a legate, in any event a man who had not held imperium before, to act as substitute.⁴⁸

It remains only to ask at what times in the year these rather complicated measures were put through. The motion declaring certain provinces praetorian was tabled and vetoed on Sept. 29th of 51:⁴⁹ what should have been the pendant to it, a motion declaring certain provinces consular does not appear, and we shall soon see why, but what may be called an amendment, ordering a discussion on consular provinces to be put down for March 1st of 50 or later, was carried without veto on the same day.⁵⁰ Now we have already learned that, as a result of this, it was thought that Caesar could stay where he was until at least the end of the year. Holding these facts firm in the mind, we move towards a theory that March 1st was a crucial date in the settlement of provinces as fixed by the *Lex Pompeia*. The idea is not contradicted, to say the least, by what we know about the appointment of governors under it. Cicero did not reach his province and thus commence his term of office until July 31st 51,⁵¹ and in May of that year he was no nearer Cilicia than Minturnae.⁵² Nevertheless there is evidence that his appointment actually dated from some months earlier. In a letter to his predecessor Appius Claudius, written presumably very soon after it, he announces that he must set out *cum imperio* for his province.⁵³ Appius replied, and Cicero received the reply at Brundisium on May 22nd.⁵⁴ Something like six weeks is the average of time for a letter to go from Italy to Cilicia, so that the original announcement can hardly be later than the beginning of March

⁴⁶ *Att.*, vi, 5, 3; 6, 3; vii, 3, 1; *Fam.*, ii, 7, 4; 13, 4; iii, 3, 1; xv, 4, 3, 6; 9, 2; 14, 5. Perhaps because the *senatus consultum* could practically do the work of the *Lex*, it was thought permissible to dispense with the latter on certain conditions.

⁴⁷ Caesar, *B. O.*, i, 6, 5; cf. *Att.*, xi, 6, 2.

⁴⁸ *Att.*, vi, 1, 14; 3, 1; 4, 1; 6, 3; *Fam.*, ii, 15, 4; 18, 3.

⁴⁹ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 8.

⁵⁰ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 5.

⁵¹ *Att.*, v, 14, 1; 15, 1; 16, 2; 21, 9; *Fam.*, xv, 2, 1; 4, 2.

⁵² *Att.*, v, 1, 5. ⁵³ *Fam.*, iii, 2, 1. ⁵⁴ *Fam.*, iii, 3, 1.

51. Again, Minucius Thermus, proprætor of Asia, was in correspondence with Cicero at the beginning of May 50 and wondering whom he should leave as his successor.⁵⁵ If he like Cicero had a year's tenure of command, this would mean that he had arrived about May of 51, which, for a governor who was not so dilatory as Cicero, again suggests a March appointment. Moreover, the *senatus consultum*, which authorizes action before the people if necessary, itself states that such action may be commenced either by the consuls of 50 or those of 49, suggesting that the turn of the year was the normal date for fixing the circumstances of appointment. The facts then, if they do not prove outright, suggest in the strongest tones that there was an 'appointment-period' which ended on March 1st. If no successor was appointed inside that period, he could not be sent at all until the next appointment period. This would explain at once, then, how a motion to discuss the consular provinces not before March 1st was regarded as securing Caesar automatically until at least the end of the year. It would explain too an otherwise hardly explicable passage in a letter from Caelius of Nov. 51 which states that, in the event of a Parthian War, some thought that Pompey should be sent, some Caesar, some the consuls, no one says Caelius, approves of private persons going on the authorization of a *senatus consultum*.⁵⁶ No one! Why on earth not? It would be the natural thing to do. But there was one thing which was shared by Caesar, Pompey, and the consuls and by few others besides—and this one thing was not military skill, the consuls had none of that. But all four did have the imperium; and on our view the possession of the imperium becomes relevant as never before. Legally, privati simply could not get the imperium until the appointment-period had expired.⁵⁷ Ideally, then, it may be suspected that, under the *Lex Pompeia*, each governor would get his *Lex Curiata* on March 1st and would go to his province with convenient speed, being duly succeeded by

⁵⁵ *Fam.*, ii, 18, 3. Though there is nothing to show that quaestors had an 'appointment period,' it is worth mentioning that Cicero expected Coelius Caldus to arrive in May, which again suggests a March appointment—*Att.*, vi, 2, 10; cf. *Fam.*, ii, 19, 1. Did it apply to legati too? See *Att.*, vi, 3, 1.

⁵⁶ *Fam.*, viii, 10, 2.

⁵⁷ Otherwise it would be hard to see why the governors appointed in January did not wait to get it. Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 6, 5.

a man who had his *Lex Curiata* in the ensuing March. Delayed departures, however, such as Cicero's, would obviously create a problem, which, indeed, never actually arose, but might have been inconvenient. If dilatory governors only reached their province late in the year, what would happen to their successors appointed by the *Lex Curiata* of March 1st of the next year? Must they be dilatory too—and so ad infinitum? Evidently it was thought feasible to shorten tenures, and thus Cicero had some hopes that he would be superseded, not in twelve months, but in nine—in May of 50, that is ⁵⁸—just that time, in fact, when a governor appointed on March 1st and prompt in his departure would arrive in Cilicia.⁵⁹

But we are very far from having finished with March 1st. Students have often expressed their surprise more or less explicitly that that motion of M. Marcellus, which we have discussed,⁶⁰ should somehow or other have disappeared from the correspondence of Caelius, who is so eager to mention its repeated postponement. They ought to have been equally surprised—though they are not—to observe that, though the motion on praetorian provinces is framed as though it were to be immediately valid, the companion resolution on consular provinces declares that no debate should take place on them until next March.⁶¹ Yet the solution of one difficulty is the solution of the other, and our interpretation of events will give it. In a letter of Aug. 1st Caelius made clear that a motion on the succession of Caesar was equivalent to a debate on the provinces⁶²—and there is every

⁵⁸ *Att.*, v, 17, 5; cf. *Fam.*, ii, 7, 4; 10, 4.

⁵⁹ As in former times provinces were allotted to praetors (*Att.*, i, 14, 5; *Q. fr.*, ii, 3, 1) not later than the first two months of their praetorship, it would be a simple hypothesis to assume that Pompey's Law merely applied with a five year interval to all provinces what had previously been the rule for praetorian provinces, and this might explain the appearance of a right to veto, and the statement of Caelius that such action was traditional (*tralatitium*; *Fam.*, viii, 5, 2). That consular allotments might be held to need a further specific lex, while praetorian provinces, as we can infer from the absence of such a clause from *Fam.*, viii, 8, 8 did not, may be a survival of old procedure under the *Lex Sempronia*, which the hint of a limitation of veto (see note 45) perhaps confirms.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Att.*, v, 21, 3.

⁶¹ *Att.*, v, 20, 7; vi, 1, 24; 2, 6.

⁶² *Fam.*, viii, 4, 4.

reason why this should be so. As Hardy has pointed out^{62a}—and we can be happy for once to follow him—the normal way to have Caesar succeeded would be to have his provinces declared consular under the *Lex Pompeia*. Now with our doctrine of the ‘appointment-period’ we know what that means. To declare that Caesar’s provinces were consular for 50 means nothing more or less than to declare that Caesar was superseded as from March 1st, and when Cicero states that this was M. Marcellus’ design he is simply expressing the anticipated result of a motion on the consular provinces which should have corresponded to that on the praetorian. Furthermore, when Caelius reports Pompey’s words—that Caesar should leave after March 1st—we can see that he is simply writing thereby the epitaph of Marcellus’ so often postponed motion: this then is why we do not hear in so many words of its demise. There may, indeed, have been some sort of senatorial debate upon it—there is no reason to go out of our way to throw over an authority⁶³—and the intervention of the consul Sulpicius reported by Suetonius and Dio⁶⁴ rather suggests that there was. Nevertheless it was, as Cicero says, mainly the intervention of Pompey,⁶⁵ who had previously declared his unwillingness to see this resolution go forward,⁶⁶ that decided the matter, and Marcellus was forced to put his motion in an amended form which postponed the debate on consular provinces until March 1st, and this, as we have said, automatically secured Caesar’s prolongation. This resolution was not vetoed—and no wonder. Our theory furthermore takes another unnoticed difficulty in its stride. Caelius in the letter of July 22nd asserts that Marcellus’ motion will go through unless there is a scandalous use of the veto, scandalous because Pompey has loudly declared that all must obey the senate⁶⁷—and then we find that Pompey was the leader two months later in putting that same motion to death! But this is no surprise to us. Pompey had been to Ariminum meanwhile, and we know what he was doing there.

^{62a} P. 171.

⁶³ Hirtius, *B. G.*, viii, 53, 1.

⁶⁴ Suetonius, *Caesar*, 29, 1; Dio, xl, 59, 1. See note 21.

⁶⁵ *Att.*, viii, 3, 3; cf. Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 26.

⁶⁶ *Fam.*, viii, 9, 5.

⁶⁷ *Fam.*, viii, 4, 4. See note 37.

It might almost seem time to approach again with this new knowledge that matter of the deal. Yet there is work to be done first: we have a duty to those other governors, whose vagaries have given us so much information. If the consular provinces were removed from the allotment, their only chance was to see their province in the praetorian list: if anything happened to this allotment, they could not hope to be succeeded at all. The senate had then two alternatives; it could simply let the commands run out at the legal dates, so that the provinces would be governed by substitutes until the allottees of the next allotment appeared in the course of 49, or it could prolong the tenure of the sitting governors.⁶⁸ Cicero, if he realised the effect of Marcellus' consular resolution upon Caesar's position, must have realised very early that a dead-lock in provincial allotments was a probability. In fact, as early as May of 51, while still in Italy, he was apprehensive of a prorogation.⁶⁹ Throughout the ensuing months questions of its possibility were uppermost in his mind and, when the whole question of consular allotment was definitely postponed and that of praetorian provinces vetoed, there was little hope, as Caelius told him,⁷⁰ of the appointment of a successor, that is in fact, that the question of praetorian allotments would be reviewed.

Succession, indeed, which involved a new grant of imperium and a new *Lex Curiata*, was, if our interpretation of the Law is correct, hardly possible after March 1st; it is natural therefore that no letters referring to such a possibility are found which would reach Rome after that date,⁷¹ indeed by Feb. 20th Cicero knew that nothing would be done before March, in fact, that an allotment of praetorian provinces was regarded in the face of the veto as impossible.⁷² Nevertheless there was nothing in the doctrine of the Appointment Period which would prevent the senate discussing at any date it liked the prorogation of governors who already held the imperium. In fact, it was only when news of a prorogation would reach provinces after their govern-

⁶⁸ As Hortensius sometime in September 51 proposed to do, *Fam.*, iii, 8, 9; cf. *Att.*, v, 17, 5.

⁶⁹ *Att.*, v, 1, 1.

⁷⁰ *Fam.*, viii, 10, 5.

⁷¹ The latest is *Fam.*, ii, 7—mid-December.

⁷² *Att.*, vi, 1, 24.

ors had legally gone away that a general measure of this kind would become practically impossible. Luck in this was on Cicero's side. He feared that, if there was a crisis on March 1st of 50, the senate might prefer regular governors in provinces and vote for prolongation.⁷³ This did not, however, come to pass, and Cicero was glad to hear that the vetoes of his good friend Curio on all provincial business made it impossible for the senate to act.⁷⁴

I regret, but cannot apologize for, digressions such as this. A wise historian^{74a} has told us that any theory of the *Rechtsfrage* finds some passages that contradict it. He has not, however, told us what they are: as we plunge through the tangle we know well 'how easy is a bush supposed a bear' and are compelled therefore to shoot at anything which looks like a bush. But now we must really return to this deal for, though I hope that my readers are persuaded that my interpretation of Pompey's words alone fits the Latin and the context, I have little doubt that their good sense makes them shrink from the notion of a deal between the future enemies so soon before their enmity was patent. Yet, from Pompey's point of view, there was not much involved in it. It may have seemed even to Pompey after the day of Alesia that the Gallic conquest was virtually over—it was merely a matter of hunting down robbers and, though there was a rumor that Caesar had been defeated by the Bellovaci in the middle of the year,⁷⁵ it must have speedily been contradicted. There was force then in Marcellus' claim. But as the campaign of 51 went on, things became different, the conquest was not ending so quickly. The fairness then of Caesar's objection to Marcellus' proposal would be obvious to an experienced soldier like Pompey, and the simplest way to meet it was to stand the consular allotments over. Caesar's command would then run to the *legis dies*, he could stand for the consulship in 51 and enjoy the full cam-

⁷³ *Att.*, v, 20, 7.

⁷⁴ *Att.*, vi, 2, 6 (May 50), the last letter in which prorogation is mentioned as a possibility. Cicero saw this point rather differently later in the year (*Att.*, vii, 7, 5).

^{74a} Marsh, p. 281.

⁷⁵ *Fam.*, viii, 1, 4. That Domitius, Caesar's enemy, should have tried to hush up Caesar's defeat fits our interpretation in the most delightful way.

paigning year which it seemed likely that he would want:⁷⁶ then on the *legis dies* he would, like Cicero in Cilicia, leave his provinces to a deputy until the allottees of the next allotment came to take it over, unless the senate, by special enactment, declared them consular from that date. If Caesar chose not to stand, he could then, on the most liberal interpretation of Pompey's concession, stay until March 1st 49; but would then have no right to the *absentis ratio* at all. And if he did choose to stay this full distance, it mattered little to Pompey, for, if it came to a breach, time would be on Pompey's side. There was one catch in the scheme: Caesar might claim that the concession allowed him to stand for the consulship in absence and then stay until the end of the year. This would give him complete security, for though, as we have said, a consul designate seems to have enjoyed in Rome a certain immunity from prosecution,⁷⁷ it was obvious that, however Caesar might have viewed matters before, at this stage of the relations between the parties, the months when he was consul designate but absent from his army would not be for him a bed of roses. There was no doubt that the concession might be interpreted that way, but, as we have seen, when Pompey was challenged on this, he could say that thus to use the concession for a purpose for which it was obviously not intended would be the most monstrous breach of faith. When Caesar, however, examined the concession, he could see that it gave him another string to his bow. A precedent had been created by the postponement of consular allotments: what had been done one year by concession could be extorted in the next by veto, and then in this way he would be safe until March 48. He could thus

⁷⁶ As Hirtius, *B. G.*, viii, 39, 3. On this famous passage I have only this to say. I consider it certain, the siege being as late in the summer as it was (*B. G.*, viii, 46, 1), that *unam aetatem* must be the summer of 50. Nevertheless it must fairly be confessed, in spite of Holmes and others, that it is unnatural that the Gauls felt any confidence if there was another whole summer of Caesar's command to go. I suspect (but cannot, of course, prove) that the Gauls really thought that Caesar would leave under Marcellus' motion on March 1st and that Hirtius, who realized that soon after, if not during the siege, the case was altered and March 1st was no longer in question, has consequently emended in his mind the fact of the Gallic hopes to fit the new situation as he understood it. This is only surmise, I admit: but it is the way—*experto crede*—that historians' minds often work.

⁷⁷ See note 18a.

with a splendid show of legality claim the *ratio absentis* in the year on which he was entitled under strict law to have his canvass. Nor would the difficult juristic question, what the *ratio absentis* connoted when a command had already expired, arise at all: for Caesar would be automatically secure as long as he wanted.⁷⁸ Caelius saw this possibility as early as August of 51 and expected that some tribune hostile to Caesar, Curio for instance, would attempt to beat down this veto and force obedience to the senate by holding up in revenge all the allotments including that of Cicero's province; as he acutely saw, the block would not be relieved for more than two years, to the end of 49, that is.⁷⁹ Pompey himself was reminded that this was a possible consequence of the deal but could only say, as he had said before,⁸⁰ that all must obey the senate and that a veto upon the allotment would be equivalent to disobedience.⁸¹

The theory seems, I trust, to be running smoothly enough, but now it must face a most formidable difficulty. Were I not endeavouring to establish to conviction a view, which, as I am told, has little hope of gaining it, I could almost pass in silent pity the neglect which this difficulty has received from my predecessors. The difficulty can fortunately be stated in reference to facts about which there is no controversy at all. Pompey declares that he will not hesitate to have the matter of the succession debated after March 1st 50, and Pompey's statement is duly implemented by a resolution to this effect, to which no tribune takes exception. And yet we have been told by Caelius in the letter of Sept. 2nd that, when Balbus, Caesar's confidential agent, heard that Scipio was proposing that the Gallic provinces should be discussed on March 1st, he was deeply distressed and remonstrated with the proposer.⁸² 'Deeply distressed'—and about a motion which seems identical on the face of it with that which no tribune was found to veto; 'deeply distressed' that Pompey's father-in-law was proposing a course of action that Pompey felt it no injustice to Caesar to follow! What can it mean? It looks like Bedlam.

Yet there is a way out. As Caelius says, a debate on the provinces and a debate on the Gauls were two ways of saying the

⁷⁸ Cf. *Fam.*, viii, 11, 3.

⁷⁹ *Fam.*, viii, 5, 2.

⁸⁰ *Fam.*, viii, 4, 4.

⁸¹ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 9.

⁸² *Fam.*, viii, 9, 5.

same thing: nevertheless, a debate on the Gauls could mean under the special circumstances something very different. In this same letter Caelius says that 'the Gauls, which have someone to veto them, are brought under the same category as the rest of the provinces.'⁸³ A better statement for the purpose of the argument, say Tyrrell and Purser, would be 'the other provinces are in the same condition as the Gauls.'^{83a} I must conceive, however, that Caelius understood more clearly than his critics what he meant to say. The purport of his remark is that the Gauls were as much subject as the other provinces to the operations of the *Lex Pompeia de Jure Magistratum*. But such a remark carries the implication that they might not have been, and that was itself a plausible doctrine. Caesar's tenure depended on a grant conferred years before the passing of the *Lex Pompeia*. Might it not therefore be argued that the succession of the Gauls was exempt from the provisions of this *Lex*, exempt that is to say from the doctrine of the appointment period? If that were so, a motion passed on March 1st referring simply to the 'succession of the Gauls' and nothing else (*neu quid coniunctim*) might supersede Caesar on the *legis dies* without any of the postponements allowed by the *Lex Pompeia*. That Caesar's friends should have protested, therefore, against a motion on the succession of the Gauls and allowed one on the consular provinces to pass through is now explicable, even though Gallic succession and succession of consular provinces were so intimately bound up under the *Lex Pompeia*, that Caelius could declare their identity and Pompey speak of a Gallic succession in relation to the very motion on consular provinces which the tribunes had let through.⁸⁴

Scipio's motion, however, was a blatant revelation of senatorial chicanery, and it was possible for the senate to press its own interpretation of the Law without it. Even if the question to be discussed on or after March 1st was that of consular provinces, it was possible to declare the Gauls consular and to claim on the *legis dies* that they, depending on an anterior grant, were not subject to the normal provisions of the *Lex Pompeia*, so that again Caesar could be superseded on the *legis dies*, procedure which would be useful if Caesar was chosen in absence at the election of 51. For this, however, it was desirable that the Gauls

⁸³ *Fam.*, viii, 9, 2.^{83a} *iii*, p. 76.⁸⁴ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 9.

should be the only provinces which could be consular for that date. Of provinces which could be consular at all, the Spains were excluded, as they had been re-granted to Pompey for four years in 52.⁸⁵ There remained then only Cilicia and Syria or one of the eight praetorian provinces. Pursuant, therefore, to the senate's manoeuvres, it was voted on Sept. 29th 51 that these eight praetorian provinces with Cilicia should be treated as praetorian in the coming year.⁸⁶ The motion was vetoed by Caesarian tribunes, but we must seize hold of it before it vanishes into oblivion and ask why Syria is not there. The purpose of the motion can only be that on the *legis dies* all provinces should be unavailable for consular allotment except the two Gauls. If it was unnecessary to include Syria in a motion designed to effect that end, we must scrutinize the behaviour of its governor with unusual attention. It is satisfactory to find that this man M. Bibulus, Caesar's colleague of 59, does behave with interesting eccentricity. The senate, we learn, was in March of 51 so anxious that Bibulus should reach his province punctually that it would not give him time to levy troops;⁸⁷ yet Bibulus was even more dilatory than Cicero, and did not arrive until early October, after his quaestor had defeated the Parthians.⁸⁸ For this delay Cicero gives a reason—'Bibulus,' he wrote in August of 51, 'is not even thinking of going to his province now. They say that he is doing this because he wishes to leave it later.'⁸⁹ What does this mean? Bibulus was not a man of the highest intellect, it is true, but he was not a schoolboy and one thing he was, a pertinacious enemy of Caesar. We have a right to demand of students an explanation for the omission of Syria from that praetorian allotment: Bibulus' conduct gives us one straight away, and we can fairly challenge the production of a better. Bibulus wished to embarrass Caesar by being established as legal governor of a

⁸⁵ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 55, 7; *Caesar*, 28, 5; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 24; Dio, xl, 56, 2, cf. *Att.*, v, 11, 3.

⁸⁶ *Fam.*, viii, 8, 8.

⁸⁷ *Fam.*, iii, 3, 1.

⁸⁸ Cicero reached Mopsuestia, at the foot of Mount Amanus, on Oct. 8th (*Fam.*, iii, 8, 10). While at Mount Amanus, but before his victory there on Oct. 13th, he heard that the Parthians, whom Cassius had already defeated (*Att.*, v, 20, 3), were in retreat and that Bibulus had arrived (*Fam.*, xv, 4, 7). His appearance then must be dated to within a day or two before October 8th—cf. *Att.*, v, 18, 1; *Fam.*, ii, 10, 2.

⁸⁹ *Att.*, v, 18, 4.

consular province at the moment of the *legis dies*. In other words, on this interpretation the suspicions that the narratives of Appian and Suetonius had given us are confirmed: we can confine the *legis dies* between July 31st of 50 when Cilicia, and early October when Syria, became vacant.

Our analysis has now reached a stage where we can stand back for a moment and examine the points at issue. Caesar, if we are right, could now, according to the strict letter of the *Lex Pompeia*, remain in his province after the consular elections of July 50 until at least the end of the year. Though this was, if Pompey was right, an unfair application of the *Lex Pompeia*, legally there was nothing that could be done about it on that score. Pompey's only remedy was now to throw himself into the arms of the optimates and agree that the *absentis ratio* of 50 contravened the law of the ten year interval. Did we possess a full series of contemporary documents upon the political manoeuvres at Rome, did we possess that is to say letters from Caelius of the winter months of 51, we might establish or refute such speculations. But few were the letter carriers who ventured then across the seas and from October 51 to February 50 Caelius says no word. The evidence must therefore be supplied from the secondary authorities. They do not fail us,⁹⁰ but their accounts have seemed so outrageous that Mommsen, who held them for hopeless,^{90a} is gladly seconded by the silence of his fellows. Our theory saves us from this cowardice. That these secondary authorities should lose their way and break the clew of the labyrinth is easy to imagine. Nevertheless, I hope to show that in their wanderings they have not torn up all the thread. Indeed the Epitomizer of Livy,⁹¹ though true to his trade, has walked safely to the centre. At the end of 51 the consul Marcellus, he says, brought a motion in the senate that Caesar should come and stand for the consulship in person, while Caesar claimed that under the provisions of the Law he might hold his provinces until the moment of his consulship. Now this is just what we wanted. It is true that the Epitomizer has taken a short cut and obscured the path, but our analysis will interpret him. With dimmer eyes Appian treads the maze.⁹² In 51, as he reports, Caesar tried to retain his power until he was elected consul, and asked the

⁹⁰ Dio, however, has nothing to say at this point.

^{90a} P. 135, note 122.

⁹¹ Livy, *Ep.*, cviii.

⁹² B. C., ii, 25.

senate to grant him a little more time in his present command of Gaul or a part of it. The request for power until elected consul and that with only a limited command Caesar did indeed make, but in the next year, where Appian in fact records it in language nearly the same.⁹³ Yet in the error truth is concealed, and this request for an extension is the claim recorded by the Epitomizer. Plutarch stumbles too. This poor compiler cannot even be consistent with himself and forgets from one Life to the next whether Caesar asked for a consulship as an alternative to an extension of command⁹⁴ or for both.⁹⁵ Can we believe that he follows the clew and does not kick it into tangles, when we read his ensuing language? ⁹⁶ Pompey alleged, he tells us, that he had letters from Caesar expressing the wish to have a successor and be relieved of the command; he thought, however, that the *ratio absentis* should be conceded. Cato and his party replied that Caesar must give up the imperium if he was to have any favour from the public; and, since Pompey made no contention but as it were accepted defeat, there was more suspicion about his sentiments toward Caesar. Yet we can in fact follow Plutarch in this. With our doctrine of the deal, we can accept with pleasure those letters from Caesar: that wish to have a successor, with Pompey's remark that he was prepared to concede the *ratio absentis*, does not surprise us at all. If Caesar was willing to leave his command on the *legis dies*, Pompey was prepared to allow the *ratio absentis*; he had implied as much and Caelius had so interpreted his implication. The Livian Epitomizer fills the gaps in Plutarch's narrative by showing that Caesar was claiming to use the concession allowed him by Pompey in that strained sense which Pompey thought so indecent. It was on this account that Marcellus challenged the *ratio absentis*, on this account that Pompey acquiesced. As Cicero says, the senate had refused to accept Caesar's claim,⁹⁷ and it was feared that war might break out then and there.⁹⁸ Caesar, however, was unwilling to bring matters to a head, and, when the winter season was over, he was, we are told, thinking of his candidature—but for the elections of 49.⁹⁹ Yet would he enjoy the *ratio*

⁹³ *B. C.*, ii, 32.

⁹⁴ *Pompey*, 56, 1.

⁹⁵ *Caesar*, 29, 1.

⁹⁶ *Pompey*, 56, 2-3.

⁹⁷ *Att.*, v, 21, 3.

⁹⁸ *Att.*, v, 21, 3; Appian, ii, 25.

⁹⁹ Hirtius, *B. G.*, viii, 50, 4.

absentis then? It was a nice juridical problem which must now be explained in relation to what Marcellus had done. Both the Epitomizer and Plutarch agree in supposing that Caesar's opponents refused to allow him to stand for the consulship in absence and retain his army; they could not rest this claim on the illegality of the codicil, for such action was blocked by veto, but they could, if Pompey backed them, press the doctrine of the ten year interval and inform Caesar that he could not be a candidate until the elections of 49, when his *legis dies*, that is to say, had passed. Now Suetonius' language, as we have seen, shows that the *ratio absentis* was to be used because Caesar's command had not yet expired at the time for using it. If, however, his candidature was pushed forward to 49, when his term of command had run out already, what could the *ratio absentis* on those terms connote? It was open for Caesar's enemies to claim that under those circumstances it could not exist. But Caesar had a reply. He could, as Caelius saw¹⁰⁰ and Pompey himself conceded,¹⁰¹ secure, by vetoing the provincial allotments of 50, a prolongation of command which would take him in strict legality past that election date of 49. If so, did Marcellus' interpretation still apply? Could Caesar use the *ratio absentis* then or could he not? His enemies, indeed, thought not,¹⁰² but Cicero found it hard to decide.¹⁰³ And Caesar had on his part a bold and specious argument. He never had actually committed himself to standing for the consulate in 50, nor could his opponents twit him with the design of doing so, for they had themselves made it impossible for him to realize the design. He could therefore with strict accuracy claim that he was merely proposing to be a candidate for the first elections at which he could legally stand—those of 49—and that his claim to stand for a consulship in absence had been conceded by the people and approved by Pompey.¹⁰⁴ The claim might be good or bad—

¹⁰⁰ *Fam.*, viii, 5, 2.

¹⁰¹ *Att.*, vii, 8, 4.

¹⁰² *Fam.*, viii, 14, 2 (there is no need here to take *feri* as meaning *designari*, though it may); *Att.*, vii, 8, 4.

¹⁰³ *Att.*, vii, 1, 4; 7, 6.

¹⁰⁴ Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 9, 2; 32, 2-3; Suetonius, *Caesar*, 29, 2. Livy himself, as is shown by Florus (ii, 13, 15-7), who is checked by Livian epitomizers (Eutropius, vi, 19, 2; Orosius, vi, 15, 1), presented this as Caesar's case: it is not known what he thought of its validity.

Caelius seems to have thought it bad ¹⁰⁵—but specious it certainly was, for Caesar's opponents in refusing him leave to break the law—which was what they virtually had done—had tied themselves into a knot which he had no intention of assisting them to untie.

The analysis now approaches 50 B. C. I have constructed a theory on the assumption that the *legis dies* is to be assigned to that year: I have cited some evidence which points in that direction. The reader has in fact been led up the garden. It is now time to justify this in the hope that he will come further. To do this it will be necessary to abandon chronological arrangement and consider at once the grounds for the final rupture in 49. Since Caesar's first period came, as is generally agreed, to an end on March 1st 54, it would certainly be the simplest hypothesis to suppose that the second period started where the first stopped, and came to its end accordingly on March 1st 49. Moreover this would give their full weight to two passages in which Cicero ¹⁰⁶ ascribes to Caesar a command of ten years' duration. Nevertheless there is a grave difficulty. It is not only that Mommsen's hypothesis demands that in several passages we should strain the plain meaning of Latin and should throw secondary authorities overboard: it presupposes that when battle was joined the strongest argument in Caesar's favour was neither advanced by him nor refuted by his opponents.^{106a} For both sides have explained the grounds on which they stood. To the optimates Caesar was holding, or—to give the traditional view its fullest license—was likely to hold, his command beyond the period granted to him by the people—and that against the senate's permission.¹⁰⁷ He had, in fact, everything except a

¹⁰⁵ *Fam.*, viii, 14, 3. Velleius, perhaps, agreed with him (*M.*, 48, 5), but his account presents the issues too concisely.

¹⁰⁶ *Att.*, vii, 7, 6; 9, 4.

^{106a} I borrow here a weapon from Adcock (*C. Q.*, xxvi, pp. 15-17).

¹⁰⁷ *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 2; *Att.*, vii, 9, 4 (Dec. 27th, 50). According to the traditional view, 'praeterit tempus non legis sed libidinis tuae'; . . . 'decernitur ut succedatur: impedis et ais,' 'habe meam rationem' are referring to 'what will take place in a few days,' in Jan. 49, that is. But the *legis dies* on their view would not come 'in a few days' but in more than two months. How could Cicero claim to prophesy what would happen at the end of those months? In fact, as Holmes, for instance, confesses, there *had* been a decree to supersede Caesar in

case.¹⁰⁸ Caesar on two occasions after the breach endeavoured to show that he had one. At Ariminum in January 49 he declared that he had been deprived of the 'beneficium populi' and was ordered home with his imperium cut short by six months, though he had been allowed by popular decree to stand *in absentia* at the next election.¹⁰⁹ At Rome, later in the year, he used similar language, pointing out that the Law of the Ten Tribunes had been approved by Pompey himself and expressing his surprise that Pompey should have prevented him from enjoying the beneficium populi.¹¹⁰ But where does the *legis dies* come in? What happened was this: relations between Caesar and the senate had become increasingly strained until on Jan. 1st it was decreed that Caesar, on pain of being declared a public enemy, should resign his command 'ante certam diem.' This was vetoed by Caesar's supporters and on Jan. 7th the *senatus consultum ultimum* was passed.¹¹¹ A few days later, without even, says Caesar, waiting for the confirmatory *Lex curiata*, governors had set out, one of them to Gaul.¹¹² Now let us consider these events in the light of the traditional view: *senatus consultum ultimum* passed and Caesar's successor on his way to Gaul, and all this when Caesar's command had by the formal provisions of a *Lex* nearly two months to run! No doubt Caesar's enemies felt sure that when that day of March 1st came he would not yield. But what of that? By their precipitation, we are asked to believe, they had thrown away their legal position. Then why on earth did not Caesar use their folly? When, for example, he complained of the *senatus consultum ultimum*, did he say that it had been used against one who was legally enjoying his imperium? By no means: he merely states that it was normally used against urban sedition, against men like Saturninus and the Gracchi. He urged his soldiers therefore, who had fought under him for nine years, to defend his dignity and reputation. But why not say that anyway his time was not

50; it *had* been vetoed in 50. If then two of these verbs can naturally be taken as of past time, is not the third naturally so to be taken too?

¹⁰⁸ *Att.*, vii, 3, 5.

¹⁰⁹ Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 9, 2.

¹¹⁰ Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 32, 2-3.

¹¹¹ Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 1, 1-5, 4; *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 2; Livy, *Ep.*, cix; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 30, 2; Florus, ii, 13, 17; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 32; Dio, xli, 3, 4.

¹¹² Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 6, 5; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 33; Dio, xli, 3, 3.

up?¹¹³ To emphasize the time factor, the nine years of war, and then say nothing of the supreme, the clinching argument based upon the time factor itself, is surely to take the horse right up to the fence and then refuse it. When a man who needs all the weapons of propaganda avoids the strongest, but one inference is possible—it is not there for him to use.

Indeed, though Caesar's first period ended on March 1st 54, there is no reason why the second should start on the same day. There is, indeed, a good reason why it should not. The other triumvirs, Pompey and Crassus, had themselves procured five year commands.¹¹⁴ That of Crassus had certainly begun before March 1st 54¹¹⁵ and, though relations between the three were fairly smooth in 55, it would be an obvious inconvenience if two commands ran out in the year before the third. The Laws by which they held these commands, *Lex Trebonia* and *Lex Pompeia Licinia*, appear to have been passed on the same day,¹¹⁶ and nothing forbids us to suppose that the periods granted by them did not begin on the same day too.

Far stronger is the argument in favour of March 1st 49, which is derived from those two letters of Cicero; they both date from Dec. 50, and they both speak of ten years. Now attentive examination of them shows that this ten years is not calculated to the day when the letters were written but to the *legis dies*.¹¹⁷ We must either assume then that the *legis dies* was yet in the future, so that the circumstances accompanying its arrival are imaginative forecasts,¹¹⁸ or that it has already happened, so that the 'ten years' is not a full ten. Either seems unnatural; yet if we can prove that 'ten years' could be used as a round number, to represent, that is, nine years and a fraction, these passages will be neutral in the battle of the Rechtsfrage. To do this might be difficult, had not Mommsen, who of all people is

¹¹³ Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 7, 5-7.

¹¹⁴ Livy, *Ep.*, cv; Velleius, ii, 46, 2; Plutarch, *Crassus*, 15, 5; *Pompey*, 52, 3; *Cato minor*, 43, 1; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 18; Dio, xxxix, 33, 2.

¹¹⁵ *Att.*, iv, 13, 2.

¹¹⁶ Dio, xxxix, 36.

¹¹⁷ When Adcock, therefore, answers the question whether Cicero could describe nine years nine months and twenty days as ten years, his jubilation is irrelevant (*C. Q.*, xxvi, p. 15, note 2).

¹¹⁸ 'Transierit' would assist the cause of March 1st 49, if, as Hardy thinks, it were a future perfect. But it can as well be perfect subjunctive.

most concerned to interpret these ten years in their rigid sense, done the work and shown that in normal Roman usage a fraction of a year was considered as a year in the computation of commands and of military service. If it were assumed, for the moment, that the *legis dies* was some date in the autumn of 50, nine years would take it back to the autumn of 59, and the period between this and the March, when the imperium began, would be treated in the Roman practice of computation as a year.¹¹⁹ Thus, if Mommsen is right, the 'ten years' are useless to tell us whether the *legis dies* came before or after this December letter, and the objections to a date in 49 stand ever firm.

We can now advance in attack upon the events of 50. But it will not be easy. Caelius is a precious witness but less talkative than we could wish; Cicero, until the breaking of the storm, was more interested in his own triumph than in affairs of state; and Hirtius, though he gives some useful facts, can hardly be said to narrate at all. Of the secondary authorities, Suetonius and Plutarch have little to offer until the last months of the year, nor is Dio much more helpful, though he does contribute the statement that Caesar's command ended in 50.¹²⁰ There remains only Appian: the chronology and significance of events have been too much for him but he has done his best. The facts are there, but to interpret them we shall have to fight every inch of the way.

As we have followed the march of events to the end of 51, we have seen that the *ratio absentis* for the elections of 50 had been refused, so that Caesar was now compelled to put into operation that course of action which Caelius had already outlined. The *ratio absentis* was to be claimed for the elections of 49, and to make it effective it was necessary to block provincial appointments so that Caesar could not be succeeded in 49 at all. To stand firm by such a course a resolute tribune was needed: at once, therefore, when the new situation had arisen, Caesar acted and to Curio, the man, who, as he might have heard, was prepared to block business against him,¹²¹ he turned and

¹¹⁹ "Rechtsfrage" (*Kleine Schr.*, i, pp. 101-9).

¹²⁰ Dio, xl, 59, 3. As Hardy confesses, Dio, xxxix, 33, 3 is an inference derived from this passage and not vice versa, and is based on his mis-conceived idea that Caesar's imperium began in 58. Cf. xliv, 43, 2.

¹²¹ *Fam.*, viii, 5, 3.

ensured by bribery that these designs would now be fulfilled for a different end.¹²² Nor did Curio delay. Under the terms of the resolution of Sept. 51 the question of consular provinces could come up on March 1st, but on that day and for many days afterwards he interposed his veto.¹²³ Finally, C. Claudius Marcellus, the consul of 50, proposed that successors should be sent to Caesar's provinces, for the time was up.¹²⁴ According to Appian Curio's support was still concealed, so that this motion must have been put forward fairly early in the year. Adherents, therefore, of the '50 hypothesis,' who have noticed that phrase 'the time was up,' must not be too eager to pounce. The *legis dies*, as we have shown, cannot be so early. The time in question can only be that period of inactivity which was prescribed by the resolution of Sept. 51, up to March, that is, to which must be added that time of uncertain length when Curio's veto impeded all discussion. For on this motion of C. Marcellus Curio not only withdrew his veto but actually came forward as a supporter. His action is strange indeed, and, though Appian can hardly order us to take his words *au pied de la lettre*, Curio's conduct becomes at once intelligible if we do. If Caesar's tenure was separated from the operation of the *Lex Pompeia*, it would be possible to supersede him on the *legis dies* itself. If then we take Appian's words literally, this was the issue that C. Marcellus raised. It was, indeed, formally illegal, for the motion of Sept. had authorized discussion on the consular provinces, not on Caesar's provinces. Nevertheless it might be said that there was an equitable case for recalling a governor who had obtained a long command on the day that it was over. Curio's action in seconding such a motion becomes now clear: in proposing that Pompey, whose tenure of command in Spain was legally secured, should resign too, he was in a manner meeting equity with equity. As Curio had seconded his motion, it must

¹²² *Fam.*, ii, 13, 3; viii, 6, 5; Livy, *Ep.*, cix; Velleius, ii, 48, 3; Plutarch, *Pompey*, 58, 2; *Caesar*, 29, 2; Suetonius, *Caesar*, 29, 1; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 26; Dio, xl, 60, 3. I confess that I cannot, any more than my fellows, explain Curio's intercalatory proposal (*Fam.*, viii, 6, 5; Dio, xl, 62, 1). It would certainly postpone the March discussion, but that seems hardly an adequate ground for senatorial opposition.

¹²³ *Att.*, vi, 2, 6.

¹²⁴ Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 27. Cf. Suetonius, *Caesar*, 29, 1; Plutarch, *Pompey*, 58, 3; Dio, xl, 62, 3.

be presumed that it was not vetoed; but as the senate had refused to admit Curio's corollary,¹²⁵ we may suppose that the original motion was itself withdrawn. But when was it proposed? Here Appian becomes most difficult. Curio, he tells us, now came out into the open against sending successors to Caesar until Pompey had disarmed, and from this he proceeds to an offer which Pompey made when he was ill later on in the year.¹²⁶ Pompey was ill in the summer; so far then all is well. Curio met this offer, too, with his inevitable plea that Pompey should resign. 'Now at last,' says Appian, 'Curio abandoned concealment and moved that both should go. In this way he concealed the fact that he had been bought by Caesar.' As the story stands, its chronology is impossible. If Curio was still trying to conceal his support of Caesar in the summer of 50, he was wasting his time. Moreover Appian's language is suspiciously familiar; it seems that we have heard this tale of Curio's coming out into the open before. We have indeed; just as we have heard that Curio concealed his support of Caesar—and all in connexion with that motion of C. Marcellus. Appian, in fact, confused—and who shall blame him?—with these repeated pleas, has duplicated the story of Curio's attitude to Marcellus' motion, and the second duplication is out of place. So indeed it must be, for in this duplication he says that before Curio dismissed the senate it had voted the transfer of legions for a Parthian war.¹²⁷ Not only does this in itself show that the chronology is astray (for this Parthian motion cannot be later than early April of 50),¹²⁸ but, if we are right in assuming the duplication, we can now bring the motion of C. Marcellus into close connexion with that upon the Parthians, and give it an approximate date.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Hirtius, *B. G.*, viii, 52, 5.

¹²⁶ Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 28.

¹²⁷ Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 29.

¹²⁸ Cicero (*Att.*, vi, 1, 14) did not expect Pompey to appear against the Parthians until July. It would need at least a month to fetch the legions (one of which was in Gaul) to Rome, and at least another two to have them ready to campaign in Syria. Furthermore, though the Parthian danger could still frighten Cicero on June 26th (*Att.*, vi, 5, 3), before the middle of July he knew that it was past, and suspected—as actually happened—that the troops would stay at home (*Fam.*, ii, 17, 5). The troops presumably heard this some time in May, which supports the view that they had been sent for in March or April.

¹²⁹ As Plutarch, *Caesar*, 29, 3 may perhaps imply.

And we must bring it into connexion with that suspension of the senate which Curio, we are told, in virtue of his tribunate had enforced. Juristically this must be interpreted as a veto upon all business or upon business of a certain type. In fact we learn from a famous letter of Caelius that a motion had been proposed about this time and had been vetoed. It was a proposal by Pompey and the senate that Caesar should resign on Nov. 13th. This Pompey thought fair (*aequum*), but his real object, said Caelius, was to prevent Caesar being designated consul before he resigned his command.¹³⁰ If Caelius reported the facts right, this November can only be the November of 50, for, if it were that of 49, Pompey would not attain his end by it; since Caesar would then if elected have already been consul designate for four months.^{130a} But if it is 50, it must have a significance which we must try to find. Unfortunately, we have no evidence at all to work upon; and can only make a guess in the hope that it will be plausible in itself and will give significance to the narrative.^{130b} The data for the problem are these: if my argument is admitted, Caesar might claim that he was secured until March 1st 49 by the concession of Pompey and the operation of the 'appointment period,' yet Pompey could think that it was 'just' that he should leave his provinces on Nov. 13th 50. When two parties assert their rights in such contradictory senses, the reason is always that they are putting different interpretations upon the instrument that guarantees them. This instrument, we have seen, was the *Lex Pompeia*. What could there be in it that could lead to such diversity of interpretation? I have tried to show that the *Lex Pompeia* contained the doctrine of an appointment-period which ended on March 1st. But had this appointment-period a definite opening date too? Certainly the preliminary motion by which certain provinces should be made consular and certain praetorian could be debated at any time; but whether there was a limited period for carrying through the allotment itself, the *leges* and the *senatus consulta*, is not revealed to us—and naturally, for the *Lex Pompeia* died before such a provision could operate.

¹³⁰ *Fam.*, viii, 11, 3.

^{130a} A point made by Marsh, p. 280.

^{130b} Frank's explanation of the date (*C.R.*, xxxiv, p. 69) is very beautiful and tempting (though it is in fact one day out), but neither he nor I, for obvious reasons, can use it for 50.

Nevertheless it does appear that prorogation of a governor, which might be vetoed if allotment was impossible, was confined to a certain period,¹⁸¹ and Cicero's letters seem to show that this period was the winter months. If prorogation, which only operates when allotment breaks down, has a limited period, it is logical to suppose that allotment had it too. If we were allowed to assume that Nov. 13th was the beginning of the appointment-period, the cause of this confusion would be clear as well as consistent with the way in which confusions occur. When Pompey held over the allotment of provinces until March of 50, Caesar could, if we are right, claim that he was secured in Gaul until March 49. If he could again postpone the allotment, he could stay until the day of his consulship; nor could any one allege that during the appointment period of 49 he had no right to be in Gaul. Pompey could at first only meet this by vague observations about disobedience to the senate; but by the spring he had thought of a new idea. This is only imaginative reconstruction, I agree, but I submit that it is imagination based on the postulates of the problem. Let us imagine Pompey saying: 'When I held over the provincial allotment, I did not mean that you should stay until the end of the appointment-period, but to the beginning of it.' If that were so, the ground would be cut from under Caesar's feet: with this interpretation of the deal, every day after Nov. 13th that he stayed in Gaul he would be staying against the will of the senate, defying the senate, no matter whether he had tribunes to veto the allotment or not. This was exactly the line that his enemies took.¹⁸² On the other hand, Nov. 13th did take Caesar, if our interpretation is right, past the *legis dies* and could therefore be reasonably called 'fair' by Pompey. Certainly this is pure imagination, but I hope that the flood of light that it throws on later events will ensure it the sympathy of my readers. They may ask, however, whether November 13th is a reasonable date for the commencement of this appointment period, and here there is this to be said. March 1st as a terminal date may have been taken over directly from the

¹⁸¹ *Att.*, v, 15, 3. Cf. *Fam.*, xv, 12, 2; *Att.*, v, 18, 3. It is instructive to note that Cicero began to canvass actively for support against prorogation in letters written towards the middle of September 51 (*Fam.*, xv, 7-10, 12).

¹⁸² *Att.*, vii, 9, 4; *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 2.

date of praetorian allotments; nevertheless it would be common sense to confine the appointment-period of governors to a time when it was difficult for many of them to reach their provinces at all—when, that is to say, the seas were closed. March 1st, which there were special reasons for choosing, is as a fact very close to the spring opening of the seas; the nearest month division to the day when navigation was supposed to stop is—Nov. 13th.¹³³ If my conjecture, then, has plausibility, we should expect the discussions upon the succession of Caesar to blaze up, as it were, three times in this year: after March 1st, on or about the *legis dies*, and after November 13th: this is precisely what we find. This and no more.

We have now forged new weapons and can again advance. It was perhaps to be expected that some of the senate felt as honest men that such procedure was not 'fair' at all. Curio had naturally put his veto upon it—Appian here comes into his own—and when, towards the middle of the year, the consul Marcellus proposed to censure him, he was ignominiously defeated.¹³⁴ This implies, as we can see from our argument, that the application of the *Lex Pompeia* as Caesar claimed to read it was allowed so that his tenure was secured till March 1st; and Caelius, if we let him speak and do not like ill-bred children complete his sentence, has said as much.¹³⁵ He has told us in fact that, if there was one date in this year when action against Caesar could not on any theory be taken, it was the *legis dies* itself. Then, on any showing Caesar was secure. The initiative must come, if at all, from Pompey. Nor does the faithful Appian desert us here.¹³⁶ We are now to deal with that chronological interpolation which is related to Pompey's illness. Fears for Pompey's health reached

¹³³ Vegetius, *De Re Militari*, iv, 39. In a Law the date would be specified on the assumption that the calendar was in order.

¹³⁴ *Fam.*, viii, 13, 2. I accept from Holmes (*R. R.*, ii, p. 310) the inference that Curio actually vetoed this proposal, though our hypothesis does not allow us, of course, to follow him further.

¹³⁵ *Fam.*, viii, 13, 2. *Transierant illuc rationem eius habendam qui <neque> exercitum neque provincias traderet.* Scholars (as Holmes, *R. R.*, ii, p. 269) who are obsessed with the *ratio absentis* forget to translate a plain sentence: a schoolboy meeting the passage without context in an unseen would teach them how 'Caesar's claim to keep army and provinces was allowed'—just that.

¹³⁶ Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 28.

Cicero's ear in May,¹³⁷ in June he was very ill¹³⁸ but we do not know how many months his convalescence lasted. The chronology, therefore, cannot be exactly fixed, but the fact is known that Pompey wrote to the senate offering to resign and desiring to create prejudice against Caesar who was not likely to be giving up his command even at the appointed date.¹³⁹ Pompey indeed intended merely to promise resignation and to use his promise as an excuse for having Caesar's command terminated there and then.¹⁴⁰ On our interpretation the narrative suits the political atmosphere of the *legis dies* to perfection. Even the senate had no case for recall before November 13th, and only by himself raising the question of resignation, by offering, in fact, himself to resign could Pompey hope to have Caesar superseded upon the terminal date itself.

Curio, however, saw bad faith in this proposal and rejected it for his patron. Moreover a proposal brought forward by those who, while seeing that Caesar could not then on any interpretation be recalled, yet thought—rightly or wrongly—that he could be deprived of some of his troops was, as it seems, equally abortive.¹⁴¹ Both sides could therefore strip for the next critical date, November 13th. Indeed Caesar's enemies had been active for months back. The defeat of that attempt to censure Caesar's tribune they had not forgotten. The senate had proved unreliable once and might be so again; it was necessary therefore to ensure the creation of a resolute censor who would help them by packing it. Appius Claudius was accordingly put forward and in spite of opposition and delay elected.¹⁴² He did his best for his

¹³⁷ *Att.*, vi, 3, 4.

¹³⁸ *Fam.*, viii, 13, 2.

¹³⁹ App., *B. C.*, ii, 28. Οὐκ ἀποδίδοντας τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νουνομισμένῳ χρόνῳ. As Hardy rightly claims against Hirschfeld, ἀποδίδοντας does not refer to past time. Presumably Pompey was referring to the *legis dies* and not Nov. 13th (of which his remarks would also be true), but one can hardly press Appian's language.

¹⁴⁰ ὡς Καίσαρι μὲν αὐτίκα δοθησομένων διαδέχων, words which are not discussed in every account of the *Rechtsfrage*.

¹⁴¹ Hirtius, *B. G.*, viii, 52, 3. Hirtius seems to imply that the proposal never even came to formal discussion. The date of it appears from Sandford's researches to be sometime in September or October, which fits strangely well with our theory of the *legis dies*.

¹⁴² *Fam.*, iii, 10, 11; 11, 5; 13, 2; Dio, xl, 63, 2.

party by numerous expulsions:¹⁴³ perhaps he did or tried to do more. Caelius records with cynical amusement the activities of the censor in prosecutions of sodomy.¹⁴⁴ He describes his own interest in the matter, and says no more. It was hardly necessary: we shall not forget the character of that man who, in days when his father was better known than he, had been called by Cicero 'old Curio's little girl.'¹⁴⁵

The stage was now set for November 13th, but before we take our seats it will be as well if I consult the convenience of my readers, who, I hope, still put trust in my analysis, and define for the last time the points at issue. By Pompey's concession Caesar could claim to be legally secure under the operation of the *Lex Pompeia* until March 1st 49. Furthermore, if there was no allotment made before the end of the appointment-period, he was then secure again until March 1st 48, just as he had been a year before. With the operation of the *Lex Pompeia* and the vetoes of tribunes his position was in the strict letter of the law perfectly sound. If, however, it was possible on any grounds to claim that his command was legally over before the appointment-period of 49 ran out, then the senate could claim what otherwise it could not—that Gaul could be considered as open to appointments running from March 1st 49. If Caesar resisted it would then be possible to say that he was remaining in his province against the will of the senate, and he could no longer command unchallenged assent in claiming that he could stay because of the provisions of the *Lex Pompeia*. So far, I must insist, the analysis is quite independent of my imaginative explanation of Nov. 13th. Caesar's enemies chose this date as one on which to insist and so to cut the ground from under his feet; my flight of imagination goes no further than to explain why they chose it.

The stage was set for Nov. 13th. Of the facts there is little doubt; the only question is whether the drama may not have opened somewhat later than this, the earliest possible day. Possibly it was as late as early December¹⁴⁶ when C. Marcellus in-

¹⁴³ Dio, xl, 63, 3-5.

¹⁴⁴ *Fam.*, viii, 12, 3; 14, 4.

¹⁴⁵ *Att.*, i, 14, 5; cf. Velleius, ii, 48, 3.

¹⁴⁶ If the doctrine of the *fascēs* was really still observed, one would certainly assign action taken by Marcellus, the junior consul, to December. The secondary authorities merely assert that the events took place towards the end of the year (Dio, xl, 66, 2) and before Curio's tribunate

introduced the resolution that Caesar should be superseded.¹⁴⁷ If Caesar really thought that the senate was still with him in his interpretation of the *Lex Pompeia*,¹⁴⁸ as it had been earlier in the year, he was to be undeceived. Marcellus put the question in such a form as invited the senate to assert the illegality of Caesar's position. He asked whether Caesar should be superseded, and secured an almost unanimous assent; he then demanded whether the senate wished Pompey to be deprived of his command, to which the reply, of course, was no. The emphasis which these resolutions laid upon the distinction between Caesar's and Pompey's position was, we may suspect, intended to forestall Curio's inevitable demand that both should go. In this it was indeed unsuccessful, for Curio carried the great majority of the senate with him.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless the victory was empty, for Pompey could not be forced to go before his time. The senate had thus declared for its own interpretation of the *Lex Pompeia*. Whether Curio now vetoed this declaration is uncertain;¹⁵⁰ it is possible that his veto of months ago still prevented the senate's views from having the force of law. Yet the senate had given its ruling, a ruling which, for all we know, it may have had good legal grounds for giving, and Caesar, whose *legis dies* had already run out, was now through his tribune defying it.¹⁵¹ C. Marcellus felt that this was a virtual declaration of war and on his own initiative commissioned Pompey to act.¹⁵² Unless, indeed, one side or the other was willing to give way, war was inevitable. Compromises were proposed in this month of December.¹⁵³ Caesar

had expired Dec. 9th (Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 31; Dio, xl, 66, 5). Sandford, who employs very complicated chronological arguments of uneven value, assigns the debate in the senate to some date between Nov. 14th-Nov. 25th. •

¹⁴⁷ I follow here Appian's account (*B. C.*, ii, 30); Plutarch, *Pompey*, 58, 3-5 names Curio as the author of all the motions: in *Caesar*, 30, 3 and *Antony*, 5, 4 he transfers them erroneously to 49.

¹⁴⁸ Hirtius, *B. G.*, viii, 52, 4.

¹⁴⁹ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 58, 5 (cf. *Caesar*, 30, 3; *Antony*, 5, 4; *Cato minor*, 51, 5 [see last note]); Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 30.

¹⁵⁰ The secondary authorities do not say so; but Cicero (*Att.*, vii, 9, 4), if his language may be pressed, implies as much (cf. note 107).

¹⁵¹ *Att.*, vii, 9, 4; *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 2.

¹⁵² Plutarch, *Pompey*, 59, 1; *Antony*, 5, 2; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 31; Dio, xl, 64, 4; Orosius, vi, 15, 1 (incorrect).

¹⁵³ *Att.*, ix, 11A, 2; Velleius, ii, 48, 5; 49, 4; Plutarch, *Pompey*, 59, 3-4;

was willing to keep only a skeleton army and one province if his interpretation was allowed: he may even have agreed to abandon that province after he had been designated consul,¹⁵⁴ thus relying merely on his immunity from prosecution inside the city. But on the crucial point his enemies were adamant: only on one condition would they allow Caesar's claims—if he abandoned the consulship.¹⁵⁵ If he wished still to stand, he must accept their interpretation.¹⁵⁶

Yet Curio's veto stood unchallenged and, though the senate had declared its opinion that Caesar had no right to be in Gaul, no successor had been sent.¹⁵⁷ Time was running out; if nothing were done before March 1st, the provisions of the *Lex Pompeia* would begin to operate and Caesar might claim that no successors could legally be sent. It was necessary to force the issue, and the extremists seized their chance on Jan. 1st when a letter was read in which Caesar declared categorically that he would resign if Pompey did and not otherwise.¹⁵⁸ To this Scipio replied that Caesar must leave 'ante certam diem.'¹⁵⁹ To the advocates of a 49 date, this presents no difficulty; it is the *legis dies*, March 1st 49. But if I have convinced my readers that the *legis dies* was already past, this cannot be accepted. Yet it is not surprising that those who agree with me in dating the *legis dies* to 50 are puzzled by this expression of Scipio; to them there was no date in the future that could be a *certa dies* at all. They are reduced to the unnatural view that *certa dies*, which Cicero had employed as a technical term,^{159a} means simply here 'a certain day.'^{159b} But we can lend them courage. For us March 1st 49, though not the *legis dies*, has a significance of its own: it

Caesar, 31, 1; *Antony*, 5, 4; Suetonius, *Caesar*, 29, 2; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 32. On the date see Holmes, *R. R.*, ii, pp. 331-3.

¹⁵⁴ So Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 32 who is perhaps supported by Plutarch, *Caesar*, 31, 1. Suetonius however (*Caesar*, 29, 2) says 'consul fieri.'

¹⁵⁵ *Att.*, vii, 8, 4; 9, 3.

¹⁵⁶ *Att.*, vii, 4, 3; 9, 2, 3.

¹⁵⁷ *Att.*, vii, 7, 5.

¹⁵⁸ *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 2; *Caesar*, *B. C.*, i, 1, 1; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 30, 2; *Antony*, 5, 3; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 32; Dio, xli, 1, 1-4.

¹⁵⁹ *Caesar*, *B. C.*, i, 2, 6-7; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 30, 2; Dio, xli, 3, 4 (incorrect).

^{159a} Cicero, *prov. cons.*, 15, 37.

^{159b} Cf. Merrill, *Class. Phil.*, vii, p. 24.

is the end of the 'Appointment Period' and, if Caesar was not succeeded by then, it might not be legal to succeed him at all. Caesarian tribunes challenged Scipio's motion,¹⁶⁰ but now the senate was roused. The *senatus consultum ultimum* was passed,¹⁶¹ successors were appointed for Caesar's province,¹⁶² the civil war had begun.

It is not the whole purpose of this lengthy paper to throw bouquets at Dio Cassius, yet we may do him kindness before we go. Dio stands boldly for the 50 date, but when he makes Antony say that Caesar was recalled *πρὸ τοῦ προσήκοτος καιροῦ*¹⁶³ advocates of the traditional date rejoice to see him turn his coat. We can save his reputation. It was true that the *legis dies* was in 50, but it was equally true that by interpreting Caesar's position under the *Lex Pompeia* in their own way they had recalled him before March 1st 49, before that day up to which he had been allowed by Pompey's own compact, as he might think, to stay. But there is more important work to be done. When Caesar laid his case before the world, he rested it on the denial of the *ratio absentis* and Cicero, when he returned to Italy, thought that this was one of the issues which was bound to come up for his decision.¹⁶⁴ Yet Cicero was wrong; when the final breach came, the issue of the 'ratio absentis' did not come up for discussion at all. Caesar's enemies had acted too skilfully; they had raised the point that Caesar had overstayed the *legis dies* and had defied a reasonable senatorial interpretation of the privilege under which he had done so. Whether it was, in fact, reasonable was one thing, but that Caesar had defied it there was no doubt at all. Caesar complained that, by recalling him in January, they had robbed him of those six months¹⁶⁵ which intervened before the

¹⁶⁰ Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 2, 7; Livy, *Ep.*, cix; Dio, xli, 3, 1.

¹⁶¹ *Fam.*, xvi, 11, 2; Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 5, 3; Livy, *Ep.*, cix; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 33.

¹⁶² Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 6, 5; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 32.

¹⁶³ Dio, xli, 43, 1.

¹⁶⁴ *Att.*, vii, 1, 4.

¹⁶⁵ *Semenstre imperium*: when a man who is superseded in January says that he has been deprived of six months, I assume that that six months runs to July, since I lack the ingenuity to assume that, superseded in January, Caesar calculated those six months from July. Caesar might have stayed according to our view until the end of 49 by juggling with the *Lex Pompeia*. But in his apologia he naturally said

consular elections, for which this *ratio* might be used, and when he might use his argument for claiming it. And well he might complain! Scipio had succeeded in putting him technically in the wrong without raising the issue of the *ratio absentis* at all.

And now the hunt is done; and the *legis dies* penned between July 31st and early October of 50, penned but still uncaught. It would be pleasant if my readers felt it to be a happy result of my theory that it can explain why the hunt is so difficult, why the hare is uncaught. Advocates of a 50 date have never quite fairly faced the fact that, though Caesar's command ran out in that year, there is no echo in Cicero's correspondence of that trumpet call which ought to have resounded when the *legis dies* came and Caesar stayed. But to us this is no difficulty. When Pompey exempted Caesar from the provincial allotment of 50, he automatically prolonged his tenure past the *legis dies*. It came about, then, that of all the key dates of 50—March 1st, *legis dies*, Nov. 18th—this *legis dies* was the least significant. It was possible on that day for Pompey to offer an equitable settlement, it may have been thought possible to deprive Caesar of a part of his army. But to supersede him legally on that day was one thing that, even on their own interpretation of the *Lex Pompeia*, the senate could not do.

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nothing of this and concentrated simply on his right to overstay the July elections. That in fact he would have overstayed them until the end of the year is probable enough, but, fortunately for Caesar, there was no need, as matters stood, to refer to that.

POSSIBLE ELLIPTICAL COMPOUNDS IN OLD ENGLISH GLOSSES.

It is a known fact that the ways of glossators were peculiar. They sometimes wrote merely the inflectional ending of a gloss; they sometimes omitted a letter or two from the gloss because these same letters stood adjacent in the lemma; they sometimes wrote glosses in ink, sometimes scratched them in with a sharp point, and sometimes indented them in the page with a blunter point. Occasionally they completely misunderstood the lemma. At times they glossed long Latin words part by part in a manner which looks much like conscious etymologizing; at times they copied glosses which they did not understand from a script with which they were unfamiliar and they may often have felt as the scribe of a Leyden glossary wrote, "sicut inveni scripsi: ne reputes scriptori." They have, however, left us many a gem of early vocabulary, and in general have provided a good deal of hard work and much real pleasure for those who would interpret their glossing.

To add to their peculiarities, they seem to have had at least one other—that of writing two glosses to one lemma, one gloss an actual compound, the other gloss an implied compound, with the tacit assumption that a part of the actual compound would be understood with the other gloss. This seems to be a manifestation of a tendency on the part of glossators to economize and is comparable to such modern expressions as 'two- or three-semester course,' 'right- or left-handed,' 'haupt- und neben-satz.' But in Old English glosses, elliptical compounds were apparently not limited to such obvious locutions as these.

As one uses an Old English dictionary, he occasionally comes upon words documented from these possible compounds. In order to observe a group of such glosses I have listed below some fifty examples and have mentioned in the footnotes their dictionary¹ treatment whenever this occurs. For a kind of classi-

¹ This refers only to the Bosworth Toller *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* and *Supplement* and Hall's *Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*, 3d edition, which are referred to henceforth as *BTD.*, *BTS.*, and *HD.* respectively.

fication I have divided them into three groups, but these are not intended to be very rigid.

1. The uncompound gloss is fairly obviously incomplete, either in its meaning or in its ending.

a) The possible compound is elsewhere documented.²

WW. ³ 194, 30: Bilustris	twiferum uel hiwum (for twihiwum?) ⁴
WW. 199, 33: Cardiacus dicitur qui patitur laborem cordis uel morbus cordis	heortecpa uel ece modseocnes uel unmiht (for heortece?) ⁵
WW. 204, 8: Cephalia .i. dolor capitis uel cephalargia	heafodwære uel ece (for heafodece?) ⁶
WW. 234, 18: Fasces .i. honores, dig- nitates, plagas, tri- umphos	cynedomas uel aldor uel gegerla uel godweb (for aldordomas?) ⁷
WW. 239, 22: Flaminea .i. episcopi gradus	bisceophadas uel sacerð (for sacerðhadas?) ⁸
WW. 414, 34: Gorgoneo	aterlicum oððe biter (for biterlicum?) ⁹

² In referring to a word as elsewhere documented or undocumented I have used only the information obtainable in the dictionaries mentioned above.

³ With the exception of this abbreviation for *Anglo-Saxon and Old English Vocabularies* by Thomas Wright, edited and collated by Richard Wülker, the abbreviations for gloss sources are those used in *BTD.* and *BTS.*

⁴ *BTD.* cites this gloss, with the completed part in parentheses, as an additional documentation for *twihiwe*.

⁵ *BTS.* cites this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, as an additional documentation of *heortece*. For *modunmiht*? cf. footnote 29.

⁶ *BTS.* cites this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, as an additional documentation of *heafodece*.

⁷ Cf. *Fascēs: ealdordomas*, WW. 155, 19 and similarly 188, 16; 402, 8. *BTS.* cites this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, as an additional documentation of *ealdordom*.

⁸ Cf. *flaminium .i. sacerdotium: biscophad, sacerðad*, An. Ox. 5056. *BTD.* cites this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, as an additional documentation of *sacerðad*.

⁹ Citing this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, and comparing Icel. *bitrigr*, *BTS.* documents questioningly a *biterlic*. The word has since been documented from another source (cf. Supplement to *HD*).

Hpt. Gl. 405, 10: in gymnasio	on leorningeg ð larhuse (for leorningeghuse?) ¹⁰
Hpt. Gl. 405, 49: sollarter	mænifealdlice ð georn (for geornlice?) ¹¹
Hpt. Gl. 411, 4: pedibus poeticis	mid meterlicum fotum ð scop (for scoplicum?) ¹²
Hpt. Gl. 427, 71: epitaphion, carmen super tumulum ð mortuorum	byriensang licleoð sang 7 bergelsleoð ð sang (forlicsang? bergelssang?) ¹³
Hpt. Gl. 462, 9: atomo	preowthwile beorht (for beorhthwile?) ¹⁴
Hpt. Gl. 501, 29: confossa, transfixa	þurhdol þed (for þurhþed?) ¹⁵
Hpt. Gl. 525, 49: oppidanis	stocweardum burh (for burhweardum?) ¹⁶
An. Ox. 1, 86: congruant .i. conueniant	gehwærlæcan ð riht (for rihtlæcan?) ¹⁷
An. Ox. 1, 2736: nugaciter .i. uuliter	aworpenlice wac (for waclice?) ¹⁸

¹⁰ Cf. in *gimnasio*: on *leorninghuse*, WW. 485, 25. In his edition Bouterwek supplies *huse* in brackets, a practice which he follows in other similar instances. In citing such glosses, to avoid confusion I have omitted the part in brackets since it owes its actual existence to Bouterwek and not to the manuscript, a fact stated by Bouterwek in his edition, *ZfdA.* ix, 402.

¹¹ Bouterwek supplies *e* or *lice*.

¹² Bouterwek supplies *licum*. BTD. cites this gloss as *scoplicum* as the documentation for *scoplic*. Cf. *pedibus poeticis .i. metriis: mid scoplicum ð meterlicum fotum*, An. Ox. 1, 199.

¹³ Bouterwek completes *licsang*, *byrgelssang*. In An. Ox., note to 1, 902, Napier cites this gloss and remarks, "The orig. gloss. meant that either *leoð* or *sang* could be added to *lio* or *bergels* respectively. . . ." BTS. cites, with the completed part in brackets, and HD. refers to this gloss as the documentation for *byrgelssang* in the meaning 'epitaph.'

¹⁴ Cf. *atomo: beorht*, An. Ox. 1, 2370, where the gloss to the preceding lemma is *preowthwile*. Napier would read *beorhthwile*.

¹⁵ Bouterwek would read *þurhþyd*. As an additional documentation of *þurhþeowan* BTD. cites this gloss as *þurhþed*.

¹⁶ Bouterwek supplies *warum*. From its documented meanings, *burhweardum* does not seem to suit the lemma.

¹⁷ Napier would supply *læcan* from the preceding gloss. A similar gloss occurs in Hpt. Gl. 407, 49 where Bouterwek supplies *læcan*. BTS. cites An. Ox. 1, 86 questioningly as an added documentation of *rihtlæcan*, preferring to complete the gloss as *riht-geþwærlæcan* for semantic reasons.

¹⁸ Napier would read *waclice*. A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 470, 38 where Bouterwek supplies *lice*.

An. Ox. 1,3008: machinamentis i.	orþancum seare
cogitationibus	(for seareþancum?) ¹⁹
An. Ox. 1,3016: argumentis	mid searecræftum þancan
	(for seareþancan?) ²⁰
An. Ox. 1,3133: præstaret i.	oferþuge stige
excelleret	(for oferstige?) ²¹
An. Ox. 1,5046: lenocinii	hæmedrimes scipes
	(for hæmedscipes?) ²²
An. Ox. 1,5290: petulantia	of galscipe wræn
	(for wrænscipe?) ²³
An. Ox. 60,1: Istoriographus	starwritere uð gewyrd
	(for gewyrdwritere?) ²⁴
Mt. 1,1: prólogus	forerim i tal i saga
	(for foresaga) ²⁵

b) The possible compound is elsewhere undocumented.

WW. 129,32: Matutinum officium	uhtgebed uel þenung
	(for uhtþenung?) ²⁶
WW. 129,34: Uespertinum officium	æfengebed uel þeowdom
	(for æfenþeowdom?) ²⁷

¹⁹ Napier, on the analogy of other glosses, would read *searecræftum*. A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 477, 9 where Bouterwek supplies *cræftum*.

²⁰ In the index Napier lists *searubano* at this passage. A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 477, 23 where Bouterwek would read *searopanum*.

²¹ Napier would read *oferstige*. A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 480, 1 where Bouterwek supplies *ofer*.

²² Napier would read *hæmedscipes*. A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 521, 40 where Bouterwek supplies *hæmed* and which BTS. cites, with the completed part in brackets, as the documentation for a particular meaning of *hæmedscipe*.

²³ Napier would read *wrænscipe*. Cf. *petulantia*: *orgalscype wrænscipe*; Hpt. Gl. 525, 74. HD. lists unquestioningly *wrænscipe* with a reference to OEG. 5290 (the present gloss).

²⁴ A *wyrdwritere*, though not *gewyrdwritere*, is elsewhere documented. Napier would read *gewyrdwritere*. Citing this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, and comparing *wyrdwritere*, BTS. documents *gewyrdwritere*.

²⁵ On *foretal*? cf. footnote 33. BTS. cites this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, as one of several documentations of *foresaga* (?).

²⁶ BTD. lists *uhtþegnung* with a reference to *uhtgebed* where the present gloss is cited with no suggestion about an *uhtþenung*. HD. lists unquestioningly *uhtþegnung* with a reference to the present gloss.

²⁷ BTD. lists *æfenþeowdom* with a reference to Aelfo. Gl. 34, Som. 62, 50, which I believe are the present gloss. BTS. adds unquestioningly for *æfenþeowdom* the reference Wrt. Voc. i, 28, 30 (the present gloss). HD. documents unquestioningly *æfenþeowdom* with a reference to WW. 129, 34.

WW. 194, 13: Bibliotheca i. librorum repositio	bochoꝛd uel fodder (for bocfodder?) ²⁸
WW. 199, 33: Cardiacus dicitur qui patitur laborem cordis uel morbus cordis	heortcōpa uel ece modseocnes uel unmiht (for modunmiht?) ²⁹
Hpt. Gl. 409, 5: multiformem	pæne mænifealdan i hiwan (for mænihiwan?) ³⁰
Hpt. Gl. 454, 20: itinerarium	siðboc foreboc fereld (for fereldboc?) ³¹
An. Ox. 1, 60: incorruptam i. in- marcescibilem	unforwurdenlice molsnienlice (for unmolsnienlice?) ³²
Mt. 1, 1: prologus	forerim i tal i saga (for foretal?) ³³

2. The incompleteness of the uncompounded gloss is less obvious.

a) The possible compound is elsewhere documented.

WW. 204, 34: Circumspectio, circuitus	embeþonc uel sceawung (for embesceawung?) ³⁴
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²⁸ BTS. lists *bocfodder* with a reference to *bochoꝛd*, where the present gloss is cited with no suggestion about a *bocfodder*. HD. unquestioningly documents *bocfodder* with a reference to the present gloss.

²⁹ BTD. lists *modunmeht* with a reference to *modseocness*, where the present gloss is cited with the completed part in brackets. Not in HD. On *heortcōe*? cf. footnote 5.

³⁰ Bouterwek supplies *mæni*. Citing this gloss with the completed part in brackets, BTS. documents questioningly a *manighiwe*. Some substantiation for this word is given by the gloss *multifario: monigheoulice* in my article in *AJP.*, LIV (1933), p. 321. Not in HD.

³¹ Bouterwek supplies *boc*. Citing this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, BTS. documents *færelðboc*. Not in HD.

³² Napier notes that the *un* prefixed to *forw-* is intended to do duty also with *molsnienlice*. A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 407, 37 where Bouterwek supplies *un*. BTD. lists *unmolsniendlic* with a reference to *unformolsniendlic* where Hpt. Gl. 407, 37 is cited with a query whether one should read *unmol-* or *unformol-*. HD. documents unquestioningly *unmolsniendlic* with a reference to OEG. 60 (the gloss cited above).

³³ On *foresaga*? cf. footnote 25. Under *foresaga*? BTS. cites this gloss with *fore* in brackets for both *tal* and *saga*; BTS. lists *foretal* with a reference to *tal* under which in BTD. one is asked to compare *forerim i (fore-)tal*. *Foretal* is not listed in BTD. or HD.

³⁴ Cited by BTD. as one of many documentations of *sceawung*; also, with the completed part in parentheses, cited by BTD. as one of two documentations of *ymbesceawung*.

WW. 209, 12: Constipata .i. consita, repleta, circumdata	embþrunge uel hringed (for embþringed?) ³⁵
WW. 210, 36: Collarium	sweorclap uel tag uel sal (for sweortag?) ³⁶
WW. 236, 6: Fantasia .i. imaginatio, admiratio, delusio men- tis, reuelatio, multi- tudo, fantasma	scinlac uel hiw (for scinhiw?) ³⁷
An. Ox. 1, 3031: litterature	stæfcræftes cyste (for stæfcyste?) ³⁸
An. Ox. 1, 3720: archimandrita .i. princeps ouium	hehfæder lareow (for hehlareow?) ³⁹

b) The possible compound is elsewhere undocumented.

WW. 121, 22: Bibiones uel mustiones	muscfeotan uel wurmas mite (for muscwurmas?) ⁴⁰
WW. 213, 8: Condolomata articula	leopusar uel gepind (for leopugepind?) ⁴¹

³⁵ Cited by BTD., with the completed part in parentheses, as an additional documentation of *ymbþhringan*.

³⁶ Cited by BTD., with the completed part in brackets, as an additional documentation of *sweorteah*. Cf. *millus uel collarium: sweorteh*, WW. 120, 19. On *sweorsal*? cf. footnote 52.

³⁷ BTS. cites this gloss and from it documents for *hiw* the meaning 'an imaginary form,' 'a fancy.' HD. refers to this gloss for the meaning 'apparition' for *hiw*. BTD. cites the gloss, with the completed part in brackets, as an additional documentation of *scinhiw*. Cf. *fantasma: scinhiw*, WW. 400, 20.

³⁸ Napier accepts the gloss as it stands. Another source for *cyst* meaning 'litteratura' is Hpt. Gl. 477, 49: *litteraturae: cyste stæforæftas*; this gloss and the one cited above come from the same original and may have stood originally as in the latter. BTS., with a reference to Hpt. Gl. 477, 49, questioningly cites An. Ox. 3031 under *cygt* and, with the completed part in brackets with a question mark, adds it as a documentation of *stæfoyst*.

³⁹ A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 493, 66. Cf. *archimandrita .i. exoelsus magister: hehhyrde, heahleornere*, An. Ox. 910; *archimandrita: heahlareow*, WW. 342, 33.

⁴⁰ Citing this gloss with the completed part in brackets, BTS. documents questioningly *mustwurm*. Not in HD.

⁴¹ BTD. lists *leopugeþynd* with a reference to *leopusar* where the present gloss is cited with no suggestion about a *leopugeþynd*. BTS. under *geþind* cites the gloss thus *leopusar uel gepind* (=leopugeþind?) but does not list *leopugeþind*. Not in HD.

WW. 228, 38: Equester, qui equitat	rædewiga uel -cempa (for rædecempa?) ⁴²
WW. 358, 17: Bolidis	sundgyrd in scipe oððe rap .i. metrap (for sundrap?) ⁴³
WW. 455, 19: Nectar	hunig oððe mildeaw (for hunigdeaw?) ⁴⁴
An. Ox. 1, 1812: glareas	stancýalas croppas (for stancroppas?) ⁴⁵
An. Ox. 1, 2631: constellationem	steorwigele mearcunge reo- nunge (for steormearcunge?) ⁴⁶
An. Ox. 1, 3161: olosericis	of ealseolcenum sidenum (for ealsidenum?) ⁴⁷

3. The gloss may well be taken as it stands, since the unpounded word occurs elsewhere with the required meaning.

a) The possible compound is elsewhere documented.

An. Ox. 1, 1811: scopulorum .i. sax- orum	stanrocca torra (for stantorra?) ⁴⁸
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⁴² Citing this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, BTD. documents *rædecempa*. HD. unquestioningly lists *rædecempa* with a reference to this gloss.

⁴³ Citing this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, BTD. documents *sundrap*. HD. unquestioningly lists *sundrap* with a reference to this gloss.

⁴⁴ Under *meledeaw* BTD. cites this gloss, with the completed part in brackets, but does not list *hunigdeaw*.

⁴⁵ A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 449, 16. Citing *croppas* from An. Ox. 1812 without mention of the preceding *stancýalas*, BTS. documents from this gloss *crop* with the meaning 'a (round) pebble.' A *stancrop* is documented, but only as a plant name.

⁴⁶ Cf. *constellationem: stiorwigele i mearcunge reonunge*, Hpt. Gl. 468, 1. Under *mearcung* BTS. cites the present gloss as a documentation of *mearcung* in the meaning 'a description,' comparing the Corpus gloss *constellatio: notatio siderum*. The need for narrowing the meaning of *mearcunge* if it is wholly to suit the lemma seems to merit the mention of a possible *steormearcung*.

⁴⁷ BTS. cites this gloss as an additional documentation of *siden*. The dictionaries do not suggest an *ealsiden*. The lemma points to this interpretation. Cf. *elosericis: ealgodwebbum*, WW. 395, 15. But that the *eal* may be unnecessary appears from the gloss *olosericis: godwebbum*, of *ealseolcenum i sydenum*, Hpt. Gl. 480, 62.

⁴⁸ A similar gloss in Hpt. Gl. 449, 16. A *stantorr* 'crag' is documented from Gr. D. 12. Cf. *scopulum: torr*, WW. 147, 38.

Hpt. Gl. 519, 46: Marsum	wyrincgalere i galdre (for wyrincgaldre?) ⁴⁹
WW. 159, 39: Rxtales	snædel uel bæþearm (for snædelþearm?) ⁵⁰
WW. 194, 28: Bilance	twiwæge uel heolore (for twiheolore?) ⁵¹

b) The possible compound is elsewhere undocumented.

WW. 210, 36: Collarium	sweorclap uel teg uel sal (for sweorsal?) ⁵²
WW. 312, 4: Clausus	steorsceofol oðþe nægl (for steornægl?) ⁵³

It is unlikely that everyone will agree with this division of examples. Various instances offer varying degrees of uncertainty and this, as pointed out in the footnotes, is reflected in the dictionary handling of such words. For instance, in *BTD.* under *meledeaw* a gloss is cited as *hunig[deaw] oðþe mildeaw*, but a *hunigdeaw* is not listed; in *BTS.* is listed *bocfodder* with a reference to *bochord* where is cited the gloss *bochord uel fodder*; from a gloss *scinlac uel hiw* both *BTS.* and *HD.* assign an additional meaning to *hiw* but *BTD.*, not assuming another meaning, cites the gloss under *scinhiw* as *scinlac uel [scin]hiw*. When a new Old English dictionary is published—and the accumulation of Old English scholarship is making this desirable—the handling of possible elliptical compounds will be one, though

⁴⁹ Bouterwek supplies *wyrino*. This *wyrino* seems to be a mistake for *wyrm*; *wyrmgaldere* is well documented. Cf. *marci: galdras*, An. Ox. 8, 245.

⁵⁰ As an added documentation for *snædel* *BTD.* cites this gloss thus: *snædel(-?) uel bæoþearm*, remarking that *snædelþearm* is more general than *snædel*. *HD.* lists *snædel* = *snædelþearm*. Cf. *catale: Snædel*, WW. 272, 13.

⁵¹ *BTD.* cites this gloss, with the completed part in parentheses, as an additional documentation of *twiheolor*. Cf. *bilance: twiheolore*, WW. 9, 14; *bilance: heolore*, An. Ox. 2, 354.

⁵² *BTD.* lists *sweorsal* with a reference to *sal* where the present gloss is cited, with the completed part in brackets, with a question mark. Cf. *collarium: sal*, An. Ox. 53, 5. On *sweorteg* cf. footnote 36.

⁵³ *BTD.* documents with a question mark *steornægl*, citing this gloss thus: *steorsceofol oðþe [steor-?]nægl* and comparing OHG. *stiuernagal: clausus*. *HD.* documents questioningly *steornægl* with a reference to the present gloss. Cf. *Clausus: nægl*, WW. 326, 35 and 378, 37.

small, problem to be considered. About such glosses there will always be some uncertainty, and probably the individual interpreter will always be able to find some analogy to justify his interpretation. Some general method of procedure might, however, be widely accepted. Since, no matter how very likely one of these compounds may be, it is never certain, any documentation of such a possible compound might well be designated as uncertain and the complete gloss cited. On the other hand since, no matter how unlikely a compound may seem, it is a possible interpretation in such glosses, a documentation made from the uncompound word and any new meaning assumed from it might also well be designated as uncertain and the complete gloss cited.

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ZU EINIGEN WIEDERHOLUNGEN BEI LUKREZ.

Die versus iterati im Gedicht des Lukrez wurden vor kurzem in einer Leipziger Dissertation von Christoph Lenz (*Die wiederholten Verse bei Lukrez*, 1937) eingehend behandelt und ein Vergleich mit meiner Zusammenstellung zeigt mir, daß Lenz das Material erschöpfend behandelt hat.¹

Die Disposition, an die sich Lenz hielt (15 f.) und der Umstand, daß er Quellenfragen im allgemeinen (62 f.) nicht in den Kreis seiner Betrachtungen zog, bringen es mit sich, daß er die Wiederholungen nicht inhaltlich ordnete. Deshalb möchte ich hier ganz kurz auf eine Reihe von Wiederholungen hinweisen, in denen Lukrez Gedanken von Epikur wiedergibt, die oft Wort für Wort mit Stellen in den erhaltenen Schriften Epikurs übereinstimmen.

1.

Zu der Wiederholung I, 146 ff. = II, 55 ff.; III, 87 ff.; VI, 35 ff. (Lenz, 40 ff.) sei auf Epikur r. s. XII (*ratae sententiae*) und *Hb.* § 78 f. (*Herodotbrief*) hingewiesen (auch die Wiederholung der Anfangsverse dieser Iteration bei Seneca, *ep.* 110, 6 ist für die Bedeutung dieser Verse kennzeichnend).

2.

Nicht aufgenommen wurde von Lenz die Wiederholung: I, 150 = 156 f., 205, 237, 248, 262, 265 f., 543 f., die dadurch an Interesse gewinnt, daß diese eindrucksvolle Formulierung des ersten Hauptsatzes der epikurischen Physik eine wörtliche Übertragung aus dem griechischen Original ist (*Hb.* § 38). Es entsprechen: nulla res — οὐδέν, gigni, creari, fieri = γίγνεται, e nihilo, de nihilo = ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, reverti, redit, pereunt, revocari — ἐφθέλpero, ad nihilum = εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Erwähnt sei auch der Hinweis auf fr. B 12 des Empedokles (Diels), das bei Philo mit den Worten Epikurs eingekleidet wird.

¹ Außer einer, gleich zu erwähnenden Iteration, die Lenz nicht berücksichtigt hat, fiel mir unter anderem das Fehlen folgender Stellen auf: II, 998 = V, 795, 821 (s. Kranz, *Herm.* LXIV, 499); IV, 189 = V, 283; V, 67 f. = 416 f. und 76 = 774 (Zeichen strenger Komposition des V Buches; s. u. S. 222); V, 866 = VI, 1245 (im VI Buch ein dazugeschriebener Vers, der das Elend der Pestkranken charakterisieren soll).

3.

Ebenso liegt in der Wiederholung I, 510 = 538, 548, 574, 609, 612; II, 157, die als Inhalt eine "feste Formulierung einer grundlegenden Aussage über die primordia" (Lenz, S. 31) enthält, eine genaue Übertragung eines epikurischen Satzes (*Hb.* § 41) vor. Es entsprechen: *corpora prima* = *σώματα*, *solida* = *πλήρη*, *simplex* = *ἄτομος*.

4.

Zu Vers III, 519 f. (= I, 670/4, 757, 790/3, 797; II, 753/6, 864) hat schon Heinze im Kommentar bemerkt, daß hier "ein Hauptsatz der epikurischen Physik" vorliegt, doch glaubte er, die originale Sentenz sei nicht erhalten (Lenz, 46; Anm. 85). Bei genauerem Zusehen findet man aber folgende Entsprechungen:

I, 672: *proinde aliquid superare necesse est incolume ollis*
= *Hb.* § 54: ἐπειδὴ περ δεῖ ὑπομένειν (ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων) στερεὸν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον.

I, 673: *ne tibi res redeant ad nihilum funditus omnes* = *Hb.* § 41: μὴ μέλλει πάντα ἐς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθαρῆσθαι.

I, 673: *ne tibi res redeant ad nihilum . . . de nihilo renata . . .*
= *Hb.* § 54: ὁ τὰς μεταβολὰς οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ποιήσεται οὐθ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. . . .

5.

Kurz sei auf die Wiederholung von II, 336 ff. in II, 692 ff., 723 f. hingewiesen, die Lenz nur in der Statistik (9) anführt, die aber auch einen epikurischen Gedanken enthält (*Hb.* § 42). Es entsprechen:

II, 722: *dissimili figura* = *διαφοραῖς σχημάτων*.

II, 724: *omnia omnibus non paria constant* = *καθ' ἐκάστην σχημάτων ἀπλῶς ἄπειροί εἰσιν αἱ ἄτομοι*.

6.

Ein schönes Beispiel, das diese ganze Gruppe von Wiederholungen charakterisiert, ist II, 1128 = IV, 860. Lenz (33) weist ausdrücklich darauf hin, daß die Formulierung: *fluere atque recedere* sonst nur noch IV, 695 vorkommt. Der von

Lukrez ausgesprochene Gedanke findet sich nun auch bei Epikur (*Hb.* § 48) und es entsprechen: fluere = *ρεῖσις*, recedere = *ἀντανάπληρωσις*. Auf die Analyse des Geruchsinnes geht Epikur nicht ausführlich genug ein (§ 53), um, wie Lukrez IV, 695, dieselben Worte wie anlässlich des Gesichtsinnes zu gebrauchen.

7.

An das Ende dieser Reihe, die noch vervollständigt werden könnte, möchte ich eine Wiederholung stellen, deren Inhalt besonderes Interesse verdient: I, 817 ff. = 907 ff.; II, 688 ff., 1007 ff. Ehe ich auf das entsprechende griechische Vorbild für diese Wiederholung eingehe, möchte ich doch der Meinung Ausdruck geben, daß Lenz dem Dichter Unrecht tut, wenn er (48) meint, Lukrez hätte, aus "Vorliebe für den Buchstabenvergleich," diesen "auch da angewendet, wo er nicht paßte und Unstimmigkeiten herbeiführte." Meiner Meinung nach spricht Lukrez an den vier Stellen folgende, von einander abweichende, Gedanken aus:

- I. So wie dieselben Atome verschiedene Dinge, so bilden dieselben Buchstaben verschiedene Worte.
- II. So wie es bei den Dingen auf die Anordnung der Atome ankommt, so bei den Worten auf die der Buchstaben.
- III. So wie die Atome, so sind auch die Buchstaben untereinander verschieden.
- IV. Die Eigenschaften der Dinge werden durch die Atome selbst ebenso wenig beeinflusst, wie Form, Klang und Sinn der Worte durch die einzelnen Buchstaben.

Wenn Lenz (47), allerdings unter Hinweis auf Diels, meint, der Buchstabenvergleich sei "für Epikur nicht zu belegen," so kann ich ihm nicht so ohne weiteres zustimmen. Epikur spricht (*Hb.* § 48) davon daß die *ἑδωλα* bei der Loslösung von den Körpern *θεῖναι καὶ τάξιν* bewahren und die gleichen Worte finden sich im Zusammenhang mit dem Buchstabengleichnis in dem Bericht über Demokrits Lehre bei Aristoteles (*Metaph.* 985b, 13 ff.). Ein ähnliches Verhältnis, wie zwischen den Worten bei Epikur und Aristoteles (oder stammen die Ausdrücke *θεῖσις καὶ τάξις* von Demokrit selbst?) besteht zwischen zwei Stellen bei Lukrez und Laktanz (*Div. inst.* III, 17, 24), der berichtet,

Leukipp, Demokrit und Epikur hätten die Verschiedenheit der Dinge *vario ordine ac positione* erklärt und dann zur Erläuterung auch den Buchstabenvergleich anführt. Wir können demnach folgende Entsprechungen feststellen:

Aristoteles (Demokrit)	σχῆμα	=	θέσις	=	τάξις
Epikur	σχῆμα	=	θέσις	=	τάξις
Lukrez	figura	=	positura	=	ordo (cum quibus)
Laktanz	—	=	positio	=	ordo

Daß das Buchstabengleichnis im *Hb.* nicht vorkommt, darf niemanden wundern, da sich der *Hb.* nicht an ein weiteres Publikum wendet und daher solche anschauliche Darstellungen im Interesse der Kürze vermeidet.

Lenz weist (47) mit Recht auf das gelungene Wortspiel: *ignes-lignum* (I, 912) hin, nur meine ich, daß diese Anwendung des Buchstabenvergleichs, an die Lukrez I, 871 noch nicht dachte, bereits im Vers I, 901 entstanden ist. Diese Stelle (I, 897 ff.) ist überhaupt sehr interessant. Wir haben hier nämlich das unmittelbare Vorbild für jene Darstellung vom *Entstehen des Feuers* (V, 1096 ff.), die Jelenko (*WS.* LIV, 59 ff.) als spätere Lage der Kulturgeschichte zu erweisen versucht hat. Es ist nun sicher kein Zufall, daß dieselbe Geschichte vom Feuer, das sich durch im Wind aneinandergeriebene Äste entzündet, auch bei Thukydides (II, 77, 4) zu lesen ist und daß die beiden Stellen fast Wort für Wort übereinstimmen: in montibus = ἐν ὄρεσι terantur = τριβεῖσα, donec flammai fulserunt flore coorto = πῦρ καὶ φλόγα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀνῆκεν.

Die Darstellung wird bei Lukrez mit "inquis" eingeleitet (ähnlich: II, 931 ff.; III, 350 ff., 533 ff., 698 ff., 894 ff.; IV, 409; V, 338 ff., 1041 ff., 1091 ff. u. a.) und könnte daher als Stellungnahme zu einem von Anaxagoras angeführten Beispiel aufgefaßt werden. Der Hinweis auf Anaxagoras fr. A 89 und A 98 (Diels) genügt, um zu zeigen, daß solche Beispiele Anaxagoras zuzutrauen sind. Daß die Geschichte vom Entstehen des Feuers bei Thukydides vorkommt, darf als Argument für die Zurückführung dieser Stelle auf Anaxagoras angeführt werden; die Thuk.-Stelle gehört zu den wenigen Sätzen dieses Autors, die gleichsam zwischen Gedankenstrichen geschrieben sind, und eine kurze Durchsicht zeigte, daß sich noch zwei weitere Hinweise auf Anaxagoras in dem Werk des Thuk. finden. II, 28 und VII,

50, 4 sind mit Anaxagoras fr. A 42 und A 77 (Diels) zu vergleichen. Wenn Anaxagoras (fr. A 75) als erster das Verhältnis zwischen Erde, Sonne, Mond erkannt hat und wir bei Thuk. die Kenntnis dieser Erkenntnis voraussetzen müssen, so sind wir berechtigt, die Thuk.-Stellen auf Anaxagoras zurückzuführen.

Durch diese Zuweisung fällt einiges Licht auf jene, von Jelenko festgestellte, zweite Lage der Kulturgeschichte des Lukrez.

Auch hier kann uns die Wiederholung einer größeren Anzahl von Versen weiterführen: III, 784 ff. = V, 128 ff. Nach den Ausführungen von Lenz (54-60) kann die Priorität der Verse im V Buch als erwiesen gelten. Da sich Lenz aber mit der Frage nach der Ursache der Wiederholung nicht weiter beschäftigt, so kann darüber einiges gesagt werden. Wenn Lukrez das III Buch nicht später eingeschoben hätte, so wäre die Frage nach der $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ im V Buch behandelt worden. Schon I, 112 ff. und 130 ff. wird die Problemstellung angedeutet (Stellen, die sicher vor Abfassung des III Buches geschrieben sind; s. Lenz, 25 ff.), dann folgt, entsprechend der Disposition des *Hb.* (wohl auch der Schrift *περὶ φύσεως*), nach der Darstellung der *εἰδωλα*-Lehre, also im V Buch, die Behandlung des Seelenproblems. Jelenko wies schon (*WS.* LIV, 67 f.) auf das Verhältnis zwischen Ankündigung des Themas im Prooemium und seiner Ausführung hin (es sei hier auf die von Lenz nicht aufgenommene Wiederholung V, 67 f. = 416 f.; 76 = 774 hingewiesen) und wir finden nun auch im Prooemium des V Buches Vers 59 ff. die Ankündigung der Behandlung des Seelenproblems, dessen Durchführung wir dann vermissen. Ein Rest der Darstellung ist uns in V, 128 ff. erhalten, wo zwei Gedanken ausgesprochen werden:

- I. Die Seele ist an den Körper gebunden und mit ihm sterblich.
- II. Die körperlichen Gestirne, deren Materie ähnlich der von Erde, Feuer, Wasser oder Luft (142 ff.) ist, sind leblos und können nicht göttlich sein. Da der zweite Gedanke in der Darstellung des V Buches nicht fehlen durfte, so blieb die ganze Stelle dort stehen, wurde aber ins III Buch mit manchem anderen übernommen (erhalten blieb aus den gleichen Gründen V, 351 ff. = III, 806 ff.; s. Lenz, 58 ff.).

An Stelle dieser Partien über die Seele, die das V Buch an das neu eingeschobene III Buch abgab; wurde von Lukrez die zweite Lage der Kulturgeschichte geschrieben.

WIEN.

A. RAUBITSCHERK.

BREVIORA.

a. *Livy's Deference to Livia.*

Livy began to write his history about 26 B. C., and since he averaged about three books per year he was apparently writing the 27th book, the part that contained the great exploits of Claudius Nero at Metaurus, about 18 B. C. Claudius Nero was considered a direct lineal ancestor of Livia's two sons, Tiberius and Drusus (Horace, *Carm.*, 4, 4). Livia, of course, was very eager that year to see the old hero glorified if only to have the prospects of her sons enhanced. A few years before, her hopes had been dimmed when Marcellus was selected by Augustus as a possible successor. The fact that when Marcellus died in 23 ugly rumor could go so impossibly far as to connect Livia's name with his death shows that Livia had at least shown a keen desire for the elevation of her own sons. In the years 22-20 the promotion of Tiberius was very rapid. In 20 Julia married Agrippa and by 19 Augustus had a grandson, Gaius, who, as everyone knew at once, was very apt to be adopted by Augustus as his heir. Naturally Livia and Julia were then looked upon as unfriendly rivals, since Livia was all too well aware that her hopes for her sons might now again be thwarted; and the court soon divided into factions again.

Livy, of course, was well aware of this rivalry when he was writing of the famous battle of Metaurus. Whereas Claudius Nero's campaign in Spain in 211 had received little attention except in a reference to his being completely outwitted by Hasdrubal (26, 17), the campaign of 207 is told by Livy with striking enthusiasm. Livy could tell a dramatic tale well, and this one was dramatic. But there is one surprising peculiarity about Livy's way of telling it. It will be remembered that Livy is usually skeptical of optimistic reports of Roman victories. Though he often repeats what the standard patriotic schoolbooks say, he generally adds that he prefers the numbers reported by

"the older authorities," or by "Fabius Pictor," or by "the more sober accounts."¹ Now, in recounting the successes of Claudius Nero he reports exaggerations time and again without a murmur. For Metaurus, Polybius had reported 10,000 Carthaginians slain (XI, 3, 3); someone, presumably Valerius Antias, had reported Hasdrubal's army of 56,000 almost annihilated (see Appian, *Lib.*, 52). Livy (27, 49, 6) cheerfully records 56,000 slain! Not only that, but just before this passage he credits the old hero with unbelievably successful battles against Hannibal: in 27, 42, 7 he reports a victory for him with 8,000 slain Carthaginians, and a few sentences further on Nero is said to have accounted for 2,000 more (27, 42, 15).

Why is Livy so generous with his numbers here when he is usually so wary of exaggerations? One may well imagine him talking the matter over with someone like Horace and explaining his quandary: "Our good lady is just now extremely sensitive about the future of her sons; they are proud of the schoolbook accounts of their ancestor's great victories over Hannibal and Hasdrubal; must I shock them and her with sober statistics?" And Horace, if it was Horace, might well answer: "Dulce est desipere in loco; why offend the lady?"

The Roman readers doubtless smiled with indulgence and comprehension when they read about Nero in Livy's history. It is not often that our critics can disclose in Livy so generous a concession to patriotic exaggeration, but the temptation was unusual. In estimating the honesty of Livy we need not count this instance too severely against him.²

b. *A New Advertisement at Pompeii.*

In *N. S.*, 1936, p. 333, Della Corte has published³ a crudely painted sign found at Reg. III, Ins. 7 of Pompeii. The sign

¹ Livy usually questions the generous statistics of the popular histories. See for example 1, 55, 7; 3, 5, 12; 21, 38, 2; 22, 7, 1; 25, 39, 14; 26, 49, 1; 29, 35, 2; 30, 19, 11; 30, 29, 7; 32, 6, 5; 33, 10, 8; 34, 15, 9; 36, 19, 10; 36, 38, 6; 38, 23, 6, etc. Tacitus rightly calls him *stdei praeclarus*.

² Livy's treatment of Livia may be compared to his apparent deference to Augustus' interpretation of the word *COSO* in 4, 20, 7. By quoting Augustus there he half conceals his own skepticism with a cunning smile. A few years later Horace did exceedingly well by those two young men in the fourth book of *Odes*.

was discovered on old stucco after the surface coat had scaled off; the lettering is apparently of the republican period. Della Corte reads it as follows:

TEGULA CUMULAR
OPERCULA COLLIQUIA
VEN. CONVENITO INDIDE

He thinks it a part of a *lex domus aedificandae*, but it seems rather to be a simple bill-board, advertising for sale (*ven[alia]*) a heap of tiles taken from the salvage of old houses, imbrices (*opercula*), and gutter-tiles (*collicia*). The phrase *convenito indide(m)* seems to refer to the place of business of the vendor which may have been given on a notice that appeared higher up on the wall.

Such advertisements were common at Rome, but since few have survived it seems worth while to call attention to any new one that appears.

c. *A Gloss in the Text of Lucretius, V, 1442?*

Diels, in his excellent edition of Lucretius, pp. xxiv ff., has collected some passages in which he thinks that old glosses, interpolations, and variants of Lucretius' archetype have caused confusion in the text that we have. I would suggest that the meaningless phrase *propter odores* at the end of V, 1442 came from a gloss superscribed on the word *florebat*. The line as given by MSS O and Q reads:

Tum mare velivolis florebat propter odores.

No editor, so far as I know, has accepted these last two words. Merrill, Giussani, Brieger, Diels, Martin, and others follow Marullus in restoring *navibus* as the noun to which *velivolis* should belong.³ Lachmann and Munro adopt *puppibus*, Garrod *proris*, etc.

My suggestion is that Lucretius had used some word like *pinibus*, and that because of it some late glossator felt called upon to explain the figure contained in *florebat* as one suggesting

³ Servius, on *Aen.*, VII, 804, has: Lucr. 'florebat navibus pontus.' If he refers to our passage, he was quoting carelessly, as so often, since he gives *pontus*, not *mare*.

agreeable odors rather than the more usual pictorial one. The gloss then replaced the last two words of the line. The glossator may have been wrong; he probably was; but, if so, he made a mistake that can readily be understood as conforming to late Latin usage. Even Plautus speaks several times of the odor of wine as *flos* (*Cist.*, 640; *Curc.*, 96; etc.) and Lucretius (II, 848) has the phrase *nardi florem* of the scent. In late Latin Dracontius has *flos ambrosius*, and Ambrose and others have *florida* and *florulenta* as *bene olentia* (see *Thes. L. L.*).

I doubt whether the scholiast was correct in assuming that Lucretius had in mind the good odor of the pine when he wrote *mare . . . florebat pinibus*; but the gloss does seem to prove that the text that was current about the fifth century did not contain such words as *navibus* or *puppibus* but some word like *pinibus*, which might suggest the gloss *propter odores*.

As for the forms of *pinus*, the word is usually used in the fourth declension in the late republic and early empire. For the metonymy, cf. Horace, *quamvis Pontica pinus*; Vergil, *quos Mincius infesta ducebat . . . pinu*; etc.

I think therefore that Lucretius wrote:

Tum mare velivolis florebat pinibus atque,

or possibly *pinibus tumque* (with silent *s*), and that some late meddler, with his mind on the word *pinibus*, glossed the word *florebat* by writing *propter odores* above the line. A gloss of the same type (which remained a harmless gloss) is found in MS O at line I, 716, where the word *triquetris* has the explanation *propter tria promuntoria* written above it.

d. *An Old Colloquial Pronunciation of circumvenire.*

Cicero, *De Orat.*, II, 249, in speaking of jokes and puns, quotes a remark made by the orator Philippus against an opposing lawyer whom he describes as *male olentem*. The remark—*video me a te circumveniri*—is supposed to be apposite to that characterization. Cicero calls it *subridicule*, somewhat humorous.

I have seen no reasonable explanation of the joke, and I am here more interested in an old philological change exemplified in a word than in the pun itself. If *circum venire* was pronounced in an archaic manner with the final *m* of the adverb

dropped (see Sommer, p. 301) and with *u* (or *o*) coalescing into the *ve* of *venire* to give *u*, as in *novendinum* > *nundinum* (Sommer, p. 159), then the result would be **circunire* (cf. *cunire*, Paulus-Festus, p. 44, 11, Lindsay).

e. *The Subject of Catalepton VI and XII.*

In Vergil, *Catalepton* VI and again in XII a *gener* and a *socer* are satirized in words which recall Catullus' *Carm.*, 29, that bitter attack on Caesar and Pompey:

Socer generque perdidistis omnia.

In Vergil the first two words change position, presumably because in this case the *gener* is the more important man. The general meaning of Vergil's verses has been plausibly explained by Rostagni in *Virgilio Minore*, pp. 44-48: it would seem that both *gener* and *socer*, the latter being named Atilius, were too much interested in a woman for whom the writer had cared—perhaps for literary purposes only. I would propose that the *gener* in this case was Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, the father of Caesar's Calpurnia. The *socer* is called Atilius in *Catalepton* XII, and Asconius (on Cicero's *In Pisonem*) says that a Rutilius Atilius⁴ Nudus was Piso's *socer*. Catullus' epigram probably appeared in 54 B.C.; that was the year after Cicero attacked Piso with unexampled bitterness in his *In Pisonem* and probably the year that Vergil migrated to Rome. Vergil could, then, take Catullus 29 as a hint and Cicero's *In Pisonem* for subject matter, a procedure not unusual in his case. His two men are also of Caesar's circle.

Vergil addresses the *gener* as *superbe Nocturne*. Cicero (*In Pisonem*, 66, *De Prov. Cons.*, 8, and *Post Red.*, 17) calls Piso *superbus*; and his constant harping on Piso's preference for the night (*tibi nox erat pro die*, *In Pis.*, 53; cf. 92, 93, *frag.* 17, etc.) might suggest the appositeness of *Nocturne*. Perhaps also the

⁴ Editors usually delete one nomen, but in some parts of Campania and in the Po Valley nomina are at times used as praenomina; furthermore in cases of adoption, the two family names are sometimes used indifferently and even together; cf. Livius Sulpicius Galba and Sulpicius Quirinius. Sex. Atilius Serranus, one of Piso's henchmen, was adopted into the Atilian family, Cic., *Pro Sest.*, 72; *Har. Resp.*, 32.

name Nocturnus is meant to recall the cognomen Caesoninus, since *caesius* might well suggest γλαυκῶπις and γλαΐξ (= noctua). Vergil further calls this *gener* "stupor," a designation that Cicero had applied to Piso (*In Pis.*, 1); and *putidum caput* in *Catal.*, XII, 1 corresponds to *putidae carnis*, *In Pis.*, 19; finally the *libidines* of Piso are constantly referred to by Cicero (*ibid.*, 66, etc.). It would seem, then, that in writing these two epigrams Vergil combined suggestions taken from Cicero and Catullus, that the persons involved were Piso⁵ and Atilius, and that the verses were written in the year 54 after Catullus' book and Cicero's speech *In Pisonem* had been published.

T. F.

⁵ When one reads Cicero's references to Piso's overhanging eyebrows (*In Pis.*, 14, 20, 70; *In Sen.*, 15, 16; *Pro Sest.*, 19), it is difficult to avoid a suspicion that the marble bust pictured in Hekler, 142 a, may well be that of our Piso. The bust belongs to about 60-50 B. C., is most excellently done, apparently by a Greek artist with some attempt at improving an ugly face. It would be interesting to know whether this bust could have come from Piso's villa at Herculaneum or from some villa of Caesar and Calpurnia.

REVIEWS.

ULRICH KAHRSTEDT. Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen. Studien zum öffentlichen Recht Athens, Teil II. (Geisteswissenschaftliche Forschungen herausgegeben von Waldermar Mitscherlich, zehntes Heft.) Stuttgart-Berlin, W. Kohlhammer, 1936. Pp. 330.

According to Kahrstedt Magistratur covers holders of ἀρχαί and excludes holders of ἱερέωσυναί. The correct definition of a holder of an Athenian ἀρχή is: ein Functionar, der über 30 Tage amtiert, einer Dokimasie unterzogen und zu εἶθυνα verpflichtet ist, ausser wenn er als Priester einem bestimmten Heiligtum zugeteilt oder als Gesandter in das Ausland geschickt wird (p. 4). Each ἀρχή is distinct and independent. There is no hierarchy of offices—no *cursus honorum*. Kahrstedt goes so far as to deny to the Council (itself an ἀρχή) authority over other ἀρχαί, and in this instance, as in many others, recalcitrant evidence is put out of court as a series of Sonderfälle (pp. 10 f.). If it were not so treated the superiority of the Council would be proved. Another instance of Vorgesetztenverhältnis des Rates which Kahrstedt should have designated as nur scheinbar is the issuance by the Council of orders to the γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν (Dow, *Prytaneis* [*Hesperia*, Suppl. I, 1937], nos. 9-96); for this secretary was not an official of the Council (below, p. 236). Aristotle's general statement on the matter is: συνδιοικεῖ δὲ καὶ [ἡ βουλὴ] ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς τὰ πλείστα (*Ath. Pol.*, 47). Such collaboration implies a right on the part of the Council. Its right generally to collaborate gave it a peculiar position. Each prytany it received, and its logistai scrutinized, the accounts of the magistrates. The other ἀρχαί had thus the right to act independently but the Council had the right to review their actions.

In this connection Kahrstedt discusses the office ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει, denying to its holder or holders authority over other financial officials like the ταμίαι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν and οἱ ἐπὶ τὰ θεωρικά. He is undoubtedly right in holding that the ταμίαι τοῦ δήμου was kein Finanzminister; but he cannot possibly be right in identifying him with the official designated by Demosthenes (XVIII, 115) as ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως κεχειροτονημένος, by Aeschines (II, 149) as ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν διοίκησιν, and by Hyperides (I, 28) as ταμίαις ἐπὶ τὴν διοίκησιν ἅπασαν. An official whom Aeschines describes as τῶν ὑμετέρων προσόδων ἐπιμεληθεὶς, who was "elected" to a charge involving the public or the entire administration of finance, who held office (at least in the case of Lycurgus) for four years consecutively has nothing in common with one whose sole known

function was to make payments on popular vote from the contingent fund of the demos (ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ψηφίσματα ἀναλίσκομένων τῷ δήμῳ). Nor is this identification helped by Kahrstedt's affirmation that Aristotle's Angabe über den ταμίης τῶν στρατιωτικῶν usw. ist Verwechslung mit dem ταμίης τοῦ δήμου (pp. 80 f.). Despite Kahrstedt's argument to the contrary I see no adequate reason for believing that what Aristotle says of the ταμίης τῶν στρατιωτικῶν (*Ath. Pol.*, 43) was incorrect at his time. After 307 B. C. the situation is different. Then this treasurer was still an annual official. But Philippos of Acharnai succeeded Habron of Boutadai in the office, not at the Panathenaia of Ol. 118.3, but at the end of the archon year (demonstrably between the 22d of Skirophorion 306/5 and the 14th of Hekatombaion 305/4 B. C. [*I. G.*² II, 1492, ll. 118 ff., 124 ff.]). That is to say, the tamias did not then serve from Panathenaia to Panathenaia, as Aristotle writing shortly before 322 B. C. reports. The just conclusion is, I think, that at some time between 322 and 307 B. C., perhaps in 307/6 precisely, this office was assimilated to the mass of Athenian offices. And I should conjecture that the quadrennial charge ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει was dealt with similarly. The record shows a period (307/6–302/1 B. C.) during which on order of the demos both the ταμίης τοῦ δήμου and ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει made payments from the contingent fund. This record Kahrstedt impugns: *IG* II² 463, die Urkunde über den Mauerbau, lässt Habron den Sohn des Lykurgos 307/6 als ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει (Zeile 36) Arbeiten vergeben. Das Jahr ist aber Ergänzung und notwendig falsch. Der Mauerbau gehört in dem τετραετῆς πόλεμος (X Redn. 851D; vgl. die Inschrift Zl. 2) von 306–303, zudem kann Hagnon 307/6 kein Finanzamt bekleidet haben, da er 306/5 ταμίης τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ist (II² 1492, 123 f.) und eine Kontinuierung von zwei Ämtern ohne Rechenschaft in der Zeit eine bare Unmöglichkeit ist (u. § 42). Habron war ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει nach 306/5 und da wir ein amtloses Jahr fordern müssen, ohne aus dem τετραετῆς πόλεμος herauszukommen, bleibt nur 304/3 übrig (p. 13). I cannot accept this transfer of *I. G.*², II, 463 from 307/6 to 304/3 B. C. It is clear from *I. G.*², II, 505, l. 30 that the building of the walls was in progress in 306/5 B. C. The conclusion seems obvious that the plans of the architects for the work were drawn up previously. Hence there are sound reasons for dating *I. G.*², II, 463, in which these plans are recorded, earlier than 306/5, i. e., in 307/6 B. C. Of the two objections raised by Kahrstedt to this date the first (p. 14) has no validity. It is true that at this epoch the same fund (τὰ ἐκ τὰ κατὰ ψηφίσματα) was disbursed in the same year by two different officials, by ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει in *I. G.*², II, 500 and the ταμίης τοῦ δήμου in *I. G.*², II, 505; but it is not true, as Kahrstedt affirms, that Kein Etatsposten kann zwei konkurrierende Chefs

haben. The fact is that in 275/4 B. C. (*I. G.*², II, 674) this very fund was drawn on, according to public order, by *οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ διοίκησει* and another, doubtless the *ταμίας τῶν στρατιωτικῶν*. We have, I believe, to recognize that between 307/6 and 302/1 B. C. we have an overlapping of two offices. After 302/1 B. C. the *ταμίας* of the *demos* never appears in our records (for *I. G.*², II, 675 see W. K. Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, 1937, pp. 329 ff.). So far as our record shows, his duties were transferred to *ὁ* or *οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ διοίκησει*, with whom at certain times, 276/5, 275/4 B. C. (*I. G.*², II, 1534, l. 15; 674), and after 229 B. C. (Dow, *Prytaneis*, pp. 11 ff.), the *ταμίας τῶν στρατιωτικῶν* collaborated. I see no reason to abandon the view taken in *Hellenistic Athens* (pp. 23 f.; cf. Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, p. 494), that the functions of the *ταμίαι ἐπὶ τὴν διοίκησιν ἅπαναν* held by Lycurgus were far-reaching; but I have become doubtful whether those of *ὁ* or *οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ διοίκησει* after 302/1 B. C. were similarly extensive (*Hell. Athens*, p. 100). This charge seems to be in reality the continuation of the *ταμίαι τοῦ δήμου* (so Kahrstedt, pp. 14 f.). My reason for questioning its controlling authority over public finance in the third century B. C. is that, whereas the office of the *ταμίας τῶν στρατιωτικῶν* was sufficiently important for services rendered during its tenure to be recorded in decrees in honor of distinguished Athenians, no allusion is made in any such decree enacted after 307/6 B. C. to services rendered by tenants of the office *ἐπὶ τῇ διοίκησει*.

The second of Kahrstedt's objections to dating *I. G.*², II, 463 in 307/6 B. C. remains—the impossibility of the same man holding two financial offices in consecutive years. The view that this was impossible rests primarily on the necessity that a man must stand his *euthyna* for one office before he could assume another. On this point Demosthenes, XXIV, 150 is categorical: *οὐδ' ἀρχὴν καταστήσω ὥστ' ἀρχειν ὑπεύθυνον ὄντα ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς*. This rule, however, was not a bar to the consecutive tenure of offices. The *strategoi*, for example, were subject to *euthyna*, yet individuals held them consecutively. A *strategos* might also hold a different office in the year immediately following (Kahrstedt, p. 6). Priesthoods involved *euthyna* (*I. G.*², II, 410, 22; Kahrstedt, pp. 3 f.), yet consecutive tenure of priesthoods is well-attested. For example Theobios of Acharnai was priest of Aphrodite Hagne in 98/7 and priest of Zeus Kynthios in 97/6 B. C. (*I. G.*², II, 2336, ll. 215, 239). Doubtless consecutive tenure of other offices could be attested if a diligent search were made. It is probable that the same person was *agoranomos* and *hoplite general* in succession in 101/0 and 100/99 B. C. (*I. G.*², II, 2336, ll. 110, 135). Kahrstedt himself cites an alleged instance (p. 6): Ein Name findet sich als Thesmothet 103/2, Archon 102/01, Agonothet für zwei Feste, Epimelet von Delos und

Leiter der Bank 98/7. Unfortunately this statement is full of errors. The thesmothetes was Meidias, not Medeios. Medeios was archon, not in 102/1, but in 101/0, and tenant of the other offices, not in 98/7, but in 99/8. I cite this as an instance of what is unpardonably frequent in the book—carelessness in testing citations and references. As editor Kahrstedt had done his work grave injustice. Coming back to the point at issue I take the appearance of Habron of Bontadai as $\delta \epsilon \pi \iota \tau \eta \delta \iota \omicron \upsilon \kappa \eta \sigma \epsilon \iota$ in 307/6 and $\tau \alpha \mu \iota \alpha \varsigma \tau \omega \nu \sigma \tau \rho \alpha \tau \omega \tau \iota \kappa \omega \nu$ in 306/5 B. C. as proof that the euthyna could be so administered that consecutive tenure of offices by the same individual was possible. The law published by Oliver (*Hesperia*, IV, pp. 14 ff.) contemplates the contingency that a man be elected to an office while still subject to euthyna ($\epsilon \acute{\alpha} \nu \tau \iota \varsigma \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \epsilon \iota \eta \nu \epsilon \rho \epsilon \theta \eta \nu \omicron \varsigma \delta \nu$).

Kahrstedt's book is by title a series of investigations. It contains a mass of data which if used cautiously will stimulate and instruct. But it must be used cautiously. Kahrstedt generalizes too fluently. All too frequently the evidence which can be adduced or which he himself adduces either does not prove or actually invalidates the conclusion he formulates. For example on p. 33 he affirms: Dies verhilft zu einer wichtigen Feststellung: die unvollständigen Behörden sind durchweg gelöst, die, bei denen eine Phyle nicht, dafür eine andere zweimal vertreten ist, sind gewählt, so die Strategen, so die neun Archonten seit dem späten 4. oder dem 3. Jhdt. (u. § 17), so die Epistaten von Eleusis, wir werden nunmehr die Epimeleten der $\nu \epsilon \omicron \rho \iota \alpha$, die *IG* II* 1604 unvollständig sind, als gelöst, die Hellenotamien als gewählt betrachten dürfen. The consideration which helps to establish this criterion is the notorious shortage in the number of the tamiai of Athena and of Athena and the Other Gods in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B. C. Yet if the criterion were valid we should have to rate the Hellenotamiai among the allotted officials since we now have a list of these magistrates (as yet unpublished) complete with only seven names. Yet Kahrstedt argues strongly that they were elective. I do not see what relevance there is between the case of the tamiai and the case of the archontes, where it is alleged that eine Phyle nicht, dafür eine andere zweimal vertreten ist. Whatever the number of the tamiai was no phyle ever had two representatives on the board. But presumably the case of the strategoi is the helping consideration here. In their case instances where one phyle had two strategoi and another phyle had none are well attested between 441/0 and 373/2 B. C., but there is no evidence that at this time the law was still in existence which had reserved one generalship to each phyle. Since in Athens the phyle was the active constituent or competitive unit in administration, war, and athletic and musical contests, it can-

not have failed to assert itself in politics. Hence it accords with the realities of political life that officials should be chosen largely *κατὰ φυλὰς* even when as in the case of the strategoi they were elected *ἐξ ἀπάντων* (Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 61). The point is, did two archontes in a given year belong to the same phyle? And, if so, is this an indication that the archontes were designated by election and not by lot? The case for two archontes from one phyle in pre-Sullan Athens (after 88 B. C. the fact is undoubted) has been presented by Dow (*Hesperia*, III, pp. 180 ff.). It is true, as he points out, that instances of double representation are avoided by the assumption, in itself legitimate, that certain demes were divided between old and new phylai. Dow's table (p. 177), however, contains only one year in which he concludes that one phyle furnished two archontes—215/4 B. C. (archon Diokles); but the reading of the demotic of the polemarch in *I. G.*², II, 1706, upon which the duplication depends, is anything but certain (*Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 51, n. 3; Dow, *Hesperia*, II, p. 143, III, p. 187). Other lists, not tabulated by either Dow or me, *I. G.*², II, 2332 (183/2 B. C.) and 2454, which is part of 2336 (99/8 B. C.), present no anomalies. The administrative difficulties which would arise if one of the phylai were represented twice on the board in a single year are serious. In that case some one of the other eleven or twelve phylai must have been unrepresented. Yet the members of the board had the important duty of attending, each for his own phyle, to the *πλήρωσις τῶν δικαστηρίων* and the *κλήρωσις τῶν ἀρχῶν* (*Hesperia*, VII [1938], no. 15). After 88 B. C. the constitution of Athens was so changed that it did not matter whether two archontes came from one phyle or not. As late as 157 B. C. Athens possessed a stock of stone allotment machines (Dow, *Prytaneis*, pp. 198 ff.). Kahrstedt himself feels so strongly the connection of the archontes with the phylai that he takes up the difficult problem of determining how the adjustment was made when the phylai became twelve. For the two phylai not attended to by the nine archons plus the secretary of the thesmothetai (Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 55; 59, 7; 63) he suggests the priest of Asklepios and the herald of the Areopagos. His observation that in 286/5 B. C. Phyleus of Eleusis, *λαχὼν ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ*, performed without the title the duties of an archon (*I. G.*², II, 1163) is convincing; but his inference that the archontic role was permanently attached to the priesthood of Asklepios has nothing to commend it. Probably Phyleus offered himself for the job at the sortition and was lucky. All the incident proves is that the tenure of a priesthood was not a bar. In Listen der Spätzeit wird gern der Herold des Areopags mit den neun Archonten zusammengestellt. Presumably, Kahrstedt refers to the puzzling lists of archontes collected and edited by Dow

(*Hesperia*, III, pp. 140 ff.), the earliest of which is post-Sullan, the latest (*I. G.*², II, 1736a), in which alone the secretary of the thesmothetai, together with five thesmothetai, is named, belongs in the middle of the second century A. D. They have, accordingly, no relevance for Hellenistic times, and record some unknown post-Sullan act or grouping (Dow, pp. 184 f.). Kahrstedt continues: *IG* II² 2336 (not a list of archontes) können wir nachprüfen: Zl. 146 ff. 187 ff. 243 ff. hat er (the herald) eine andere Phyle als die neun Archonten, Zl. 97 und 100 ergibt sich eine Kollision. There is an error here. Lines 187 ff. give us a second collision. No theory can be based on such data. All that is disclosed is Kahrstedt's feeling that every phyle should have a representative on the composite board. In this particular I am in agreement with him.

Wahlen als das Normale setzen schon hellenistische Urkunden voraus. The documents which Kahrstedt cites to substantiate this affirmation (p. 51, n. 5) do not cover the point. *I. G.*², II, 649, l. 33 (for a complete text see Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens*, p. 8) limits *χεποροία* to the functions of an agonothetes; *I. G.*², II, 1000 simply shows that some magistrate or other was "elected"; *I. G.*², II, 1304, ll. 3 ff. defines the "liturgies" for which the demos "elected" Demainetos of Athmonon: they were embassies and generalships. No implications of a wider use of "election" are involved. Kahrstedt proceeds: Jedenfalls ist sicher, dass auch die neun Archonten in hellenistischer, sogar schon früh-hellenistischer Zeit gewählt wurden, wie die Iteration führender Politiker zeigt (*IG* II² 1713, 2. bis 1. Jhdt.). The case cited is that of Medeios, archon eponymos from 91/0 to 89/8 B. C. (as well as in 101/0 B. C.). But who will venture to affirm that normal conditions existed at Athens in the years which preceded the "anarchy" of 88/7 B. C.? This case has but one parallel, for we now know that Argeios did not serve twice (Dow, unpublished fragment of *I. G.*², II, 2336), the tenure of this same charge for two consecutive years, 294/3 and 293/2 B. C., by Olympiodoros—again in an abnormal period (De Sanctis, *Riv. di Fil.*, 1936, pp. 236 f.). During his regency Demetrios of Phaleron held the office. If he sought it, he need only have offered himself as a candidate; others would have seen the wisdom of retiring in his favor. We have to reckon in Athens with cases of *abstention volontaire* (Foucart's term). Those who stood aside would be, naturally, his fellow phyletai; and their action would produce the same effect whether the office was elective or allotted. The fact that men known to be führende Politiker held the archonship precisely during periods of irregularity suggests to me that in normal periods they secured it only by chance. In this latter way I suppose that it fell to Eurykleides in 232/1 B. C. The normal thing between 307/6 and 91/0

B. C. is the tenure of the eponymous archonship by inconspicuous people. Since we rarely know the demotic or the patronymic of the archon eponomos, he is seldom capable of identification. Kahrstedt refers to Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens*, pp. 93, 95, 178, for various conjectured identifications of archons with contributors for public defense, some of which (Niketes and Chairephon, for example) are demonstrably incorrect; but the count made by Dow (*Hesperia*, II, p. 442, n. 1), which shows that of the 62 persons with demotics listed among the donors who responded to a patriotic appeal for money in 241/0 B. C. not a single one reappears among the 92 archontes with demotics listed in *I. G.*², II, 1706 (230/29–213/2 B. C.), discloses the fact that the latter were conspicuous neither for their public spirit nor for their wealth. Until the contrary is proved I am disposed to believe that the earlier method of selecting the archontes was maintained during the Hellenistic era. One enigmatic statement of Kahrstedt's requires a comment: Im Jahre 296/5, d. h. bei dem Sturz des Lachares wechselt bei der Apocheirotomie der Beamten der Archon (*IG* II² 644 f.), ist also kein geloster Spiessbürger, wie man ihn 411 oder 321 und 318 ruhig zu Ende amtieren liess (pp. 52, 107, n. 4). All we know about 296/5 B. C. is that Nikias remained archon for the entire year (*I. G.*², II, 682, ll. 21 ff.), and that during the period of the second Council he was designated ὄστροπος.

Kahrstedt develops the doctrine that when a magistrate or a board of magistrates is dated ἐπὶ τοῦ δέινα ἀρχοντος he or it served for one calendar year precisely, and then he uses this doctrine as a criterion by which to determine the Amtzeit of various magistracies. The doctrine itself is, however, ill-grounded. He says: Die Epheben haben ein vom 1. Boëdromion an laufendes Dienstjahr, dem das Ausbildungspersonal sich notwendig anpassen musste. Daher ist die Bezeichnung Kosmet ἐπὶ τοῦ δέινα ἀρχοντος genau wie bei den Epheben (o. S. 70) erst in späthellenistischer Zeit Mode und wird vorher vermieden. Significantly enough he cites no records to justify his final phrase. There is, in fact, no evidence for or against this statement. In the case of the ephebes the situation is different, and not at all as Kahrstedt represents it. In our earliest ephebe record (*I. G.*², II, 1056, 334/3 B. C.), which Kahrstedt does not cite, we have a clear instance of the usage which Kahrstedt designates as "late" and "lax"—οἱ ἐφηβοὶ οἱ τῆς Κεκροπίδος οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησυκλέους ἀρχοντος, and it recurs in 315/4 (*I. G.*², II, 2970), 269/8 (*I. G.*², II, 665) and in 243/2 B. C. (*I. G.*², II, 681). The term ἐπὶ τοῦ δέινα ἀρχοντος designates, as Kahrstedt affirms, their Dienstantritt (οἱ ἐγγραφέντες ἐπὶ) in 306/5 B. C. (*I. G.*², II, 478) and ca. 253/2 B. C. (*I. G.*², II, 700, Antiphon archon); but in the second instance they are said not only to have been "enrolled" but

also to have "served" ἐπὶ [Ἀντιφῶντος] ἀρχοντος. This being the evidence, I do not see that any basis exists for inferring that an office spanned precisely a calendar year because its tenant is described as having held it ἐπὶ τοῦ δαίνα ἀρχοντος. Nor is a better basis secured from the other case investigated by Kahrstedt in the effort to substantiate his thesis (pp. 91 ff.)—that of the treasurers of Athena and of Athena and the Other Gods. In *I. G.*², I, 255, l. 323 the treasurers are expressly said to have served ἐπὶ τοῦ δαίνα ἀρχοντος notwithstanding that their term began, not on Hekatombaion 1, but on Hekatombaion 28 or later. This Kahrstedt himself admits. The other instances of similar character listed in *Treasurers of Athena*, p. 138, n. 2 are brushed aside as specious; the archon, it is alleged, dates, not the term, but an act during the term. Thus in *I. G.*², II, 1498 the phrase ἐπὶ τοῦ δαίνα ἀρχοντος indicates simply the "dates of dedication of the stelai concerned by the ταμίαι of the year." But to make this interpretation possible the restoration of lines 9 and 22 given in *I. G.*² has to be rejected and for two reasons (p. 92, n. 2) he rejects it. Neither objection is valid. Die Lesung στήλη ταμῶν τῶν [ἄλλων τῶν ἐπὶ τ. δ. α. ist unmöglich, der Titel heisst ταμίαι τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, das letzte Wort darf nicht fehlen. But in line 8 it is lacking. Lines 22 and 10 are, he affirms, each one letter too short (40 instead of 41). But the normal line has 40 letters. The line of 41 letters is the exception: it is found only three times in *frag. a* (9, 12, 14).

It is, I think, fair to say that Kahrstedt's presentation and use of evidence do not command confidence. For good measure three further examples of his lack of care and circumspection, of his proneness to score a point without making sure of his ground, are appended. (1) On page 134 he says: Das Prytanenkollegium *IG* II² 1749 zählt nur 49 Mitglieder, das ist in Ordnung, der 50. Mann ist der Ratsschreiber des Jahres II² 228. That is wrong, and the inferences drawn (p. 34) are invalid. The correct explanation of the defect in the prytany-list may be found in Kirchner's note on *I. G.*², II, 1749. Brillant (*Les secrétaires athéniens*, pp. 49 f.) presents the right view regarding the secretary. The secretary was not a member of the Council at all, that is to say, he was an official of the state. This was pointed out by Meritt in publishing the prytany-decree of the year 155/4 B. C. (*Hesperia*, III, p. 35), and has been set beyond any possibility of doubt by line 43 of this same decree, republished with additional fragments by Dow, *Prytaneis*, pp. 148 ff. Here the secretary Philiskos, son of Krates, of Paiania is not listed among the prytaneis though the catalogue for Paiania is complete. (2) On page 35, after tabulating the tribal relations of the prytany-secretaries between 307/6 and 286/5 B. C., Kahrstedt remarks: Auch dies setzt voraus, dass der Schreiber des Jahres des Diokles

(288/7), in *IG II*² 650 ein 'Αλαίεύς, zur IV. Phyle gerechnet wird: normal ist 'Αλαῖος IV. Phyle, 'Αλαίεύς IX. This is incorrect. In all the instances cited in P.-W.-K., *Real-encyclopädie*, V, pp. 39 f. or otherwise known to me, where Halai belongs to Aegeis, the demotic is 'Αλαίεύς. 'Αλαῖος is simply a mistake on the part of Stephanos of Byzantium. (3) On pages 30 f. he writes: Die Epimeleten der Dionysien sind bei Aristot. 56, 4 zehn Mann nach den Phylen, im frühen dritten Jahrhundert wird diese Rücksicht nicht genommen⁸⁾, trotzdem ihre Stärke zur Phylenzahl stimmt¹⁾, wohl aber wieder im zweiten Jahrhundert (*IG II*² 896, 42 ff.: 24 Mann auf 12 Phylen verteilt). There is considerable confusion here and the notes add to it. Note 8 on page 30 cites in support of the statement made in the text *I. G.*², II, 668, 676. But 676 deals with the epimeletai of the Disoteria, not of the Dionysia, and in 668, while the epimeletai bear no relation to the phylai (3 were from Antigonis and none at all from Erechtheis, Pandionis, or Akamantis), their number does not agree with the number of the phylai. They were 10, the phylai at this time (268/7 B. C.) 12. In note 1 on page 31 we are told: Bei der Vermehrung der Phylen hat man offenbar das Kollegium verstärkt und die Bindung an die Phylen beibehalten, dann erst später die letztere kassiert. What is true is that in the later period, when the phylai were again 12 (186/5 B. C.), the number of the epimeletai was indeed 24, but tribal distribution was disregarded. Of the 24 listed in *I. G.*², II, 896 Aegeis furnished 6 (possibly 7), Oineis furnished 4, and Attalis none.

I regret to have had to report thus unfavorably on a book written by a scholar from whose earlier work I have learned so much. In justice to him I must also add that the defects noted are not inconsistent with the existence in the book of good arguments and suggestive ideas. These cannot be ignored by scholars with impunity.

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C. J. DE VOGEL. Een Keerpunt in Plato's Denken. Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1936. Pp. 266.

The title of this book is the statement of its thesis, and it is hardly necessary to add that the "crisis" to which it refers is the *Parmenides*. Dr. De Vogel begins his study of this much debated dialogue by outlining three possible interpretations of the first section: the theory of ideas attacked by Parmenides is 1) Plato's early theory, a revision of which is announced by this criticism, or 2) a parody of Plato's theory as it was *misunderstood* by others, or 3) Socrates' own theory of ideas which

Plato here criticizes in order to pass on later to his own philosophical system. Ultimately no one of these interpretations is accepted; they are, Dr. De Vogel thinks, mere theoretical abstractions of parts of the truth which cuts transversely across them. In the Socrates of this dialogue there is much of Plato's earlier self; but the critique here given contains many of the objections made by others to the theory, and to that very form of the theory which was closest to Socrates' teaching, for—although Socrates had no theory of ideas in the sense that Burnet maintained—his whole life's work was an indication which for Plato pointed to the ideas.

The study begins with a consideration of the third interpretation and consists in a refutation of the theories of Burnet and Taylor. In the refutation itself there is little that is new; but in the course of the section a number of positive interpretations are given.¹ The second section deals with the "crisis"; this begins with the *Theaetetus*, where the conception of the senses as instruments through which perception occurs shows that the position of the *Phaedo* has been abandoned and the establishment of a new basis has become necessary. The antinomies of the *Parmenides* then destroy the division between the world of ideas and the world of experience; the ideas are changed from being "objects of thought" and become "points of departure" for thought. Thus Plato has overcome the Parmenidean philosophy of absolute being but therewith his own philosophy too which has been "a turning away from the visible to seek the idea in itself." The ideas now have an aspect above being and thought but also an aspect which is turned toward our world; non-being, opposition, change, movement are no longer alien to the world of ideas, and so a bridge is thrown between the two worlds. So far as the *Parmenides* is concerned, De Vogel is in accord with Natorp; with regard to Plato's philosophy in general he seeks to establish a middle ground between Natorp and Ritter "but one that inclines more toward the former than toward the latter." Yet he does not deny the "metaphysical aspect" of the ideas, although he thinks that Plato recoiled from the theory of real existences apart from phenomena and avoided the answer; and since he refuses to take the *Timaeus* as a "reversion to the early mythical meta-

¹ *Phaedo*, 98 ff., for example, though not "historical" in Burnet's sense, is an account of Socrates' thought as it was developed by Plato in the direction which he felt Socrates himself had indicated. "It is really Socrates . . . who relates his life history; but where Socrates finds his own method . . . there the pupil, who is conscious of being the spiritual heir, has him speak in the language of the Academy." This leads the interpreter, who rejects Taylor's portrait of Socrates based on the *Clouds*, to picture Socrates, nevertheless, as the leader of a group of intimate students and interested in natural science.

physics" he is bound to admit that Plato never surrendered the ideas as eternal essences and to say that there is a certain basis that remained untouched by the "critical turn" in Plato's thought: the opposition of the *Phaedo* was overcome, but the belief in the ideas, in the superiority of the spiritual to the material, was not thereby altered.

If, however, as De Vogel says and as the passages which he cites show (p. 235), Plato never disavowed the doctrine of the "classical dialogues," what was this deep change that was "not a surrender and a refutation" of the earlier doctrine, this "reversal" that did not break the "unity" of his thought? Is it true, in the first place, that the analysis of the *Theaetetus* "supersedes" the doctrine of the *Phaedo*? Without pressing the point of the difference of theme and of dramatic *ῥηθός* in the two dialogues, a point that deserves more attention than philosophical interpreters usually give it, I should note that even in the *Phaedo* it is *by using the senses* that we recover the knowledge lost at birth (75 E-76 A), for it is the *sensible objects* that remind us of the essences to which we refer the sense data (74 A-75 B), whereas in the *Theaetetus*, however necessary the instrumentality of sensation may be, sensation itself has no power to perceive the truth of anything (186 E) and the soul by itself comprehends the being and truth of everything (186 B-D), for it is the soul, not the senses, with which we perceive even the sensibles (184 D). That in this process of knowledge there are for some things auxiliary organs and none for others, this is no revolutionary discovery of the *Theaetetus* which makes necessary for Plato a new consideration of his basic tenets. The concern of the analysis in the *Theaetetus* is *not* to vindicate for sensation a positive function in thought but, on the contrary, to show that even *sensation* cannot be accounted for by the senses alone. Nor is it evident how the "antinomies" of the *Parmenides* destroy the gap between ideas and phenomena, for, even if we grant that with them non-being (i. e. otherness) and movement enter the world of ideas, how would this create a *μεταξύ* *between* ideas and phenomena? The *Timaeus* solemnly emphasizes the absolute separateness of the ideas (52 A: οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποιεῖ λόγος); like so many interpreters from Aristotle on, De Vogel fails to distinguish between the "inter-communication of ideas" and the "participation of phenomena" in the ideas. This whole attempt, however, to find a positive doctrine expressed in the "antinomies" still seems to me perverse. It pays no attention to the concluding sentence of the dialogue in which Plato says that the same results follow from both propositions: ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ἔτε μὴ ἔστιν, itself and the others in relation to themselves and to one another are and are not, appear and do not appear, all in every way! In short, the critique is

entirely destructive, and the point of it is that one proposition is as absurd as the other. If, however, we can maintain neither, there is no reason to combine the two and to suppose that in the combination is to be found Plato's "new system." Rather, we are forced to say that "there are *many* One's," τὰ ἐν of the *Philebus*, the "monads" concerning which that dialogue refers to the same difficulties as are raised in the first part of the *Parmenides*, the *ideas* which are a plurality of indivisible, unalterable units. The second part of the dialogue is, after all, an *indirect* defense of Plato's doctrine, not the announcement of a revolution in that doctrine itself. Neither here nor in the *Sophist*, however, is the precise nature of participation explained (cf. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 297); and Plato could not explain it. De Vogel is quite right in saying that Plato could not say *what* the idea is but that he could and had to say that no notion of a concrete thing, no empirical concept, no judgment is possible without the ideas; but he is mistaken in supposing that either Plato or he himself succeeds in explaining "the nature of the *connection* between idea and empirical concept."

Perhaps the best part of this book is the careful and usually acute discussion of the work of modern interpreters; the remarks on Robin, Jaeger, Stenzel, and Wundt, besides the critique of Burnet and Taylor, deserve special notice.

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A. W. GOMME. *Essays in Greek History and Literature*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1937. Pp. viii + 298. 15s.

These twelve essays, as the author modestly entitles them, have to do with a variety of subjects, ranging from prehistoric trade routes in Boeotia, or the Athenian law of citizenship, to the art of Menander; they are preceded by a spirited attack upon the particularism that proclaims "Science for the scientists" and seeks to eject the historian from the temple, and followed by two brief letters to the *Times*, previously unpublished. Behind this seeming diversity will be found an element of unity. The author is distrustful of the brilliant paradox which flashes out new truth as though by miraculous inspiration; he is likewise coldly skeptical toward the time honored generalization that long tradition has clothed with a sort of *de facto* sanctity. So he deals his blows impartially against Bérard's law of isthmuses as applied to Cadmean Thebes, Hasebroek's theories

of ancient industry and trade, the analysis of the battle of Mantinea proposed by Woodhouse, Wilamowitz' discovery that Thucydides wrote his account of Sphacteria before 421, and also against current generalizations regarding the position of women in Athens, the condition of the Greek city-state after Chaeronea, the degeneracy of the Greeks in the fourth century, and the qualities of Menander as compared with Roman adaptations of the New Comedy. In thus avoiding uncritical enthusiasm for what is new and uncritical reverence for what is old, he achieves a golden mean which recalls the Hellenic distrust of extremes. He exhibits also a commendable disrespect for authority; we feel that illustrious sponsorship of a theory invites rather than deters his attack.

Of the studies which have not previously appeared in print, the best in my opinion is "The Speeches in Thucydides" (pp. 156-189). Gomme begins by defending the interpretation of I, 22, 1 in accordance with normal Greek usage against the tortuous misconstructions to which Schwartz was led by his preconceived notions; he then examines in some detail the speeches and the circumstances in which they were delivered, and concludes that Thucydides consistently endeavored to report the general tenor of what actually was said. The essay contains some acute observations on differences between the speeches in Thucydides and in Herodotus.

Like most of us, the author is not able always to avoid the pitfalls against which he warns. Thus his interpretation of Aristotle, *Cons. Ath.*, 42, 1 in "Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law" (pp. 67-86) seems to me not entirely objective; if we should apply Gomme's method in all its rigor to the entire passage, we should have to conclude from $\delta \mu\epsilon\nu \epsilon\phi\acute{\iota}\eta\sigma\alpha\iota$ that appeals were mandatory and invariable. Least satisfactory perhaps is "Traders and Manufacturers in Greece" (pp. 42-66). The general position is sound, but the argument is sketchy and we occasionally feel that the author is not entirely at home amid such details, for example, as are involved in the classification and leasing of mines (p. 49), rates of interest on sea loans (p. 53), banking loans and deposits (p. 54), mortgages, metics, and ownership of land (pp. 55, 60 f.) and that some of his generalizations call for scrutiny. Other reservations suggest themselves in the other essays, but in general the author's knowledge is deep as well as broad.

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ERNAR LÖFSTEDT. *Vermischte Studien zur lateinischen Sprachkunde und Syntax* (Acta Reg. Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis XXIII). Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, and Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. xiii + 232. 10 s. 6 d.

This book, by one who has long been a leader in his field, treats of a large variety of words and constructions in late Latin. It is a work of unusual skill and patience and one which, in tracing the courses of linguistic change, consistently avoids the pitfall of over-simplification and gives the facts in all their complexity.

While the book is in a sense a supplement to the author's *Syntactica* and an enriched revision of his *Spätlateinische Studien*, it contains a great deal of new matter. It differs from Löfstedt's earlier works in giving greater prominence to mediæval Latin and in including late Greek within its scope. From the Latin of all periods as well as from the Romance tongues, from Greek, and occasionally from other languages, light is derived for the study of late Latin, which is the author's chief concern. On the other hand, light is reflected from late Latin upon the Latin of other periods, upon the Romance languages, and upon late Greek. For example, the use of *dolor* in late Latin in the sense of "passion" supports the reading *dolores* in Prop., I, 10, 13 and II, 15, 35, where some editors have "emended" to *calores*. Indeed a rather extensive clearing away of "emendations" should result from the publication of this book. Löfstedt argues convincingly for the restoration of the readings of the best MSS in Ennius (*Scen.*, 222) and Seneca rhetor (*Controv.*, VII, 1, 27); as well as in many late Latin writers. He justifies, too, inscriptional readings which have been called in question (e.g., p. 110). He supplements the *Thesaurus* at various points.

Of more than philological interest is the illustration given on pp. 203-204 of the dependence of history on philology. Jordanes, *Getica*, III, 22, a passage in which are described the habitations of a number of Old Norse tribes, *quorum omnium sedes sub uno plani ac fertilis*, was formerly misinterpreted because *sub uno* was not understood. Accepting Mommsen's explanation that the phrase meant *similiter*, students distributed the tribes in various ways along the east and west coasts of Sweden, until Lauritz Weibull demonstrated by means of passages from Comedian and Benedict that *sub uno* means "together" and so proved that the tribes in question lived in one locality (*Arkiv för nordisk filologi*, XLI (1925), pp. 230 f.).

The only defect of the *Vermischte Studien* is a formal one, the incompleteness of the Indices and the brevity of the Table

of Contents. The following references are omitted from the Index of Passages: Catullus, 50, 17 (p. 116), Lucretius, I, 11 (p. 85), III, 526 (p. 119), VI, 805 (p. 85), Ov., *Am.*, II, 2, 33 (p. 124), Paul. Nol., *Carm.*, XXXI, 4 (p. 119), Petron. (?), *frg.* XXXIX [Bücheler-Heraeus] (p. 72), Stat., *Silv.*, II, 1, 218 (p. 119), Vergil (?), *Moretum*, 83 (p. 124).

As parallel to the examples of the use of *vocare* in the sense of *invocare*, cited p. 126; n. 1, Löfstedt might have mentioned *Aeneid*, I, 290, *Vocabitur hic quoque votis*.

To summarize the book, Part I (pp. 1-68) consists of historical studies of certain uses of particles. These uses include: (1) the employment of a single *nec* in the sense of *nec . . . nec*; (2) the employment of *ut* (rarely *sicut*) and, after expressions of place, *ubi* in the sense of *qui*, *quae*, *quod*; (3) a wide variety of uses of *quod*: (a) its use with words expressing likeness, difference, etc.; (b) its rare use without a correlative, in the meaning "as"; (c) its combination with *propter*, *post*, *ad*, *statim*, *mox*, *usque* and, in Merovingian and Carolingian documents, *interim* (*interim quod* = "until"); (d) the rare use of temporal *quod* (= German *als*); (4) the use of *quam* (a) in the sense of *sicut*, (b) as correlative with *tantus*, (c) after the adverb *adeo*, (d) in the sense of *tam . . . quam*, (e) in the meanings of *quam ut*, *quam si*, *quam qui*; (5) the use of *nisi* (a) with adversative force, (b) after a comparative, (c) after *tam*—in all three cases only in a negative context—, (d) in one instance in very late Latin in the sense of "except," in an affirmative context; (6) the otiose use of *-que* (e. g., *ideoque* = *ideo*) and the related phenomenon of the employment of *quis*, *uter*, *quicum* . . . for *quisque*, *uterque*, *quicumque* . . .; (7) the use of adverbs and adverbial expressions with the function of conjunctions; (8) the pleonastic use of particles.

Part II (pp. 69-196) deals with the following subjects: (1) *loqui* (*dicere*) *de aliquo* = *male loqui* . . .; (2) *secretum* = "secret intercourse," etc.; (3) *horae* (*dies*, *anni*) = *aliquot* (*paucae*) *horae* (etc.); *tempus* = "a (longer or shorter) period of time"; *ante hos dies* = "several days ago"; (4) some uses of *proximus*; (5) active verbal adjectives in *-bilis*; (6) *numquam sui*; (7) ellipsis of *feri* (*evenire*); (8) etymologizing semantic change and word coinage; (9) *libere* and *liber* (*liberare*) in late Latin; (10) *refert* = *differt*; (11) *arida* and similar elliptical expressions; (12) *una* as a preposition; (13) *observare* = *cavere*, and related matters; (14) *dolor* = "passion," "love"; (15) simple for compound verbs; (16) abstract nouns in *-tus*, derived from verbs; (17) *reperior* as a deponent verb; (18) the impersonal use of *dicit*, *potest*, *debet*, etc.; (19) loosely used relative clauses; (20) the double object; (21) illogical expression with verbs of saying, etc. (*Nam et quod bonus Pater*,

bonus Filius, bonus Spiritus sanctus, sicut probatur); (22) the use of *corpus* to denote a *part* of the body; (23) a peculiar use of *decipere*; (24) *praeterea* = *praesertim*; (25) *cibus, cibora*, a type of declension in vulgar Latin; (26) *ad horam* and its variants; (27) accusative of price; (28) some uses of *inter*; (29) *post se reverti* and similar expressions; (30) *solus* or the like = *praeter ceteros, praecipue*; (31) infinitive for imperative; (32) the bare accusative of the gerund, expressing purpose.

In an appendix (pp. 197-216) are traced the interrelations of Latin and Greek in late antiquity, as these are observable in a variety of syntactical constructions and word uses. Introduction, Table of Contents, Bibliography, Index of Subjects, Index of Words, and Index of Passages complete the volume.

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ERNEST DUTOIT. *Le Thème de l'adynaton dans la poésie antique.*
Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1936. Pp. xiv + 177. 30 francs.

Ante leves ergo pascentur in aethere cervi,
et freta destituent nudos in litore pisces,
ante pererratis amborum finibus exsul
aut Ararim Parthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim,
quam nostro illius labatur pectore vultus.

Virgil, *Bucolics*, I, 59-63.

These lines well exemplify a figure familiar to all readers of Greek and Latin poetry. Sooner, it runs, shall there occur a designated phenomenon (which is admittedly impossible, or all but impossible) than so-and-so shall happen. Or, in the positive form, so long as so-and-so shall endure, so long shall a stated condition last. Thus the poet makes vivid his denial or his affirmation by connecting it with the *foedera naturai*.

Aspects of this figure have been examined by various scholars, notably by H. V. Canter in a brief but systematic study, "The Figure AΔYNATON in Greek and Latin Poetry," *A. J. P.*, LI (1930), pp. 32-41, which classified nearly two hundred examples, chiefly on the basis of the logical forms of expression. The excellent new study by Ernest Dutoit, completed before Canter's article appeared but delayed in publication, is not based on a larger collection of examples; but it has the merit of a fuller and of a chronological treatment, whereby each example and its context is discussed and the characteristics of the individual poets are illuminated. An Index classifies all the examples under thirteen categories, based on their content.

Most frequent in bucolic, elegiac, and dramatic poetry, the *adynaton* finds a place also in epic, lyric, and satire; it occurs

more often in Latin than in Greek. Many paradoxes are traditional and proverbial; the term *ἀδύνατον* itself derives chiefly from paroemiographers. The classical writers on style for the most part neglect the figure; Donatus, however, soberly labels *Aeneid*, XII, 203-211 as "*impossible*." Whether the device in general should be termed a *σχῆμα* (*figura*) or a *comparatio* has been argued; it might be called simply a *τόπος* (*locus communis*). M. Dutoit makes out a good case for the term *thème*, with its suggestion of a musical *motif*.

A considerable range of phenomena finds its way into the *adynaton*. The leafing of a staff is as old as Homer (*A*, 233-241). Of frequent occurrence are rivers flowing backwards (*ἄνω ποταμῶν*, Euripides, *Medea*, 410), the counting of sand or of stars, the matings of alien beasts, the washing of a brick. Some paradoxes, such as the compatibility of alien beasts and kindly spontaneity on the part of Nature, were linked with the idea of the Golden Age—lost, but not the less desirable. Roman patriotism conceived as *adynata* the fall of Rome or of the religion of Rome. Ovid holds the doubtful honor of being the poet who most exploited the *adynaton*, which indeed lends itself to hyperbole and rhetoric of the Ovidian kind. Later writers use it with little freshness of style. One must agree with M. Dutoit: *l'abus de l'adynaton coïncide avec l'abus, en poésie, de la rhétorique*.

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CARL ERIK HOLM. Griechisch-Ägyptische Namenstudien. Göteborg, Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag, 1936. Pp. XIV + 169; 1 Plate. 6.50 Kr.

This monograph is a study of the personal names derived from the god Kronos and the Egyptian Earth-god Geb with whom Kronos was identified. Holm has collected all the occurrences of such names in published and certain unpublished material available to him, has distributed these names according to time and place, and has studied the implications of these distributions. The basis of the study is thus statistical, but, while some valuable results are arrived at, Holm's handling of statistics is open to criticism on two scores. Holm reduces all his data to percentages, with the result that many of his "statistics" are meaningless, as, e. g., when he tells us (p. 119) that only 1.9 per cent. of the Geb-name bearers have double names, as against 5 per cent. of the Kronos-name bearers! The second and more important fault is Holm's tendency to treat his present figures if not as definitive, at least as valid on an arbitrary scale.

This is perhaps most clearly seen when he undertakes to show the relative frequency of Geb and Kronos names in the Fayum by comparing the number of occurrences of such names in each century with the total number of personal names found in the sources from the same century. A table presents the figures and percentages, and two graphs illustrate the resultant relationships (pp. 46-47). But the result of this elaborate presentation is to give us the relative frequency of these names *in our sources*, which, in view of the fragmentary and uneven nature of the latter (papyri, ostraca, inscriptions), is no index of the true relativity. This could be computed accurately only from a complete census of the population—a thing which we are not likely ever to have except perhaps for individual localities. But the impossibility of attaining an accurate index does not justify the acceptance of calculations such as Holm's as a *pis aller*, since our fortuitous sources cannot be considered as giving us a fair sample of the population.

Holm's chief results are these:

Chapter I. In the Greek rendering of Geb, an η vocalization prevailed in the Fayum, and an $\alpha(v)$ vocalization in Upper Egypt. Similarly, the "Schluss-k" which follows the god's name in Demotic is in Greek regularly (with three exceptions) retained in the e group, and not (with one exception) in the o group. Such data should be of value in the study of the development of the local Coptic dialects.

Chapter III. Great frequency of related *nomina theophora* in any region is an indication of the existence in that region of an important cult of the god from whom the names are derived. At Tebtynis the cult of Kronos-Geb was identified with the chief cult of the vicinity, that of Soknebtynis (one of the forms of the crocodile nome-god, Sobk [$\Sigma\omicron\upsilon\chi\omicron\varsigma$]), and the papyri from Tebtynis contain $2/3$ the Geb and Kronos names found thus far in all Egypt. Conversely, Holm explains the complete absence of Kronos names in the papyri from such prolific Fayumic sites as Karanis and Soknopaion Nesos as due partly to the smaller Hellenic element in the population of those villages, and partly to the lack there of the identification of Kronos-Geb with (the local form of) Sobk.

In the same chapter Holm lists those occurrences of Geb and Kronos names in which the racial stratum or social status of the bearer is indicated or may be deduced. He finds Kronos names borne by Greeks and Egyptians alike, but Geb names only very rarely borne by Greeks; and concludes in effect ("Schlussbemerkungen," pp. 168-169) that while, as frequently observed before, from the second century B. C. onward a Greek name is no longer an indication of origin, an Egyptian name can safely be taken as indicating the Egyptian origin of its bearer in the absence of

evidence to the contrary. This conclusion, based as it now is on a study of Geb and Kronos names only, should be placed on a firmer basis by extending the lines of Holm's researches to other groups of names.

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VIKTOR PÖSCHL. Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero (Neue Deutsche Forschungen, Bd. 104). Berlin, Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936. Pp. 187. 8.50 M.

In spite of some shortcomings and certain unpleasant features (noted by Professor Keyes, *Class. Weekly*, 1937, pp. 192 ff.) this is a very good book. It deserves study if only because it includes the fullest and best treatment of the influence of Plato's *Republic* and Cicero's *De Republica*. In the first chapter Dr. Pöschl springs a surprise on us: the same contrast between the mixed constitution and simple forms of government (monarchy, democracy, etc.) as in Cicero's *De Rep.*, I is found in Plato's *Legg.*, III and the features regarded as typical of the simple constitutions are the same in both works. Somehow these ideas must have found their way from Plato into the source of Cicero's first book. As to this source, Dr. Pöschl allows us to think of Dikaiarchos or some other Peripatetic philosopher while rightly rejecting, for the first book, Panaitios for whom Professor Pohlenz has recently shown an unreasonable predilection.

In the same chapter (I) Dr. Pöschl also tries his hand at the question why Cicero interrupts and in a way damages his plea for a mixed constitution in book I, 46-64, by putting in arguments for kingship as the best simple form of government. Here, however, it is hard to follow him. For, although the Roman habit of resorting to a dictator in times of stress appears among Cicero's arguments and although in the *Somnium* it is said of Scipio: *Dictator rem publicam constituas oportebit*, one can hardly believe that Cicero thinks of dictatorship where he pleads for kingship.

In chapter II we are given a new comparison of Cicero's *De Rep.*, II and Polybios' account of the Roman constitution and a refutation of Taeger's book, *Die Archæologie des Polybios* (1922). Yet, more important and probably the most valuable chapter of the book is the third, with its careful comparison of both structure and argument of Plato's *Republic* and Cicero's *De Rep.* It appears from Dr. Pöschl's discussion that next to the Roman state Plato's work was by far the most important source of inspiration for Cicero, and, I think, he has every right to hold this view, in spite of the fact that owing to Hellenistic influences Cicero started his work not with an inquiry into the

nature of justice but with a theory about the best form of government. Dr. Pöschl himself points out that this accounts for some further differences between the two works. There is little room for criticism of his illuminating treatment of the internal organization of the state, the rôle of education, the ideal of the statesman, and the problem of political leadership in both works. If anything is not quite satisfactory it is the chapter on *iustitia* (pp. 137 ff.), for a comparison between *De Rep.*, III, 27 and Plato, *Rep.*, II, 361 suggests that, contrary to what Pöschl tells us, Cicero follows Plato in discussing justice with reference not only to the state but also to the individual's happiness.

Dr. Pöschl rightly maintains that in the description of *disciplina* and of the moral basis of the state in *De Rep.*, IV and V Cicero draws to a very large extent on existing Roman conditions and is at times even led to criticize Plato's theories as falling short of the ideal attained (or attainable) in Rome. I was particularly pleased to see that in this connection he has done what many other scholars ought to have done, namely, examined whether or not John of Salisbury knew Cicero's *De Rep.* He makes it probable (pp. 136 ff.) that John is indebted to Cicero's work in his description of both healthy and unhealthy effects which works of art may produce on a susceptible mind (Polycraticus, VII, 9). On the possible existence of copies of Cicero's *De Rep.* until the twelfth century see H. Fuchs, *Augustin und der antike Friedensgedanke* (Berlin, 1927), pp. 238, 243, and Reitzenstein, in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1927, 2204 (with reference to p. 117, 6, Ziegler).

Dr. Pöschl's book should also be consulted for the historical connection between Cicero's emphasizing of the Roman cardinal virtues and the program of moral reform carried out by Augustus, for, although his suggestions here are not as brilliantly original as e.g. Reitzenstein's, he has the merit of avoiding some of Reitzenstein's extravagances.

It is a pity that Dr. Pöschl is not familiar with some important work on the *De Rep.* done e.g. by Ciaceri, Keyes, Smith and Sabine, W. W. How (*J.R.St.*, 1930). However, this shortcoming and some others are certainly outweighed by the merits of the book.

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CARL EDUARD FRHR. VON ERFFA. *Αἰδώς* und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit (*Philologus*, Supplementband XXX, Heft 2). Leipzig, Dieterich, 1937.

This monograph offers a comprehensive study of an important group of concepts. Passages dealing not only with *αἰδώς*, but

also with *νέμεσις*, *δίκη*, *ᾄπις*, *δέος*, *ἔλεος*, *σέβας*, *σωφροσύνη*, *τὸ αἰσχρόν*, and various related verbs and adjectives are collected and discussed. The difficult problem of analyzing their relationships is handled with judgment and restraint and the author can seldom be accused of attempting to prove too much. He has consulted many editions of the Greek texts and has read widely in the German secondary literature. Wilamowitz is quoted frequently, but not uncritically. English and American scholarship is represented chiefly by standard editions, such as Gildersleeve's Pindar. An earlier work in the same field, Schultz' Rostock dissertation of 1910, has been duly considered and not a few of its views are criticized, not only with regard to individual passages, but also in its general conclusions, as for example in making too sharp a distinction between *αἰδεῖσθαι* and *αἰσχύνεσθαι*.

The material is arranged in chapters according to authors. In Homer *αἰδώς* already covers a considerable range of meanings, the underlying idea being that of "Scheu." Here and elsewhere it is emphasized that the word has passive and active senses and that the latter, far from designating a merely negative restraining force, describes a positive factor in the determination of conduct. The enforcing sanction of Homeric *αἰδώς* is to be found in the standards of a society of nobles. In Hesiod, however, it is no longer connected with rank and appears as a generalized concept, being no longer applied merely to single concrete situations. In the lyric poets the term *αἰδώς* has a wide application. It is noted among other things that in Tyrtaeus and Callinus it is now connected with the *πόλις* community and that with Solon it becomes subordinated to *δίκη*. In Aeschylus *αἰδώς* sometimes plays an important part in the dramatic conflict. It is brought into closer connection with *δίκη* and with piety towards the gods. In Sophocles it is similarly brought into connection with *σωφροσύνη* and *εὐσεβεία*. Euripides' interest in psychology leads him at times to treat *αἰδώς* as a special characteristic of certain individuals; indeed several of his characters are personifications of *αἰδώς*. A new development, due to the influence of contemporary thought, is the tendency to question the validity of universal standards of *αἰδώς* and such qualities. Aristophanes also reflects this tendency. Another feature of his work is the frequency of *ἀναιδέα* with its related words and the implication that this is especially characteristic of orators and politicians. Herodotus offers little material and this contains nothing that is new. With Thucydides the terms in question gain in significance because of their application to international relations and the relations of the individual to the state. The chapter on the Presocratics gives a prominent place to the myth of Protagoras and the relativism of Archelaus, the latter of which is used to

lead up to a discussion of the dictum of Democritus (Diels, B 264). In this we have an attempt to overcome the relativism and subjectivity which followed the breakdown of νόμοι by finding a new sanction in the individual man's duty *ἑαυτὸν αἰδέσθαι*; only thus could the concept of αἰδώς once more become fruitful.

A few debatable points may be mentioned. The connection of Homeric αἰδώς with "Adelsethik" is not convincing. The inclusiveness of X, 106 implies that masses as well as classes were taken into account. The Homeric doctrine that noblesse oblige was surely relative rather than exclusive. It was Euripides who applied *γενναῖος* to a peasant, but Homer's application of δῖος to a swineherd shows at least a tendency to ascribe "noble" qualities to humble characters. In the discussion of *Eumenides*, 710 the suggestion that αἰδούμενος τὸν ὄρκον is a legal formula is not supported by evidence. It is hard to see why *Antigone*, 540 should refer to "Scheu" rather than "Scham"; Ismene's preceding speech shows that she wishes to be regarded already as an accessory. In the discussion of *fragment* 619 of Sophocles, which is taken to be a revelation of the poet's own views, the author appears to lean rather heavily upon a fragment of rather uncertain significance. Finally, in the discussion of Euripides, and still more of Aristophanes, he has perhaps not made it sufficiently clear that many utterances may be introduced for the purpose of implied criticism.

But the work as a whole is sound and useful. The quotation and paraphrase of passages increase the bulk of the book, but greatly assist the reader. Reference is facilitated by a full table of contents, page headings, and an index of passages. In a study which rightly aims at completeness much is inevitably included which the reader may have known or guessed before, as well as many phenomena to which no particular significance can be attached. But it affords a good instance of the value of having general impressions of the development of Greek thought confirmed by the detailed study of individual word groups and ideas.

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H. G. ROBERTSON.

IRENE ROSENZWEIG. *Ritual and Cults of Pre-Roman Iguvium*.
London, Christophers, 1937. Pp. viii + 152.

Any quest in the dialect-speaking regions of pre-Roman Italy demands first and foremost two things—competence to handle the dialect-records themselves independently, and then the combination of their evidence with that obtained from other sources, literary and archaeological. The second requirement Miss Rosenzweig fills well enough. She has been to Gubbio and observed

its ancient remains and quaint modern ceremonies. She has faithfully gathered together all that is known of the records, topography, and municipal organization of pre-Roman Iguvium, and she gives us a good map with a suggested reconstruction of the Umbrian city. Then she takes up, one by one, the topics of its religious ceremonies, its deities, the Atiedian brotherhood, and their ritual and cults. To the internal evidence of the Iguvine tables she adds what I think must be a complete, or nearly complete account of every relevant scrap of ancient testimony and of every modern conjecture that has any bearing on her subject. But she very seldom, if ever, expresses a definite opinion of her own, and especially in vexed questions of interpretation of the Umbrian text (which she reprints with Buck's translation of 1928, reprinted by Buck from the first edition of his *Grammar*, 1904), she indiscriminately sets forth every guess, probable and improbable, that she has been able to find in print, with never a contribution of her own; or if there be any such, it is as much lost as the proverbial needle in a haystack. Those who are equipped to judge independently will therefore be saved the trouble of gathering together some hundreds of scattered notes and articles, theories and conjectures, arguments and (a few) conclusions for themselves, and for this help will be grateful. But the reader who is innocent of linguistic training must look before he leaps.

In her historical introductory section Miss Rosenzweig accepts von Duhn's theory of "inhuming" Italic, chiefly on the ground (p. 6) "of the close relation of the Oscan and Umbrian languages to Latin." Here she shares the prevalent misconception about the distribution of the so-called Umbrian dialect. All the evidence, archaeological and linguistic, indicates that the speakers of the Iguvine dialect are to be distinguished very clearly from the *Ὀμβροί* or *Umbri* said by ancient authority to have been the pre-Etruscan inhabitants of the great part of Italy north of the Tiber, Umbria included. And in fact the actual distribution of inscriptions in the Italic "Umbrian" dialect agrees well with that of the *cremating* people of the Umbrian fringe (see my *Foundations*, p. 194). The situation is different for Oscan, but there too Miss Rosenzweig's view involves an argument from linguistic evidence that is contradicted by the archaeological.

A few suggestions and corrections:

P. 5, n. 17. For 837 read 83.

P. 9. The actual provenance of the "Tabula Agnonensis" is not Agnone, but Capracotta.

P. 18, n. 65. Is Portuensis the *modern* name of the road?

P. 19, n. 66. Note that *kasīlos* is also a Lepontic personal name (*P. I. D.*, no. 327).

P. 36. The "black vessels" were clearly thought to be of

ill omen; but it is well to bear in mind that black ware of early date is widely distributed in Italy, and apparently had no special ritual significance. Were the Iguvine black vessels a survival of an ancient type, put to non-secular usage?

P. 59. The flamen "must collect a sum for each farm." What sum? The Umbrian is *nuṛpener* (instr. pl.), on which Conway (*Dial. Ital. Ex. Sel.*, 1899, p. 24) had an interesting suggestion that is worth repeating, since it seems to have been overlooked. He took *nuṛpener* as "**nodipendiis*," and after calling attention to the deus Nodutus mentioned by Augustine and others,¹ he continued: "apud agrestem populum *nodipendium* bene poterat uel ipsam spicam (qua culmus grauatur) significare, uel simplicius ipsum culmi nodum, pro sacro usu exsectum, uel, quod mihi . . . magis placet, imaginem utriusuis aere aut argento effictum, uel etiam nummum aliquem ab hoc incuso typo denominatum; cf. [Ridgeway] *Origin of Metallic Currency*, p. 179 ff., et praesertim p. 327, ubi Metapontinum nummum reperies siliqua incusum et Strabonis historiam (6. 1. 15) de aurea arista Delphis dedicata."

There is yet another possible solution to this old riddle, which on the whole I prefer. There is a gloss of the genuine Placidus (*Gloss. Lat.*, 4, 1930, p. 29, N-10) that reads: Nucispineum est quod rustici nudipineum dicunt (I give Deuerling's reading, which is also the reading of *R*, i. e. of the archetype of the three cod. Rom. Vat.; there is some evidence in favour of the *nuclipineum* of the Paris fragment). Now *nux*, *nucis* (and hence *nucleus*) and English *nut* show different extensions, *k* and *d* respectively, of the same base *qneu-* (Walde-Pokorny, I, 391); but if I mistake not the *d*-extension existed also in Italic, where, except in this compound in Umbrian, and according to Placidus in rustic Latin, it was driven out of use by *nodus* "knot," a word of different etymology. The close correspondence between *nuṛpener* and *nudipineum* (for *i* written *e* cf. Umb. *pehatu*) suggests further that Meillet was right in deriving Lat. *pinus* directly from *pi-nu-*, *pi-no-*, for the consonant group *-sn-* survived in Umbrian. As with Conway's interpretation,² it is not clear whether the payment was in kind (cf. *P. Oxy.*, στροβιλᾶς, "a dealer in pine-cones") or in another form commuted for the older unit.

P. 68, n. 18. For vergleichender read vergleichenden. For Somner read Sommer.

P. 89. As von Blumenthal has recently reminded us Osc. *anter statai* is two words in the original, and as such he would now interpret it (*I. F.*, LV, 1937, pt. I).

¹ Arnob. 4, 7: *qui ad nodos perducit res satas; et quae praestit frugibus terendis, Noduterensis*. And this seems to be the clue to the deus *Nōdens*, *Nūdēns* (Ir. *Núadu*, W. *Nudd*) whose name is variously but unconvincingly interpreted.

P. 91. On matrimony in heaven note the famous passage in Pliny, *N. H.*, 2, 17.

P. 97. *Puprike* is more likely "**pubidico*," i. e. connected with initiation-rites.

P. 99. For Pweigueux read Périgueux. But Vesunna was Ligurian.

P. 105, n. 14. On *pontifex* see Herbig, *K. Z.*, XLVII, 1916, pp. 211 ff.

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ERNST WENKEBACH. Galeni in Hippocratis Epidemiarum Librum III (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum V, 10, 2, 1). Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1936. Pp. xxx + 187.

The editor continues the edition of Galen's commentaries on the Hippocratic *Epidemics* auspiciously begun with the publication of the commentary on the first book in 1934 along with the German translation of the second book by Franz Pfaff from the Arabic version of Hunain Ibn Ishāq. Dr. Wenkebach presents us with an exemplary edition, if possible even better than that of the earlier instalment. How excellent his work is can be appreciated only by one who compares it with the miserable text of Kühn, which it is to be hoped one may soon be able to ignore. Here again, especially in the portions of the text preserved only in Arabic, Dr. Wenkebach has enjoyed the constant help of Dr. Pfaff. The text is exceptionally clean and if there are errata they have escaped me; but type will be fractious at times even in the presses of the best publishers. A few letters out of alignment or broken occur in the *Praefatio*.

WILKO DE BOER. Galeni De Propriorum Animi Cuiuslibet Affectuum Dignotione et Curatione, De Animi Cuiuslibet Peccatorum Dignotione et Curatione, De Atra Bile (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum V, 4, 1, 1). Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1937. Pp. xvi + 166.

In general Dr. De Boer follows the methods of his predecessors in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* in editing the three brief treatises of Galen before us. The first two treatises were planned and written by Galen as companion pieces or rather as parts of a single work, and the manuscript tradition is essentially the same for both. The editor, having discoursed at length regarding the basis of the text in his Marburg disserta-

tion, 1911, in the separate *Praefatio* (pp. v-ix) here contents himself with a brief summary, correcting and supplementing a few details. The MS tradition of the third treatise, also, he had previously discussed in the *Wiener Studien*, II, and here in a second *Praefatio* (pp. x-xvi) he summarizes his results and briefly discusses earlier printed editions. The copious *Indices Nominum* and *Verborum* (pp. 97-166) are given separately for the first two and for the third treatises. In these respects the edition seems to be equal to the best of its companions in the *Corpus*. Whether the readings adopted in the text are always or generally the best can be determined only by the close scrutiny that comes with long use. It is disturbing, however, to discover in a rapid perusal a goodly number of passages where one is prompted to question the text and an even greater number of minor misprints, such as are rarely found in other numbers of the *Corpus*.

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GIOVANNI BATTISTA PIGHI. *Nuovi Studi Ammiani*. Pp. xv + 234. I Discorsi nelle Storie d'Ammiano Marcellino. Pp. viii + 104. Milano, Soc. Ed. "Vita e Pensiero," 1936.

Ammianus Marcellinus, the sturdy staff officer under Julian and Valentinian, who spent his retirement in writing the last great Roman history, is again under close scrutiny. Prof. Rolfe, in his Loeb translation, is summarizing the results of a generation's study, and reconstituting the Latin text; and now out of Italy come these valuable contributions of Pighi, full of meat for the text critic, the Latinist and the historian (of literature, as well as of events). Fortified by a remarkable mastery of Oriental history, Pighi gives a clear account of the clashes between Roman and Persian in Mesopotamia and Armenia, and a full description of Julian's great victory at Strassburg over the Germans—the battle which determined whether Roman Gaul was to become France or another Franconia. After a study of the general practice of ancient historians in fabricating speeches for generals, he examines each of those in Ammianus in connection with all other available sources; Ammianus comes out well. Incidentally he reconstructs the text. We are dependent on one 9th century MS, the Fuldensis (V), for almost all of what remains of Ammianus; and V's errors and inaccuracies are a perpetual temptation to text critics. Pighi's general principle, to hold fast to V wherever possible, is admirable; but I doubt if many of his changes will commend themselves to others, particularly where he restores readings or makes conjectures which sin against Ammianus' use of the rhetorical *cursus* in the clausu-

lae. But this little impairs the high value of these interlocking and overlapping volumes, which deserve to be in every serious classical library.

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EDWARD KENNARD RAND. A Toast to Horace. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1937. Pp. 41. \$1.00.

When this felicitous toast was proposed before the Municipal Art Society of Baltimore, there must have been approving chuckles in the Elysian fields. For here is pure Caecuban in Attic shape, the distilled essence of Horace's mellowed wisdom, urbanity and charm, bubbling in a tiny goblet of exquisite craftsmanship. To the poet who, in Professor Rand's words, was never temperate to excess, who had something for every man, and who always bore his seriousness lightly—*nunc est bibendum*.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

GRACE FRANK.

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
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XENOPHANES AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

The lines, quoted by Athenaeus, X, 413 f. (fr. 2, Diehl), in which Xenophanes attacks the rewards given to victors in the Olympic Games, stand almost alone in the records of Greek thought about athletics. It is true that Euripides echoes their sentiments in a famous fragment of his *Autolycus*¹ and that Isocrates begins his *Panegyricus*² with a complaint that while athletes are rewarded, those who have toiled for the public good are not. But these complaints belong to a later age when athletes were often professional, and in any case both Euripides and Isocrates may be suspected of repeating what Xenophanes had said before them. His criticism is all the more impressive because it provides the opposite side of the picture to the praise of athletes found in Simonides, Pindar and Bacchylides, and comes from a time when, we assume, athletic prowess was universally honoured in Greece. That Xenophanes should counter what seems to have been a common opinion is naturally taken as another sign of his independence from accepted beliefs. The man who attacked Homer and rejected old tales about the gods might be expected to attack the honoured institution of the Olympic Games and to say that his own σοφία was more worthy of reward than was success in any of their various events. It is, therefore, not surprising to find modern scholars treating these opinions of Xenophanes as part of his philosophical system and typical of his outspoken criticism. Recently this view has received new strength from W. Jaeger,³ who, though he says that Xenophanes was "no original thinker," says also that he shows "the inevitable collision between the old aristocratic upbringing

¹ Fr. 282, Nauck.

² Or. IV, I.

³ *Paideia*, pp. 230-4.

and the new philosophic man," and bases much of his case on this fragment. His argument contains two main points: first, that by attacking athletic renown Xenophanes was opposing the aristocratic tradition which believed in "the absolute supremacy of the ideal of the games," and secondly, that in its place he recommended his own *σοφία*, which Jaeger takes to mean "spiritual education" and explains as "the strength of the spirit which creates right and law, correct order and well-being." If Jaeger is right in his interpretation, Xenophanes was certainly no less original in his criticism of institutions than of theology. But on closer examination doubts suggest themselves, and the lines seem to have a different meaning and to have been prompted by other motives.

The lines were probably written before 520 B. C. For in that year the Race in Armour was introduced into the Olympic Games,⁴ and since Xenophanes mentions all the main events which existed before that date and says nothing about this, we may presume that it did not exist when he wrote. Xenophanes was born about 570 B. C., and so the lines may be dated between 550 B. C., when, we may presume, he began to write, and 520 B. C., when the Race in Armour became a regular event. The date is of some relevance to the problem, since it shows that this fragment is earlier evidence for Greek views of athletics than anything in Pindar or Bacchylides and probably earlier than the few fragments of Simonides' Epinicians. It is at least possible that the athletic ideal, which dominated the Greek aristocracies in the fifth century, was not so dominant in the sixth century, and that Xenophanes was not so revolutionary in his attack as might seem from a comparison with Pindar. In any case the lines should first be considered with reference to the language and ideas of their time, and when that has been done, their social origin and significance can better be estimated.

Xenophanes says clearly that he regards his own *σοφία* as superior to physical strength:

⁴ After the first foundation events were added in the following order: two stade race in 724, long distance race in 720, pentathlon in 708, horse-race and pankration in 648, wrestling in 632, boxing in 616; the four-horsed chariot race was probably substituted for the two-horsed chariot race in 648. Cf. E. N. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 35.

ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων
 ἀνδρῶν ἣδ' ἱππῶν ἡμετέρῃ σοφίῃ.
 ἀλλ' εἰκῇ μάλα τοῦτο νομίζεται, οὐδὲ δίκαιον
 προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης (fr. 2, 11-14)

The interpretation of these lines depends on the meaning given to σοφίῃ. Opinions vary between referring it to the poet's skill and to his philosophy or wisdom. Either is possible in the sixth century.⁵ The first meaning of "craft" or "skill" in any art or handicraft is as old as the *Iliad*,⁶ where it is applied to ship-building, while Margites is said to be in no way σοφός because he lacked every τέχνη.⁷ Anacreon applied σοφίῃ to embroidery,⁸ and Attic potters used it of their craft.⁹ Among other forms of craft was song, and excellence in this was also σοφίῃ, so that it was the word for what we call the poet's "art." Hesiod calls Linus παντοίης σοφίης δεδαηκότα,¹⁰ and the word is used by Solon¹¹ and "Theognis"¹² for poetry. The same sense is used at a later date by Simonides¹³ and abundantly by Pindar. It is, therefore, perfectly possible that Xenophanes used the word σοφίῃ to mean "art" and that we can accept such translations as "our art" (J. Burnet) and "the poet's skill" (J. M. Edmonds). If so, Xenophanes simply complained that his poetry was not rewarded as the victories of athletes were. On the other hand it is also at least possible that Xenophanes used σοφίῃ to mean "knowledge" with special reference to what he taught, and so Diels took it when he translated "unsere Weisheit." That σοφίῃ could have such a meaning in the sixth century is not absolutely certain, since none of the early philosophers or physicists seem to have used the word in this sense. But with Heraclitus it came, if it had not already come, to have a meaning like this. The best evidence comes from his attack on Pythagoras, who ἐποιήσατο ἑωυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην,¹⁴—"claimed as his own a wisdom which was but a learning of

⁵ Cf. B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie* (Berlin 1924), pp. 1 to 19.

⁶ O 412.

⁷ Fr. 2, Kinkel.

¹¹ Fr. 1, 52, Diehl.

⁸ Fr. 108, Diehl.

¹² 770, 790, 942, 995.

⁹ Epigr. 1100, Kaibel.

¹³ Fr. 56, Diehl.

¹⁰ Fr. 193, Rzach.

¹⁴ Fr. 17, Bywater (fr. 129, Diels).

many things and an art of mischief" (Burnet). Since Heraclitus is speaking of Pythagoras' *ισορολή*, which he practised "beyond all other men," this shows that for him there was a *σοφλή* in inquiry as in any other *τέχνη*, although in the case of Pythagoras he thought the *σοφλή* mischievous. So Heraclitus also uses the neuter adjective *σοφόν* to qualify what is appropriate to his own special activity, such as listening to the Word¹⁵ or knowing the thought by which all things are steered.¹⁶ And finally, as a seeker after truth, he said that *σοφλή* consists, at least partly, in speaking the truth.¹⁷ The word *σοφλή*, then, had for Heraclitus a special meaning, and from this it must have developed its later sophistic meaning of philosophical or scientific knowledge, such as we find in Anaxagoras¹⁸ or in the epigram on Thrasy machus,¹⁹—*ἡ δὲ τέχνη σοφλή*. In the case of Heraclitus we can see how the word came to mean what it did for him. His business, like that of Pythagoras, was *ισορολή*, itself a *τέχνη*, and being proficient in it he claimed for it the name of *σοφλή*.

These two views of the meaning of *σοφλή* are not absolutely incompatible, though neither quite covers its full meaning. *σοφλή* was proficiency in any *τέχνη* and Aristotle reflected the view of an older generation when he said that *σοφία* was *ἀρετὴ τέχνης*.²⁰ It is simply skill in any craft. This helps to fix what Xenophanes meant by his own *σοφλή*. Since he was writing a special kind of poetry, it must be to his excellence in this that he refers, and we are wrong to assume that he meant either poetry as such or knowledge as such. He meant simply the philosophical and didactic poetry which he himself wrote and which he believed to be worthy of better rewards than it got. Jaeger, then, gives too precise and too philosophical a meaning to *σοφλή* when he translates it by "spiritual education." No doubt Xenophanes regarded himself seriously as a teacher, but it is not directly to teaching that his words refer. Nor can such a meaning be extracted from his description of his art as *ἀγαθή*. He means simply that it is "good" in the same sense as he calls the boxer "good" in the next line. Each is successful in

¹⁵ Fr. 1.¹⁶ Fr. 19 (fr. 41, Diels).¹⁷ Fr. 107 (fr. 112, Diels).¹⁸ Fr. 21 b, Diels.¹⁹ Athen., X, 454 f.²⁰ *Eth. Nic.* VI, 7, 1, 1141 a 12.

its own way as an example of *τέχνη*. "Good" is so ambiguous a word in English that it is hard not to find some ethical connotation in the Greek word *ἀγαθός*, but it may be doubted whether it had any such connotation in the sixth century,²¹ and it is unlikely that, even if it had, it would be found in connection with such a word as *σοφία*. Nor is there any need to alter *τῆς ἀγαθῆς* in 14 with J. M. Edmonds to *ἡγαθέης*. Greek poets seem to have felt little objection to repeating the same word within the space of a few lines, and *ἡγάθεος* is applied only to places.

There seems, then, no convincing reason why we should accept Jaeger's interpretation of *σοφία* in this poem or deduce from it that Xenophanes illustrates the inevitable collision between philosophers and aristocrats. But it would still be possible to assume with Jaeger that Xenophanes' attack on the games was part of an anti-aristocratic outlook, that as a rebel or a misfit he attacked an institution dear to the established class of nobles. The question of Xenophanes' social status is of some interest and needs consideration. The champions of his comparatively humble origin might claim that his dislike of athletic renown was part of a revolutionary or democratic or at least of a dissatisfied outlook. The basis of such views is the belief that Xenophanes was a professional rhapsode who earned pay for reciting poetry and that he shows that fact here. The evidence for this is the statement of Diogenes Laertius²² that Xenophanes *αὐτὸς ἐρραψώδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*. K. Reinhardt accepts this literally and explains these lines as the complaint of a professional poet who introduces himself to his audience as someone more worthy of their money and honours than the athletes whom they have been watching.²³ But, as Burnet pointed out, "nothing is said anywhere about his reciting Homer, and the word *ῥαψωδεῖν* is used quite loosely for 'to recite.'"²⁴ Indeed it seems impossible that a man who made his living as a reciter of Homer should have been called *Ὀμηροπάτης* by Timon of Phlius²⁵ or have said what Xenophanes said about Homer. To judge by fr. 1, 21-4, he thought it wrong to tell such stories as Homer

²¹ Cf. Snell, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

²² IX, 18.

²³ *Parmenides*, p. 134.

²⁴ *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 127, n. 2.

²⁵ Fr. 60, Diels.

told, and after saying that, he would have found it difficult to recite such passages as the Δῶς ἀπατή or the Θεομαχία. It is in fact unlikely that Xenophanes was a rhapsode in the proper sense of the word or that he endured the feelings of resentment or inferiority which professional poets may sometimes have suffered. On the contrary Fr. 1 shows that he mixed in good company as an equal who was allowed to say what he thought and to dictate his instructions to the other guests in a rich house. It may, moreover, be doubted whether elegiac verses at this date were composed by professional poets. There is no evidence that Tyrtaeus or Archilochus or Mimnermus or Solon or Theognis sang for anything but their own satisfaction, and it is reasonable to assume that Xenophanes was like them.

It is, of course, perfectly true that Xenophanes complains that honours and rewards given to athletes would more suitably be given to him. But this does not mean that he was normally paid for his services. In fact it implies the contrary: he complains because he is not rewarded. Nor does it even mean that he would like to receive money for his poetry. What he wants is not so much money as respect and honour such as are given to athletes. Money was doubtless one way of rewarding athletes, but it was not the only way, and for Xenophanes it is simply a symbol of the honour which he feels to be his due. Nor does it seem likely that in his time poets were paid for a song as they were in the fifth century. So far as lyric poets were concerned, payment seems first to have been made to Simonides,²⁶ and Pindar certainly regarded such payment as a comparatively recent institution when, speaking of earlier times than his own, he said:

ἡ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδής πω τότε ἦν οὐδ' ἐργαίς.²⁷

Rhapsodes were certainly in a different position and may well have derived their living from pay received for recitations, but there is no evidence that other poets were like them in this respect. What Xenophanes wants is honour, and we can see what his conception of the poet's true position was from the words which Homer makes Odysseus speak to Euryalus in Phaeacia:

²⁶ Schol. Aristoph. *Pax* 695.

²⁷ *Isthm.* II, 6; Cf. *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 387.

ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος πέλει ἀνὴρ,
 ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεισι στέφει· οἱ δέ τ' ἐς αὐτὸν
 τερπόμενοι λούσσουσιν, ὃ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει
 αἰδοὶ μειλιχίῃ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν·
 ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ δῶνυ θεὸν ὧς εἰσορόωσιν.²⁸

Xenophanes feels that the man of words should be honoured by his fellow-citizens, and in saying what he does, he advances no new idea. He wishes rather to return to the old honour in which a poet was held before athletes superseded him in popularity and renown. He expects, in fact, to receive the kind of reward that was given to Pindar for his Dithyramb for Athens when he was presented with the right of *προξενία* and a sum of money which is variously given as 1,000²⁹ and 10,000 drachmae.³⁰

Jaeger's argument, then, is inconclusive about either the political views or the social position of Xenophanes. But the argument from his attack on athletic rewards looks stronger. In the fifth century victory in the Games was highly prized by the noble families of Greece, and Pindar erected round it a whole metaphysic of aristocracy, seeing in athletic success the manifestation in *ἀρετή* of those noble inborn qualities which the fortunate few inherited from divine ancestors. To a lesser degree his views were shared by Bacchylides who believed strongly in the importance of success in the games. For these poets important patronage came from nobles like those of Aegina and from Thessalian and Sicilian princes. But it is not certain that in earlier centuries athletic renown was so universally prized by aristocrats. In Sparta of the seventh century Tyrtaeus was careful to say that *ἀρετή* in running or wrestling was not nearly so important as *ἀρετή* on the battlefield:

οὔτ' ἂν μνησαίμην οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθεῖν
 οὔτε ποδῶν ἀρετῆς οὔτε παλαισμοσύνης,
 οὔτ' εἰ Κυκλώπων μὲν ἔχοι μέγεθός τε βίην τε,
 νικῶν δὲ θεῶν Ὀρήκιον Βορέην.³¹

and he justified his preference by the usefulness of good fighters to the city. It is true that Sparta was never quite the same as

²⁸ *Od.* VIII, 169-173.

²⁹ *Isocr.*, XV, 166.

³⁰ *Eustath.*, *Vit. Pind.* 28.

³¹ *Fr.* 9, 1-4.

other Greek cities and that the seventh century was not the sixth. But the fact remains that it was possible for a Greek of the seventh and sixth centuries to be far from being a democrat or rebel and yet to disapprove of undue rewards being given to athletes. Indeed Solon seems to have had some doubts on the subject. For, when he arranged for the city to pay five hundred drachmae to an Olympian victor,³² it looks as if he were trying to regularize and control an existing practise which had got out of control. For, as Diogenes Laertius says,³³ he thought that "it was in bad taste to increase the rewards of these victors and to ignore the exclusive claims of those who had fallen in battle." A similar doubt seems to have been felt by Pythagoras, who was certainly no democrat. He advised men to compete, but not to win, at Olympia; for he thought that victors were not εὐαγεῖς and liable to φθόνος because of their success.³⁴ Something of the same temper may be seen in his famous comparison of life to the Olympic Games. For in that the class of men who correspond to the athletes are those whom ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἱμερος, φιλονεικίαι τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν.³⁵ There was in fact a small current of opinion which was hostile to the excessive honours paid to athletes, and Xenophanes shared it. But this does not mean that he was seriously criticising the aristocratic way of life or really finding himself in conflict with it. The aristocratic society was tolerant of diversity of opinions on this as on other points.

We may perhaps come to a more just appreciation of what Xenophanes said and meant if we consider the position which the great Games held in his time. The sixth century both inherited a tradition of athletics and itself added considerably to it. It seems to have maintained the attitude towards athletics which Homer ascribes to Alcinous:

οὐ μὲν γὰρ μείζον κλέος ἀνέρος ὄφρα κεν ᾗσιν,
ἢ ὃ τι ποσσὶν τε βέξῃ καὶ χερσὶν ἔῃσιν.³⁶

and to have felt, as Tyrtæus knew that men of his time felt, that success in them was an ἀπερά as good in its way as any.

³² Plut., *Sol.* 23.

³³ I, 55, Tra. R. D. Hicks.

³⁴ Porphy., *Vit. Pyth.* 15.

³⁵ Iamblich., *Vit. Pyth.* 58.

³⁶ *Od.* VIII, 147-8.

other. It displayed its belief by the foundation of three new festivals, the Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean, which, if they did not quite equal the Olympian in prestige, were certainly regarded as next in importance to it. The great majority of Greeks enjoyed the Games and admired men who succeeded in them, and when Xenophanes attacked the honours paid to athletes, he attacked a wide and popular belief, which was not confined to a single class but held by most men of his time. So if we would understand the reasons for his attack and the arguments which he used, we must first understand the extraordinary prestige which athletic success had for Greeks of all kinds and places.

The plain fact seems to be that in many parts of Greece the athletic victor was regarded not so much as a superior man but as someone who was almost above man.³⁷ It is significant that Tyrtaeus compares him not to other men or even to heroes but to the Cyclops and the North Wind,³⁸ while "Theognis" compares him also to the North Wind and to the Harpies.³⁹ There is of course some natural exaggeration in these comparisons, but they indicate that those who admired athletic success saw in it something more than mortal. And this admiration found its expression in the honours paid to athletes, in songs composed for their home-coming and in statues erected in their honour. The great development of the Epinician in the sixth century and the number of archaic statues of athletes made in it show the degree of success which attended the victor. In Southern Italy and Sicily respect for athletic success seems to have reached its highest point; and, if Xenophanes was in the West when he wrote these lines, he may well have been moved by the extraordinary honours which the Western Greeks seem to have paid to victors. For in the West the victor seems literally to have become a hero. Philippus of Croton, who accompanied Dorieus to Sicily and died fighting against Segesta, was heroized after his death and honoured with sacrifices "because of his beauty."⁴⁰ But we may suspect that, since he was an *Ὀλυμπιονίκης*, his athletic prowess had something to do with the establishment of his cult. Another man of the West, Euthymus of Epizephyrian

³⁷ Cf. F. M. Cornford in J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, pp. 212-259.

³⁸ Fr. 9, 3-4.

³⁹ 715-6.

⁴⁰ Hdt., V, 47.

Locri, also an Olympic victor, is said to have received similar honours in his own lifetime.⁴¹ No less significant is the story that the famous athlete, Milon of Croton, led his country against Sybaris dressed as Heracles with club and lion-skin.⁴² Heracles was the true type of the *καλλίνικος*, as Euripides shows in several passages of his *Hercules Furens*⁴³ and as Pindar shows by the many myths about Heracles which he inserted in his Epini-cian Odes. His intimate connection with athletic success may best be seen in the song attributed to Archilochus⁴⁴ which was sung by the victor and his friends after the victory, with its words:

τήνελλα
ὦ καλλίνικε χαῖρ' ἀναξ' Ἡράκλεες.

Milon must surely have indicated by dressing himself as Heracles that he was in some sense like Heracles, a man more than human because of his physical strength and prowess. He too was a *καλλίνικος*, like the alleged patron and founder of the Olympic Games. In beliefs of this kind we may see the first stages of the remarkable honours paid to athletes which later led to such a demonstration as that given to Exaenetus, who won in 416 and 412 B. C. He entered his city in a four-horsed chariot, attended by three hundred other chariots drawn by pairs of horses.⁴⁵

Nor were such demonstrations confined to the West. In other parts of Greece the athletic victor was certainly regarded as more than ordinary man. This may be seen clearly in the lines which Simonides wrote for the boxer, Glaucus of Carystus:

οὐδὲ Πολυδέκeos βία
χείρας ἀντίσταντ' ἀν' ἐναντίον αὐτῷ •
οὐδὲ σιδάρεον Ἀλκμήνης τέκος.⁴⁶

These have been explained away, but it is clear from Lucian, who quotes them,⁴⁷ that Simonides put Glaucus above Heracles and Polydeuces. Nor was his choice of heroes accidental. Hera-

⁴¹ Plin., *N. H.* VII, 47.

⁴² Diod., XII, 9.

⁴³ Diod., XIII, 82.

⁴⁴ 582, 681, 789, 961.

⁴⁵ Fr. 28, Diehl; cf. *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 325.

⁴⁶ Fr. 120, Diehl.

⁴⁷ *Pro. Imag.* 19.

cles and Polydeuces were patrons of the Games, and to be compared with them in this way meant that Glaucus also was in some sense more than human. More mysterious is the case of Cleomedes of Astypalea, who was disqualified for killing his opponent but on the instruction of the Delphic Oracle was worshipped as "the last of the heroes."⁴⁸ It looks as if the Astypaleans were determined to make the most of their local athlete, even if he had been disqualified. Even statues of athletes were credited with miraculous powers. That of Theagenes of Thasos fell on an enemy; and, when it was thrown into the sea, Thasos was visited with a failure of crops.⁴⁹ So it was fished up, and in Lucian's time it was said to cure fevers. Similar powers were attributed to the statue of Polydamas of Scotussa at Olympia.⁵⁰ These cases show that the belief in the supernatural qualities of athletic victors was widely spread and that it took the form of comparing them to real heroes.

The idolization of athletic victors was not confined to religious rites and beliefs in miraculous powers. There was also a social and political side to it. Success in the Games was an excellent means to winning popularity and power, and it is significant that tyrants and would-be tyrants competed and won. In the Olympic Games the facts speak for themselves. Myron, successor of Orthagoras at Sicyon, won the chariot-race in 648 B. C. Pheidon of Argos, whom Aristotle regarded as a tyrant,⁵¹ seems to have tried to control the Games and certainly interfered with them.⁵² Cylon, would-be tyrant of Athens, was an Ὀλυμπιονίκης.⁵³ In the sixth century Cleisthenes of Sicyon won the chariot-race,⁵⁴ and among other successful competitors were Peisistratus of Athens⁵⁵ and the elder Miltiades.⁵⁶ And on the negative side the evidence is no less illuminating. From Sparta, where any attempt to establish tyranny was regarded with hostile suspicion, no king competed until the rebellious Demaratus won the chariot-race.⁵⁷ In Athens such victories, common in the days of the tyrants, were viewed with increasing distrust as the fifth century advanced. In the collection of Pindar's *Epini-*

⁴⁸ Paus., VI, 9, 6.

⁴⁹ *Id.*, VI, 11.

⁵⁰ Lucian, *Deor. Cono.* 12.

⁵¹ *Pol.* V, 8, 1310 b 26.

⁵² *Hdt.*, VI, 127.

⁵³ *Id.*, VI, 71.

⁵⁴ *Id.*, VI, 126.

⁵⁵ *Hdt.*, VI, 103.

⁵⁶ *Id.*, VI, 36.

⁵⁷ *Id.*, VI, 70.

cian Odes only two were written for Athenians, *Pythian* VII in 486 B. C. for the ostracised Megacles, and *Nemean* II about the same time for Timodemus of Acharnae, and the absence of later examples shows what public opinion felt on the matter.⁵⁸ The distrust felt at Athens about such victories may be seen from the way in which Thucydides makes Alcibiades defend his own sensational entries in the chariot-race at Olympia and admit candidly that such *λαμπρότης* as his naturally excited *φθόνος* among his fellow-citizens.⁵⁹ Something of the same hostile spirit may be seen in the lines on the great Rhodian athlete Dorieus,⁶⁰ who won three times in the Olympic and eight times in the Isthmian Games,⁶¹ but took a leading part in anti-Athenian politics and was exiled from Athens and Rhodes and condemned in absence to death.⁶² The epigram may be dated soon after 424/3 B. C. and says of him:

πρὶν φύγειν γε πατρίδα
δεινὰ γε χειρὶ πολλὰ ῥέξας ἔργα καὶ βλαία.

No doubt his politics were oligarchic, as his father's seem to have been before him,⁶³ and he was regarded as a dangerous member of society. The connection of games with politics was particularly clear in the West, as the early years of the fifth century show, when Astylus of Croton, Anaxilas of Rhegium, Theron and Xenocrates of Acragas, Gelon and Hieron of Syracuse all won important events. Nor was this interest simply a development of the military tyrannies which flourished after 500 B. C. For at some date between 530 and 520 B. C. Pantares of Gela, the father of the future tyrants Cleandrus and Hippocrates, won the chariot-race,⁶⁴ and recorded the fact with a dedication.⁶⁵ In the West, as elsewhere, the prestige which belonged to any successful athlete was eagerly sought by those who wished to win political power for themselves and their families.

Xenophanes, then, living in Sicily in the sixth century, would

⁵⁸ Bacchylides, *Ode* X is also for an Athenian, but his name and its date are not known.

⁵⁹ Thuc., VI, 18, 3.

⁶⁰ *Anth. Pal.* XIII, 11.

⁶¹ Paus., VI, 7, 4.

⁶² Xen., *Hell.* I, 5, 19.

⁶³ Cf. Pind., *Ol.* VII, 17, 90 ff.

⁶⁴ Hdt., VII, 164.

⁶⁵ Geffcken, No. 20.

have had good reasons for deploring the respect paid to athletes both on moral and on political grounds. In fact both objections might be reduced in Greek language to the same, that such success made a man think too highly of himself and believe that he was not as other men. It was liable to encourage ἵβρις, and that Xenophanes disapproved of ἵβρις may be seen clearly from his attack on the old inhabitants of Colophon who flaunted their wealth before the crowd and were punished for it,⁶⁶—a sentiment which agrees with some lines of Theognis where the conquest of Colophon is regarded as a classic case of the punishment of ἵβρις.⁶⁷ The undue respect for athletic success, of which he speaks, seems to have been curbed to some extent in the fifth century, and Pindar at least was careful not to praise athletes too highly. But his very moderation, his insistence on not wanting too much, are in themselves evidence for a widely spread idolatry of athletes. Pindar was in his own way conscious both of the religious and political aspects of this worship. He never once says that a successful athlete is really more than man,⁶⁸ and at times he warns his patrons against thinking that they are. The clearest case are his words to Phylacides of Aegina in *Isthmian* V, 14-16:

μὴ μάτερε Ζεὺς γενέσθαι· πάντ' ἔχεις,
εἰ σε τούτων μοῖρ' ἐφίκοιτο καλῶν.
θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει.

but a similar message may be seen for the father of Hippocleas

⁶⁶ Fr. 3, Diehl.

⁶⁷ 1103-4.

⁶⁸ Certain passages of Pindar have been taken to convey that the victor is more than man, but all may be satisfactorily explained otherwise. They are:

a) *Ol.* VI, 8-9 ἴστω γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ πεδίλῳ δαιμόνιον πόδ' ἔχων Σωστράτου υἱός

where δαιμόνιον means "by the help of the gods."

b) *Ol.* IX, 28 ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σόφου κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες ἐγένοντ'

where κατὰ δαίμονα does not mean "like a god" but "by god's will" which makes men brave and wise.

c) *Ol.* IX, 110 τοῦδ' ἀνέρα δαιμονία γεγάμεν εὐχέειρα κτλ.

where δαιμονία again means "by god's will."

d) *Nem.* I, 9 κέλνου σὺν ἀνδρὸς δαιμονίαις ἀρεταῖς

where the δαιμόνιαι ἀρεταί are simply the successes which the victor wins through the help of the gods.

of Thessaly, who has the great joy of seeing his son a Pythian victor, but must remember the limits set to human happiness (*Pyth.* X, 27):

ὁ χάλκεος οὐρανὸς οὗ ποτ' ἀμβατὸς αὐτῷ

while Aristophanes of Aegina is reminded that (*Nem.* III, 21)

Οὐκέτι πρόσω

ἀβάταν ἅλα κιώνων ὑπερ Ἡρακλέος περᾶν εὐμαρές.

Nor was Pindar unaware of the political implications of athletic success. He approves of Diagoras of Rhodes because he

ἵβριος ἐχθρὸν ὁδὸν

εὐθυπορεῖ

(*Ol.* VII, 91)

and in his praise of Hieron he is careful to point out that being a king he must look for no more than that:

μήκετι πάπταινε πόρσιον

(*Ol.* I, 114)

while his myth of Tantalus is a solemn warning against any attempt to escape from the mortal state. A similar warning may be seen at the end of *Pythian* I, where Hieron is told that he may choose between being like the good king Croesus or the evil tyrant Phalaris, and we cannot doubt that Pindar was fully conscious of the pride which athletic renown might breed in a man.

Pindar shows that the attitude which Xenophanes seems to attack still existed in his time and needed careful correction. His attitude is based on a moral conviction of the wickedness of ἵβρις, and like him Xenophanes approaches the question in an ethical spirit. He states his objections briefly and uses the language of his time. His first point made at 13 is that it is not δίκαιον to prefer strength to his own good σοφίη. The word δίκαιος has as many meanings as the English "right," and we cannot expect Xenophanes to have decided very exactly what he meant by it. In general δίκαιος seems to mean that which belongs to the established order of things and is for that reason to be approved. Its opposite, ἀδικος, is applied to whatever breaks this order and is associated with κόρος and ἵβρις. This way of thinking is to be seen in Solon's analysis of the political

situation in his time and it takes on a more tendencious air with Theognis. Xenophanes seems to mean that the preference for athletes is not "right" because it is against the established order of things. He could, no doubt, have added that it encouraged ἵβρις in those who were so honoured. He looks back to a past when words were more honoured than athletic success, and his language, though not specifically political, belongs to an aristocratic order of society in which any far-reaching change which seemed to promote the unworthy was regarded as ἄδικον.

Xenophanes' second objection is given in 15-19, where he denies that if men win in the Games,

τοῦνεκεν ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλις εἴη.

The word εὐνομία was often associated with δίκη and is closely connected with it. Hesiod made Εὐνομία, Δίκη, and Ειρήνη daughters of Themis,⁶⁹ and Δυσνομία and Ἀδίκη daughters of Eris.⁷⁰ This ancient view was accepted by Bacchylides, who at XV, 54-55 calls Δίκη

ἀγνᾶς

Εὐνομίας ἀκόλουθον καὶ πινυτᾶς Θέμετος,

and echoed by Pindar at *Olympian* XIII, 6-9:

ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασιγνηταί τε, βάθρον πολλῶν ἀσφαλές,
Δίκα καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνη, τάμ' ἀνδράσι πλούτου,
χρῦσεαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμετος.

In the fifth century Εὐνομία and Δίκα had come to be catch-words of oligarchic and aristocratic societies, as we see from Pindar *Ol.* XIII, 6 of Corinth, IX, 16 of Opus, *Pyth.* V, 67 of Cyrene, and Bacchylides, XIII, 186 of Aegina. In the sixth century it does not seem to have developed so exact a meaning, but stood for the abstract quality of good government. In this sense Solon uses it in an important passage,⁷¹ in which he adopts an idea from Hesiod and contrasts Εὐνομία with Δυσνομία. He says that Δυσνομία brings all evils to a city, but Εὐνομία puts things right and stops ἵβρις and ἄτη. Solon is developing in his own way the doctrine expounded by Hesiod of the different results of good and bad government, and his chief development

⁶⁹ *Theog.* 902.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 230.

⁷¹ *Fr.* 3, 30-39.

lies in his application of the old idea to individual citizens who may produce good or ill according as they act rightly or wrongly. For him *Εὐνομία* is practically a state of mind, or at least a political condition produced by a state of mind. And it is something like this to which Xenophanes must refer when he says that athletic success does not put a city *μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ*. He means that so far from creating that modest frame of mind which is the essence of social stability, the honours paid to athletes will encourage *ὑβρις*.⁷²

Finally, Xenophanes closes with a third point in the words:

σμικρὸν δ' ἂν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ,
εἰ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῇ Πίσαςο παρ' ὀχθας.
οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλιος.

This might be taken to mean that the rich prizes given to victors were a waste of public money and a useless expense. And of course it does mean this. But it also means something more. The phrase is not simply an ironical understatement. It appeals to a general principle, that it is the duty of citizens to enrich their city and that those who govern it should aim at securing such enrichment. The idea is implicit in the passage already quoted from *Olympian XIII* where Peace, the companion of *Εὐνομία* and *Δίκη* is called *τάμ' ἀνδράσι πλούτου*. A more obvious connection may be seen in a vivid document of the aristocratic life, *Homeric Hymn XXX*, where at 11-12 *εὐνομία* is definitely connected with wealth:

αὐτοὶ δ' εὐνομίῃσι πόλιν κάτα καλλιγύναικα
κουρανέουσ', ὄλβος δὲ πολὺς καὶ πλοῦτος ὀπηδεῖ.

This emphasis on the importance of wealth belongs to the aristocratic age, and may be seen most clearly in the *Theognidea*. The situation is nicely summed up in the couplet, 885-6:

εἰρήνη καὶ πλοῦτος ἔχοι πόλιν, ὄφρα μετ' ἄλλων
κωμάζοιμ'· κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔραμαι πολέμου.

But Xenophanes is probably using an older idea even than

⁷² The contrast between *εὐνομία* and *ὑβρις* had been made by Homer, *Od. XVII*, 487, about the gods

ἀνθρώπων ὑβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

this,—the notion of Hesiod that just government makes a land rich and is rewarded by the prosperity of the people:

θάλλουσιν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι διαμπερές· οὐδ' ἐπὶ νηῶν
νίσονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ξείδωρος ἄρουρα. (*Op.* 236-7)

If he had this, or a similar passage, in mind, Xenophanes' meaning is clear. He criticises the rewards given to athletes, because they do not enrich the city, that is, they have not the true sign of a just government in making the country prosperous, and are in fact *ἄδικα*.

Xenophanes then seems to attack these rewards and honours on traditional and conventional grounds which are in origin as old as Hesiod and were current in the aristocratic society of his own day. So far from advancing a revolutionary argument, he appeals to deep-seated convictions which were too familiar to need elaboration. A similar traditionalism may be seen in the three types of reward which he chooses to make his meaning clear. All three are privileges or possessions which belonged by traditional right either to the hereditary ruling class or to a few distinguished men who had done some benefit to the city. Xenophanes does not distinguish between the two classes of beneficiaries because his point is that athletes are neither but get rewards which they do not deserve and to which they are not properly entitled. The first appears in 7:

καὶ κε προεδρίην φανερὴν ἐν ἄγωνι ἄροιο.

The privilege of *προεδρία*, of sitting in the front seats at games and festivals, was an ancient and prized honour. In the main it was given to persons of high rank or to families and even to cities as a reward for benefits rendered. So the Spartans traditionally allowed it to their kings⁷³ and gave it to the Deceleans because of help given long ago to the Tyndarids.⁷⁴ The Delphians gave it to their great benefactor Croesus,⁷⁵ and in Mandrocles' picture of Darius at the Bosphorus the king was depicted as sitting *ἐν προεδρίῃ*.⁷⁶ In the fifth century, at least in Athens, it was granted more freely, and Aristophanes, who was a stickler for old customs, complains of the common demand for it among Athenian generals:

⁷³ Hdt., VI, 57.

⁷⁴ *Id.*, IX, 73.

⁷⁵ *Id.*, I, 54.

⁷⁶ *Id.*, IV, 88.

νῦν δ' ἂν μὴ προεδρίαν φέρωσι καὶ τὰ σιτία,
οὐ μαχεῖσθαι φασιν.⁷⁷

Xenophanes would have agreed with Aristophanes that it was a special privilege which should be given only to a select few.

The second privilege which Xenophanes mentions is that of being fed at the public expense. This might possibly refer to the feasting of Olympic victors in the *πρυτανεῖον* at Olympia, to which Pausanias refers,⁷⁸ but more probably it refers to the free feasting granted to victorious athletes on their home-coming in their own *πρυτανεῖον*. That such honours were given in the fifth century is proved by an Attic inscription of B. C. c. 431-422⁷⁹ and by Socrates' words to his judges that if he must fix his own sentence, it would be *ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι*,⁸⁰ which he claimed to deserve more than any Olympian victor. Such honours were also granted at Carthaea in Ceos⁸¹ and in Paros.⁸² Xenophanes shows that they existed at least in the sixth century, and he complains about them. His reasons for complaint may be seen. Originally the privilege of feasting in the Prytaneum seems to have been rather exclusive. The Prytaneum was regarded as the common hearth of the city,⁸³ and the custom of giving free meals in it was derived from the entertainment dispensed by kings to distinguished guests.⁸⁴ So King Celeus, the founder of Demeter's cult at Eleusis, asked important men to his table, and this was called *πρυτανεῖον*.⁸⁵ In the sixth century the right of eating in the Prytaneum seems to have belonged to hereditary aristocrats or to the benefactors of the city and their descendants. At Athens it was where aristocrats met and sang *σκόλια*,⁸⁶ while the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton had the right to feast in it.⁸⁷ The antiquity of the privilege may be seen from the fact that this right was also awarded to the descendants of the Delphian Cleomantis, who was said to have helped Athens in the time of King Codrus.⁸⁸ In Mytilene

⁷⁷ *Equ.* 575-8.

⁷⁸ V, 15, 8.

⁷⁹ *I. G. I* (ed. min.), 77. Cf. H. T. Wade-Gery in *B. S. A.*, XXXIII, pp. 123-127.

⁸⁰ *Apol.* 36 d.

⁸¹ *Plut., Symp. Prob.* IV, 4, 1.

⁸² *I. G. XII*, 5, 1060.

⁸³ *Schol. Plat. Gorg.* 415 e.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 274, 281, 289.

⁸⁵ *I. G. I* (ed. min.), 77.

⁸⁶ *Schol. Thuc.*, II, 15.

⁸⁷ *Lycurg., In Leocr.* 87.

⁸⁸ J. Burnet, *Plato's Apology*, p. 155.

Sappho's brother, Larichus, served wine in the Prytaneum because he was *εὐγενής*,⁸⁹ and one of Alcaeus' objections to Pittacus seems to have been that he, a man of low origin, held carouses in it.⁹⁰ Even in the fifth century at Tenedos Pindar's *Nemean* XI, with its invocation of

Παῖ Πέας, ᾧ τε πρυτανεῖα λέλογχας, Ἑστιά,

shows that it was still an exclusive place and that the admission of the young Aristagoras to it was perhaps due to his being descended from Orestes.⁹¹ An inscription of the sixth century from Cyzicus grants *ἀτελείην καὶ πρυτανεῖον* to the descendants of two men who may be presumed to have been benefactors of the city.⁹² So when Xenophanes objects to this privilege being given to athletes, he again shows that in his view it was appropriate only to those who held it by ancient right or had really done something for the city.

In objecting to the extension of the right of *σίτησις* Xenophanes again recalls Solon. Two passages show that Solon tried to control the practise and to regularise it. Plutarch (*Sol.* 24) says of him: τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔφ' οὐτέισθαι πολλάκις· ἐὰν δὲ ᾧ καθήκη μὴ βούληται, κολάζει· τὸ μὲν ἡγείται πλεονεξίαν, τὸ δὲ ὑπεροψίαν τῶν κοινῶν; and this makes it clear that, like Xenophanes, he objected to the appearance of some men at the *σίτησις* as an exhibition of *πλεονεξία*, while the penalty attached to the non-appearance of the rightful participants was an attempt to summon the nobles to a proper sense of their duty. Secondly, Athenaeus (IV, 137 e) says that he ordered τοῖς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτουμένοις μᾶζαν παρέχειν in distinction from those who fed ταῖς ἑορταῖς and were to be given ἄρτον. The explanation of this distinction is to be found in a quotation from the *Πτωχοί* of Chionides made by Athenaeus on the point. It seems that a feast was sometimes given to the Dioscuri in the Prytaneum; they received

τυρὸν καὶ φουστὴν δρυπικεῖς τ' ἐλάας καὶ πράσα

which were given by the Athenians *ὑπόμνησιν ποιουμένους τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀγωγῆς*. The distinction which Solon made shows that

⁸⁹ Schol. II. XX, 234.

⁹¹ *Nem.* XI, 33-5.

⁹⁰ Cf. *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 157.

⁹² *G. D. I.* 5522.

he wished to keep the ancient character of *σίησις* in the Prytaneum and did not wish the custom to become simply a social event. It is not clear that he appreciated the religious aspect of it or regarded this as of primary importance. To judge by Plutarch's words he saw the question as one that concerned the city and the attitude of her citizens towards her customs. In this he resembled Xenophanes.

The attitude of Solon and Xenophanes in regarding *σίησις* as a primarily civic right proper to good citizens was a protest against another view which may have been equally ancient. If the Dioscuri were regarded as being present at such a *θεοξένια* we can better understand why athletes were given the privilege of eating in the Prytaneum. For the Dioscuri were essentially patrons of the Games. That is no doubt why Theron asked Pindar to sing his *Olympian* III at a *θεοξένια* at which the Dioscuri and Helen were thought to be present. So too in Sparta *σίησις* was held in the presence of the same divine participants.⁹³ The victorious athlete was regarded as a proper guest for such an occasion in that he had been specially favoured by the Dioscuri. Pindar makes them the source of his glory,⁹⁴ but perhaps in earlier days he was regarded as being somehow more important than this, and himself half divine. Xenophanes protests against too great attention being paid to the athlete, and his reason is not religious but social or ethical. The undue honours are disruptive of good order and against ancient practise.

The third reward is given in the words at 9

καὶ δῶρον ὃ οἱ κειμήλιον εἶη

and since the language recalls the words in which Homer describes the gift offered by Telemachus to Athene⁹⁵ or the cup given by Achilles to Nestor,⁹⁶ it may be assumed to be something valuable, money or the like. Such rewards seem not to have been common in early days, but it is significant that early evidence for them comes from Sicily. Staters of Metapontum, minted about B. C. 500 with the inscription Ἀχελῷον ἀεθλον seem to be prize-money,⁹⁷ and Evans well explains the Syra-

⁹³ *G. D. I.* 4440-4442.

⁹⁴ *Ol.* III, 39.

⁹⁵ *Od.* I, 312.

⁹⁶ *Il.* XXIII, 618.

⁹⁷ Head, *Hist. Numm.*, p. 63.

cusan decadrachms inscribed δόλα as rewards for a victory of B. C. 412.⁹⁸ Before either of these the custom of giving money to Olympian victors is proved in Athens by Solon's limitation of the reward to five hundred drachmae. Xenophanes complains that the athlete does not deserve such a reward:

ταῦτά κε πάντα λάχοι
οὐκ ἔδν ἄξιός ὥσπερ ἐγώ. (10-11)

and implies that while some men, like himself, deserve money, others do not. In this he recalls both Solon and Theognis. Solon made a distinction between just and unjust gain. His unjust gain is sought in ὕβρις, comes οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, and is soon followed by ἀτη.⁹⁹ In general his position may be seen from the line:¹⁰⁰

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται

which implies that money should belong not to κακοί but to ἀγαθοί, and since in his time the words had a largely political meaning, he suggests that money on the whole should belong to those who have a right, by inheritance or "just gain," to it. Theognis takes the point further when he complains that owing to loss of their wealth the ἐσθλοί are now κακοί¹⁰¹ or that men of good birth marry women of bad birth for their money and πλοῦτος ἔμειξε γένος.¹⁰² He believes that the ἀγαθοὶ ought to be rich and the κακοί poor, and any deviation from this he considers wrong. Xenophanes seems to have agreed with him to the extent of thinking that some men deserved money while others did not.

Xenophanes, then, uses arguments and makes points which would appeal to Greek aristocrats of the sixth century like Solon or Theognis, and the basis of his case against the rewards given to athletes is that they are wrong because they upset the existing order and confer honour on those who do not deserve what should properly be given to the city's benefactors. Among these benefactors he classes himself, and so he claims for himself a position which may strike us as unusual for a Greek poet. Rich rewards do not seem commonly to have fallen to poets,

⁹⁸ *Num. Chron.*, 1891, p. 333.

⁹⁹ *Fr.* 1, 9-13.

¹⁰⁰ *Fr.* 4, 9.

¹⁰¹ 53 ff.

¹⁰² 183-192.

though Arion's trip to the West shows that in the right circumstances they could make money.¹⁰³ But Xenophanes' claim is not so much that he wants money as that he deserves it, and he deserves it because his art does good to the city as the athlete's success does not. He is in fact reasserting an old idea that there was an *ἀρετή* of words just as there was of physical strength or birth or martial prowess. The claim was as old as Homer who made Odysseus contrast the ugly and eloquent man with the beautiful and speechless.¹⁰⁴ But it was developed by the elegiac poets and seems to have been almost a traditional subject for them. One poet would praise this type of *ἀρετή*, and another that. So Tyrtaeus in Fr. 9 dismisses the *ἀρεταί* of the athlete, the beautiful, the royal and the eloquent in favour of the soldier who dies for his country. So too "Theognis," 699-718, cynically prefers the *ἀρετή* of wealth to the *ἀρετή* of moderation, wits, eloquence, and speed. These two poems show that among other *ἀρεταί* those of words and wisdom had a place, and no doubt Xenophanes felt that he was qualified to compete under both headings. To suit this traditional type of comparison he used the elegiac, as Tyrtaeus and "Theognis" used it, but he came to a different conclusion from either of them. The presence of poetry, or at least of eloquence, in the other lists shows that it was regarded as a possible claimant to having the best type of *ἀρετή*, and Xenophanes may not have shocked or surprised his audience when he entered a plea for it.

By saying that athletic success does no good to the city and claiming that his own art is better than it, Xenophanes hints that he somehow benefits the city. So he makes a claim which was more than a century later to be elaborated by Aristophanes in his *Frogs*. There at 1009-1010 even Euripides is allowed to say that poets make "men better in cities" and Aeschylus claims that his *Persians* made men fight better (1026-7), that the great poets of the past had all been teachers, (1030-36), that poets do for grown men what school teachers do for boys (1054-5). Xenophanes can hardly be regarded as teaching *τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ἀπλόους ἀνδρῶν* with Homer, but he certainly thought that he was a teacher, and it must be for this that he claimed a reward. The teaching which he claimed for his own

¹⁰³ Hdt., I, 24.¹⁰⁴ Od. VIII, 169-175.

must have been the remarkable physical and theological speculations whose remains are to be seen in his Hexameters, and this elegiac poem is a personal appeal to men to look more seriously at his more serious works. Just as Heraclitus tells men to listen to his λόγος,¹⁰⁵ or Solon prefaces his political warning with the words

ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμός 'Αθηναίους με κελεύει,¹⁰⁶

so Xenophanes claims to be heard because he has something to say that will benefit the city. Nor, if we may judge by a later age, was Xenophanes alone in claiming civic rewards for a poet. For Aristophanes complained of the public neglect of old Cratinus

ὄν χρὴν διὰ τὰς προτέρας νίκας πίνειν ἐν τῷ πρωταλείῳ.

(*Knights* 535)

and makes a very similar point not for himself but for someone whose poetry he admired.

In conclusion, then, we may say that this poem affords no evidence that Xenophanes was a revolutionary in any political sense. It shows that he attached a high importance to his own work, that he disapproved of honours given to men whom he thought unworthy, that, like Tyrtaeus and Solon, he judged the worth of an activity by its use to the city. He presents his case in traditional language and appeals to the deep distrust which the Greeks felt for ὕβρις or disturbance of the existing order. In his moral judgments he was certainly more sensitive and severe than many men of his time, but he was not so destructive or so revolutionary in them as he was in his theology. He was a high-minded member of a society which was conscious of its social and moral obligations. In the sixth century Greek aristocrats were neither all so reactionary as Alcaeus nor so homogeneous in their opinions as some social historians have thought, and the intellectual vigour and range of a class which produced Pythagoras and Heraclitus found a characteristic voice in Xenophanes.

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¹⁰⁵ Fr. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Fr. 3, 30.

MAENIANUM AND BASILICA.

The admirable work achieved by scholars of the 19th century, who had to handle and combine an enormous mass of written and steadily increasing monumental sources, has established fairly well the general outlines of the topography and history of ancient Rome. But, as a matter of course, the very authoritative character of the work by Platner, Bunsen, Jordan, Lanciani, Huelsen, and others often prevented further criticism. The need of getting as much information as possible out of the existing sources for the compilation of comprehensive works has sometimes led to a rather unmethodical solution of single problems; and the results, in turn, have been accepted by modern scholars without further inquiries. One such case involves the traditions about the Maeniana in the Roman Forum; and since very important aspects are involved, both of the appearance of the Roman Forum in an early period and of the general history of ancient architecture, it seems worth while to review the evidence.

Let us begin with a resumé of current opinion as it is expressed in most of the outstanding works on Roman topography as well as in more specialized discussions of our subject.¹ Re-

¹ Niebuhr, *Römische Geschichte*, III, p. 167; Bunsen-Platner, *Beschreibung der Stadt Rom*, II, 1, pp. 43 ff.; Becker, *Handbuch der römischen Altertümer*, I, 1843, p. 296, note 500; p. 300, note 19; Ossan, *Commentatio de Columna Maenia*, 1844; Reber, *Mitteilungen der K. K. Zentralkommission*, Vienna, XIV (1869), pp. 35 ff.; Lange, *Haus und Halle*, 1885, pp. 153 ff.; Jordan, *Topographie*, I, 2, p. 345, note 43; Huelsen, *Roem. Mitt.*, VIII (1893), pp. 84 ff.; Gilbert, *Geschichte und Topographie der Stadt Rom*, III, 1890, pp. 165, 206, 212 ff.; Richter, *Topographie der Stadt Rom*, 2nd ed., 1901, pp. 85, 98; *idem*, in Baumelster, *Denkmaeler*, III, p. 1462; Lafaye, in Daremberg-Saglio, *s. v. "Maenianum,"* p. 149; Thédénat, *Le Forum romain*, 1904, pp. 69; 98, note 5; 137; 139; 110; O'Connor, *The Graecostasis of the Roman Forum and its Vicinity* (*Bull. Univ. Wisconsin*, 99), 1904, pp. 188 ff.; *Real-Enc.*, XIV, p. 245 (Ebert); pp. 248 ff. (Muenzer); suppl. IV, p. 489 (Vierkandt); Stuart Jones, *Companion to Roman History*, 1912, pp. 100, 132, 136; Leroux, *Les origines de l'édifice hypostyle*, 1913, pp. 269 ff., 276 ff.; Marchetti, *Bull. Com.*, 1914, p. 106; Huelsen, *Forum and Palatine*, 1928, p. 10; Platner-Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary*, 1929, *s. v. "Columna Maenia,"* pp. 131 ff.; *ibid.*, *s. v. "Basilica Porcia,"* p. 82; *s. v. "Tabernae,"* p. 505; Müfíd, *Stoekwerkbau der Griechen und Römer*, 1932, p. 76; Böthius, *Opuscula Arch.*, I (1935), pp. 170, 183 ff., 189 ff.

duced to a few words, the modern conception is the following: the Maeniana, upper balconies or galleries from which spectators could look down at the games in the Forum, were first erected in the year 318 B. C. by the censor C. Maenius over porticoes in front of tabernae. After the battle of Antium this famous man had been honored with a column (in the Forum close to the Comitium) which later stood in front of the Basilica Porcia, erected by the censor Cato in the year 184 B. C. Thus, in the early second century B. C. there had been a column in the neighborhood of a house which its owner, another Maenius, had sold to Cato for the erection of the Basilica. The younger Maenius reserved for himself and his descendants the right to erect a tribune in order to have a privileged seat during the games in the Forum. This tribune was somehow connected with the Columna Maenia, i. e. the honorary monument of his ancestor.³

This whole theory is, as we shall see, highly improbable. It is based on an attempt to conciliate some obvious contradictions in the various sources, which in themselves offer no evidence for the existence of porticoes in the Roman Forum in the Republican age.³ Furthermore the original Maeniana are no-

³ This theory is seldom to be found exactly in the way in which it has been summarized here. In most cases the modern writers have scattered their remarks in different places in dealing with the various features concerned. These have been combined here. Some varieties will be discussed later.

³ This is true in spite of the theories of Reber, *op. cit.*, pp. 50 ff., and most other references to the subject. The tradition of the existence of porticoes in the age of the kings (Dionys. Hal., 3, 67, 4; Liv., 1, 35, 10) is of course legendary. It may have been based on a misinterpretation of traditions about the first column-porches connected with temples in the Forum. Nowhere are porticoes mentioned for republican times. I see no reason for the assumption that the games represented in the fresco of the Tomba delle Bighe from the early 5th century B. C. take place in a Forum. There, truncated columns are supporting low tribunals on which the masters are seated, while slaves are making love beneath them. They are not to be confounded with architectural porticoes (Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 189 ff.), but have to be compared with the supporting truncated column so common on south Italian vases, especially with those supporting the low pulpita of the Phlyakes, an interesting feature of Italian woodwork. Besides, such an interpretation of a fresco of such an early period would conflict with all the existing traditions about the origin of the Maeniana in Rome.

where in our sources connected with the Tabernae, and besides, the tradition about an honorary column of C. Maenius, the victor of Antium, is at best uncertain. On the other hand, very reliable and early traditions give a picture which differs widely from the modern theory.

The key sources are the following:

A. "Maenius, cum domum suam venderet Catoni et Flacco censoribus, ut ibi basilica aedificaretur, exceperat sibi *ius unius columnae, supra quam tectum proiceret* ex provolantibus tabulatis, unde ipse et posteri eius spectare munus gladiatorium possent, quod etiam tum in foro dabatur. *Ex illo igitur columna Maenia vocitata est: † causis eiusmodi soliti*" (Pseudo-Ascon. ad Cic., Div. in Caec., p. 201 [Stangl]: Lemma "ad columnam Maeniam").⁴

B. "Hic fertur domo sua, quam ad Forum spectantem habuerat, divendita unam columnam sibi excepiisse, unde gladiatores spectaret; quae ex eo Maenia columna nominabatur. Cuius et Lucilius sic meminit: (Maenius) columnam cum peteret" (Porphyrus ad Hor., Serm., I, 3, 21: Lemma "Maenius absentem Novium cum carperet"; compare Lucil., Frag. 1203 [Marx]).

C. "Maeniana appellata sunt a Maenio censore, qui primus in foro *ultra columnas tigna proiecit, quo ampliarentur superiora spectacula*" (Festus, p. 120 [Lindsay]). Compare Paul. Diac. (p. 121 [Lindsay]), "Maeniana aedificia a Maenio sunt appellata. Is enim primus ultra columnas extendit tigna, quo ampliarentur superiora."

D. "Maenius collega Crassi in foro *proiecit materias, ut essent loca, in quibus spectantes insisterent*, quae ex nomine eius Maeniana appellata. Haec et solaria quia patent soli. Post haec alii lapide, alii materia aedificavere portibus⁵ Maeniana et foribus⁶ et domibus adiecerunt" (Isid., Orig., 15, 3, 11).

E. "Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt unde et *columna Maenia*" (Nonius, I, p. 91 [Lindsay]).

It is perfectly clear that these five passages are unanimous in so far as the type of construction of the original Maeniana is concerned; or, at least, there is nothing in the shorter passages which would contradict the statements given by the more detailed

⁴ Compare *Schol. Bob. ad Cic., Pro Sest.*, p. 137 (Stangl); *Pseudoasconiana*, p. 51 (Stangl).

⁵ porticibus?

⁶ foris?

descriptions. The original Maeniana, thus, were believed to have been projecting upper balconies (A, C, D) constructed in order to make room for spectators (A, B, C, D) in the higher parts of a building at the edge of the Forum (A, B, C), and they projected from a portico (A, B, C) over columns (A). Any connection with tabernae is nowhere mentioned for this early type. Indeed tabernae are first mentioned in a passage of Vitruvius referring to conditions of his own time.⁷

Even if all the sources agree about the original character of the Maeniana, they do not agree in regard to the date, the inventor, and, implicitly, the place in which they first were used. In these respects the sources are divided into two classes: one of these is composed of A, B, and apparently E; the other of C and D. The former class ascribes the invention to an otherwise unknown Maenius, who lived in the early second century B. C., and connects the erection of the first Maeniana with the construction of the Basilica Porcia. The second class, without indicating local or other details, ascribes the same invention to the most famous member of the Gens Maenia and to a period four generations earlier. If we have to make a choice between these two traditions without regard for other considerations, it seems clear that those sources that contain more local and historical details and, at the same time, refer to a person only mentioned in this connection have to be regarded as more reliable for this problem. It is easy to understand how in the second tradition a famous man became substituted for an otherwise unknown one, but the opposite process is hardly conceivable. Moreover it is obvious that the first class is also preferable from the point of view of the origin of the two sets of traditions. As a matter of fact, it is clear that this class goes back to Lucilius,⁸ i. e. to an

⁷ See below, note 39.

⁸ This fact, generally acknowledged, has also been accepted by Huelsen (*Roem. Mitt.*, VIII, pp. 84 ff.). In spite of that he and others believe the whole story to be legendary. Very strangely, Marx, *Lucilius*, II, p. 382, states on one side that Lucilius had told a story which he might have heard as a child, when the younger Maenius was still alive. But on the other hand he follows the general opinion about the earlier invention of the Maeniana and the honorary column. But what, if not details referring to the whole bargain told by Lucilius, could have inspired the Scholiasts?

author who saw the buildings to which he referred and who lived close to the events. The class C-D, on the other hand, is based on the book of Verrius Flaccus, who no longer could see the Basilica Porcia and the column. While he could easily ascribe the Maeniana to the famous censor, it is inconceivable that Lucilius would have talked about events of his own century without accurate information. Therefore, most modern authors agree that sources A-B are talking about something which existed in reality, although generally they made desperate efforts to distinguish the balcony erected by the younger Maenius from the Maeniana. That this is impossible was shown by a comparison of the description given in all the texts. Although A and B do not use the word "Maenianum" (because they are not commenting on this term but on the Columna Maenia), it is perfectly clear that they describe the same structures as C and D. Furthermore some modern theories are based on the assumption that the earlier Maenius built balconies in the Forum and that four generations later a descendant of the same man repeated the operation, which at that time so startled the minds of his contemporaries that he became known for this act alone! Moreover we have no evidence that there existed in the Roman Forum of the Republic, besides the porches of temples—and we shall see, since the second century B. C., basilicae—façades with columns or porticoes of some kind, which the sources C and D, as well as A and B, require.* The natural conclusion is that the earliest Maenianum was built by the younger Maenius in connection with the Basilica Porcia. This is the invention which Lucilius saw and which a later writer, probably Verrius Flaccus, wrongly ascribed to the famous Maenius of the fourth century B. C.

In this respect the passage of Nonius (E) is especially important, since he apparently follows the earlier and better tradition in mentioning the simple name Maenius and tying up the invention of the Maeniana with the traditions about the Columna Maenia. Undoubtedly, here as in A (where, of course, "unius columnae" and "columna Maenia" are referring to the same column) and in B the column from which the balcony is said to have projected is the Columna Maenia, which got its name, according to this tradition, from the stipulation made by Maenius

* See above, note 3.

for himself and his descendants when he sold his house to the state.

At this point we meet a second and grave difficulty of the modern theory. The Columna Maenia mentioned in our sources A, B, E was a well-known feature of the Roman Forum.¹⁰ Pseudo-Asconius and Porphyrio (i. e. their source, Lucilius, who had seen this monument which had been destroyed by the imperial age)¹¹ say that the Columna Maenia connected, at least locally, with the Basilica Porcia, over which the younger Maenius erected his Maenianum. If such a column had been inscribed

¹⁰ See Platner-Ashby, *s. v.*

¹¹ Occasionally, one reads that the Columna Maenia still stood upright in the 4th century A.D. (Platner-Ashby, *op. cit.*, *s. v.* "Columna Maenia") because of its being mentioned by Symmachus. This is a typical example of the wrong use of quotations from ancient authors without a consideration of the real meaning of the passage. In his typical learned and obscure style, Symmachus discusses in two letters (*Ep.*, V, 54 and 66) a lawsuit about a piece of real estate property. In this case claims have been made on a house which is owned by the client of Symmachus. The house had been owned nearly a century by that family. Now suddenly a certain Eusebius claims that before it was sold to these people the former owner had encumbered it with a debt which had not been repaid. Symmachus claims, in turn, that the family of the present owners had nothing to do with this affair, and that the claims of the opponents went back to a very remote time. In his invective against them he speaks several times despisngly about the procurator of Eusebius, whom he characterizes as an obscure pettifogger who by tricks makes perfectly unjust claims, which, furthermore, have been outlawed by the long period of the present ownership. And in this sense he says among other unflattering remarks: "nunc procurator a columna Maenia multis huiusmodi sutelis foro cognitus inveterata iura supplicationibus quatit, . . ." (*Ep.*, V, 54, 3). The man tries "from the Maenian column" to destroy rights which have been established for a long time. In this way he refers to a monument symbolizing "prehistoric" claims of property rights which are conflicting with present conditions. The man is said to lay claim "from the Maenian column" because he is referring to real estate rights of a very old time, for which obstinate people are fighting even as Maenius did, and which have been outlawed by the later evolution even as the Maenian column had been. The joke is this, that this column does not exist any more and it was already an anachronism in its own time. Instead of being a proof for the survival of the column, which is contradicted even by Pliny, this passage shows that Symmachus and other people of his time were very familiar with the tradition about the younger Maenius and the Maenianum.

with a document confirming the stipulation, it would naturally have been named the Columna Maenia.¹² And there does not exist among the passages of ancient writers referring to the locality of the Columna Maenia (with the exception of one relatively late author) any statement which would contradict this identification. In most of these passages we have only references to a column near the Comitium connected with the Basilica Porcia. A column, especially one standing on the corner, belonging to a portico on the façade of the Basilica that faced the Comitium would be in perfect harmony with the indications given in the sources. Such a place could easily be called "Ad Columnam Maeniam" and be used as the customary seat of the *triumviri capitales* or the plebeian tribunes. That the Columna Maenia was only a part of the Basilica Porcia is confirmed by the much discussed tradition about the plan of the plebeian tribunes to enlarge the room available for their customary seat¹³ by removing the column.¹⁴ If our suggestion is right, this could easily be done by reducing the extent of the portico on the façade of the Basilica at one corner. We learn, moreover, that the younger Cato started his oratorical career with an effective speech against the removal of the Columna Maenia. In my opinion, this speech is a strong confirmation of the fact that the column was a part of the building erected long before by a member of the family of the young orator.¹⁵ As the basilicae in the Roman

¹² The parallel is the "pila Horatia" (Dionys. Hal., 3, 22, 9; Platner-Ashby, *op. cit.*, s. v.) which, incidentally, later was a corner pillar of the Basilica Aemilia, whatever it might have been originally.

¹³ The subsellium of the tribuni did not have a fixed place and could be set up anywhere: Mommsen, *Droit public romain*, 3rd ed., 1892, II, p. 40, n. 3; Daremberg-Saglio, s. v. "subsellium." But in republican times they had, of course, a customary seat in the forum. The tribunal of the Basilica Porcia (so Lange, *op. cit.*, pp. 180 ff.) is excluded for the very reason that the tribuni were not entitled to sit on a tribunal (see also Gilbert, *op. cit.*, III, p. 165). The legend reported by Valer. Max., 2, 2, 7, about the tribuni examining the decrees of the senate on a seat before the entrance of the Curia, because they were not allowed to enter the building, confirms the tradition about their customary seat in front of the Basilica Porcia.

¹⁴ Plut., *Cat. Min.*, 5, 1.

¹⁵ Plutarch indicates this directly in stating at the beginning the fact that the basilica was a "dedication" by the elder Cato (Leroux, *op. cit.*, p. 278, is not fair in his criticism, since he creates the impression that

Forum were named from the families of the executives who had cared for their erection, Porcia, Sempronia, Opimia, Aemilia, and Julia (although in reality they were not dedications by private men), they were regarded—as it is especially known for the Aemilia—as a kind of family monument. If thus the younger Cato started his career with a speech delivered for the sake of the Columna Maenia, which was at least locally related to the Basilica Porcia, the natural explanation is that he fought against a damage threatening the appearance of the monument of his ancestors in the Forum.

As a matter of fact the obvious explanation of the Columna Maenia as a part of a portico on the façade of the Basilica Porcia, identical with the column on which the young Maenius reserved the rights of a balcony in the year 184 B. C., is contradicted by only two statements of one and the same source, the elder Pliny. And this is the only reason why modern interpreters in general believe either that there once existed two columns connected with the Maenian family or that the whole tradition of the balcony of the younger Maenius had nothing to do with the Basilica Porcia.¹⁶ The following passage from

the Basilica and the column are mentioned together only incidentally by Plutarch). The identification of the column with the Columna Maenia is not absolutely sure, but at least the most obvious: Huelsen, *Roem. Mitt.*, VIII, p. 93; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, III, p. 165.

¹⁶ There exist strange solutions of the problem in modern literature, of which I give only a few examples, illustrating the confusion which arises from any kind of compromise between the contradicting sources. Thédenat, *op. cit.*, p. 139, thinks that the younger Maenius used the honorary column of the elder for the balcony (so earlier Bunsen, *op. cit.*). That would imply a former position of the official monument on private ground. Indeed Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 213, believed that the elder Maenius had secured the right to erect a balcony on a column on his private ground, which then was preserved in the bargain by his descendant. Marchetti, *op. cit.*, thinks that the younger Maenius preserved a column from the former structure of the house as free standing but different from the Columna Maenia; Ossan, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff., on the other hand, had suggested that the honorary column existed and also an unrelated structure preserved from the house and provided with the balcony. Muenzer, in turn (*op. cit.*), discards the tradition about the younger Maenius, not without hesitation (p. 248), but he assumes that the original honorary column was destroyed when the Basilica was erected (what was then the later column?) and denies that the Atrium Maenium was a house, suggesting that it was called so only because of the vicinity

Pliny is the only source which mentions an honorary column erected for the elder Maenius after the victory of Antium among the oldest monuments of this kind in Rome: "antiquior columnarum (*scil.* celebratio) sicuti C. Maenio, qui devicerat priscos Latinos . . . , item C. Duillio . . . quae est etiam nunc in foro" (34, 20). One important fact is obvious from this: the column did not exist in the time of our witness. It has been stated by Muenzer¹⁷ that the passage referring to Maenius, in so far as some historical facts (here discarded) of the preceding war are concerned, follows a good old annalistic tradition. But, on the other hand, Muenzer himself has stated that this chapter of Pliny was composed from various sources. Thus it seems not at all certain that such a generally reliable source as Varro, who has been used elsewhere in this chapter, has to be held responsible for the mention of the Columna Maenia as an honorary column.¹⁸ In addition, this passage of Pliny is explicitly contradicted¹⁹ by an earlier and reliable source, Livy, who it is absolutely certain directly used sources of a period when the Columna Maenia still stood in the Forum Romanum. He does not mention it as an honorary monument for the older Maenius, but he says (8, 13)²⁰ that the two victors who shared the triumph of the war got two equal honorary monuments in the

of the column. Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 170, 190, accepts the theory of the original Maeniana being upper balconies of the tabernae-porticoes around the forum, but suggests that the Columna Maenia was either a remnant of a former façade-portico of the Maenian house or—rightly—a column of the porch of the basilica (p. 183). Thus he seems to accept both the conflicting traditions about the origin of the Maeniana. It has to be noted that the sources do not mention the preservation of a column but the stipulation of a right in the new building.

¹⁷ *Beitraege zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius*, 1897, pp. 288 ff.

¹⁸ Even in this case a mistake would be possible. See, for a list of Varronian errors, Muenzer, *op. cit.*, p. 144. On the other hand, the Varronian text is hardly preserved here, although some facts may have been drawn from it. "Etiam nunc" refers almost certainly to Pliny's own time.

¹⁹ Muenzer, *op. cit.*, p. 289, states rightly that there is no way to conciliate the two traditions, as several of the authors mentioned in note 1 tried to do, especially in assuming that the statues mentioned by Livy stood on columns.

²⁰ Compare Eutropius, 3.

form of equestrian statues in the Forum, a tradition which is confirmed elsewhere. Since Niebuhr, however, most modern scholars have discarded this testimony in favor of the obviously less reliable information given by Pliny. If we consider the unanimity of our other sources and at the same time the clear contradiction between Pliny and Livy, this procedure seems thoroughly unjustified.

Indeed, such a criticism would probably never have gained favor unless there had been a side glance at a second reference given by Pliny. It seems necessary to repeat this second well-known passage because of its considerable contribution to the misinterpretation of the sources: "Duodecim tabulis ortus tantum et occasus nominatur; *post aliquot annos* adiectus est et meridies, accenso consulum id pronuntiante, cum a curia inter Rostra et Graecostasin prospexisset solem; *a columna Maenia ad carcerem inclinato sidere* supremam pronuntiavit, sed hoc serenis tantum diebus *usque ad primum Punicum bellum* . . . M. Varro *primum* (scil. horologium) statutum in publico . . . tradit bello Punico primo . . ." (7, 212-3). This passage is the most valuable source for the topography of this region of the Roman Forum,²¹ and leads to the localization of the Columna Maenia in a place somewhat east of the Carcer. This would, in my opinion, be the right place for the southern column of a portico on the eastern façade of the Basilica Porcia. However that might be, the passage has wrongly been considered as evidence for the existence of a Maenian column before the First Punic war and thus different from the column connected with the Basilica Porcia, although Pliny might have interpreted his source Varro²² in this sense due to his own well-known method of compiling excerpts. That Varro himself did not follow sources of the period he is discussing for details of buildings he mentions is absolutely clear. He mentions, for example, the Carcer. We know from Tenney Frank's fundamental studies that this building, originally a well-house and only considerably later used as Carcer,²³ was not constructed prior to the third century B. C. As a carcer it did not exist in the period preceding the First

²¹ Compare Huelsen, *Röm. Mitt.*, loc. cit.; O'Connor, *op. cit.*

²² Muenzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 260 and 353.

²³ *Roman Buildings of the Republic*, 1924, pp. 38 ff.; Lugli, *Capitolium*, VIII (1932), pp. 232 ff.

Punic war and as a building for other uses it was certainly not constructed until the last years of the custom discussed by Varro. On the other hand, the phrase "post aliquot annos" shows clearly that Varro is talking about something that was customary from at least the 5th century B. C. down to the middle of the 3rd century. Thus the Columna Maenia too, even if it had been erected in the late 4th century, would have existed during only a short part of the period mentioned. Consequently Varro could not have had any other intention than this: to illustrate the various points of these observations with topographical details of his own period, which is a quite natural idea. Pliny, however, in his obviously reduced excerpt did not preserve the explicit expression of this intention, however that might have been indicated. The passage as it is, therefore, remains a most valuable document for the topography of single buildings in Varro's period, but it proves neither that the Carcer existed and was used as such before the First Punic war nor that there was a Columna Maenia in this early period. It might be true, on the other hand, that the whole tradition of the column of the elder Maenius is rooted in the misinterpretation of Varro, who referred to it loosely in connection with customs prevailing before the middle of the 3rd century B. C.

The conclusions we reach from the preceding analysis are as follows: first, that there never existed an honorary column for the dictator Maenius and that he had nothing to do with the invention of the Maeniana; second, that the Columna Maenia was a column on the façade of the Basilica Porcia, probably on its southeastern corner; third, that this column was called Maenia because the owner of one of the houses, sold to give room for the construction of the basilica, reserved for himself and his descendants the right to erect over it a projecting wooden balcony in order to look down from there upon the games in the Forum. This balcony as a new and unique feature in the Forum was called Maenianum; a name which was later extended to similar constructions. It was probably a small wooden platform on wooden beams and accessible by means of a wooden stairway.

The facts discussed above are very important for the history of the Roman Forum and of the forensic basilica. At the be-

ginning of the 2nd century B. C. the Roman Forum was not only surrounded by temples, a few public buildings, and rows of tabernae, but by private houses such as the one belonging to the Gens Maenia. This tradition about these houses in the northwestern corner of the Forum, given by our sources A and B, is confirmed independently by a well-known passage of Livy: "Cato atria²⁴ duo, Maenium et Titium in lautumiis, et quattuor tabernas in publicum emit basilicamque ibi fecit, quae Porcia appellata est" (39, 44). That the "atria" here are synonymous with "domus" is absolutely clear from the story of the invention of the Maeniana. The house of the Maenii, at least, must have faced the Forum; the house of Titius might have been the neighboring house to the west on the clivus. A similar complex of private property on the very edge of the Forum formed still later the house of the Scipios on the south side; this too was sold for the erection of a basilica, the Sempronia, only 15 years later. It was situated in the eastern part of the area of the later Basilica Julia. "Ti. Sempronius . . . aedes P. Africani pone Veteres ad Vortumni signum lanienasque et tabernas coniunctas in publicum emit basilicamque faciendam curavit, quae postea Sempronia appellata est" (Liv., 44, 16).²⁵ The plural "aedes" might indicate a double house, since the earlier Basilica Porcia also occupied the space of two domus. We know of such double houses,²⁶ which were formed by adding a neighbour's house to one's own property, from the contemporary Tufa-period in Pompeii. And especially interesting, again as compared with Pompeii, is the fact that for the houses on the ground of the later Basilica Porcia as well as of the Sempronia "tabernae coniunctae" are mentioned. These were, of course, the façade

²⁴ Livy uses "atrium" for house also in 5, 41, 7; compare Varro, *Men.*, 36. For further evidence, see *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s. v. "atrium," p. 1102. In view of the uniform traditions, it is impossible to assume another meaning here. See also: Wistrand, *Orologia archaeologica*, 1932, pp. 57 ff.; Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

²⁵ See, for this passage, the earlier remarkably good observations of Reber, *op. cit.*, p. 55, and recently the excellent discussion of Wistrand, *op. cit.* and Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

²⁶ *Baugeschichtliche Untersuchungen am Stadtrand von Pompeji* (henceforth quoted as *Unters.*), 1936, pp. 171 and 175. For Rome, *ibid.*, p. 203. The term "aedes" seems more to suggest this type than a house with atrium and peristyle (so Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 183).

shops²⁷ so well known from the Pompeian Tufa houses. The workshops mentioned in connection with the house of the Scipios had exactly the same type of tabernae structures as can be shown by another Varronian passage (*L. L.*, 8, 55) describing the "lanienae" as a special kind of "tabernae." The house of the Scipios, as Boëthius has already pointed out, must have had exactly the aspect of the rich patrician houses of the Pompeian Tufa-period with their rows of shops on the façade. Moreover I have recently shown²⁸ that in Pompeii too in the 2nd century and even later there existed at the edge of the Forum, at least in its southern part, private domus with shops, in part dating back to the Tufa-period. The Italic Fora including the Forum Romanum were, as expressions of a different society, unlike the Greek Agora. The latter, even when it was not laid out on regular lines, was at least from the fifth century on a public space surrounded only by public buildings, religious and profane. In Italy (in Rome down to the second century B. C. and in provincial towns even later) the aspect of the Forum was much more like that of medieval European markets. Comparable to the combination of churches, town halls, shops, and patrician houses in these places, the Roman Forum united the socially leading element of patrician society—in the form of stately patrician houses²⁹—with temples, administration buildings, and tabernae into a picturesque whole.

On the ground of several such private houses purchased by the state there arose the earliest basilica in the Roman Forum,³⁰ a new type which, shortly before, had been introduced into Rome in the fishmarket nearby.³¹ The use of private grounds is quite natural, since the space already occupied by temples and administration buildings was sacred. The same process was repeated in Pompeii, where the basilica also covered the area of earlier

²⁷ Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 183 ff.

²⁸ *Unters.*, p. 172.

²⁹ They derived their privileged place from a royal assignation: Liv., 1, 35, 10.

³⁰ Liv., 26, 27, 3 (year 210 B. C.): "comprehensa postea privata aedificia—neque enim tum basilicae erant . . ." See Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

³¹ Plaut., *Capt.*, 815; *Curcul.*, 472. See Leo's comments on these passages against doubts about the authenticity and significance. From Plautus we hear only of a basilica in the fishmarket, close to, but not directly in, the Forum (Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 192).

private houses and where later monumental buildings in the southern part of the forum gradually pushed away the existing domus (the "Curiae" and the so-called Comitium, the latter preserving in its façade the tabernae-front of a Tufa-period house).³² As a matter of fact, the evolution of the Roman forensic basilica on the market place was conditioned by the existence of private property on the edges of the fora, and this factor must be considered whether in origin the basilica was Greek or Italian. In Greece, since the monumentalization began earlier and only public buildings surrounded the Agora, this type of basilica did not play an important rôle except in such rare cases as the new layout at Corinth after its destruction. Pompeii and Paestum, where porticoes screen the various public and private buildings on the periphery of the forum, are in every respect compromises between the Greek and Roman type. The Roman Forum also never lost the traces of its individualistic growth and never got a unified monumental frame. The forensic basilica of the early imperial age, when long colonnades began to extend along the edge of the open places, represents in its evolution another compromise between Roman and Greek tradition.³³

The traditions about the invention of the Maeniana show that the Basilica Porcia, at least, had a portico on the façade facing the Forum.³⁴ This situation has important bearing on the form of the earliest basilicae at Rome. In view of the topographical situation this portico could be only on the small side, since there was no room for a building facing the open space with its long side.³⁵ Thus the Basilica Porcia belonged to the same type of

³² *Unters.*, pp. 137, 163, 166, 200, 172, 134 ff., 152, 157 ff., 185 ff.

³³ This is not the place to discuss the origin of the Basilica. See now the interesting suggestions by Val. Mueller, *A. J. A.*, XLI (1937), pp. 250 ff. It seems to me that his theory does not account sufficiently for the difference in dates of his various types and the possibility that several of them are only later modifications. This development, not only important for the history of single buildings but also intimately connected with the whole history of the Forum, I tried to sketch in *Real-Enc.*, VI, s. v. "Staedtebau," pp. 2062 ff. and 2071 ff. Brilliant observations were added by Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 191 ff.

³⁴ This conclusion has already been drawn by Reber, *op. cit.*, p. 50 and Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 159. See also Boëthius, above, note 16.

³⁵ Reber, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff.; Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 159; Huelsen, *Roem. Mitt.*, VIII, pp. 88 ff.

longitudinal building as those that faced open spaces with a porch on one small side which we know from the earliest basilicae in Italy, those at Pompeii⁸⁶ and (somewhat modified) at Ardea. It is natural to assume that the Sempronia, chronologically intermediate between the Porcia and these buildings, had the same plan; in this case, however, the building, running with its long axis parallel to the Forum, was separated from it by the Tabernae Veteres and faced the beginning of the Vicus Tuscus. In the same way the Basilicae Julia and Aemilia later faced the ends of the streets at the entrance of the Forum, but they now had another portico-façade extending along the Forum on the long sides too. For the Sempronia also we have indirect evidence for the existence of a portico on its façade; indeed we hear from Varro that this building was likewise provided with Maeniana (Plin., 35, 113).⁸⁷ Since a single large picture at one time filled the whole rear wall of this balcony, there can be no doubt that the Maeniana extended only along the short façade of the Basilica⁸⁸ toward the end of the Vicus Tuscus. Such Maeniana at the very corner of the Forum could, of course, be used for spectators at the games. In any case, the relation of the Sempronia and Porcia in type is clear. The balcony of the Sempronia, extending the scheme which for a unique reason had first been used in the Basilica Porcia, might in this case have occupied the whole length of the façade. The next step in the development is mentioned by Vitruvius: the Maeniana extend over porticoes surrounding the whole forum.⁸⁹ Vitruvius, fol-

⁸⁶ See the recent discussion of Mueller (above, note 33); earlier, Lange, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff.

⁸⁷ "sub veteribus" here is a short form for Basilica Sempronia, see also Plin., 35, 25; Cicero refers also to these Maeniana, *loc. cit.*, 2, 70: they would be called "vetera Maeniana" in his time because of their age, without alluding to the tabernae veteres in the vicinity. The meaning is that the shadow of the "good old" Maeniana offers its protection likewise to the good old academic philosophy. "Sub novis," in this passage, refers of course to the tabernae novae on the other side of the Forum.

⁸⁸ Ebert, *op. cit.*, is obviously wrong in assuming a gallery over the whole length of the Basilica.

⁸⁹ 5, 1, 1. It seems to me methodically wrong to confound this later passage with the traditions about the 2nd century B. C. The very fact that in the late 2nd century temporary wooden tribunals were erected around the Forum on the occasion of the games (Boëthius, *op. cit.*,

lowing the old Roman tradition, still regards the Maeniana not as simple upper stories of stoae of the Greek type but as projecting wooden balconies. An inscription from Aeclanum mentioning "(Ma)eniana circ<a> forum"⁴⁰ may refer to this type. Later, with the disappearance of the old primitive features of the Roman market places, the word became a rather vague designation for various kinds of upper galleries, balconies, etc.

It seems clear that the history of the Maeniana as a characteristic feature of the Roman republican forum started from a single and rather capricious invention of one man. If this is true, as I tried to prove, it is obvious that the invention itself was rooted in the traditional structural features of its period, and that its success and development were made possible only because of this intimate connection with an existing "milieu" of architecture. In this curious architectural type we again meet that strange and characteristically Italian interplay between private and monumental architecture. It is a priori clear that Maenius, in securing the right of his family to have a privileged place for viewing the games in the Forum in the upper part of the façade of a public building, tried to preserve some feature of his own house which had previously been used for this purpose.⁴¹ It has been mentioned above that this house belonged to the type of atrium-house with *tabernae* on the façade well known from the Tufa-period in Pompeii. Now, as the reader will remember, the *tabernae* of such houses in Pompeii often had in their upper part wooden galleries open toward the street, the so-called "*pergolae*."⁴² Such *pergolae* in buildings along the forum would naturally have served as privileged "balconies" for the owners of the houses at the time of the games. Maenius, in startling his contemporaries by applying

pp. 190 ff.) shows that in that period in Rome there did not yet exist extensive upper galleries surrounding the area. The events reported by Plutarch may have been the reason for extending the type in some places in the manner described by Vitruvius.

⁴⁰ *C. I. L.*, IX, 1148.

⁴¹ Compare Reber, *op. cit.*, p. 50, who however based his argumentation on the wrong idea that the houses of this period generally had porticoes on the façade.

⁴² See, for the following remarks, the fundamental article by Mau, *Roem. Mitt.*, II (1887), pp. 214 ff. Further bibliography: *Unters.*, pp. 171 and 181 ff.

wooden balconies to the façade of a monumental building, simply introduced a characteristic feature of domestic architecture into an already existing monumental type because he wanted, for obvious reasons, to preserve this single feature of his former house. The feature then was developed into a customary part of the republican basilicae at Rome. Moreover, it preserved a connection with its origin in domestic architecture not only in its use as a balcony for spectators but in other respects also. We have already mentioned the painter who exhibited a painting in the Maenianum of the Basilica Sempronia in Varro's time. It is in general well known that the upper wooden pergolae of private houses and shops were on the one hand especially adapted for viewing pageants and games and on the other hand suitable for exhibitions; this was the case with the Maeniana too.

Thus the invention and development of the Maeniana on the Roman Forum illustrates in a remarkable way the growth and decline of an architectural type: introduced into monumental architecture from existing Italian domestic construction (for the essential reason that the basilicae succeeded the patrician houses along the Forum), they developed as a typical Roman form during the later republic until they were absorbed, with other traditions of the good old age, into the new monumentality of the early empire.

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A NOTE ON KLEON'S ASSESSMENT.

Last year I published in this Journal a correction of certain views expressed by Nesselhauf on the Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.¹ The debate has now been opened again by Professor Kolbe, who seeks to support Nesselhauf's determination.² In view of the importance of Kolbe's conclusions, if they should be accepted as correct, I feel compelled to make also one or two further comments.

Fortunately, there is general agreement that every argument which is based on the text of the assessment decree should begin from the stones themselves and from the letters actually preserved upon them. The crux of the matter lies in the position of fragment 2, which controls the restoration of the first twelve lines of the inscription.³ Kolbe gives to this fragment a position one letter space to the left of that to which West and I have assigned it, in spite of the fact that the continuous line of fracture along the right lateral surfaces of fragments 2 and 7, which he and Nesselhauf and I all desire, is thereby disrupted.

The position which Kolbe advocates is shown to be incorrect by the photographs which he himself publishes. In one photograph (*op. cit.*, p. 176) he shows the position of fragment 2 as determined by West and Meritt and in his argument he claims that the line of fracture in question is here not continuous. I print in Fig. 1 an untouched copy of this photograph and in Fig. 2 a marked copy with a heavy line showing the continuous line of fracture which Kolbe denies. In Fig. 3 I print an untouched copy of a revised photograph which Kolbe has had prepared in Freiburg (*op. cit.*, p. 178) to show his position for fragment 2 and, as he claims, a continuous line of fracture. In Fig. 4 I repeat this photograph, adding only the heavy lines along the right lateral edges of fragments 2 and 7 to show that the line of fracture is, in fact, not continuous.

These determinations I made in Athens in 1933, and I advo-

¹ *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 152-156.

² Kolbe, *Sitzungsberichte Preuss. Akademie*, 1937, pp. 172-188; see also Nesselhauf, *Gnomon*, XII (1936), pp. 296-301.

³ See Meritt and West, *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.*, p. 44 and Plate I.

cate the position which I believe to be right not because I wished it so, but because I was unable to interpret the evidence of the fracture in any other way. I had myself rebuilt the stele in the museum with fragment 2 in its traditional but incorrect position. The transcript which West and I furnished to Tod for publication in his *Greek Historical Inscriptions* depended still on the old position of fragment 2, to which Kolbe would now have us return. But, in order to test the evidence of the fracture, I removed fragments 2 and 7 from the reconstructed stele, found the correct line of cleavage, and rebuilt the inscription accordingly. The necessary patchwork occasioned by this change may be seen today in the photograph published on page 39 of *The Athenian Assessment*, and the relative position of the fragments in question is correctly indicated in the photograph published in the same volume on page 32.*

This evidence on which a text of the opening lines of the assessment decree should be reconstructed is, in fact, easily controlled. Either the position to which West and I have assigned fragment 2 is right or it is wrong. I believe that the photographs published in the *Athenian Assessment*, in Kolbe's recent article, and again by me here, show that the West-Meritt position is correct. If these photographs seem doubtful, the ultimate test is to lay the fragments on a table and sight along the broken surfaces, observing the continuity of the fracture across its entire depth from front to back of the stone, not merely along the surface line which predominates in the photographs. I have myself juxtaposed the fragments, both in Kolbe's position and in my own, and sighted along the broken surfaces; anyone who wishes may do the same if he will remove them from the stele and juxtapose them as I did in 1933. In my criticism of Nesselhauf's suggestion I recommended that anyone who wished to propose a new arrangement should make this test. The recommendation still seems to me sound; Kolbe's argument collapses because he has ignored the evidence of the stones as still preserved, where this objective test can be applied.

It should be noted that new evidence which Kolbe advances

* I do not know why Kolbe seems to believe that the line of fracture depends in some way on the vertical columns of letters in the inscription (*op. cit.*, pp. 176-177). Obviously no account was taken of the lettering when the stone was broken.




Fig. 1. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak., 1937, p. 176*) showing the position assigned by West and Meritt to fragments 2 and 7. Kolbe claims that their right lateral surfaces do not here present a continuous line of fracture.




Fig. 2. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak., 1937, p. 176*) showing the position assigned by West and Meritt to fragments 2 and 7, to which is here added a heavy line showing the continuous fracture of their right lateral surfaces.




Fig. 3. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 178), showing the position assigned by Kolbe to fragments 2 and 7. Kolbe claims that their right lateral surfaces here present a continuous line of fracture.




Fig. 4. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 178), showing the position assigned by Kolbe to fragments 2 and 7, to which are added heavy lines showing that their right lateral surfaces do not here present a continuous fracture.

for his position of fragment 2 depends on what he conceives to be a necessary restoration in the text (*op. cit.*, p. 177). For him the position is fixed by the reading [ho] ε[σ]α[γογῆς ἐπ]ιμε[λίσθον] in line 12. Here West and I have restored [hoi] ἐσ[α]γ[ογῆς ἐπ]ιμε[λίσθον --]. For the first preserved letter Pittakys, who alone saw the lower part of fragment 2 undamaged, read the upper part of a vertical stroke. This is not necessarily, as Kolbe claims, an "einwandfrei gelesene Jota." The vertical stroke is still preserved and to the right of it all the surface of the stone is broken away, as may be seen by reference to the photographs on pages 6 and 32 of *The Athenian Assessment*. So far as one can now judge the letter may be completed as epsilon just as well as iota. But Kolbe writes "Infolgedessen halte ich an Pittakis' 'fest --." He gives also a small drawing showing the iota as it was originally shown by Pittakys in the *Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς*, 1862, no. 72. But whereas Pittakys drew the bounding line of the fragment close enough to the vertical stroke so that one, aware of Pittakys' lack of exactness, might legitimately suppose that the surface along the right of the stroke was no better preserved than now, Kolbe has unconsciously favored his own case by showing a wide area of uninscribed stone to the right of his iota. To illustrate this point clearly I print a photograph taken from Pittakys' drawing in Fig. 5 and a copy of Kolbe's drawing, for the sake of comparison, in Fig. 6. The second letter was read by Pittakys as part of a sigma, of which the upper stroke



Fig. 5. Copy of the lower part of fragment 2, as drawn by Pittakys (*Ἀρχ. Ἐφ.*, 1862, no. 72).

alone was preserved. This has now entirely disappeared, and Kolbe assumes that it was part of epsilon. There can be no doubt that the stroke in Pittakys' drawing belonged to sigma and not to epsilon; one has only to look at his drawing to be

convinced of this fact (see Fig. 5). Kolbe has shown this stroke in his drawing also (see Fig. 6), but he has changed the



Fig. 6. Copy of the lower part of fragment 2, as redrawn by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 177).

aspect given by Pittakys so completely that the letter now looks like epsilon—the letter necessary for Kolbe's restoration. No argument can be based on evidence presented in this way.

One further point should be noted. The stone in Athens must be studied as a monument of three dimensions. Kolbe has moved not only fragment 2, but fragment 3 as well, one letter space to the left. In so doing he encounters a conflict between fragments 3 and 8, for the fragments are so preserved that fragment 3 cannot be moved to the left of the position to which it is assigned in *The Athenian Assessment* without intruding on preserved portions of fragment 8. This was made clear in my *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 13, in *The Athenian Assessment*, pp. 6-7, and in the exposition in *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 153-154. The consequences have evidently escaped Kolbe's attention, though he gives in his footnotes (*op. cit.*, p. 178) reference to all these discussions here cited. I see no reason for commenting further on the restorations he proposes (*op. cit.*, p. 181) for the opening lines of the decree. Whatever difficulties they involve (and there are many) are secondary to the physical difficulties of the stone which concern fragments 2 and 7 and fragments 3 and 8.

BENJAMIN D. MERITT.

THE NATIONALITY OF THE POET CAECILIUS STATIUS.¹

Staius Caecilius comoediarum scriptor clarus habetur natione Insuber Gallus et Enni primum contubernalis. Quidam Mediolanensem ferunt. Mortuus est anno post mortem Enni (III, Ritschl) et iuxta Ianiculum (iuxta eum in Ianiculo, Ritschl) sepultus (Jerome, *ad Euseb. Chron. A. Abr.* 1838 = 179 B. C.).

Staius autem servile nomen fuit. Plerique apud veteres servi eo nomine fuerunt. Caecilius ille comoediarum poeta inclutus servus fuit et propterea nomen habuit Staius. Sed postea verum est quasi in cognomentum appellatusque est Caecilius Staius (Gellius, IV, 20, 12 and 13).

It is from these two passages that modern scholars have assumed that Caecilius Staius was a manumitted Insubrian Celt. As typical of this assumption may be quoted the account concerning him in the *Cambridge Ancient History*:² "Caecilius Staius (c. 219-166 B. C.) an Insubrian captive and the first Celtic author in Rome. . . ." There are, however, grave difficulties in accepting this view. Chief among these may be mentioned the name Staius, which is neither servile nor Celtic.

The name Staius is comparatively frequent in the extant Oscan inscriptions, occurring at least three times in Buck's collection.³ In addition at least five examples may be quoted from Latin literature where Staius is used together with a name which is Samnite: Staius Statilius (Val. Max., I, 8, 6); Staius Gellius (Livy, IX, 44, 13); Staius Minatius (Livy, X, 20, 13); Staius Trebius (Livy, XXIII, 1, 1-3); Staius Metius (Livy, XXIV, 19, 2);⁴ and one example of a Samnite with Staius as a nomen: Σταίριος ὁ Σαυίτης (App., B. C., IV, 25). Further in volumes IX and X of the *CIL* containing the Latin inscriptions from Southern Italy the name occurs at least 37 times. From this evidence, therefore, it would appear that Staius is an old Southern Italian name, belonging probably to the Samnite tribe. The fact that it appears in literature as both a praenomen and a nomen further suggests a non-Roman origin, for the

¹ The writer wishes to thank Professor N. W. DeWitt for reading this paper in manuscript and offering helpful criticism.

² VIII, p. 412.

³ *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*: Boston, Ginn and Co., 1904, Nos. 20, 49, 62.

Roman name was highly standardized, the various parts not being interchangeable. Samnite nomina and praenomina are, on the other hand, interchangeable, as for example:

- Gavius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and App., *B. C.*, I, 40;
nomen in Oscan inscr. and Val. Max., IX, 3)
- Herennius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and Livy, IX, 1, 2;
nomen in Oscan inscr. and Livy, XXIII, 44, 1)
- Papius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and Vell. Pat., II, 16, 1;
nomen in Oscan inscr. and App., *B. C.*, I, 40)
- Vibius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and Livy, XXIII, 6, 1;
nomen in Latin inscr. and Cic., *ad Fam.*, XI, 12, 1)
- Herius, always a nomen in Oscan and generally in Latin inscriptions, is a praenomen in Livy, XXIII, 43, 9.

So also Statius is, as we have seen, a praenomen in Oscan and in Livy but a nomen in Appian. It is a cognomen in the case of the poet Publius Papinius Statius, whose native town was Naples.⁴ The name is, it is true, occasionally found as a slave name in Latin as, for example, the slave of Cicero's brother Quintus.⁵ Isolated examples of this kind, however, are not sufficient to prove the servile origin of people bearing the name Statius.

This evidence for the Samnite origin of the name Statius raises the second difficulty in the traditional account that the poet was an Insubrian Gaul, from Milan "as certain writers say." The name is in fact widespread in the Po Valley, occurring—in Volumes V and XI of the *CIL*—85 times. This frequent occurrence, however, does not prove the name to be Celtic. The present writer has, by an investigation⁶ of Samnite names in the south and north of Italy, shown that there is much evidence for a large migration of Samnite farmers to the Po Valley in the years following the Hannibalic War. It may be well to summarize one or two of the points made there. The history of the Po Valley as recorded in the Roman historians is very confused. Although there is no evidence for it, most modern his-

⁴ *Silvae*, III, 5; 81.

⁵ *Ad Att.*, II, 19, 1: "Sed mihi nihil est molestius quam Statium manu missum. 'Nec meum imperium, ac mitto imperium, non simultatem meam / revereri saltem.'" Is it possible that this mention of a manumitted slave, together with a passage of Roman comedy (Terence), has contributed to the mistaken inference that Statius the dramatist was a slave?

⁶ *C. J.*, XXIX (1934), pp. 599-608. (An abstract.)

torians assume that the Celts continued to inhabit this part of Italy down to the Christian era,⁷ even going so far as to assert that Virgil was a Celt.⁸ But we have the precise statement of Polybius⁹ who passed through this district in 150 B. C.: "As I have witnessed them (the Celts) not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po except a few communities close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent expulsion." He says elsewhere¹⁰ that the wars of the Romans upon the Celts had always been "not for the sake of supremacy or sovereignty, but for their total expulsion and extermination." This expulsion of the Celts must have created a problem because of vacant lands in the Po Valley, which the Romans were apparently unable at the time to colonize by themselves. Added to this is the fact that the Samnites had been dislodged from their home in the south by the devastations of Hannibal's army.

⁷ It is only recently that this view has been doubted. Cf. T. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 327: "It was not long before the Italians began to settle in the neighbourhood of Milan, and in a century (sc. about 100 B. C.) the Insubrian lowlands revealed hardly any traces of Celtic civilization."

⁸ It has also been assumed that Cornelius Nepos was an Insubrian (most recently by Mary L. Gordon, "The Patria of Tacitus," *J. R. S.*, XXVI (1936), pp. 145-161, where she attempts to prove that the historian also was a Celt; also by J. Wight Duff, *A Literary History of Rome to the Close of the Golden Age*, p. 423). The reasoning by which Professor Wight Duff makes Nepos a Celt is fallacious: "He was *Padī acicola* (Pliny, *N. H.*, III, 18, 127) and a townsman of T. Catius (Pliny, *Ep.*, IV, 28, 1). Since Catius was an Insubrian (Cic., *ad Fam.*, XV, 16, 1), it is a fair inference that Nepos came from the one Insubrian town on the Po—Ticinum near Pavia." This involves several unnecessary assumptions: (1) that Ticinum was Celtic in the last century B. C.; (2) that, since Catius is called by Cicero an Insubrian and Nepos is said to have dwelt near the Po and to have been a fellow-townsmen of Catius, both must have come from Ticinum; (3) that all inhabitants of the same town belong to the same nationality. The letter of Pliny referred to is, however, addressed to Vibius Severus, who was also a townsman of Nepos and Catius. Since Vibius is a Samnite name, by the above reasoning Nepos and Catius would be Samnite also. Further, there is little reason for assuming Catius to be a Celtic name. There was a Quintus Catius, a plebeian aedile, in Rome in 210 B. C. (Livy, XXVII, 6, 19). Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, IV, 21) refers to an old Roman god, one of the Indigitamenta, called Catius Pater. The nomen of the poet Silius Italicus was Catius.

⁹ II, 35, 4.

¹⁰ II, 21, 9; 31, 8.

These historical facts taken in conjunction with epigraphical evidence point to the conclusion, mentioned above, that a large number of Samnite farmers migrated north following Hannibal's departure from Italy and the exodus of the Celts.

During one of these wars of expulsion, it is said, Statius was taken captive and brought to Rome. The tradition followed by some (*quidam*) that he was a Milanese probably arose from the fact that Milan was the chief town in the small district of the Insubres.¹¹ It was there that the decisive battle was fought in 194,¹² after which according to Strabo (V, 213) their village organization came to an end and the tribe as such disappeared. The practise usually followed by the Romans in such cases was to sell the slaves captured in war for work on the farms, as for example Marius' captives of 102, who later became the backbone of Spartacus' revolt. It would be extremely unlikely, therefore, that one Celt would be singled out of all the captives to be taken into a Roman household.

Even without the above evidence to disprove the Celtic origin of Statius, the inherent difficulties in Jerome's account are very great. When and how, being a Celt, with no knowledge of Latin and Greek and probably no education, could he have become so proficient in these languages as to have composed at least 40 plays, some of them adaptations from the Greek New Comedy? Assuming that he came to Rome between the years 200-194 and died in 169 (or, if Ritschl's emendation be accepted, in 166), he would have lived in Rome at the longest 28-34 years. Some of these years must surely have been spent in slavery, for he would scarcely have been freed immediately upon his arrival. Further, it has been shown¹³ that, accepting the traditional dates, Jerome's date (179 B. C.) for the peak of his career is reasonable. This then would leave only 16-20 years for him to have been brought to Rome, to have served as a slave and been freed, to have learned Latin and Greek, and to have established himself as one of the most successful playwrights in the city.¹⁴ If, how-

¹¹ According to Frank's reckoning (*C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 327) it comprised only about 1800 square miles of arable ground.

¹² Livy, XXXIV, 46.

¹³ Pauly-Wissowa, *Oacilius*.

¹⁴ Although he was apparently unsuccessful at first, he later became a favorite (2nd prologue to Terence, *Heccyra*, ll. 1-16). Cf. also Varro (*ap. Non.*, 374): *in argumentis Oacilius poscit palmam*; Volcatius Sedigitus (*ap. Gellius*, XV, 24) places him first in a list of writers of

ever, Statius came from Samnite stock, this question of language would be more easily answered. Even if he had not come into contact with Latin and Greek in the early years of his life, still Oscan—which would have been his native tongue—was an Italian dialect, a sister to Latin; and the district from which he came had reached some degree of civilization.

If Statius was a Celt, such a career would be without parallel, for the cases of Plautus and Terence were not similar. Plautus, was in the first place an Italian and, according to the traditional account of his life, he would have had ample time during the early part of his career, while working at the stage at Rome and while engaged in business as a trader, to become acquainted with both Latin and Greek. If this tradition is doubted, it has recently been shown that it is quite possible that he became acquainted with Greek and perhaps with Menander before leaving his native town of Sarsina.¹⁵

Terence, although he came from Carthage as a slave, may quite possibly have been the son of a southern Italian family which had been taken captive by Hannibal and sold in Carthage.¹⁶ If this suggestion be correct, Terence would have had some knowledge of the Italian dialects and perhaps Greek even before he was brought to Rome as a slave. He then had the advantage of being a protégé of the Scipionic Circle, the outstanding literary society of the time, whose chief interests lay in Latin and Greek literature. Still he wrote only six plays, and even of these some people doubted whether he was the author, thinking that their *elegantia sermonis* pointed rather to some member of the Scipionic Circle, Laelius perhaps.¹⁷

Nor can Statius' choice of language be used to prove his Celtic origin. As far as may be judged from the extant fragments, there is no evidence of any "Celtic fire" which would doubtless have remained in his soul had he been an Insubrian. On the other hand his language is of a boisterous type, with a freedom in the use of abstracts that is typical of Plautus and of southern Italians generally and such as may have existed in the *Fabulae*

palliatae. Suetonius (*Vita Terentii*, II) relates how Terence was bidden by the aediles to read his first play before Caecilius for criticism. Cicero (*De Opt. Gen. Or.*, I) speaks of him as *fortasse summus comicus*.

¹⁵ *A. J. A.*, XXXIX (1935), pp. 92 ff.

¹⁶ *A. J. P.*, XLIV (1933), pp. 268 ff.

¹⁷ Cicero, *Ad Att.*, VII, 3, 10; Quint., X, 1, 99.

Atellanae. Cicero speaks of him as *malus auctor Latinitatis*¹⁸ and joins him with Pacuvius (who was born at Brundisium) as *male locuti*.¹⁹ But in the first case it is with Terence²⁰ that he compares him and in the second with members of the Scipionic Circle. These comparisons, then, do not suggest lack of ability in the use of Latin. It could not be said that Ennius, Naevius, or Plautus (who were all Italians) possessed this *elegantia sermonis* which Cicero praised in the Scipionic Circle.²¹

Jerome's information that he was an Insubrian Gaul was probably derived from Suetonius' lives of the poets.²² Although it cannot be literally true, inasmuch as Statius is not a servile or a Celtic name, yet it may contain an element of truth. That is, Statius may have come to Rome from the district of the Insubres and even from Milan. It has been shown above that the evidence points to a Samnite migration to the Po Valley after the Hannibalic War. Statius, therefore, if born c. 220 B. C., could not have been born there. Accepting, however, the traditional date for his birth, he would have reached military age about 200. It was just about this time that the Romans were again turning their attention to the Celts in the North in a final attempt to expel them, and it was against the Insubrians that they were fighting. It may be suggested, therefore, that Statius was one of the Italian allies who formed the Roman garrison in the north at this time.²³ It may further be suggested that, just as Ennius came to the notice of Cato in Sardinia in 204 and was brought to Rome by him, so Statius may have been brought to the attention of one Caecilius while still fighting in the north or even after his arrival in Rome. When he began to make a name for himself as a dramatist, he may have taken the name of his patron and kept his own as a cognomen.

Certain identification of Statius' patron is of course impossible. The suggestion may be made, however, that he was the

¹⁸ Cicero, *loc. cit.*

¹⁹ *Id.*, *Brut.*, 258.

²⁰ Cf. Horace, *Ep.*, II, 1, 59: *vincere Caecilius gravitate, Terentius arte.*

²¹ Cf. *Brut.*, 172; *ad Fam.*, IX, 15, 2 where Cicero dates Celtic influence on Roman speech after the time of the Gracchi.

²² Cf. the preface to his translation of Eusebius' *Chronicon*.

²³ Livy, XXXI, 10, 5: *L. Furius Purpurio tum provinciae (sc. Cisalpine Gaul) praerat, cetero eo senatus consulto exercitu dimisso praeter quinque milia socium ac Latini nominis.* Also XXXI, 21, 7: *in alas divisum socialem exercitum habebat* (i. e. before Cremona).

Marcus Caecilius, *legatus legionibus praepositus* in Cisalpine Gaul in 200.²⁴ Statius may have come to his notice then or as late as 194, when the allies in the Roman army of the previous year were dismissed from service.²⁵ There is, further, the interesting passage in Pliny's *Natural History* (VII, 101) which gives as Ennius' reason for adding the sixteenth book to his *Annals* his admiration for Titus Caecilius Denter and his brother.²⁶ The brother may perhaps be identified with the Marcus Caecilius Denter who was sent on an embassy to Macedonia and Greece in 173.²⁷ The passage of Pliny would most reasonably be explained by identifying this Marcus Caecilius Denter and the Marcus Caecilius, commander of the legions in 200, with Statius' patron. The close friendship between Ennius and Caecilius would explain how Statius became acquainted with Ennius so soon after his arrival in Rome (cf. Jerome's *Enni primum contubernalis*), for Caecilius would certainly have introduced him, as soon as possible, to the outstanding poet in the city.

It would be curious if Caecilius, the *legatus* of 200, did not appear later in history. The objection that he may have died in battle appears less likely in view of the fact that it was the right wing commanded by Marcus Furius which stood the brunt of the enemy's attack and in which most of the casualties occurred.²⁸ If it seems improbable that a *legatus* of 200 be sent on an embassy 27 years later, the case of Furius may be cited, whose career can be traced from 201 to his praetorship in 173.²⁹ It

²⁴ Livy, XXXI, 21, 8.

²⁵ *Ib.*, XXXIV, 56, 5 and 12. As this is the only mention of such a dismissal between 200 and 194, it may be assumed to have included also those who fought in the campaigns of previous years.

²⁶ If the usual emendation of Teucer to Denter be accepted. The name in Pliny's account has also been emended to T. Aelius (E. M. Steuart, *The Annals of Ennius*, p. 203) in order to make it agree with the account in Livy (XLI, 1, 7; 4, 3), where two brothers, T. and C. Aelius, are mentioned as tribunes in the Istrian War. The emendation makes it possible to place in Book XVI a fragment of Ennius, otherwise doubtful (15 of Bk. XVI, Steuart). There are, however, so many uncertainties in dealing with the fragments in general, and with the names in this account in particular (cf. Havet, *Bibl. de l'école des hautes études*, XXXV, pp. 35 ff.), that there is no obligation to accept this emendation. We do not know anything further of Caecilius' interest in literature; nor do we of that of Terentius Lucanus who adopted Terence.

²⁷ Livy, XLII, 8, 5.

²⁸ *Ib.*, XXXI, 22, 2.

²⁹ P. W., *Furius*, 56.

may be assumed that these two men and their colleague Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who died during an epidemic in 180, while holding the office of pontifex,³⁰ were in the year 200 at the very beginning of their careers.

The chief points in the above argument may be summarized as follows: (1) epigraphical and literary evidence points to the name Statius as being neither servile nor Celtic but Samnite; (2) the successful literary career of Caecilius Statius, hard to explain if he was, according to the tradition, a manumitted Insubrian Gaul, becomes intelligible if he was of Samnite birth; (3) Jerome's account may, however, contain this truth, that he was one of the Italian allies fighting for Rome in the north during the final war of expulsion of the Insubrians; (4) Statius may have been discovered by a Caecilius either in the north or later in Rome and may have kept his own name after adopting that of his patron in the arts, Caecilius.

The importance of the above suggestions, if they be accepted, is greater than the mere establishment of the racial origin of Caecilius Statius. The improbable assumption that a Celt, the only example in Roman literary history and at such an early date, became one of the leading dramatists in Rome will no longer be necessary. His career will, on the other hand, accord well with the interesting fact that during the third and second centuries B. C. practically all Roman writers were of Southern Italian origin.

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³⁰ Livy, XL, 42, 6.

A THOUGHT PATTERN IN HERACLITUS.

"They that seek gold, dig up much earth and find little" says Heraclitus (22).¹ Students of the classics, familiar as they are with the dusty business of archaeological or literary excavation, may nevertheless be warned that we are going to burrow for a small grain of Heraclitean philosophy in an especially unpleasant and unpromising ground. The late legend on the life and death of the obscure philosopher is an accumulation of imbecilities. Its author (or authors) tried to be facetious and ironical, but the attempt resulted in stupid vulgarity.

In Diogenes Laertius, 9, 3 (= *Vors.*, A 1), the last period of Heraclitus' life is thus described: "... finally he fell into misanthropy. He secluded himself and lived in the mountains, feeding on grass and plants. This caused him to contract dropsy. He went back to town and consulted the physicians, asking them in cryptic language whether they were able to turn deluge into drought. But they did not understand. So he buried himself in a place where cattle were stalled, hoping that the tepid cow-dung would have an evaporating effect. But not even that helped, and so he died, being sixty years old."

The repellent story is not based on any historical tradition. Lassalle was the first to remark that it belongs to a certain group of stories and anecdotes that invent appropriate deaths for prominent people.² The fictitious conditions under which famous men are said to have ended their lives symbolize their peculiar merits or foibles. In the case of Heraclitus the story is unusually circumstantial and the caricature unusually elaborate. As the judges of the underworld condemn the great sinners to suffer what they did unto others, so the author of this posthumous libel turns loose against Heraclitus the alleged defects of his writing and the absurdities of his doctrine. And

¹ I quote from Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, chapter 22 in the 5th ed., Berlin (Weidmann), 1934 (= ch. 12, previous editions). The numbers, if not preceded by "A," refer to the "B" series.—All the fragments of Heraclitus (with few exceptions) have recently been discussed with circumspection by Olof Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, Leipzig (Dieterich), 1935.

² Ferdinand Lassalle, *Gesamtwerke*, ed. Schirmer, Leipzig (Schirmer), 1905, vol. 6, p. 58, note 1.

in addition he throws his victim into such situations and makes him commit such actions as Heraclitus, outraging decent humanity, had slanderously ascribed to ordinary man.

Let us try to explain, in the spirit of its originators, the Philistines' impotent revenge on genius. Heraclitus, the scorner of humanity, cannot bear any longer the intercourse with his fellow creatures and retires into uninhabited mountains. He had charged ordinary people with enjoying only the crude pleasures of the body, like animals feeding on weeds (4), and of being blind to real values, like asses that prefer straw to gold (9). Now he himself, in his secluded remoteness from proper living conditions, under the sway of bare material necessity which he so haughtily despised, has to eat grass and weeds. Heraclitus had advanced the theory that the soul of man consists of divine and living fire, but that in most men the flame is soiled and deteriorated by a considerable admixture of water, preventing the mind from shining brightly and understanding clearly. Now fate makes Heraclitus contract a dropsy as a consequence of his unhealthy diet. Heraclitus, being well aware that "it is death for souls to be turned into water" (36), is compelled to return to the city and to consult the doctors. What a humiliation! Had he not insulted in his book the whole profession by maintaining that its practitioners only took money from their patients for inflicting further pains on them (58)? If what Heraclitus taught were true, viz. that "what is moist dries" (126; cf. [Heracl.], *Epist.* V, p. 72, 33, Bywater), he should have been cured easily. But unfortunately he spoke to the doctors in the style with which he drives his readers to despair: he asked them to turn deluge into drought,³ and they did not understand what he wanted them to do. This served him right. How often had he abused all humanity for not grasping the meaning of his riddles (1 and *passim*)! Now Heraclitus tries a cure of his own invention. He buries himself in dung, and, on the assumption that the process of life is sustained by a constant exhalation and evaporation (12 *et al.*), he hopes that the tepid manure will save him. But his hope is vain, and he dies.

³ Lassalle is probably right when he feels that the very words *ἐρουβρία* and *ἀρχμός* are taken from some passage in Heraclitus.

There are some variants and additions in other versions. Thus Neanthes of Kyzikos (A 1, 4) relates that the transformation (μεταβολή) of the philosopher into an apparent heap of manure caused the dogs not to recognize (ἀγνοεῖν) him; consequently, they ate him up. According to Heraclitus, life means incessant change, and transformation is a kind of rest and renewal (μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται, 84). On the other hand, he had upbraided his unbelieving public telling them that "dogs bark at all those whom they fail to recognize" (μὴ γινώσκωσι, 97).

Our interpretation of the legend does not claim to be accurate throughout. Our incomplete material does not allow us to quote point for point the particular and specific references which the author had in mind when composing his parody. We have been able, however, to illustrate the story from beginning to end by some pertinent tenets and sayings of Heraclitus. But there is one notable exception. That Heraclitus should have buried himself under filth is an idea not warranted by the known fragments of Heraclitus.⁴ And yet this loathsome oddity recurs in all the different versions, with only slight variations in details.⁵ It is therefore a legitimate guess that this motif is, like all the rest, parodic, and that Heraclitus, in one of his irksome criticisms, had used the words "he buries (κατορύττει) himself in filth," or the like.

Now it happens that the two significant words βορβόρῳ κατορωρυγμένον recur in a no less dignified book than Plato's *Republic*, and that they recur in a quotation from an unnamed author. Plato says (*Rep.*, vii, 533 d): ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος . . . τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω. That Plato is quoting someone is proved by the words τῷ ὄντι which, as they stand, can only mean τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ καὶ πάλαι ἔλεγον σοφοὶ τινες ἄνδρες. We may conclude with confidence that the author whom Plato

⁴ Frags. 13 and 37 seem to be somehow related but their purport is as yet uncertain (Gigon, p. 121).

⁵ The tradition varies in so far as Heraclitus either buries (κατορύττει) or anoints himself or asks children to cover him with the substance. (Time and again he expresses his disdain for immature childhood; now he needs the help of children.) The stuff is always described as cowdung; only Suidas (A 1a) speaks instead of sand. To the evidence as printed in *Vorsokratiker* may be added Marc. Aur., 3, 3, 4.

quotes is Heraclitus, and that Heraclitus had said: the ordinary man cannot perceive metaphysical reality because he has buried himself in filth. This accounts well enough for two words in Plato's quotation;⁶ but what about the rest? What about the "eyes of the soul, prevented by barbarism from clear perception"?⁷ They are taken, almost literally, from another saying of Heraclitus:

107 Κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχόντων.

The double coincidence (both between the quotation and the biography of Heraclitus, and between the quotation and fragment 107 of Heraclitus), a coincidence in expressions of such a peculiar coinage, makes the identification certain. It may be accepted as established that Plato, in his one quotation, combines two cognate passages from Heraclitus, frag. 107 and the new one.⁸

One inference is at once obvious. Heraclitus' book contained a thought which Plato was to develop into his cave parable. Heraclitus had contended that man is buried in filth and that thereby his spiritual view is obstructed. Plato, in the beginning of the seventh book of the *Republic*, sets forth how man is, as it were, buried in a subterranean cave, unable to see the daylight of spiritual truth. It is now clear that Plato, when quoting Heraclitus in the same seventh book of the *Republic*, is paying homage to the archaic author who, by his blunt and crude verdict on the human state, had given him the inspiration for his consummate parable of the cave.⁹

⁶ Adam in his commentary on the *Republic* (Cambridge [Univ. Press], 1902) says that the image *βορβόρῳ κατορωρυγμένον* is taken from Orphic theology and refers to *Rep.*, ii, 363 d: Μουσαῖος . . . καὶ ὁ ὁὗς αὐτοῦ . . . τοὺς ἀνοσίους . . . καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἀΐδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδρι ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, ἐπὶ τε ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἀγορτες . . . (= *Orphic. fragmenta*, ed. Kern, no. 4). The relationship between the two passages in the *Republic* will be discussed below on p. 323, note 32.

⁷ The words *ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἀνω* are not part of the quotation but refer back to Plato's own cave simile (cf. 518 cff.).

⁸ The blending of the *βορβόρος* fragment and the *βάρβαρος* fragment results in the pun *βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ*. Perhaps the pun, in some form or other, was already in the original.

⁹ It is not necessary to expatiate on the analogous way in which

For Heraclitus himself, the result does not appear spectacular. Two words, something like *βορβόρω κατόρύττεται*, have been recovered. But the gain might prove less meager if we were in a position to restore also the original setting of the tiny bit of new evidence and to determine its original bearing. This should not be impossible since Plato's quotation shows beyond doubt in what sense the image was applied by Heraclitus. Perhaps the new fragment may shed some light in its turn on the other tradition.

Looking round for analogies among the known fragments, we note, in the first place, fragment 107, an allusion to which had been blended by Plato with the allusion to this one. Both fragments refer to the same idea of Heraclitus that ordinary man, however able and experienced according to current standards, has only a superficial contact with reality. But to him who has seen the light of metaphysical truth, things become transparent. His insight penetrates through appearance and proceeds to the core of objects and events. He witnesses a spectacle more sublime than anything one could suspect (18) and at the same time as close to everyday life as the most manifest sensations are. For it is not to a remote dreamland somewhere in the void that the Heraclitean discoveries carry the mind, but they make the enlightened among us understand more deeply this our world, make them experience more fully and intelligently these our lives, and make them perform more wisely and aptly the actions which are required from the best.¹⁰

In the second place, there are three more fragments in which "dirt" or "mud" is mentioned (13, 37, 5), and to these may be added the evidence appropriately collected by Bywater in his

Heraclitus and Plato call for liberation of the mind from confinement and entanglement. The fundamental identity of views necessarily led to parallelisms in detail.

¹⁰ It is in the particular Heraclitean sense that I shall distinguish in the following pages "metaphysical reality" or "the divine" from "superficial reality" or "the mundane," and "the enlightened" from "ordinary man" respectively. I admit that these expressions are vague, but it is beyond the scope of this article further to determine the vista which Heraclitus claims to have opened up. The specific quest and pursuit of the early metaphysicians has been admirably clarified by Georg Misch, *Der Weg in die Philosophie*, Leipzig (Teubner), 1926.

note on frag. 13 (= no. 54 in his edition).¹¹ An imaginative mind, when confronted with this accumulated evidence, will at once see emerge from it the idea of an elaborate symbolism, or even allegorism, a system in which certain philosophical conceptions seem to be represented by certain definite metaphors, one of them being "filth." A critical mind, however, will soon raise the objection that all combinations are vague and precarious unless the proper relation of the different notions and their position in the Heraclitean system are reliably ascertained. Fortunately this is feasible. The single symbols can be accurately interpreted as elements in a characteristic pattern of Heraclitus' thought. The pattern, as we shall see, is more than just a favorite scheme of reasoning or speaking. It is not an external form, interchangeable with several others, but it has been instrumental in molding to some extent the substance of the doctrine.

The pattern is obvious in this saying:

79 Ἄνθρωπος νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος, ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός.

Man is stamped as infantile by divinity, just as the child is by man.

For the sake of convenience, we call this pattern by the name of the geometrical mean and transcribe it by formulae such as *God/man* = *man/boy*, or else $A/B = B/C$, using mathematical language rather loosely and disclaiming mathematical strictness. To ascertain the actual meaning and function of the pattern, we shall have to analyze the instances in which Heraclitus uses the scheme, starting from fragment 79:

There are three planes: the levels of God, man, and child (A, B, and C). The degree of perfection decreases, and the degree of imperfection increases, in equal measure in the transitions from A to B and from B to C ($A/B = B/C$). Or (and this will paraphrase more correctly what Heraclitus had in mind) we might speak of contrasts and say that the contrast between perfection and imperfection is the same in both cases. Thus man, being the geometrical mean, may be called wise when compared to a boy, and childish when compared to God. He combines opposite qualities. It all depends on the standard by

¹¹ The fragments will be quoted and discussed below, on pp. 322 ff.

which he is judged. An adult man is perfect according to conventional conceptions but utterly defective according to philosophical truth.

Of the three elements A, B, and C, each has its characteristic function. The member C (child) is a known magnitude and its inferiority is unquestionable. For it was a truism for Heraclitus and his public that a child is a weak, foolish, and despicable being.¹² Referring to the indisputable defects of a child, Heraclitus makes the startling assertion that any respectable and dignified citizen when viewed in the light of divinity, is by no means less miserable than an infant. B (man) is tantamount to C (child) when compared to A (God). Thus the term C (child) serves as predicate in the statement, and it indicates what specific quality or circumstance is ascribed to B and A: in this case, imperfection and perfection respectively.

It follows that the element C varies according to the predicate to be given the statement, or even to the shade of its meaning. Another saying of Heraclitus expressed the same idea of human imperfection in a more bitter and caustic way through the choice of a different term of reference. The saying is not preserved in its original wording, but its purport was that the most beautiful and wise of men, when compared to God, is like an ape (82 and 83). That which makes the ape appear so hideous, contemptible, and ridiculous is the fact that he seemingly tries to look like a man and to act and behave like a man. This is precisely the situation of man in reference to God. Humanity is a caricature of divinity.¹³

The pattern implies, as we have seen, the statement that the middle element B, when considered from a higher standpoint, is no better than its apparent opposite C. Thus Heraclitus can reduce the equation to a shorter form by simply asserting that B

¹² It may be recalled that in the art of the period children are represented as miniature adults. The specific positive qualities of children were only discovered much later.

¹³ The element B is put here in the superlative: "even the most beautiful and most wise of men." Heraclitus is fond of using the superlative in such statements and to show that even those who are commonly considered as supreme in reality are incompetent and ridiculous (56; 57; cf. 124). For the comparison of ape and man cf. McDermott, *T. A. P. A.*, LXVI (1935), p. 167.

virtually amounts to its opposite C. Of this type are the statements in frag. 1 that ordinary people are equally uninformed before and after they have been told the truth; that they do not experience their own experiences; that even while awake they are like sleepers, unaware of what they had ever known before. All such assertions can easily be transformed into the complete scheme of the double proportion, e. g.: the consciousness and alertness of ordinary people, eagerly pursuing their activities, is like unconscious and torpid sleep when compared to the state of a mind that has awakened to the contact with metaphysical reality. The opposites are said to be equivalent also in this fragment:

34 Ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐόλκασιν· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρόντας ἀπείναι.

They that have no understanding, though hearing, are like ¹⁴ the deaf. The expression "present but absent" is fitting for them.

Those who hear the message and are present in a certain sense (viz. bodily) are virtually deaf and absent (viz. mentally) if they do not understand what has been said and fail to establish a contact with that metaphysical reality which surrounds them and which is the very essence of their existence. When we thus qualify the opposite notions, in order to make them compatible, by adding "bodily" and "mentally," we must be careful not to overlook that the two restrictions are on a different plane. It is mental comprehension alone that really matters. In statements of this type, Heraclitus does not mean to say that any predication can only be relative and therefore has to be properly qualified as to the conditions under which it is valid. The wording of fragment 79 shows how far Heraclitus was from

¹⁴ Here, as in frag. 1, the notion "tantamount" is rather vaguely indicated by ἐόλκασιν. Heraclitus does not use technical language for the expression of his pattern. All the early Greek philosophers abstain from developing technical language. The specific meaning is not couched in specific terms or stereotyped schemes but it results by implication from an unlimited variety of expressions in current language and style, including instances, images, and other devices to guide the imagination. The philosophical ideas are intimated to the reader instead of being forced upon him with rigid and coercive strictness.

advocating relativity as a universal and uniform principle. It is by no means to an equally limited degree correct to call ordinary man wise or foolish, for his claim to wisdom is based only on his superiority to complete foolishness, while the contrary verdict is passed on him by God's wisdom. Relative, and relatively real, is man's wisdom but his foolishness is absolutely true. When Heraclitus distinguishes two different factors making for contrary predication, he usually implies that only one of them is decisive and the other comparatively negligible and futile. In the following fragment he explicitly distinguishes between the bodily and the mental factors in perception, but at the same time he makes it clear that the final result depends on the soul:

107 *Κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχόντων.*

Bad witnesses for men are eyes and ears of those that have barbarian souls.

Many a time the opponents of Heraclitus will have recurred to common-sense experience in order to refute the lofty paradoxes of his creed.¹⁵ But their experience, so Heraclitus points out, though they are proud of being civilized and enlightened Greeks, amounts to no more than the experience of primitive savages with an horizon confined to their base needs and menial interests.¹⁶ The insight is a question not of sensual perception and superficial assimilation but of a deeper consciousness and thorough interpretation.¹⁷

In all the instances quoted so far it was always the element C (child, ape, sleeping, deaf, etc.) alone which varied, and with it the predicate of the statement. The term B constantly represented ordinary humanity, and the element A referred, in some

¹⁵ Cf. the attitude of the half blind cave-dwellers in Plato's *Rep.*, vii, 516 e toward those who see.

¹⁶ Again we can form a double proportion: Barbarian / Greek = Greek / the really enlightened.

¹⁷ Perhaps the notion "barbarian" indicates rather the inability to understand Greek (or, figuratively, to understand the language of reality) than the lack of civilization and education. The difference is only slight, as in any case the fragment is concerned with the problem of interpretation.

sense or other, to God and the Absolute. The equation of the geometrical mean is a method of denouncing and humiliating humanity; it is equally a method for praising and extolling the divine. But there is one more gradation implied in the scheme. The term C (child, barbarian, etc.) is, as we have observed, a well known thing with notorious defects; the term B (ordinary man) happens to be a supposedly well known magnitude and a supposedly worthy subject, but the equation reveals that the common evaluation is erroneous and that the qualities of man are in actual fact the opposite of what was generally assumed. But then the term A (the Absolute) represents that which was unknown to mankind, not visualized by anyone, not worshipped or revered appropriately, until Heraclitus discovered its real essence and preached its gospel. God and True Reality are a something beyond the ken of inexperienced experience, senseless sensations, unreal realizations, and unwise wisdom; something beyond the competence of human imagination and description. The scheme of the geometrical mean thus becomes a device to express the inexpressible and to explain the inexplicable. The equation may be rewritten, on this view, with an x instead of an $A : x/B = B/C$. What is God? God is that compared to which the most perfect man will appear as an infant or as a hideous and ridiculous ape. What is divine clarity of mind and the insight of an illuminated soul, burning in a clear, unadulterated, fiery glow? It is a state in comparison to which ordinary consciousness is like sleep, and sober reasoning like the numbness of a drunken man, not knowing whither he goes, his soul being moist.¹⁸

¹⁸ I have combined frag. 1 (sleep) and frag. 118 ("Dry soul, wisest and best") with frag. 117: "A man when drunk is led by an immature child, not noticing whither he goes, his soul being moist." Frag. 117 is in itself an instance of the geometrical mean (Man, drunk / child = child / man, sober; cf. *supra*, pp. 90 f.). But I feel confident that this fragment, taken as a whole, in the original was only the one half of a double proportion, such as indicated in the text above. It is not likely that Heraclitus should have condescended, for its own sake, to a trivial denunciation of intoxication, or to a physiological proof of his thesis on the nature of the soul. And the words "not understanding whither he goes" are echoed, within a series of excerpts from Heraclitus, by Marcus Aurelius, 4, 46, 2: "he who forgets where his way leads him" (= Frag. 71; cf. Seneca, *Epist.*, 98, 10: *obliti quo eant*,

Constantly upbraiding humanity, scolding and abusing it, Heraclitus tries to arouse it from its spiritual stupor and numbness and calls it to a new and unheard of awakesness and sobriety. He hates mysticism and ecstasy (14; 15), just as he despises vulgar intoxication, and yet he has a message that demands an almost superhuman effort of the mind to reach the state of illumination:

18 Ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσai, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὼν καὶ ἄπορον.

Unless one hopes against hope, he will not find out that which is indiscoverable and inaccessible.¹⁹

Instead of trying to enrapture his readers, to envelop them in a misty cloud of vague enthusiasm and whirl their minds upward to the beyond in a tornado of oratory, Heraclitus is content calmly to point out the direction in which the reasoning has to travel. Like the Delphian God who "does not tell nor hide but indicates" (93),²⁰ Heraclitus asks his readers to find the transcendental by the indirect means of extrapolation, through the device of the double proportion. The greatness of the metaphysical organization, the perfection of the hidden harmony which is far finer than the apparent one (123; 54), is indicated by him in this same way:

124 <δ>κ>ωσπερ σάρμα ²¹ εἰκῇ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος κόσμος.

The most perfectly organized universe is like a heap of garbage dumped at random — (*scil.* when compared to the less obvious organization behind and beyond the manifest regularity of sun, stars and life ²²).

scil. ad mortem; and Pind., *Nem.*, 6, 6 ff. in a context strongly influenced by Heraclitus), where the "way" is clearly metaphorical. It seems therefore that the "drunken man" was only an image used for exposing the state of man in general.

¹⁹ In this instance, the combined opposites do not express incompetence but on the contrary the triumph of him who overcomes almost invincible obstacles.

²⁰ Cf. Snell, *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 371.

²¹ σάρμα is an excellent emendation by Diels for σάρξ.

²² There is no means, as far as I can see, to have the quotation fit precisely and with strict logic into Theophrastus' own argument. The smoothest way, however, of coördinating the quotation with the rest

The obscure frag. 52 is perhaps taken from a similar context:

52 Αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων, πεσσεύων· παιδὸς ἢ βασιλῆς.

Human existence is a child at a game, playing draughts; a child rules as king.

The course of nature, the sway of necessity, the codes of law and convention, or careful planning, or whatever else is controlling our lives, all this amounts to the wilful moves of a child playing a game of arbitrary rules²³ — *scil.* when compared to the one law divine. This interpretation, however, is no more than a guess.

The notion of "the one divine law" which we tentatively supplied in the preceding fragment is to be found in this saying:

114 Ἐν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλιν, καὶ πολλὴ ἰσχυροτέρως· τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁ κόσμος ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

One must speak in accordance with reason and by this means²⁴ strengthen oneself through that which is common to all, as a community (*scil.* is strong) through its law; and even more strongly (*scil.* does reason support those who are in keeping with it), for all human laws are fed by the one divine, for it prevails as much as it will and is sufficient for (and equal to) all of them and superabounding (superior).

Reason is, according to Heraclitus, not an achievement of the

of the context is to make Heraclitus say that the metaphysical system is even more perfect than the apparent organization, and to have Theophrastus use the quotation for indicating that it would be absurd if the fine organization of our visible universe were brought about by accident and fortuitous chance and not by correspondingly well organized definite principles.

²³ Cf. Plato, *Laws*, vii, 803 c-804 b.

²⁴ It seems to me obvious that λέγοντας is also governed by χρὴ. Otherwise the participle would have been put in the future or the auxiliary μέλλω inserted, as in the Platonic reverberation of this sentence, *Rep.*, vii, 517 c: δεῖ ταύτην (*scil.* τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν) ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράττειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. (That the preceding part of Plato's sentence also is indebted to Heraclitus can be inferred from its coincidence with Pindar, *Isthm.*, 5, 1 ff.; cf. *Gnomon*, VI, p. 13.)

individual but a suprapersonal power; it is common and universal (frag. 2, etc.). Thus Heraclitus at first remarks that, as communities are strong as long as they act in conformity with their constitutional law (cf. 44), so individual minds are strong when they comply with the common law of reason. But then, as in an afterthought, a new gradation is added in the scheme of the geometrical mean: The individual citizens / the common law of their social organization = all the individual community laws / the law of laws, the one divine law.²⁵

Our analysis has ascertained that Heraclitus had a predilection for the thought pattern of the geometrical mean, and that this scheme helped him in the arduous task of approaching the conception of the transcendental. The essence of the pattern is²⁶ that mundane values, when compared to the paramount, are tantamount to their opposites, the non-values. This general idea is implied in various statements and expressed in various ways. There is no external uniformity. Heraclitus does not use stereotyped figures of speech, though the thought pattern seems to invite and provoke their application.²⁷ Nor does he clothe his thoughts in the distinctive but monotonous livery of technical language.²⁸ In the absence of any technical terms, there is no clue to indicate the field in which Heraclitus may have become acquainted with the scheme of the continued proportion before he applied it to metaphysics. Perhaps he had learned from the Pythagoreans about the harmonious contrasts in a succession of tones with equal intervals (i. e. equal proportions of string length) and about correspondent progressions in geometry and algebra.²⁹

²⁵ This equation differs from all those analyzed before. No disparaging criticism is implied, for Heraclitus had no intention of depreciating the laws of man. This time positive and direct advice is given and the transcendental is extolled not by contrast alone but explicitly and directly.

²⁶ With the exception of frag. 114, cf. the preceding note.

²⁷ It is true that there is much in the style of Heraclitus to remind the reader of the *figurae orationis* as they were taught later by rhetoricians, but in the writing of Heraclitus the subject determines the expression and not the reverse. Cf. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa*, I, pp. 18 ff.; *Logos und Rhythmus*, p. 23.

²⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 316, note 14, and Snell, "Die Sprache Heraklits," *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 353.

²⁹ There are some references to music and musical harmony in the

The function of the pattern is now, I hope, sufficiently well established to allow us to integrate and to interpret with its support another group of incomplete fragments.

9 Ὅροι σύρματ' ἂν ἔλουντο μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν.

Asses would prefer chaff to gold.

The text suggests the equations: Ass/ordinary man = ordinary man/the discriminating philosopher, and correspondingly: Refuse/gold = gold/real values. This interpretation is corroborated by the following two fragments.

4 Si felicitas esset in delectationibus corporis, boves felices diceremus cum inveniant orobum ad comedendum.³⁰

29 Αἰρεῦνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντὶ ἀπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηται ὄκωσπερ κτήνηα.

The best men prefer one thing to all other things, everlasting fame to things mortal; but the many are glutted in the way of cattle.

The mass of humanity is degraded to the rank of their domestic animals, and their happiness to the delights of cattle and asses.³¹ With archaic thoroughness, Heraclitus further and further exploits the conception of man owning animals, disposing of them freely and despising them profoundly, but not being aware that, measured against the standard of what he ought to be, he is by no means their superior. For it is an easy guess that when Heraclitus speaks of

13 βορβόρῃ χαίρειν

revelling in filth,

he is denouncing the pleasures of the unenlightened. And this

fragments (10 *cum test.*; 51). Pythagoras is mentioned twice (40; 129). The usual derogatory tenor does not preclude indebtedness to the school (cf. Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, 2, p. 188). It is less likely that Heraclitus should have invented the scheme of the continued proportion independently.

³⁰ It goes without saying that the original form of this saying was different from the text as given by Albertus Magnus.

³¹ Speaking of the fodder of asses (9), Heraclitus aptly uses the word σύρμα "litter, refuse, chaff," just as he had compared the kosmos to σάρμα "garbage" (124).

becomes certain on the strength of some other allusions to these utterances of Heraclitus: Clem. Alex., *Protr.*, 10, 92, 4: Οἱ δὲ (the heathen) σκολήκων δίκην περὶ τέλματα καὶ βορβόρους, τὰ ἡδονῆς ρεύματα, καλινδούμενοι ἀνοήτους καὶ ἀνοήτους ἐκβόσκονται τρυφάς, ὑώδεις τινὲς ἄνθρωποι. “ὕες” γάρ, φησὶν, “ἡδονται βορβόρῳ” μᾶλλον ἢ καθαρῷ ὕδατι καὶ “ἐπὶ φωρυτῷ μαργαίνουσιν” κατὰ Δημόκριτον (= *Vorsokr.*, 68, B 147). Plotinus, I, 6 (περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ), 6: Δὴ καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὁρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς “Αἰδὸν κείσεσθαι ἐν βορβόρῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν βορβόρῳ διὰ κάκην φίλον· οἷα δὲ καὶ ὕες, οὐ καθαρὰ τὸ σῶμα, χαίρουσι τῷ τοιούτῳ.”²² A new, and more specific, note is brought into the caricature by this saying:

37 Heraclitus ait sues caeno, cohortales aves pulvere vel cinere lavari.

For the expression “they wash in mire and dust” (κόνει = “pulvere vel cinere”) implies that those whose horizon is restricted to this world, when trying to cleanse themselves, actually do nothing but befoul themselves a second time. The unenlightened, unable to find their way out of this sphere of worldliness and “filth,” try to wash off mire with mire. For the madness of such a procedure Heraclitus has found an especially striking example in the rite of purifying murderers by washing their hands with the blood of a pig:

5 Καθαίρονται δ' ἄλλφ αἵματι μαινόμενοι, οἷον εἴ τις εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῷ ἀπονίζοιτο, μαίνεσθαι δ' ἂν δοκοίη εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιφράσαιτο οὕτω ποίοντα. Καὶ τοῖς ἀγάλμασι τουτέοισιν εὐχονται, ὁκοῖον εἴ τις δόμοισι λεισχηνέοιτο, οὐ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ' ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσι.

²² It is obvious (and was so interpreted by Plotinus) that the sinners in the underworld were thought to be buried in mud because they had been revelling in filth, as it were, during their lifetime. The conception of their punishment is derived from the verdict on their guilt. Now the punishment is attested for the Orphics by Plato in book ii of the *Republic* (cf. *supra*, p. 312, note 6), while the verdict on their behavior in life is attested for Heraclitus (frag. 13; 37; and Plato's quotation in book vii). It follows either that both ideas were originally Orphic and that Heraclitus borrowed the one from the Orphics, or that the Orphics borrowed from Heraclitus the one conception and duplicated it with the idea of correspondent punishment. This would have taken place in the time between Heraclitus and Plato.

They purify themselves by defiling themselves with more blood, as if one who had stepped into mud would wash himself in mud; any man who discerned what he (the ritual purifier³³) was doing would deem him mad. And they pray to these images, as if one were to prate to dwellings, not knowing (this refers to the man who addresses images instead of the gods) what gods are and heroes.

That in the rite actually the same substance, blood, is applied to take away the stain of bloody murder makes the blunder the more manifest, but it is not essential for what Heraclitus intends to make clear. The main thing is that some mundane matter is applied as a remedy for such a pollution. Not even in his religious acts does man succeed in establishing a contact with the beyond. Instead, he clings to "these" images (the word "these" is significant), which may or may not be the dwelling places of divinity but certainly are not themselves divine. He cannot escape the mire of this superficial reality; and, when he tries to do so, he only covers himself with more of the same substance. How, then, should he be able to visualize that which is beyond the ken of trivial experience? The vicious circle of ignorance and faulty behavior closes and imprisons its victim in a grave of "filth."³⁴ In this sense Heraclitus had exposed ordinary man as "burying himself in filth."

Thus the new fragment has found its place in the Heraclitean system. It has been linked to a considerable number of other fragments, which have all proved to be interrelated and to combine into a solid and homogeneous fabric. Not only do they express cognate and coherent ideas but most of them approach the metaphysical reality by the same procedure, the thought pattern of the geometrical mean. Using this scheme, Heraclitus contends that ordinary man, when compared to the enlightened is no better than a domestic animal; and that the superficial reality to which he confines his horizon, when compared to the

³³ The style and structure of this fragment has been analyzed in *Göttinger Nachrichten*, 1924, pp. 105 ff.

³⁴ While in the vicious circle a wrong attitude prevents a true understanding and the lack of understanding prevents an improvement in behavior, quite the opposite is true for those souls which possess the logos: 115 ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος αὐτῶν αἰετῶν.

transcendental, is no more valuable than refuse and filth. Plunging into menial experience, man covers, as it were, his organs of perception with a crust of mire.⁵⁵ A comparison of this type inspired the originator of the Heraclitus legend to his miserable invention. He made the metaphysician, when stricken by the very realistic and mundane pains of bodily disease, try to wash off his sickness by covering himself with a crust of cow-dung.⁵⁶

We could stop here if we were concerned only with the new

⁵⁵ Empedocles (*Vorsokr.*, 31, B 2, 2) likewise speaks of "the many petty imprints blunting our thoughts," and again he says (in frag. 110) that, just as the metaphysical insight will wane in a mind set on worldly things, it will wax and increase by itself (*αὐτὰ αὐξέει*) in a mind engrossed in "pure" meditations (= Heraclitus, frag. 115, cf. preceding note).—It is worth while to compare, for the sake of analogy, the expressions of medieval Christian mysticism. I translate some passages by Tauler (ca. 1300-61), all taken from one and the same sermon "Beati oculi qui vident quod vos videtis et c." (no. 45 in Vetter's edition, *Deutsche Texte des Mittelalters*, 11, pp. 194-201). In spite of the fundamental differences on which it is needless to expatiate, some coincidences are striking. "Man has two kinds of eyes, external and internal eyes. And but for the internal eye man would be like some other kind of animal or beast" (cf. Heracl., frag. 107, p. 317 of this article; and fragments 9, 4, 13, 37, pp. 322 ff). "Dear children, how can it be that noble reason, the internal eye, is so miserably blindfolded that it fails to perceive the true light? The fatal defect results from this: a thick coarse skin, a thick hide is laid over it, and this is love and affection to creatures, or else to one's own self or some of what one possesses, and through that one has become blind and deaf. . . . What are those skins? They are whatever you turn to intentionally. . ." (cf. Heracl., the new fragment; frag. 34, p. 316; frag. 1). "My dear, let yourself sink down, sink down to the bottom ("entsink in den grunt"), and all the best of all things will be yours. . . . This true humiliation sinks down into the divine internal abyss" (cf. Heracl., frag. 101; frag. 45, p. 327). "This is the naught of which St. Dennis has said that God is none of whatever can be grasped or understood or comprehended" (cf. Heracl., frag. 18, p. 319).

⁵⁶ Dung is mentioned by Heraclitus in frag. 96: *νεκρῶς κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι*. For the sake of demonstration we might circumscribe the probable purport of this saying in the style of frag. 5: "They revere dead bodies and worship them as heroes with ritual offerings, not understanding that carcasses are more properly to be cast away than dung." Heraclitus wants to make as clear as possible the line of demarcation between priceless values such as a living soul enlightened by the logos and worthless non-values such as a dead body emptied of the soul which it once contained.

fragment and its interpretation. But the story of the geometrical mean in the philosophy of Heraclitus is not yet ended, for the extant tradition appears to yield yet other interesting instances.

The scheme helps us better to understand the well known fragment

53 Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.

Strife is father of all things, and king of all things, and he appointed some as gods and the others as men, he made some to become slaves and the others to be free.

Here again three levels are mentioned. Man (the ordinary free citizen) holds the central position between the gods above and the slaves below him. As slaves are ruled by (free) men, so man is controlled by his heavenly lords: The gods/(free) men = free men/slaves. The power behind both these relationships is the same creative and dominating force of strife. The slaves have been thrown into their position through the strife of warfare, and between gods and men there is not only the contrast of opposite qualities (62) but also antagonism and strife as expressed in Hesiod's and Aeschylus' representations of the Prometheus myth.

The following fragment is not concerned with man and god but with some phenomena of nature's:

99 Εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν, ἔνεκα τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρον εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν.⁸⁷

If the sun did not exist there would be night in spite of all the other stars.

The fire of any star, of any αἰθόμενον πῦρ διαπρέπον νυκτί, cannot break the spell of the night, nor can they all together with their combined efforts; but the one sun outshines them all and turns night into day, ἐν ἡμέρᾳ φαεινὸν ἀστρον ἐρήμας δι' αἰθέρος.⁸⁸ The

⁸⁷ The wording is hardly authentic.

⁸⁸ I borrow expressions from the exordium of Pindar's first Olympian to indicate that this passage, like others, shows the influence of Heraclitus. In the exordium are implied the Heraclitean ideas of water being superior to the varieties of the base element, and of fire equally surpassing water (see *infra*, pp. 333 ff.); of day and the one sun sur-

glamor of all the stars, brilliant though they are, amounts only to darkness and is called night by comparison with that period in which the one sun illuminates the world (Darkness/brilliancy of the stars = brilliancy of the stars/light of the sun).

Thus the sun is extolled as by far the greatest of all the fires in our visible universe. But then again we read:

3 Ἑλίου εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου.

The width of sun: that of one human foot.

Lying down on your back and lifting one leg, you are able to blot the whole sun with one foot. The largest and most powerful of the heavenly bodies does not amount to more than that. This sounds exactly like many of the statements which we have analyzed. Even the greatest things of this world are contemptible—viz. when compared to divine things. The other half of the double proportion is missing. Can we hope to recover it?

In our extant tradition (A 1, 7) a reference to this fragment 3 is linked to another fragment (45), and we have been unwise in ignoring their connection. The other fragment supplies perfectly what is needed and makes an admirable complement:

45 Ψυχῆς πείρατα ὧν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν, οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

The boundaries of soul you will not find, wandering in whatever direction, so deep is the logos it possesses.

The soul is the one thing in the world of man that can blend with the boundless logos, the all-embracing law of laws. Through insight and clear consciousness the soul can share in the supreme power of the logos and can intelligently and actively live the rules that govern the universe, instead of being unwittingly and passively controlled by them. The sun, on the other hand, is not more than an intermittent phenomenon, annihilated every night and produced anew on every morning.³⁹

passing night and the many stars (Heraclitus, 99); of fire corresponding to gold (90); and of renown (as won by an Olympian victory) corresponding to gold (29 + 9).

³⁹ Frag. 6; Plato, *Rep.*, 498a with schol. Cf. Gigon, *op. cit.* (p. 309, note 1), p. 84 ff. Gigon is right in pointing out the similarity in the views of Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Cf. also frag. 16.

The course it has to take is strictly prescribed to it and the police officers of Nature's justice enforce the heavenly traffic rules:

94 Ἡλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπικούροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.

Sun will not overstep its measures; if it does, the Erinyes, assistants of Justice, will find it out.

While the logos in the soul may increase indefinitely (115), the extension of the sun is invariably determined by the size of the container in which the flaming masses are gathered. For the thing that man calls sun is not a real body, freely floating in the void, but a certain quantity of fiery exhalation rising from below during day time and intercepted by a bowl turned upside down. The sun is not so much an object as a transitory process, a fire kindled when the bowl rises, being sustained throughout the day by a steady flow of new material and extinguished as soon as the bowl sets at the horizon. That petty mechanical appliance, the bowl with what it holds, can be covered and blotted by one human foot (3). But—it is only a “but” we have to supply—the same foot, wandering in any direction, will never reach the end of a living soul. So deep is the logos it possesses (45).⁴⁰

It can hardly be doubted that the thought pattern of the continued proportion was primarily used, if not invented, by Heraclitus in order to clarify the contrast between the mundane and divine. But we may well expect that so familiar a tool has served him for other purposes as well. One instance is his definition of a generation. A generation is passed, so he says, and one cycle of human nature completed, as soon as, after the lapse of thirty years, the begetter sees the begotten a begetter.

⁴⁰ It is not impossible that the three fragments 99 and 3 + 45 were connected in the original as indicated in our text above: The sun by far surpasses all other fires, but the sun itself is equally surpassed by the soul (fires/sun = sun/soul). The brilliancy of the sun is the “mother of our eyes” (Pind., *Paeon*, 9, 2), but what are the eyes of the body when compared to the soul with the living and perceiving logos in it? The latter thought is expressed by Plutarch (*De Fortuna*, 98c) in connection with Heraclitus, frag. 99; and on the other hand it is implied in Heraclitus, frag. 107. Seneca, *Epist.*, 88, 13 may or may not be vaguely related.

The cycle closes when the equation *Son/father* = *grandson/son* has been enacted, so that the central figure is endowed with both the opposite qualities, sonhood and fatherhood.⁴¹

There may be more instances in our extant tradition. But, if anywhere outside the sphere to which the scheme properly belongs, we shall first of all expect it to underlie the theory of three⁴² elements of nature. As fire for Heraclitus is either identical or cognate with the divine, it may well be that it takes the position of the divine (A) in the equation, with water and earth as the B and C elements respectively.

The authentic evidence as to the Heraclitean theory of elements is scanty and the indirect tradition unreliable. The best approach to our problem, though it requires some discussion, is the historical one. Tracing the development of the idea both before and after Heraclitus and comparing his thesis with those of his predecessors and successors, we can hope to reach a more definite result and to understand more fully its implications.

Heraclitus was the only philosopher to assume three elements. Thus their number coincided with the number of the states of matter, the gaseous, liquid, and solid. Heraclitus taught that the elements are convertible into one another and in fact laid a special stress on the conversions. We can therefore say as well that he assumed only one element, the basic form of which is fire. "Fire" can be precipitated and become "water," and "water" can freeze to "earth," and *vice versa*. The relation of the other liquids to "water," and of the other solid substances to "earth" is not determined but it is obvious that with him, as with many others, "water," "earth," and perhaps also "fire" each represent a whole group of different varieties. The quantities resulting from the conversions are said by Heraclitus to be determined by a *λόγος*, i. e. law of proportions (31), and the general relationship of "fire" to all other substances or objects is one of "equivalence" or "exchange value" (*ἀνταμοιβή*, frag. 90).⁴³ This system might have worked out very well and

⁴¹ Heraclitus, A 19. For particulars, cf. *supra* pp. 89 ff.

⁴² Gigon, pp. 99 ff., contends that Heraclitus assumed four, instead of three, elements. His arguments are not convincing. Cf. Cherniss, *A. J. P.*, LVI, p. 415.

⁴³ It goes without saying that any attempt at paraphrasing implies some adulteration and modernization of the original conceptions.

have led to important progress,⁴⁴ had it not soon been superseded by the theory of four elements, earth, water, air, and fire. The new theory, introduced by Empedocles, became then canonical and prevailed for a very considerable number of centuries.

Shortly before Heraclitus, Anaximenes had laid down the similar thesis that the basic element is "air," and he had also maintained that "air" can be transformed into other substances. With him, density is the determining factor, and as density can exist in an indefinite number of degrees, any number of substances can be brought under the same principle and can find their places in the one progression. We are told that according to him air, when rarified, becomes fire, but when condensed, becomes in succession wind, cloud, water, earth, and stone. We thus get away from the idea of some very few elements. Perhaps Anaximenes even assumed that the number of possible conditions of matter is indefinite.

Contemporary with Heraclitus and holding views diametrically opposite to his, Parmenides, in his analysis of the world of appearance, assumed a strict duality of elements. They are called "fire" and "night." The positive and the negative element do not change into one another, and their interaction is restricted to attraction and mixture. Their quantitative relationship is determined by sums, not proportions; since there cannot be any void, the sum of both elements in any given space is a constant.⁴⁵ The qualities resulting from any given mixture are likewise controlled by the laws of addition and subtraction. As the one element is nothing but the negative counterpart of the other, equal quantities of both will neutralize each other and the amount of surplus remaining on this or that side will determine the character of the resulting quality and the degree to which the mixture possesses it (*Vors.* 28 [Parmenides] B 16 and 18). It is obvious that this theory is unrelated to that of Heraclitus.

The philosophical systems of Anaximander, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes have to be ruled out as far as this problem is con-

⁴⁴ A progress, it is true, in which Heraclitus himself would not have taken much interest. Like most of the *φυσικοί*, he was no physicist, though every one of them made good use of whatever physical phenomenon might help to corroborate his system.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Göttinger Nachrichten*, 1930, pp. 176 ff.

cerned, because there is nothing in the extant evidence to allow a fruitful comparison.

Thales alone seems to remain. He maintained, we are told, that water is the basic substance. But not even to the ancients was authentic information about his theory available, as he did not write a book to expound his doctrine.

Instead, we possess in its original form one precious little piece of very early evidence, allegedly contemporary with Thales, which refers to a theory of two elements. This text is not usually mentioned or discussed in connection with the history of Greek cosmology. For the author of the passage happens to be not a philosopher but a poet, and a rather poor satirical poet at that. It is odd enough that we should receive such information from such a quarter; but, badly in need of authentic material as we are, we have to take whatever we can get and be grateful.

Semonides of Amorgos, in his otherwise well known iambos on womankind, enumerates nine types of bad women and one of good women. With the exception of only two, all the types are determined by their resemblance to certain animals, swine, fox, dog, ass, cat, horse, and ape for the bad types, and bee for the one good type. In the wording of the text, however, not only is there similarity but each type is said to be made by the Olympian gods "out of" (ἐξ) the animal to which it belongs. With the archaic Greeks, substances and objects are determined by inherent qualities much more than by size and quantity or by shape and arrangement of the parts within the whole. This particular view is largely responsible for the archaic theories concerning the elements composing the universe.⁴⁶ As to the types of women, the principle led to the idea that their characters are due to the qualities of the substance which was used in making them. In seven plus one types, as we have seen, a certain animal substance is said to be the cause of the resulting character, and these eight make a natural and homogeneous

⁴⁶ The theory of Anaximenes is a notable exception in that it makes all the main qualities only a function of one quality (density) and that this one quality is assumed not as being simply present or absent, pure or adulterated, but as existing in various degrees. Density has no specific substratum but is a factor in any substance. All this is strikingly unarchaic.

series. But in the middle of this series Semonides has inserted a pair of entirely different substances. Two bad women are "molded out of earth" and "made out of sea" respectively, and their characters bear the marks of the qualities inherent to earth and sea:

- Semonides, 7, 21 Τὴν δὲ πλάσαντες γῆνιν Ὀλύμπιοι
 ἔδωκαν ἀνδρί, πηρόν· οὔτε γὰρ κακόν
 οὐτ' ἐσθλόν οὐδὲν οἶδε τοιαύτη γυνή,
 ἔργων δὲ μῦνον ἐσθίειν ἐπίσταται.
 25 Κούδ' ἦν κακὸν χειμῶνα ποιήσῃ θεός,
 ῥιγῶσα δίφρον ἄσσον ἔλκεται πυρός.
 Τὴν δ' ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἥ δὲ ἐν φρεσὶν νοεῖ.
 Τὴν μὲν γελᾷ τε καὶ γέγηθεν ἡμέρην·
 ἐπαινέσει μιν ξείνος ἐν δόμοισ' ἰδὼν·
 30 "Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη τῆσδε λωίων γυνή
 ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν οὐδὲ καλλίων,"
 τὴν δ' οὐκ ἀνεκτὸς οὐδ' ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἰδεῖν
 οὐτ' ἄσσον ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαίνεται τότε
 ἀπληκτον ὥσπερ ἀμφὶ τέκνοισιν κυών,
 35 ἀμελίχως δὲ πᾶσι κάποθυμή
 ἐχθροῖσιν ἴσα καὶ φίλοισι γίγνεται·
 ὥσπερ θάλασσα πολλάκις μὲν ἀτρεμῆς
 ἔστηκ' ἀπῆμων, χάρμα ναύτησιν μέγα,
 θερέος ἐν ὥρῃ, πολλάκις δὲ μαίνεται
 40 βαρυκτύποισι κύμασιν φορευμένη·
 ταύτῃ μάλιστ' ἔοικε τοιαύτη γυνή
 ὀργήν, φυὴν δὲ † πόντος ἀλλοίην ἔχει.

It is obvious that here a cosmological system is reflected according to which two basic substances, or qualities, make up the whole of the universe. Earth is the negative, passive, and more material element and is primarily characterized by its lethargic inertia. The only activity which the corresponding woman possesses, her only "ability" (ἐπίσταται), is consumption of food-matter. The lack of energy gives rise to the comparison with a cripple (πηρός), a person who is by himself helpless and will get nowhere by his own effort. The positive element, sea, on the other hand, is distinguished by an excess of wilful spontaneity. It is spirited to the extreme, sometimes raging in dreadful fury and sometimes "laughing" ⁴⁷ in peaceful and happy mood. Thus earth and sea, as together they make the bulk of the world in

⁴⁷ The Greeks speak of the "laughter" of the sea when it is sparkling as in quiet and friendly happiness (Aesch., *Prom.*, 90, etc.).

which we live, also provide together the main qualities which it takes to equip the world with whatever else it contains: the solidity and inertia of matter on the one hand and, on the other hand, the activity of motion and force together with the spontaneity of will and spirit. Everything can be broadly explained through the presence, the interaction, and the antagonism of the contrasting primary qualities. Sea, of course, as the active power, has the leading role and its partner is subjected and in some way subordinated to it. Thus even in this dual system it could be said that the primary agent or cause of everything is one, viz., sea or "water."

After the time of Thales and the unknown authority behind Semonides (he may be identical with Thales), the sea preserved its key position in the system of Anaximander (*Vors.*, 12, A 27 and 30), fundamentally different though his views otherwise were, and to some degree also in what Xenophanes taught.⁴⁸ Sea held the central position among the three elements for Heraclitus likewise, and Clement says that sea, in his doctrine, is "the germ of creation" (31 testim.). This word may or may not correctly describe what Heraclitus meant but certainly it is sea from which both ways are open, the way upward through the rising fiery whirlwind to fire, and downward to earth:

31 Πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα· θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἤμῃν γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἤμῃν πρηστήρ —. Θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἢν ἡ γενέσθαι γῆ.

The second part seems to be incomplete and therefore somewhat obscure, but it can hardly be doubted that λόγος is used in a sense which at least comes very near to "correspondence" or "proportion,"⁴⁹ and that the proportion, whatever the ratio may be, is meant to prevail in all the four upward and downward conversions: Fire/sea = sea/earth. There is no lack of further corroboration for the equation. The middle term always combines opposite qualities, as we have seen in numerous instances, since its relations to the things above are the opposite of those to the things below it. This is precisely stated for the sea:

⁴⁸ Cf. *Vors.*, 21, Xenophanes, A 33, 5-6; Gigon, p. 66.

⁴⁹ The idea of a ratio and fixed proportion in the relationships among the elements is likewise borne out by frag. 90.

- 61 Θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαινότατον, ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἀποτον καὶ δλέθριον.

Sea is purest water and foulest, to fish drinkable and life-giving, to men undrinkable and destructive.

In the sea all pollution collects, and yet its waters are used for ritual purification;⁵⁰ it is pure when compared to dirt, but foul when compared to purity. The sea is life for base animals with much earth in their constitution,⁵¹ but it is death for higher life endowed with a soul of fire.⁵²

Life and the soul of man is, in the view of Heraclitus, a process sustained by continuous conversion of "water" into its opposite, "fire," i. e. through evaporation. Evaporation supplies the air for respiration and thus supports consciousness and reasoning; evaporation likewise brings about the assimilation of food (A.15; A.16, 130).⁵³ The opposite transformation, precipitation, is death for souls:

- 36 Ψυχῆσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι· ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

It is death for souls to be turned into water, and for water

⁵⁰ For particulars cf. *Philologus*, LXXXVII (1932), p. 475.

⁵¹ For the idea of prevalence of earth in base animals cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 92 a-b and Taylor's note on 92a, 4.

⁵² Perhaps Heraclitus has also spoken of the sea as being mastered and dominated by the "fire" of storms, but overpowering and destroying in its turn the solid matter of ships (frag. 53 likewise implies the progression, Master / servant / servant's slave, *supra*, p. 326). This idea is indicated, though not very clearly, in Nicander, *Alsioph.*, 172-6. The passage from Nicander has been inserted by Diels among the fragments of Heraclitus (A.14a) because Nicander uses the Heraclitean expression *πῦρ δαίμων* (= frag. 30) and because the scholion on Nicander twice refers to Heraclitus. The first reference in the scholion should be emended to this effect: *ὅτι δὲ δουλεύει ἡ θάλασσα ἀνέμοις κατὰ τὸ πῦρ* (176), *κατὰ θεῖον νόμον δηλονότι, τοῦτο [δὲ] καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Μενεκράτης* (which?) *εἰρηκεν*.

⁵³ In the early theories respiration and digestion are closely connected and in fact identical. The action of "fire" (heat) which disintegrates and concocts the food to prepare it for assimilation is thought to be both dependent on and responsible for respiration by Plato in *Timaeus*, 78e and 80d. The lungs, named *πνεύμονες* for their function in respiration, are likewise supposed to be the recipient of drink (Alcaeus, frag. 94 Diehl; Plato, *Tim.*, 70c and 91a).

to be turned into earth. But out of earth water is born,
out of water soul.

The two downward conversions are equivalent to a twofold death, and the two upward transformations to a double birth, with water (it is not "sea" this time) in the central position, where the ways of birth and death meet.

We are now in a position to reach a conclusion. The old conception of sea and earth as contrasting elements or bodies⁵⁴ possessing opposite qualities still prevails in the system of Heraclitus, with a similar relationship between the partners. But then Heraclitus follows Anaximenes in increasing the number of the elements and in assuming that they are convertible into one another. Unlike Anaximenes, however, he considers the changes from one condition to the next not as slight and gradual transitions but as violent and dramatic transformations from opposite to opposite, and he restricts the number of elements to three. By this means they are made to coincide with the three states of matter (the solid, liquid, and gaseous), and at the same time to comply with the pattern of the geometrical mean. The contrast between dead inertia and vivid power exists twice in this configuration, with sea or water in the central position. This thesis explains the kosmos and the meteorological phenomena but it holds good equally in everyday experience. Fire and heat, the substance of life, makes dead matter in the rigid state gain life and motion and melt; and again it makes half-dead matter in the heavy state of liquidity gain real life and energy, lose its weight,

⁵⁴ Our little survey has shown that the theory primarily referred less to the substances water and earth than to the objects sea and land, the components of the world in which we live. To the prehistory of the conception belong the Homeric similes symbolizing powerful motion by the waves of the sea and stubborn resistance by the stable cliff upon which the waves break. In some of the similes storm takes the place of roaring sea, or storm is associated with waves to symbolize the will of the leaders who stir the crowd (sea) and push it into motion. Solon (frag. 11 Diehl, cf. Jaeger, *Berliner Sitzungsberichte*, 1926, p. 81) uses the simile of sea and wind in order to state that not the crowd (= sea) but the leaders (= storms) are responsible for political unrest. This clever remark in some way preludes the development from Thales (sea or water as motive power) to Anaximenes (air as motive power). As a rule, the discoveries and theorems of Greek philosophy are preceded by anticipation on the moral field.

break its bonds, freely evaporate upward and become during the transition, *in statu nascendi*, conscious breath and living soul. Deprivation of fire and life, making things travel downward on one and the same path, has the opposite result.⁵⁵

As soon as Empedocles had firmly established his four element theory, the scheme of the geometrical mean was seemingly ruled out for ever from that province. But just at this late stage of the development it happened for the first time that the scheme was explicitly, as such, applied to the elements of nature. Plato in the *Timaeus* (31b ff.) deduces the Empedoclean system by starting from the extreme elements fire and earth, and then pointing out that an intermediate is necessary to bind the conflicting bodies to one another. He goes on to say that the binding element, in order to serve its purpose of mediation and harmonization, must be determined by the principle of the geometrical mean, for only through a geometrical progression can a complete cycle of mutual relations be brought about. But, as elements are tridimensional bodies, he infers that not one but two geometrical means have to be inserted between fire and earth. The final result is a sequence of four elements, determined by the double equation $\text{Fire/air} = \text{air/water} = \text{water/earth}$. It has been assumed that either Plato himself, or possibly Philolaus, introduced into cosmology the "Pythagorean" idea of the geometrical progression.⁵⁶ We now learn that Heraclitus had done it long before, except for the mathematical strictness of expression. The difference in the number of elements is really negligible. For every reader of the *Timaeus* will feel that the duplication of the geometrical mean comes as somewhat surprising and unconvincing.⁵⁷ The line of thought leads rather

⁵⁵ This, however, is perhaps not the whole story. If we can trust our indirect evidence (A 1, 9-11), Heraclitus, in order to account for the phenomena of day and night and of the weather, introduced two kinds of evaporation, a bright and a dark one. This would involve a concession in the line of Anaximenes and not be consistent with the main thesis. But Cherniss (*A.J.P.*, LVI, p. 416) is inclined to disbelieve the accounts of a double evaporation, and they are indeed open to several grave objections.

⁵⁶ Cf. Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 98.

⁵⁷ Plato's argument that there is one geometrical mean for planes but two for tridimensional bodies seems to be based on the theorems Eucl., *Elem.*, viii, 11 and 12 (cf. Eva Sachs, *Philol. Unters.*, 24, Berlin

to three, instead of four, elements, mutually related according to the simple pattern of the geometrical mean. This is exactly what Heraclitus taught. With an unimportant modification, Plato finally formulated with technical precision a basic principle of Heraclitean thought.

The strong consistency in the grandiose system of Heraclitus imposes on the interpreter the duty of seeking the connections between the parts of the doctrine, connections which in the original were either expressed or tacitly implied. On the other hand, there is much to mislead our efforts. The power of Heraclitus' thought and style is so overwhelming that it is apt to carry away the imagination of his readers (of those at least who do respond) beyond the limits of sober interpretation. Neither the ancient philosophers and physicians nor modern scholars have escaped the danger of allowing their fancy to run riot and heraclitizing on their own account. The Stoics especially blended with their own ideas the inspirations for which they were indebted to the obscure philosopher. We have to use all the material and yet be utterly suspicious of the views under which it is presented. Almost every single statement in the indirect tradition, if it can be compared with the original saying to which it refers, affords a striking proof of limited ability, not to speak of limited will, to assimilate archaic thought and reproduce it correctly. It is fortunate that we are able to settle some of the problems by tracing back a certain pattern of Heraclitus' original thought.

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[Weidmann], 1917, p. 126, note 1; substantially the same explanation is given by Taylor, p. 96, but a different one by von Fritz, *R. E.*, XVII, 2268, s. v. *Ἐινοπίδης*).

Index to passages cited: Anaximenes: 330; n. 46. Empedocles: n. 35. Heraclitus, A 1, 3/4: 309; 325. A 1, 9-11: n. 55. A 14a: n. 52. A 15/16: 334. A 19: 328 f. A 130: 334. B 1: 316-8. 3: 327 f. 4: 322. 5: 323. 6: 327. 9: 322. 13: 322. 16: n. 39. 18: 313; 319. 29: 322. 31: 333. 34: 316. 36: 334. 37: 323. 44: 321. 45: 327 f. 52: 320. 53: 326; n. 52. 71: n. 18. 79: 314; 316 f. 82/83: 315. 90: 329. 94: 328. 96: n. 36. 99: 326-8. 107: 312; 317; n. 40. 114: 320. 115: n. 34 f. 328. 117 and 118: n. 18. 124: 319. Orphics: nn. 6; 32. Parmenides: 330. Pindar: nn. 18; 24; 38. Plato, *Rep.* ii 363d: n. 6; vii 517c: n. 24; 533d: 311 f.; *Tim.* 31b ff.: 336. Sch. Nic. *Alex.* 172: n. 52. Semonides: 331. Solon 11: n. 54. Tauler: n. 35. Thales: 331; 333.

A CHRONOLOGICAL PROBLEM: THE DATE OF THE DEATH OF CARUS.

In view of the fact that the available historical evidence for the years 282-283 A. D. is not extensive, the determination of the chronology for the reign of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Carus presents many problems. One of the most difficult of these problems is concerned with the date of Carus' death, an event which took place some time in the latter part of the year 283. Vogt¹ and Domaszewski,² basing their chronological calculations upon the evidence of the Alexandrian coinage and the material contained in the so-called "Chronograph of 354," reached the conclusion that Carus met his death before August 29 of that year. Their arguments may be summarized as follows:

(1) To all appearances, the Alexandrian coinage of Carus does not go beyond the year A, the first year. At any rate, no coins of the year B are known. Vogt therefore assumes that Carus reigned sometime between August 28, 282 and August 29, 283.³ The first year (A) of Carinus and Numerian, the sons of Carus who were associated in the imperial government with their father, corresponds to the first year of Carus, although at the beginning of his reign Carus gave them only the rank of Caesars. During the course of the year A Carinus was made an Augustus, while Numerian was not accorded this title until some time in the year B, the second year.⁴ Coins of Carinus and also of Numerian for the year 3 are known, indicating that the brothers continued to rule after August 28, 284.

(2) Substantiating evidence for the theory that Carus ruled only one year may be found in the "Chronograph of 354" which records the length of his reign as ten months and five days. Therefore, as far as Carus is concerned, the coin dates and the "Chronograph" are in agreement.

¹ J. Vogt, *Die alexandrinischen Münzen*, Stuttgart, 1924, p. 166.

² A. von Domaszewski, "Die Daten der Scriptorum Historiae Augustae," *Sitz. Heid. Akad.*, VIII (1917), pp. 34-35.

³ Vogt, *op. cit.*, p. 166. The Alexandrian regnal year ended August 28 and began August 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

(3) Basing his conclusions on the foregoing evidence Domaszewski calculated the approximate dates for the reign of Carus as September 7, 282 to July 11, 283.⁵ Historians generally agree in placing the death of Numerian in the autumn of 284 and that of Carinus in the spring of 285.

Nevertheless, in spite of the apparently indisputable testimony of the Alexandrian coinage and the "Chronograph of 354" regarding the brevity of Carus' reign, there is much to be said for the theory of the older historians headed by Schiller⁶ who thought that Carus did not die until December, 283.⁷ Moreover, a study of the epigraphic sources, hitherto disregarded, lends strong support to this earlier opinion. The following table of the dates at which Carus presumably received consular and tribunician honors will serve to demonstrate this point:

Sept. 282 ⁸ —Jan. 283	tr. p. I cos. I—	<i>C. I. L.</i> II, 1117, 4760; VIII, 968; <i>E. E.</i> VIII, 740; <i>A. E.</i> (1923) 16, 103. ⁹
Jan. 283—Sept. 283	tr. p. I cos. II—	<i>C. I. L.</i> II, 3660, 4102; <i>E. E.</i> VIII, 227.
Sept. 283—Dec. (?) 283	tr. p. II cos. II—	<i>C. I. L.</i> VIII, 5332, 10250, 12522.

Mattingly has already put forth arguments to show that in the third century the tribunician power was renewed on the anniversary of the date on which each emperor first received it rather than on December 10 as Mommsen supposed.¹⁰ The inscriptions noted in the table above can be interpreted only as additional proof for Mattingly's theory. Lest it be urged that this is the merest coincidence, it is only necessary to point to the coins and

⁵ Domaszewski, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁶ H. Schiller, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Gotha, 1883, I, p. 884.

⁷ They based their theory upon a rescript of Carus (*Ord. Greg.*, II, 2, 2) dated in that month and year.

⁸ It is possible that Carus did not actually become emperor until October (Domaszewski, *op. cit.*, p. 34).

⁹ *A. E.*: "Année épigraphique" in *Revue Archéologique*.

¹⁰ H. Mattingly, "Notes on the Chronology of the Roman Emperors from Valerian to Diocletian," *Jour. Eg. Arch.*, XIII (1927), p. 14; "Tribunicia Potestate," *Jour. Rom. Studies*, XX (1930), pp. 78-91; Mommsen, *Röm. Staat.*, II, p. 796.

inscriptions of the preceding emperor Probus which tell the same story, demonstrating beyond any question that Probus, who first received the tribunician power in July 276,¹¹ annually renewed this power in the month of July and not in December.¹²

If Carus' second grant of the tribunician power *had* been conferred in December 282, it would have been impossible for an inscription to record TR. P. I COS. II (as we find it in *C. I. L.* II, 3660, 4102; *E. E.* VIII, 227) since he would have to have been TR. P. II before becoming COS. II. Moreover, if this had been the case, we should expect to find him as TR. P. II COS. I for the period December 10, 282–January 1, 283. No inscriptions of the TR. P. II COS. I type are known, however, and since all the evidence points in the opposite direction, it may be concluded that Carus was not made TR. P. II until September 283, the anniversary of his accession. At that date, therefore, Carus must have been still alive.

Although there is apparently no way to put aside the evidence of the Alexandrian coinage except to produce strong arguments

¹¹ H. F. Stobbe, "Tribunat der Kaiser," *Philologus*, XXXII (1873), p. 78.

¹² Probus was consul in 277, 278, 279, 281, 282 (Pauly-Wissowa, II, p. 2519), and we may correlate his consulships and grants of the tribunician power as follows:

July 276–Jan. 277	tr. p. I	— <i>C. I. L.</i> II, 4881
Jan. 277–July	I cos. I	—II, 1116; XI, 1178
July–Jan. 278	II	I —III, 8707
Jan. 278–July	II	II
July–Jan. 279	III	II —XII, 5437, 5511; <i>E. E.</i> VII, 693.
Jan. 279–July	III	III
July–Jan. 280	IV	III
Jan. 280–July	IV	III
July–Jan. 281	V	III— <i>C. I. L.</i> II, 3738
Jan. 281–July	V	IV
July–Jan. 282	VI	IV—II, 1673
Jan. 282–July	VI	V —Cohen, 460 (Vol. VI, Probus)
July–Oct. (?)	VII	V

If a similar table is worked out on the supposition that the tribunician power was renewed on Dec. 10, it will be found that the inscriptions *C. I. L.* II, 1116 and XI, 1178 cannot be used since there will be no place for tr. p. I cos. I. More important, however, is the fact that the coin Cohen 460 (tr. p. VI cos. V) will not fit into such a system. Therefore the solution offered in the above table is the most satisfactory.

for disregarding it,¹³ the "Chronograph of 354" presents no such obstacle. It is a well-known fact that the "Chronograph" is seldom accurate. The length of the reign of Carinus and Numerian as given in the "Chronograph" is 2 years, 11 months and 2 days. This estimate is too long by at least five months. According to the same chronicle Diocletian and Maximian ruled 21 years, 11 months and 12 days. Actually they reigned less than 21 years. It is not advisable, therefore, to use the "Chronograph" for important chronological details.

The theory that Carus died in July 283 cannot be reconciled with the evidence of the literary sources. The ancient historians of the fourth century A. D. agree that Carus was killed by a bolt of lightning during a severe thunderstorm after his victorious army had penetrated Persian territory as far as Ctesiphon.¹⁴ This story in itself gives us the date for the event. Thunderstorms occur in Mesopotamia frequently during the winter months (November-March) and *never* in July.¹⁵ Furthermore, Diocletian, who was with Carus at this time, was, in later life, notoriously afraid of thunderstorms, and it is quite likely that having witnessed Carus' accident he feared that a similar fate might overtake him.¹⁶

Another bit of epigraphical evidence which strengthens the supposition that Carus was still alive in the autumn of 283 is to be found in *C. I. L. VIII*, 10283 in which Numerian as Caesar

¹³ Mattingly, *Jour. Eg. Arch.*, XIII (1927), p. 16 implies that coins of the year B of Carus *have* been found, but this must be a misstatement. One particular point in connection with the Alexandrian coinage should be noted, however. Numerian does not become an Augustus until some time in his *second year*. If Carus had died in July, as Domaszewski supposed, it is difficult to see why Numerian did not appear as Augustus on the coins late in the first year or from the very outset of the second year. As long as Numerian remains a Caesar, we should expect to find coins of his father Carus as Augustus since Numerian probably was proclaimed his successor by the Persian expeditionary force.

¹⁴ Eutropius, IX, 18; Victor, *De Caesaribus*, 38, 3; Festus, XXIV; and others. Lightning struck Carus' tent, and he perished in the flames.

¹⁵ Professor A. E. R. Boak of the University of Michigan has been so kind as to forward to me the opinions of Professor LeRoy Waterman and Professor Clark Hopkins, both well acquainted with the climate of Mesopotamia, who are agreed that a July thunderstorm would be out of the question entirely.

¹⁶ Constantine the Great, *Oratio ad Sanctorum Coetum*, Chap. 25.

is mentioned as *consul designatus*. We know that Numerian was consul for the first time in 284.¹⁷ The *consules designati* were usually announced in the latter part of the year;¹⁸ and therefore the inscription can be dated in the autumn of 283. If Numerian was still Caesar at that time, his father cannot have been dead.

The conclusion that Carus reigned until nearly the end of 283 is amply justified by the arguments advanced above. The last rescript of his reign is dated in December of that year,¹⁹ and it seems probable that his death occurred in that month.

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¹⁷ Pauly-Wissowa, II, p. 2513.

¹⁸ Mommsen, *op. cit.*, I, p. 558.

¹⁹ *Cod. Greg.*, II, 2, 2.

A NEW FRAGMENT OF THE SARAPION MONUMENT.

The many fragments which belong to the Sarapion monument were assembled and published by Oliver in *Hesperia*, V (1936), pp. 91-122. This triangular monument, inscribed on all sides, contains a paean of Sarapion, a catalogue of *παλαιστοί*, and the paean of Sophocles. To these fragments of Oliver may now be added another fragment, previously published in the *Corpus* but not identified as a part of this inscription, which necessitates a new interpretation and date for one side of the monument.

The first publication of this fragment was made by Pittakys (*Eph.*, 943) who stated that it was of Pentelic marble and that *εὑρέθη τὸ 1839 εἰς τὰς πρὸς τὸ δυτικὸν τοῦ Ἐρεχθελίου ἀρχαιο-λογικὰς τοῦ [sic]¹ ἐρεῦνας*. Later, Rangabé (*Ant. Hell.*, II [1855], 673) published it with no additions to the transcription of Pittakys. Finally, Dittenberger (*I. G.*, III, 3839), listing it among *fragmenta incerta*, reproduced it from a copy made by Koehler. It now bears the Epigraphical Museum number 8321.

This fragment may be identified with certainty, and it contains part of the top four lines from the right side of the monument. At the top of the fragment are to be found continuations of the two incised lines which may be seen in the photograph given by Oliver (*op. cit.*, p. 104). The lower of these was incised 0.015 m. above the words *ἀγαθῇ* of Oliver's group and *τύχῃ* of the new fragment; the distance between the two incised lines is 0.035 m. The new fragment is to be placed between the two pieces E. M. 9646 and E. M. 8517, shown in Oliver's diagram on page 105.

The following text for the first four lines of the right side is now proposed:

Ἀγαθῇ	τύχῃ
Ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Μου[νατί]ου Θεμισωγο[ς $\frac{c}{s} \frac{d}{d} -$]ιέως	
ιερ[έ]ως δ[ὲ] βίου Φλ[αυίου] Ὀ[νησικράτου] [ς $\frac{c}{s} \frac{d}{d} -$]αίεως	
ζακ[ορεύοντος] Εὐκαρπίδου τοῦ Ἐκπ[ά]γλου Βερ[εν]εικίδου	

Oliver had followed Graindor in restoring in line 2 of this

¹ τοῦ should apparently be deleted in accord with innumerable examples of this same sentence in Pittakys' writings. Otherwise, the reading might be emended to *-ικὰς μου ε*.

right side the name of the archon Μουνάτιος Οδοῦρλοςκος Ἀθηναίος, who held office about 174/5 A. D.² Since the front of the monument, containing the paeon of Sarapion, furnished the information that Quintus Staius Glaucus, priest of Asclepius, had erected the monument in honor of his grandfather Sarapion, the year of the ἐφηβεία of the grandson (ca. 218/9 A. D.) dated both his appointment as priest and the *terminus post quem* for the erection of the monument sometime after 220 A. D.³ In line 7 of the front of the monument Oliver restored the name of the archon in whose year the monument was erected as Δε[ύκιος Διονυσόδ]ωρος.

In regard to the interpretation of the right side, whereupon is engraved a catalogue of παλαιστοί, Oliver explained that the archonship of Munatius Vopiscus (ca. 174/5 A. D.) recorded the year of the original occasion on which the paeon of Sarapion was chanted, and connected this occasion with a religious ceremony during the plague of Antoninus.⁴ Approximately fifty years afterwards the grandson erected the monument to Sarapion and included the catalogue of the chorus.⁵ A priori, one might question that a list of all the members of a chorus should have been retained for fifty years; and, with the new readings, the occasion for the singing of the paeon must in fact be moved down to the later date. The archon was not Munatius Vopiscus, but Munatius Themison, and the latter may now be recognized as an immediate predecessor of Δε[ύκιος Διονυσόδ]ωρος. The identification of the zakoros in line 4 as Εὐκαρπίδης Ἐκπύλου Βερενικίδης who was kosmetes about 218/9 A. D. is very nearly certain.⁶ The priest Flavius Onesicrates appears as ἱερεὺς διὰ βίον in *I. G.*, II², 4532.⁷ This latter inscription records the votive-offering made by Claudia Agrippina, the wife of the dedicator of the Sarapion monument. And although this relationship of wife and husband is not mentioned on the votive tablet, the dedicatrix was of sufficient maturity to set up the tablet on her own volition with no mention of her parents. The votive-offering, then, can scarcely be dated before the close

² Graindor, *Chronologie des archontes athéniens sous l'Empire*, pp. 178-79.

³ *I. G.*, II², 2226 and 3704.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 93 and 121.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁶ *I. G.*, II², 2224.

⁷ See also *I. G.*, II², 3685.

of the second decade of the third century, and Ónesicrates' priesthood must be placed in approximately this same period.

The restoration of the name of the archon as Munatius Vopiscus caused Oliver to identify Δακίνιος Φέρμος of line 3 of fragment *h* as Φέρμος Δ Γαργήτιος, who had been ephebe in 163/4 A. D. (*I. G.*, II², 2086, line 50), and Δακίν. Φ[έρμος] of line 5 of fragment *h* as Φέρμος Δ Γαργ., who had been ὑποσωφρονιστής in 154/5 A. D. (*I. G.*, II², 2067, line 111). However, the name Φέρμος occurs too frequently to permit this identification on the basis of the similarity of one element of the name, and with the new date both identifications must be rejected. Among many occurrences of the name may be mentioned Δα. Φέρμος, who was ephebe at the end of the second century (*I. G.*, II², 2120, line 1), and Δακ. Φέρμος, who also was ephebe about the same time (*I. G.*, II², 2136, line 3).

Inasmuch as the chanting of the paean must be dated after 220 A. D., one piece of evidence must be rejected which Oliver used to strengthen his identification of the Sophoclean paean engraved on the left side of the monument as a hymn to Coronis, and not the famous παιδν εἰς Ἀσκληπιόν. Oliver suggested that this hymn was extracted from a partial oblivion about 175 A. D. with the result that Tertullian (*ad Nationes*, 2, 14), writing about 197 A. D., could conclude from the fame and solemnity of this great occasion that more honor was paid to Coronis at Athens than even to Theseus.⁸ The passage in Tertullian may no longer be connected with this occasion for the singing of the Sophoclean paean.⁹

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⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 114 and 121.

⁹ After this paper was in galley-proof, I received K. Keyssner's "Zu inschriftlichen Asklepios hymnen," *Philologus*, XCII (1938), pp. 269-284. Keyssner did not examine Oliver's work in detail, but he identifies our Sophoclean paean as the hymn to Asclepius (pp. 277-278) and rejects Oliver's conclusions concerning the anonymous paean of Erythrae (p. 284).

IG III (= CIA III), APPENDIX, 66.

The text of numerous curse tablets is written in *Spiegelschrift*, for the most part in such manner that it is only necessary to read the lines from right to left in succession either downward or upward. Another mode of composition, and one not so obvious, permits the normal practice of reading the lines from left to right, but reverses the spelling of the individual words or phrases. This method, which is rarely used, is illustrated by a lead tablet inscribed in Latin in the latter years of the second or the early years of the third century. It was discovered at Bath in 1880 and edited originally by Charles E. Davis, who reconstructed the text on the basis that the lines were to be read from right to left. When it did not emerge as a *defixio* in spite of the ancient preference for lead in the preparation of curse tablets, it was inevitable that further attempts should be made to bring it within that category. Later editors discovered that a perfectly good *defixio* resulted if instead of reading the lines from right to left, one applied this principle only to the successive words and phrases.¹

Although Wuensch republished the text of the Bath tablet in the introduction to his edition of Attic *defixiones*,² he failed to see that the same method could be applied with considerable advantage to a lead tablet of the fourth century B. C. from Attica.³ From the carefully drawn facsimile which Wuensch gives, I have derived the following diplomatic transcript.

A.

NOTAPAYEQΔATAKNAT
 ΤΩΛΓΙΑΚΝΗΧΨΝΗΤΙΑΚΟΤΑΡΑ
 ΥΕΣΟΤΙΑΚΟΤ[.]ΡΑΥΕΤΕΜΣΟΚΙΑΝ
 ΣΝΑΙΟΣΟΙΑΚΙΣΟΤΤΑΡΗΝΣΟΤΑΡΑΥ • •
 5 ΕΤΕΜ : NOTΥΑ[.]ΑΚΝΑΤΤΩΛΓΟΤΙΑΙΩΔΑ
 ΤΑΚΝΗΧΥΨΝΗΤΙΑΚΟΤΩΙΑΝΕΤΟΝΙΣΕΛΕΤΙΑ
 ΚΙΟΚΙΑΝΥΣΙΟΣΟΙΑΚ

¹ Both versions as well as a bibliography and a brief history of the decipherment of the text can be found in Auguste Audollent, *Defixionum Tabellae quotquot innotuerunt tam in graecis Orientis quam in totius Occidentis partibus praeter atticas in Corpore Inscriptionum Atticarum editas* (Paris, 1904), No. 104.

² Richard Wuensch, *Defixionum Tabellae Atticae* (= *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum*, Appendix, Berlin, 1897), p. xxv.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 66.

B.

ΙΞΕΝΟΥΤΟΥΤΑΤΕΙΤΝΑΝΕΣΙΤΕΙΑΚ
ΙΟΜΕΙΕΙΤΤΑΡΠΙΣΟΛΛΑ

In order to obtain sense from this text, Wuensch adopted a striking and ingenious arrangement. He read the first fourteen letters of line 1 from right to left, then read upward in the same way beginning with the end of line 7 and proceeding to NAT in line 1. With line 8 he made a new start and read first line 8, then line 9 from right to left. The result is an intelligible, but confused text, with an awkward and improbable syntax:⁴

A.

Καταδῶ Εὐάρατον·

καὶ ὅσοι σύνδικοι κ-

αὶ Τελεσῖνο<ν> τὲν Ἰδιώτο(ν) καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατ-
αδῶ Ἰδι<ώ>το(ν), γλῶτταν κα[ὶ] αὐτόν: μετ' Ε-

- 5 ἑαράτο(ν) σ<ν>νπράττωσι καὶ ὅσοι ἂν σ-
<ν>νδικος μετ' Εὐαρ[ά]το(ν) καὶ το(ν) Εὐ-
αράτο(ν) καὶ τὴν ψ<ν>χὴν καὶ γλῶτ-
ταν.

B.

καὶ ε(ῖ)τις ἐναντί<α> ε(ῖ) τὰ τούτων ἐσ<τ>ί

- 10 ἄλλος πρᾶττ{ι}εὶ ἐμοί.

Wuensch was by no means blind to the syntactical and stylistic difficulties inherent in his arrangement and proposed in his notes possible emendations of ll. 5-6 and 9-10. On the assumption that our *magus* reversed only words and phrases instead of whole lines, the following text, correct in grammar and simple in style, is obtained with no change in the order of the lines as given on the tablet.

⁴ I have modified Wuensch's text to the extent of making it conform to the recommendations of the *Union Académique Internationale. Emploi des signes critiques. Disposition de l'apparat dans les éditions savantes de textes grecs et latins. Conseils et recommandations*, Paris, 1932. I have nevertheless retained his use of ο(ν) for ο = ον and of ε(ι) for ε = ει in order to avoid a textual apparatus.

A.

Εὐάρατον καταδῶ, καὶ γλώτταν
καὶ τὴν ψ<υ>χὴν Εὐάρατο(υ),
καὶ το(υ)ς μετ' Εὐαρ[ά]το(υ) σ<υ>νδίκο(υ)ς,
καὶ ὅσοι ἂν σ<υ>νπράττωσι μετ' Εὐάρατο(υ),
5 κα[ι] αὐτόν: γλώτταν Ἰδι<ώ>το(υ) καταδῶ
καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ Τελεσίνο<υ> τὸν Ἰδιώτο(υ)
καὶ ὅσοι σύνδικοί

B.

ε(ι)σι τούτων. τὰ ἐναντεῖ<α> ε(ι)τις καὶ
ἐ(ι)μοὶ πράττει ἄλλος.

6. τέν: for τόν. An alternative arrangement is τὴν χυχὴν τὸν (= τὴν) Ἰδιώτο(υ) καὶ Τελεσίνο(υ), and an argument in its favor is that no other accusative on the tablet has simple *o* for *on* whereas *o* is regular for *ou*.
8. ἐναντεῖ<α>: for ἐναντία. No other reading is possible from the facsimile supplied by Wuensch, but cf. *ε* twice in line 9. ε(ι)τις: possibly, but not necessarily, an error for εἴτι.
9. ἐ(ι)μοί: *ε* for *ε*, as in line 8 *ε* for *ε* twice. Nevertheless, the influence of the adjacent *ε* cannot be completely discounted. Cf. note to line 8.

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PLUTARCHEUM.

Plutarchus quo loco egregia arte et ad excitandos legentium animos accommodata mortem Cleopatrae describit (*Vit. Anton.*, 86, 1) his utitur verbis, quae sic exhibeo ut in Ziegleri editione extant: λέγεται δὲ τὴν ἀσπίδα κομισθῆναι σὺν τοῖς σύκοις ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θρίοις ἄνωθεν ἐπικαλυφθεῖσαν· οὕτω γὰρ τὴν Κλεοπάτραν κελεῦσαι· μηδ' αὐτῆς ἐπισταμένης τῷ σώματι προσπεσεῖν τὸ θηρίον.

Haec non prorsus sana esse non fugit homines doctos; velut Ziegler καὶ ante τοῖς θρίοις delere voluit, Madvig verba τῷ σώματι proscripsit. Illa autem offensio, ut ipse coram mihi significavit Ziegler, distinctione mutata tollitur; verbis enim οὕτω... κελεῦσαι

parenthesin contineri et μηδέ illud non excusari nisi cum καὶ antecedente coniunctum. Rei grammaticae ita satisfactum est; sed restat aliud. Quid enim sibi vult ἐπισταμένης? Regina sane ipsa anguem adferri iussit atque etiam quomodo celanda sit praescripsit: id autem hic nihil ad rem, ac ne callidissimi quidem serpentis intererat comperire, utrum regina de omni re certior facta esset an non. Una igitur littera mutata scribendum est ἐφισταμένης: ne cum regina quidem accessit ad fiscellam anguis prosilit eiusque corpus adgreditur.

Fabulam potius quam historiam narrari—optime tamen narratur—Plutarchus ipse significat. Talia in mortibus singularibus describendis saepe fieri constat; in memoriam revoco quae in libro gratulatorio Felici Ramorino tradito de Claudii morte scripsi, nescio quo pacto haud recordatus, Rudolphum Herzog (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, 125, 235) eadem fere ante me dixisse.

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HIPPARCHEUM.

In codice Pomponii Melae, qui unus extat, III, 70 haec traduntur: *Taprobane aut grandis admodum insula aut prima pars orbis alterius ipparchius dicitur; sed quia habitatur nec quisquam circum eam esse traditur, prope verum est.* Haec aliquam lucem accipiunt ex Plinii loco VI, 81: *Taprobanen alterum orbem terrarum esse diu existimatum est antichthonum appellatione; ut insulam liqueret esse, Alexandri Magni aetas resque praestitere.* Certe is, qui mundi formam ita adumbravit, ut posteri diu in eius verba iurarent, insulam esse Taprobanen docuit; qua de re in docto Herrmanni commentariolo (*R. E.*, IV A, 2263) plura legas licet. De antichthonibus post Eudoxum locuti sunt; cf. Kauffmann, *R. E.*, I, 2531; Gisinger, *ibid.*, XIX, 833.

Melae et Plinii locos si comparabis, cognosces illam de antichthonibus opinionem vetustiore fuisse et repudiatam esse, postquam Taprobanen circumnavigari posse compertum est (nam esse dudum in *isse* correctum est). Errant igitur qui Hipparcho hanc opinionem obtrudunt; id quod Bergero, qui olim confidentius iudicaverat, oboluit (*Gesch. d. wiss. Erdk.*, 462). Vel Albertus Rehm autem rem non improbabilem iudicaverat (*R. E.*, VIII, 1680). At patet locum illum Melae minime sanum ac

ne per compluria quidem saecula sanatum esse. Legebatur enim fere *prima pars orbis alterius Hipparcho dicitur*: ita v. g. Tzschucke, qui vol. II, 3, 251 se dubitare dicit et cum alia tum *ut Hipparchus dicit* reponi posse significat sermonis adsurditate recte perspecta. Illud *ut Hipparcho dicitur* nullo modo ferri potest; neque propter rem (nam Hipparchus de re post Alexandrum vel certe Eratosthenem certa dubitare non poterat) neque propter verba: dativus enim ille auctoris non ferendus est, quod sensit Barbarus (vel Vinetus), praepositionem *ab* addens, passivique usus excusationem non habet. Non sensit Wachsmuth loco se mederi arbitratus, cum *ut Hipparcho dicitur* scribebat, astronomo doctissimo eam opinionem inculcans, quam ille non reicere non potuit. Ceterum commemorare necesse est *sed* illud post *dicitur* a Perizonio et plerisque in *et* mutatum esse: nihil enim erat cui verba *sed quia . . . prope verum est* opponerentur.

Verum vidit R. Hansen (*Nov. ann.*, CXVII, 497), id quod nescio quo pacto fugit Frickium Melae editorem. Vel enim a ratione palaeographica veri dissimile est *ipparchius* in *Hipparcho* mutandum esse; nec minus ab re, cum Mela in tanta brevitate compendii sui auctores afferre non soleat neque cur hic potissimum id fecerit inveniri possit. Ille igitur ductus traditos fideliter interpretatus *id parcius* restituit; quod si examines; videbis id sententiae qualis re vera est (sc. cum *sed quia habitatur* sequitur) optime satisfacere. Id igitur dicit Mela Varronem ut opinor secutus: id quod pauciores adfirmant, Taprobanen initium antichthonis esse, ideo probabile est, quod habitatur i. e. sedes ἀντιχθόνων est (nec spondeo non immixtas esse opiniones quales Mela, I, 4, profert), et quod quemquam eam terram circumnavigasse non traditur. Offendas in forma orationis: *parcius* usurpatum esse videtur pro *rarius*, auctorque munditias sermonis captans his verbis dixit pauciores huic opinioni favere. Ac sane mirum est, Varronem ad recentiore aliquem se adplicasse, qui veram Eratosthenis sententiam impugnaverat. Neque id mirum in homine doctrina et industria magis quam iudicio excellenti.¹

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¹ Malavialle, *Rev. de philol.*, XXIV (1900) 29, eos nominat qui Hansenio adstipulati sunt, ex quibus commemoro Konr. Miller, *Mappae-mundi*, VI, 120.

REVIEWS.

R. E. WITT. *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*.
Cambridge University Press, 1937. Pp. xii + 147.

This, the third volume to be published in the new *Cambridge Classical Studies*, is an examination of the epitome of Platonic philosophy which bears the title Ἀλκίνοου διδασκαλικὸς τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων. The last two chapters of the book are devoted to an investigation of the identity of the author and to his place in the history of Platonism; the bulk of the work, the first seven chapters, is an analysis of the structure and philosophical content of the epitome with the main purpose of determining the sources of the interpretation of Plato which it presents.

A review of the evidence concerning the name Ἀλκίνοος leads to agreement with the conclusion of Freudenthal that both the *Didaskalikos* and the *Prologus* were written by a single author, Albinus; but Freudenthal's theory that our text is only a late and abbreviated edition of the original is rejected. In the last chapter the position of Albinus as a "typical middle Platonist" is more closely defined, and his theology and psychology are compared with those of Plotinus; Dr. Witt decides that Albinus was probably of little importance for Plotinus. The conclusion of the first part of the investigation is that the *Didaskalikos*, though mainly dependent upon the system of Antiochus of Ascalon, is directly derived from Arius Didymus, who in his account of Plato, while borrowing from Antiochus, introduced of his own accord elements from Aristotle and the Old Academy which Antiochus himself had not used. To reach this result Dr. Witt, after identifying the general Stoic and Peripatetic elements in the *Didaskalikos* and calling attention to the traces of Xenocratean doctrine to be found therein, sketches the characteristics and consequences of the eclecticism of Antiochus, establishes the sources from which his doctrines may be determined, and then proceeds to study systematically the doctrines in the *Didaskalikos* for agreement or incompatibility with those of Antiochus. Agreement in part with Antiochus, in part with Arius, and the presence of Posidonian elements as well as influences of the Old Academy, all this leads to the decision that the influence of both Antiochus and Posidonius is indirect; then, supposing that the author used a single doxographical source, Dr. Witt decides that this source was most probably Arius "whose account of Plato would naturally be coloured by the views not only of Antiochus but of Posidonius also." The intimate relationship of the *De Platone* of Apuleius, Hippolytus'

account of Plato (*Refut.*, I, 19), and the *Didaskalikos* is reasserted (after Howald and Sinko); but for the Arian work which is the source of all three Dr. Witt holds to the *Epitome*, rejecting—though not in very decisive terms—Howald's hypothetical Arian handbook "A."

That Albinus used the *Epitome* of Arius cannot, I think, be denied; and Dr. Witt presents cogent objections to the hypothesis that Antiochus is the direct source of the *Didaskalikos*. His own conclusion, however, requires the assumption that Albinus used a single doxographical source; and this leads him far beyond the point warranted by his evidence. Proposed as a *possibility* on p. 96 and taken for granted on p. 103, the hypothesis of a single source is presumably supported by the attempt in the intervening pages to show that the *Didaskalikos*, *De Platone*, and Hippolytus, *Refut.*, I, 19 are intimately related. Yet, in order to maintain that the *De Platone* and *Didaskalikos* have as their single source the *Epitome* of Arius, Dr. Witt has to suppose that Apuleius "took considerable liberties with his original"; but then why presume that Albinus may not have done the same? It is not plausible to suppose that the pupil of Gaius and the editor of his lectures could have followed the *Epitome* of Arius without allowing the influence of Gaius to manifest itself in his treatment of that source.

I do not wish, however, to argue the psychological improbabilities of the "Einquellenprinzip," to which Witt himself objects when Strache uses it (pp. 27, 95), but only to point out that the desire to establish Arius' *Epitome* as the source of the *Didaskalikos* has now and again led to errors in the interpretation of the *Didaskalikos* itself. In the attempt to reconcile the *De Platone* and the *Didaskalikos* Witt says, for example, that the identification of ἡ πλατωνική τε καὶ βευστή οὐσία with τὸ μὴ ὄν "is probably implied in chapter XXXV" of the latter work (p. 100, n. 2); but this chapter merely reproduces the doctrine of the *Sophist* concerning τὸ μὴ ὄν as "otherness" and contains no hint of such an identification.¹ It is the same thesis which induces him to cite the "hominem ab stirpe ipsa neque absolute malum nec bonum nasci" of Apuleius as a point of agreement with the οὐδὲ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους of

¹ Witt cites *Didaskalikos*, p. 189, 18-20: ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν . . . μετὰ συνεμφάσεως τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ ὄντι παρέπεται. Hermann reads: ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καθ' ὃ ἐξακούεται, οὐ ψιλλὴ ἀπόφασις τοῦ ὄντος [cf. *Sophist* 257 B-C], ἀλλὰ μετὰ συνεμφάσεως τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον [cf. *Sophist* 258 A-B], ὅπερ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ὄντι παρέπεται [*Sophist* 259 B, 256 E-257 A and cf. p. 189, 20-22]. So with p. 189, 15-18 cf. *Sophist* 258 E 6 ff. and 238 C-239 A. With either reading the implication is not that ἡ βευστή οὐσία is τὸ μὴ ὄν but, quite to the contrary, that even the idea of being itself has the attribute μὴ ὄν. Of the parallels cited above, Witt's *Loc. Platonici* contain only 258 E which is equated with p. 189, 20.

Albinus (p. 101). The order in which Apuleius treats the five senses Witt admits is not that of the *Didaskalikos*, but he calls it significant that in the latter work the order "which is exactly the reverse of the Platonic is the arrangement recognized by Arius Didymus" (p. 102). This is an unfortunate statement, for in Arius, *Frag. Phys.*, 15 (*Dox. Graec.*, p. 456, 1) the order "sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch" refers to Aristotle, *not* to Plato. Furthermore, the reason for this order is not far to seek, since it is the order followed by Aristotle himself in the *De Anima* (418 A 26-424 A 15). Finally, lest the use of this Aristotelian order in the treatment of Plato be itself considered an indication that Arius is the source, let it be noted that Theophrastus himself followed this order in reporting Plato's theory of the senses (*Dox. Graec.*, p. 500, 7-18).²

The passage on the ideas in the *De Platone* (I, chap. 6) is, according to Witt, "like the opening of *Didaskalikos* XII certainly derived from Arius Didymus" (p. 99). Now the opening of *Didaskalikos* XII does appear to be an abridgment of the fragment of Arius preserved by Eusebius (cf. Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 447); but, whereas elsewhere in the *Didaskalikos* (chaps. IX, X [p. 164, 26-27, 37], XIV [p. 169, 33-35]) the ideas are said to be the thoughts of God, this doctrine does not occur in the fragment of Arius or in the Albinus passage parallel to it. Witt says that "we may conjecture" that Arius placed the ideas in the mind of God, his argument being that *Didaskalikos* XII is similar to IX and that "it is natural to conclude that both chapters are derived from Arius, and that the omission in XII has no significance" (p. 75 and note 2). This is just to assume the thesis that has to be proved, namely that the *Didaskalikos* was derived from a single source. Moreover, if Albinus copied this doctrine from the *Epitome* which was also the source of the *De Platone*, why does Apuleius not describe the ideas as

² In *De Sensu* 439 A 7 Aristotle lists the sensibilia in this order and it probably became conventional after Theophrastus who uses it in his reports of Empedocles (*Dox. Graec.*, pp. 500, 19-502, 5), Cleidemus (*ibid.*, p. 590, 4-11), and Democritus (*ibid.*, pp. 513, 10-515, 22: sight, hearing, "the other senses"), though his order for Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes is different in each case (*ibid.*, pp. 506, 23 ff.; 507, 8 ff.; 510, 14 ff.). Epicurus (*Ad. Herod.*, §§ 46a-53) uses the order: sight, hearing, smell (the other two not being treated); Chrysippus (*St. Vet. Frag.*, II, p. 238, 36) listed the five senses in the Aristotelian order, preceded however by *φωρῇ* which he treated separately. It is not quite true to call this order "exactly the reverse of the Platonic" either, for, although in the *Timaeus* from 61 C to 68 D tactile qualities, flavors, odors, sounds, and colors are discussed in that order, Plato has already discussed sight and hearing in 45 B-47 D, so that one might treat the sections on sounds and colors as subsidiary and, following the *Timaeus* strictly, get for the Platonic order: sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell. The order of Apuleius (sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell) is very close to this.

thoughts of God?³ It can hardly be more likely that Apuleius systematically excised from Arius references to this doctrine than that its occurrence in Albinus is to be credited to a source other than that common to the *Didaskalikos* and the *De Platone*.

At the same time it would have been more helpful to analyze more fully the content of chap. IX than to insist that it is similar to XII "save that the idea is not once again defined as νόησις θεοῦ." For example, it would be of some importance to notice that the second sentence (p. 163, 12-16) is reproduced almost exactly by Chalcidius (*In Tim.*, § 339 [p. 363, 5-11]) just before he comments upon *Timaeus* 51 D-E, which is the source of the last argument in chap. IX (p. 164, 1-5, not noted in Witt's *Loci Platonici*). Witt is impressed by Theiler's comparison of Varro's identification of the ideas, "exemplum secundum quod fiat," and Minerva with the statement of Albinus: οὐ μόνον ἐκ τινός ἐστι γεγονώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπό τινος . . . καὶ πρὸς τι (p. 163, 35-37); he, as well as Theiler, takes this designation of the idea then to indicate the theory of "the thoughts of God" (p. 72). Even in Albinus, however, this passage (p. 163, 34-37; cf. p. 163, 16-18) is an argument for the existence of ideas which has no real connection with that particular interpretation of them. A comparison of Alexander, *Metaph.*, p. 88, 20 ff. shows that neither the designation of the idea as πρὸς ὃ nor the argument in full involves any such doctrine (καὶ ὁ τῶν τεταγμένων γνωμένων αἰτίαν λέγων τὸ πρὸς ἔσῳς γίνεσθαι τι παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δὲ τὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι [possibly from Aristotle's *De Ideis*; cf. Robin, *La Théorie Plat. des Idées*, note 19]). A similar criticism must be made of Witt's argument that Diogenes Laertius, III, 13 shows "that the view of the ideas as the thoughts of God was held by some members of the Academy contemporary with Alkimos." Witt contends (p. 71) that in

³ In *De Platone*, chap. XII there is the definition "providentiam esse divinam sententiam, conservatricem prosperitatis eius cuius causa tale suscepit officium; divinam legem esse fatum per quod inevitabiles cogitationes dei atque incepta complentur." "In this passage," Witt remarks, "πρόνοια is identifiable with God's νοήματα" (p. 100). If by this he means that the passage identifies πρόνοια and the ideas, he should have to admit that it is inconsistent with the fragment of Arius which distinguishes God's πρόνοια from the ideas (*Dox. Graec.*, p. 447 A 24-27, cf. *Didaskalikos*, p. 167, 9-11). Apuleius' definition of providentia no more implies that the ideas are thoughts of God, however, than does the *διανοηθείς* πρώτον μὲν ὅτι . . . of *Didaskalikos*, chap. XII (p. 167, 21), which passage Witt himself in his final section (pp. 133 f.) marks as inconsistent with the theology of chap. X and the interpretation of God's relation to the world-soul (p. 164, 35-37; cf. p. 169, 31-35), where again the ideas appear as thoughts of God. Here, incidentally, the world-soul is represented as ἀποβλέπουσα πρὸς τὰ νόητα αὐτοῦ (soul. τοῦ θεοῦ) . . . ἐφειμένη τῶν ἐκείνου νοημάτων (p. 169, 33-35) whereas in chap. XII πρὸς τινα ἰδέαν κόσμον ἀποβλέπωντος, παράδειγμα ὑπάρχουσιν is said of God himself (p. 167, 7).

calling the idea *αἰδιὸν τε καὶ νόημα* Alcimus implied that God was the thinker; yet Alexander refers to a theory of the ideas as *αἰδία* and *νοήματα* according to which, his arguments show however, these "eternal thoughts" were *not* supposed to be thoughts of God (*Metaph.*, pp. 92, 18-28; 103, 1-4).⁴

Some discussion is wanted also of the interesting passage concerning the extent of the world of ideas and the disagreement among Platonists there indicated (p. 163, 22-27; n. b. οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἐπὶ Πλάτωνος ἀρέσκει . . .); this passage is an important piece of evidence for the history of a controversy which touched the very foundation of Platonism and for which we have testimony reaching from Aristotle's *De Ideis* (cf. *Metaphysics* 990 B 10-17; Alexander, *Metaph.*, pp. 79-83) and the seventh Platonic epistle (342 D) to Proclus (e. g. *In Parm.*, V, p. 63 [Cousin]: οὔτε τῶν κακῶν ἰδέας εἰσοίσομεν ὥς τινες τῶν Πλατωνικῶν).

Such omissions are not to be expected in a book which the author claims to be "an exhaustive examination of the *Didaskalikos* itself" (pp. ix and 2); the truth is that the desire to establish Arius as Albinus' source often eclipses entirely the interest in the *Didaskalikos* itself. This is not to deny the importance of establishing the historical connections of such a work as the *Didaskalikos* nor to depreciate the value of Dr.

⁴ Since the description of the idea as *νόημα* is in the Alcimus passage followed by διὸ καὶ φησιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τὰς ἰδέας ἐστάναι καθάπερ παραδείγματα and this is practically a verbal quotation of *Parmenides* 132 D (τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει) which follows immediately the refutation of the thesis that each idea is a *νόημα ἐν ψυχαῖς*, the Alcimus passage (if the text is right; cf. Breitenbach *et al.*, app. crit., *ad loc.*) may be simply a stupid misinterpretation of *Parmenides* 132 B-D. Aristotle, *De Anima* 429 A 27 (οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν), however, points to an interpretation of the ideas as "thoughts"—and *not* thoughts of God—at least as early as Aristotle, and the *Parmenides* passage itself is evidence for this (cf. Friedländer, *Die Platonischen Schriften*, pp. 486 f.). Those who discuss the origin of the "thoughts of God" theory seem to overlook this indication that it was preceded by a theory of ideas as "thoughts of men." The historical transition to "thoughts of God" is lacking, although Aristotelian influence in that direction is highly probable (cf. R. M. Jones, *Glass. Phil.*, XXI, pp. 324-326; Witt, p. 73, against Theiler). For Witt's attempt (p. 71) to establish Xenocratean influence on the doctrine, however, I can find no evidence. He cites only *frag.* 60 in support of his statement that Xenocrates "regarded the Dyad or World Soul . . . as the Number in which the Ideas are contained" so that "since he called both Monad and Dyad Gods" he could be said in a sense to have held that the Ideas are contained in God. *Frag.* 60, which merely defines the soul as self-moving number, is apparently a mistake for *frag.* 15 where alone the world-soul is identified with the dyad, an identification itself open to grave doubt (cf. Jones, *Platonism of Plutarch*, pp. 97 ff.); but nowhere is this dyad said to "contain the ideas," and whether it were the determinate dyad, as Heinze contends, or the indeterminate it is hard to see how it could.

Witt's contribution to the study of the history of Platonism but only to suggest that neglect of significant parts of the text in question cannot help weakening the conclusions concerning those historical connections. Of the same order is the temptation to overlook significant differences in seeking similarities which will help to establish the source. Dr. Witt in refuting Strache and Theiler points out that for all the likenesses between Antiochus and the *Didaskalikos* there are important differences. Yet in his own positive argument he is not always guiltless of the same kind of error. His eagerness to find doctrines of the Old Academy, for example, makes him discover on p. 165, 32 the theory of indivisible lines (pp. 17, 77-78), although Albinus says merely *καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐπίπεδον πρότερον ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ πρότερον ἢ τὸ ἐπίπεδον*. This, given only as an example of the priority of a part to that of which it is a part, does not, of course, imply that the line is indivisible (cf. also p. 165, 16-17: *ἐπιφάνειαν νοήσαντες, εἴτα γραμμὴν, καὶ τελευταῖον τὸ σημεῖον*); even for Aristotle the point is not "part" of a line (*Physics* 241 A 3).⁵

In spite of such omissions and occasional errors, however, Dr. Witt's detailed study is in the main sound; and, whether or not he has made it plausible that Arius was the chief source, he has done good service in analyzing the kind of Platonism represented by the *Didaskalikos*. His final chapter is particularly illuminating; and attention should be called to his analysis, among the sources for the study of Antiochus, of Clement's *Stromateis* VIII. It is to be hoped that Dr. Witt will soon publish the critical text of the *Didaskalikos* which along with the present study was presented as a Cambridge Dissertation.

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⁵ Similarly far-fetched is the contention (p. 15) that the account of λόγος in chapter IV is ultimately Xenocratean. Xenocrates had a triple division (*ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, αἰσθησις*) whereas Albinus has only *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* and makes the correlate of the latter *τὰ αἰσθητά*, its *ἀρχή* being *αἰσθησις* (p. 154, 28-29). The definition of *αἰσθησις* (p. 154, 29) should be compared with the Platonic *Definitions* 414 C; its ultimate source is *Philebus* 33 E-34 A as that of *μῆμη* (p. 154, 34) is *Philebus* 34 A 10 and that of *δόξα* (p. 154, 35) is *Philebus* 39 A (cf. p. 155, 12-15 with *Philebus* 39 B-C). The ultimate source of *τὸ βέβαιον* connected with *ἐπιστήμη*, of *δόξα* with the opposite, on p. 154, 22 ff. is *Philebus* 58 E-59 C. None of these parallels is given in Witt's *Locis Platonici*; instead he compares parts of chap. IV with Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 216 ff. (pp. 53-55).

Inscriptiones Graecae, Voluminis II et III Editio Minor: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis Anno Postiores, Pars Tertia, Fasciculus Prior: Dedications, Tituli Honorarii, Tituli Sacri. Ed. IOHANNES KIRCHNER. Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1935. 4°. Pp. viii + 362. M. 122.

An adequate review of this big agglomeration of materials is next to impossible; Körte has done a good job,¹ but I have seen only two other reviews.² What they have said is not repeated in the following notes which are intended for actual users of the fascicule—a fascicule which is important for archaeologists, for historians of politics, of cults, and of institutions. All will agree that the editing is masterly, the flaws are petty.

Abbreviation. In the old Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum, which became Inscriptiones Graecae, Volume II, edited by Koehler, went from 403/2 to 30/29 B. C., and Volume III, edited by Dittenberger, went from 30/29 B. C. through to the end of pagan inscriptions. These volumes are cited properly as I(nscriptiones) G(raecae) II or III, or more conveniently as IG II¹ or III¹. In the new Editio Minor, the entire contents of the old Volumes II and III are combined, so that Kirchner's work, to be completed in eight fascicules, runs from 403/2 to the end of pagan times. The abbreviation of this new work might be the accurate but cumbersome IG II-III²; it is to be hoped, however, that present practice, which agrees with the understood wishes of the editor himself, will continue, so that the last inscription, for instance, in the new fascicule will always be cited properly as IG II² 5219, or as some prefer *I. G.*, II², 5219. (The form IG II, iii, i², 5219 is certainly to be discouraged, and the form IG III² 5219 also need never be used.)

*Omissions.*³ The dedication to Isis et al., Epigraphical Museum inv. no. 649, can be proved to be Athenian, not Delian (*Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXX [1937], pp. 208 f.). The dedication published by Pittakys (Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., no. 224), read by him as -νίππου Βούραντι-, has never found a place in the Corpus; the mere fact that Pittakys alone reports it is not a sufficient reason for omitting it. I have not found in this or the preceding fascicule the text ἱερὸν Μητρός (Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., 1899, p. 239), which gives the location of a shrine of Magna Mater in Athens (cf. Judeich, *Topographie*², p. 398); nor the text [-----] | [Θ]εοδώρου | Ἀπόλλωνι Πατρὶ[?] | ἀνέθηκεν from Ἀρχ. Δελτ., II (1916), p. 143 (see now *Hesperia*, VI [1937], p. 110 n.). Sixty-

¹ *Gnomon*, 11 (1935), pp. 625-641.

² Kolbe, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 57 (1936), pp. 2170-2174, and Ziebarth, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, 56 (1936), pp. 380-387.

³ Körte (*loc. cit.*) noted two omissions.

eight *titulorum honorariorum incerti generis fragmenta* included by Dittenberger (IG III¹ 954-980, 982, 984-1004; addenda 963a-998a) are omitted from the new fascicule.* These texts range in length from --]OXY[-- (IG III¹ 1001), rightly omitted, to larger texts such as [τὴν δαῖτα] Δεω[νίδου? τοῦ ἐπωνύμου] ἀρχοντος [θυγατέρα, κληρονομία] ἴσα[σαν, -- ἀνέθηκε]ν, σωφροσύνης ἕνεκα (IG III¹ 989), which some scholars may feel should properly be retained in a Corpus. It is encouraging to note, therefore, that practically all of the relevant smaller inscriptions discovered on the Acropolis by B. Tamaro are included.⁶—The new fascicule was able to include only the first published inscriptions from the American Excavations of the Agora, namely those included in the inventory numbers 1-500, which are only a fraction of the eventual total; for others the student must consult successive issues of *Hesperia*.—An interesting relief found in Piræus, inscribed ΗΡΑΚΛΕΟΣ | ΑΛΕΞΙΚΑΚΟ should appear (L. D. Caskey, *Museum of Fine Arts, Boston: Catalogue of Greek and Roman Sculpture*, pp. 102-104, No. 47, with photograph).

Duplications. Among the ca. 2460 inscriptions in the new fascicule, some are inevitably duplicated by error.⁶ Ziebarth calls attention to the similarity in text of IG II² 4442d and IG II² 4498. The two titles are undoubtedly one and the same: the measurements of the stones differ only because the dimensions are recorded in a different order. Further, IG II² 3183, fragment c, appears also as IG II² 3180; IG II² 4371a (addenda, p. 352) appears again as 4428; and 4670 is the same as 5015. Likewise among the 103 inscriptions which Körte (*loc. cit.*) finds in honor of Hadrian, who undoubtedly received more honorary inscriptions than any other individual, some texts probably repeat others.

Arrangement. Dedications might conceivably be grouped according to the status of the dedicants, or according to the deities to whom the dedications were made. In either system prohibitive difficulties would arise. Kirchner has wisely abandoned any severely logical plan: the first groups are by dedicants;

* IG III¹ 985 has been republished, with a photograph, but without knowledge of previous publication, by B. Tamaro, *Annuario d. R. Scuola arch. d. Atene*, IV/V (1921/2), p. 64, no. 139. The original, as Pittakys said, was a large monument.—IG III¹ 997 also reappears as *op. cit.*, p. 67, no. 183.

⁶ Her useful epigraphical survey of the Acropolis can be brought up to date by noting that in *op. cit.*, pp. 55-67, no. 18 = IG II² 3962, no. 52 = 4318, no. 79 = 4029, no. 97 = 4080, no. 106 = 3180, no. 108 = 3272, no. 121 = 3409, no. 146 = 4167, no. 153 = 4919, no. 166 = 3721, no. 178 = 3582.

⁶ Ziebarth, *loc. cit.*, has noted that IG II² 2939 = IG II² 4339.

the next groups include statue bases and the like, arranged according to the status of the persons honored; there follows a section of artists' signatures; then dedications by private persons, arranged according to the deities. This scheme is simple and good. *Any* scheme involves dangers for the unwary researcher. Thus the student of sculpture will find sculptors' signatures scattered through various sections; the student of the cult of Asklepios will find much of his material outside the section "Donaria Aesculapii"; even dedications by the Athenian Demos are not all in one place.⁷ The volume of indexes will eventually remedy some, but not all, of this trouble; some dedications do not mention the name of the deity.

Descriptions. Most of the descriptions of the monuments are doubtless correct. This branch of the study, however, has developed less than others; archaeologists will therefore not accept the descriptions, always brief in any case, without controlling them. Thus IG II² 4702 is a stele with a sculptured relief, not an altar—the word *ara* is overworked; and the text itself of the curious tripartite monument IG II² 4994 cannot be rightly understood from the one word "basis" (*Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXX [1937], p. 214). Part of a true altar—the altar of Apollo Patroös—, a "tabula," IG II² 4984, has now been properly published (Thompson, *Hesperia*, VI [1937], p. 110; also a new altar, *op. cit.*, p. 106). Among more unusual forms, some examples of actual Athenian allotment machines have recently been identified (IG II² 2864, see "Prytaneis," *Hesperia*, Suppl. I [1937], p. 198). IG II² 4833 and 4835, each described merely as "marmor," will be shown in a forthcoming article to be corners of elaborate cult tables. Beginning with a small new fragment from the Agora, and eventually including IG II² 3563, 3631, 3796, 4510, 4544, and many other fragments, the large tripod-base inscribed with the paeon by Sophocles has been built up (Oliver, *Hesperia*, V [1936], p. 91 ff.); the inscribed block which has proved to be the crowning member had been identified as Athenian by Kirchner (formerly IG XII, 9, 40, as if from Karystos; IG II² 3796).

Misprints. The extraordinarily high standards of previous fascicules have been maintained. I have noted only IG II² 2797, line 6, read *Θυμαράδην*, and 2967, commentary on line 6, where

⁷ In one matter of this sort, even Körte (*op. cit.*, p. 639) was misled, or at least his statement is misleading. Dedications involving the Egyptian gods are more numerous than the 18 to Zeus Hypsistos, although the sanctuary of the former has not been excavated, whereas that of Hypsistos has (list of Egyptian dedications in *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXX [1937], p. 214).—Hypsistos in the Greek world has been fully treated by Nock, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXIX (1936), pp. 55 ff.

the year is 346/5. The spacing of the type is of course not intended to imitate the original at all closely, but the occasional gross irregularities, as in IG II² 2797 and 2798, diverge unnecessarily much from the originals. These instances are exceptional; in the main the setting of the type, the work mostly of one veteran craftsman, is unimpeachable, and the student will not be misled who remembers that in monumental work especially the masons spaced their letters regularly.

That some 101 inscriptions were first studied, and are published for the first time in this fascicule, by the editor himself, will not surprise those who have known him. Johannes Kirchner received his doctorate in 1883, finished the *Prosopographia Attica* in 1903, and has now edited some 5300 epigraphical texts in IG II², not to mention many in Ditt., *Syll.*³; in 1935 appeared his valuable *Imagines Inscriptionum Atticarum*. In August 1935 he arrived in Athens to continue work on the last fascicule of texts in IG II² (the sepulchral monuments), and by June 1936 he had checked over all the ca. 12,800 inscriptions in the Epigraphical Museum, had examined practically all the other known grave monuments in Athens, including those in the Agora Excavations, and had taken part in an exploration of Attica which turned up about 100 more unpublished inscriptions (*Hermes*, LXX [1935], pp. 461 ff.; *Ath. Mitt.*, forthcoming). To congratulate such a scholar is superfluous. One thinks rather of what the example offered by his soundness, keenness, and vigor means today for classical studies of every sort, wherever pursued.

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PIERRE BOYANCÉ. *Études sur le Songe de Scipion* (Bibliothèque des Universités du Midi, Fascicule XX). Paris, E. de Boccard, 1936. Pp. 192.

In the first part of his book Boyancé gives the text of the *Somnium Scipionis*—according to Ziegler's edition (p. 12)—and its translation into very clear and adequate French. Then he discusses the most important philosophical ideas of Scipio's speech: his conception of the world (ch. II), of the soul and immortality (ch. III), of glory and the great year (ch. IV). Boyancé prefers this method of writing several essays to that of writing a commentary (p. 9) because of the main purposes which he has in mind: to show that Posidonius is not the philosopher whom Cicero follows and to determine the theories which really moulded his thinking. For Boyancé considers the

myth of the *Somnium* to be original (ch. I) only in the sense that he ascribes originality to Cicero as a writer, not as a thinker (p. 9).

The Posidonian influence on the *Somnium* has already been disproved by Reinhardt, Heinemann and Harder, as Boyancé is well aware (p. 38). Since his book appeared, Bignone too has rejected such an assumption (*L'Aristotele perduto* I, 1936, pp. 240 ff.). Yet the older theories have a strong hold on the interpreters; it is, therefore, not improper to deal once more with them. Besides, Boyancé's discussion of the arguments brought forward for and against the thesis often contributes, beyond the immediate problem, to the understanding of the philosophical doctrines involved. What he says about the term *αἰών* and its meaning in the various Stoic systems (pp. 65 ff.) is especially interesting and valuable. In this argumentation there are but few mistakes. His claim, for instance, that Cicero did not admire Posidonius as a stylist (p. 45) can hardly be accepted. After all, Cicero sent one of his writings to Posidonius for correction (ut ornatus de iisdem rebus scriberet [*ad Atticum*, II, 1, 2]).

On the other hand, Boyancé is right, I believe, in establishing the importance of Cleanthes for the solar-theology (pp. 78 ff.; 174); therein he agrees with R. M. Jones. But the possibility of the influence of Heraclides Ponticus is very uncertain (pp. 74, 137). The fact that friends of Cicero were interested in problems which are treated by Cicero too (pp. 168 ff.) does not prove anything about the historical dependence of the statements made by Cicero. Nor is it a convincing procedure to reconcile, as does Boyancé, Cumont's theory that the deification of Hellenistic kings is relevant for Cicero's belief in the immortality of statesmen with Harder's contention that these are different things (pp. 141 ff.). Finally, since the sentiments alone of the *Somnium* are considered to be Roman, whereas the ideas as a whole are declared to be Greek, it is difficult to understand how the idea of the immortality of the statesman should be a Roman conception (p. 173).

I hesitate the more to enter into any argument about these points because a decision must necessarily be based on considerations outside of the *Somnium*. The mere interpretation of the text, however, is not yet far enough advanced, and it is astonishing that Boyancé did not go into greater detail with this problem. Where he deals with the composition at all, he accepts in general Harder's analysis of the *Somnium* (R. Harder, "Über Ciceros *Somnium Scipionis*," *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft*, VI [1929], Heft 3). Although he is so bitterly and ironically opposed to the logic of "Quellenforschung"—and this with good reason—he himself is primarily, even exclusively, interested in discovering the

sources. But many questions concerning the understanding of the text are still unsolved, the answers to which must affect the discussion of the more general problems.

To give an example, I take the main theme of the *Somnium*, the rejection of human glory. Boyancé is satisfied with characterizing this attitude as being equally far from the confidence in human glory, expressed in *De officiis*, as from the disillusion regarding human glory, shown in *De finibus* (pp. 158-9). Harder says that the rejection of human glory is the philosophy of a man whose expectation for just recognition of his merits has not been fulfilled in this world; he therefore seeks a compensation in the life to come (p. 149). But Scipio, having urged the statesman to despise glory among men and having described how limited in space and time this glory is bound to be, concludes therefrom: quocirca si reditum in hunc locum desperaveris, in quo omnia sunt magnis et praestantibus viris, quantum tandem est ista hominum gloria . . . (VI, 25). Scipio then declares that the acquisition of human glory cannot counterbalance the loss of immortality. In the *Somnium* immortality is promised only to the just and pious statesman—ea vita via est in caelum (VI, 16). He who abandons these principles can no longer hope (desperaveris) to return to the heavenly abode, although he may thus acquire the recognition of his compatriots. But the tenuousness of what he then would gain cannot be compared with the stability of what he is in danger of losing. In such a case he must make his choice: he should despise human glory; he should look up to the heavens (igitur alte spectare [VI, 25]) and not devote himself to the earth. For the aim of the statesman is not the reward of men but the eternal requital bestowed on him by God (illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes nec triumphos arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum genera desiderat, [VI, 8]). If it is demanded of him, he cannot hesitate to give up the one for the other. Cicero himself alluding to the *De re publica* writes to Atticus: quod si ista nobis cogitatio de triumpho iniecta non esset, quam tu quoque approbas, ne tu haud multum requireres illum virum qui in VI. libro informatus est. Quid enim tibi faciam qui illos libros devorasti? Quin nunc ipsum non dubitabo rem tantam abicere, si id erit rectius. Utrumque vero simul agi non potest, et de triumpho ambiciose et de re publica libere (*ad Atticum*, VII, 3, 2). This is no attitude of indifference concerning human glory; it is not the renunciation of what the world does not grant and which is therefore sought after in another world. Rather is it the repudiation of a good that one can get but because of a moral standard does not feel allowed to accept. It is, therefore, impossible to determine the source of Cicero's remark as a Hellenistic declamation against glory, comparable to the reflections

of Marcus Aurelius (Harder, pp. 131, n. 4; 133). Nor is it necessary to suppose that the Romans, in general, had not the same esteem for glory as the Greeks (Boyancé, p. 160).

Cicero's demand does not mean that the statesman should never indulge in human glory. If it is acquired in a justifiable way, he may rejoice in it. Scipio himself says: *principem civitatis gloria esse alendum* (V, 9), and he declares that the state would remain safe as long as homage is paid to the princeps (*ibid.*). Boyancé tries in vain to reconcile those statements, not taken into account by Harder, with his interpretation of the myth; they are irreconcilable. At no period of his life did Cicero renounce glory as such. In *De finibus* (III, 57) it is Cato who is speaking, not Cicero as Boyancé wrongly presumes (p. 156). Scipio knows that the philosopher alone is able earnestly to treat the vanity of all glory (I, 26-29). The man of active life must believe in the value of human endeavor.

Scipio admires the philosopher on account of his superior attitude toward glory; he admires the philosophical discussions as such (I, 29). This is symbolic for the philosophy of the *Somnium*. There is no primacy of the active life over the theoretical one, as is generally assumed (Boyancé, pp. 139 ff.; Harder, p. 119). It is true that the active life is stressed much more than is usually done in the Hellenistic systems; but the philosopher and the statesman both have the same claim to immortality as is expressly stated in the *Somnium* (VI, 18). This admission is not a "Bruch" in the composition (Harder, p. 120), nor a contamination of two sources; for that nothing on earth is nearer to God than statesmanship (I, 12; cf. VI, 13) is said in defiance of those who assert that the life of the philosopher alone leads to the salvation of man. In the introduction to the whole treatise Cicero defends and establishes the right of political activity against the current philosophical doctrines of his time; he must do so, he says, because otherwise the purpose of his book would be meaningless. But nothing indicates that he goes so far as to dethrone the theoretical virtues or to claim that the value of philosophy is less than that of political activity. He coördinates the statesman and the philosopher, and this was bold enough an adventure in those days. It is, however, not the theory of Dicaearchus, which Cicero certainly knew (*ad Atticum*, II, 16, 3; VII, 3, 1). It is the philosophy of the Academy or, at least, the philosophy of Antiochus (*ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita, si gerendis negotiis orbatus possit paratissimis vesci voluptatibus. Nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt aut, qui altiore animo sunt, capessunt rem publicam honoribus imperiisque adipiscendis, aut totos se ad studia doctrinae conferunt* [*De finibus*, V, 57]).

Boyancé speaks of a dogmatic Platonic belief in immortality (p. 176) which Cicero embraces in the *Somnium*. But the

myth is a dream, which must not be understood only psychologically (pp. 50 f.). Scipio is the friend of Panaetius who does not recognize the truth of dreams; the contents therefore remain mere conjecture (cf. I, 15). Cicero explicitly emphasizes that all these things are only dreamed by Scipio; one is never allowed to forget this fact (contrary to Harder's opinion, p. 148). At the moment in which he relates his dream Scipio seems rather to dream than to narrate what he has dreamt (*St! quaeso, inquit, ne me e somno excitetis* [VI, 12]). Human glory is rejected not because of a dogmatic belief but, so to speak, on account of a postulate or a probability alone.

Cicero, in writing his books on the state, proves himself first of all to be a sincere follower of the Academy and to be consistent in his views on the principles of political activity. This fact—and many others which I cannot mention here but which should and could be ferreted out by a careful interpretation of the text—have to be taken into consideration before it will be possible to give a convincing analysis of the sources. Until this has been done, I do not think it permissible to pass judgment, as Boyancé does, on the originality of Cicero either as a writer or as a thinker.

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GERDA BUSCH. Untersuchungen zum Wesen der *τύχη* in den Tragödien des Euripides. Heidelberg, Winter, 1937. Pp. 75.

Not the oldest, but the most long-lived ancient conception of fate, *τύχη* is the power that one associates particularly with Greek tragedy, and above all with Euripides. One's off-hand impression would doubtless be that the action of his plays, like the language, is full of *τύχη*. But that the references to chance on the part of the characters are out of all proportion to the actual rôle of chance in the plays is the somewhat surprising conclusion of this dissertation.

Dr. Busch begins by analyzing the meaning of the word *τύχη* in its various contexts, as it is qualified by some ninety different epithets, favorable or unfavorable (the latter being far the more numerous), or as it stands in relation to other words. Next she deals with the moral implications of the word: the inscrutability, and the moral dangers, of luck; its opposition to virtue; the possibility of man's collaborating with *τύχη*. There follows a discussion of the relation between *τύχη* and other powers (*χρεών*,

θεῖον, ἀνάγκη, πότμος, μοῖρα, δαίμων, and the gods). Here it appears that τύχη varies greatly in the extent to which it is regarded as independent or as the embodiment of a divine power; its personification is rare before the fourth century. Little attention is given to the persons who express particular views; so far as it is possible to divine the view of the poet himself, Dr. Busch believes that he usually regards τύχη and everything enigmatical as dependent on the gods; apparently she is not troubled by doubts as to the strength of the poet's religious faith. Though not much is to be made of chronological development, the earlier plays show more of τύχη as equivalent to fate; the later plays tend to present τύχη as chance. Freakish, capricious τύχη is not to be found; the one surviving play in which τύχη does not appear is the *Bacchae*.

From these competent analyses the author passes to the consideration, in a meager final section, of the rôle of τύχη in the several plays; this should have been the most complete part of the dissertation, but it is far from adequate. Not only the *Bacchae*, the *Cyclops*, and the *Rhesus* are excluded from consideration, but also the two plays devoted to the glorification of Athens (*Supplices* and *Heracleidae*), and the *Andromache*, in which the appearance of Peleus is termed the help of a *deus ex machina*. Four more plays are dismissed as having their action controlled wholly by a form of destiny: the *Iphigenia Aulidensis* (the divine command to sacrifice Iphigenia), the *Hercules* (the madness sent by Hera), the *Phoenissae* and the *Orestes* (a family curse). The *Hecuba* and the *Troïades* are merely labelled as examples respectively of unhappy fortune and of sudden disaster. There remain for very brief consideration three plays of fate (all, as it happens, comparatively early), and four that turn on recognition.

The *Alcestis* is analyzed as depending on the privilege vouchsafed by Apollo to Admetus of circumventing a predestined lot (cf. 695: καὶ ἔης παρελθὼν τὴν πεπρωμένην τύχην), though at the expense of a corresponding doom for Alcestis, which is escaped only by the intervention of Heracles. This Dr. Busch unconvincingly declines to regard as "einen glücklichen Zufall," in view of the cheerful character of the ending, which, she argues, has nothing to do with the poet's faith. (What does she make of the last speech of Admetus?)

The *Medea* is rightly seen to involve τύχη to the least possible extent; it turns on the supernatural powers of the heroine.

The tragic death of Phaedra, in the *Hippolytus*, is ascribed solely to irresistible necessity, springing from the pressure of Aphrodite (τύχα Κύπριδος, 371 f.; cf. 469 f.; 315), and appearing to Theseus as the fulfilment of a curse (818 ff.). The tragedy of Hippolytus himself is not mentioned.

What, then, of the four "recognition dramas"? The recognition in the *Electra* of brother and sister is promoted by the arrival of the old man, due to a lucky chance; yet the word $\tauύχη$ is not used of it, but rather of the success of Orestes' undertaking (610 f.; 648), which he attributes to the gods whose agent he is (890 ff.).

Of the many incidents in the *Helena*, Menelaus ascribes to $\tauύχη$ only his escape from shipwreck (412) and his reunion with Helen (645; cf. 698); and Dr. Busch holds that all the incidents are the means by which the divine will is carried out, as indeed Helen herself believes, despite casual allusions to $\tauύχη$.

In the *Iphigenia Taurica*, at least, one might suppose that the success of the fugitives hinged on chance, in the timely delivery of the letter. But even here, as Orestes himself urges (909 ff.), all depends on coöperation with the opportunity presented by chance, which is based ultimately on the will of the gods as declared by Athena (1435 ff.). No mention is made of the wave and the temporary obstacle that it presents.

Finally, in the *Ion*, it is Apollo's plan that is of fundamental importance, though in the incidents it is $\tauύχη$ that delays its fulfilment, that almost wrecks Ion's life (1512 ff.), and that indeed is the making of the play. Following a hint of F. Solmsen, Dr. Busch suggests that the $\alphaγνοια$ of the characters in the throes of the recognition scenes is a symbol of human weakness and of the obstacle which it presents to the gods' desire to turn chance to man's advantage. The suggestion should be considered more fully in the light of the whole Euripidean attitude toward the gods, and of tragic irony in general, as indeed all the plays, in their general intent and in the manipulation of incident, need a closer analysis than Dr. Busch has undertaken.

The author's conclusion is that an arbitrary $\tauύχη$ prevails as little in the "recognition dramas" as in the "fate dramas" of Euripides; moreover that the occurrences of the word $\tauύχη$ bear no relation to the influence of $\tauύχη$ in the action, and are often mere expressions of unfortunate individuals or of temporary circumstances and moods. (I am tempted to call $\tauύχη$ a Euripidean *cliché*.) "Tyche übt also in der Handlung Euripidischer Tragödien kein Amt aus."

It is nevertheless true, as Dr. Busch admits, that the poet's mind was constantly preoccupied with the idea of $\tauύχη$, now more, now less independent, and of its relation to gods and men, even if he did not commit himself to a belief in the overmastering power of chance. The gods, whatever they might be, remained, at least for dramatic purposes; and it can be no accident, I think, that Euripides chose to end no less than five of his extant plays (*Alcestis*, *Medea*, *Andromache*, *Helena*, *Bacchae*) with all but identical lines:

πολλὰ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων,
 πολλὰ δ' ἀέπτως κραίνουσι θεοί·
 καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη,
 τῶν δ' ἀδοκῆτων πόρον ἤρε θεός.
 τοιόνδ' ἀπέβη τόδε πρᾶγμα.

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W. E. J. KUIPER. *Grieksche Origineelen en Latijnsche Navolgingen. Zes Komédies van Menander bij Terentius en Plautus. Verhand. d. Kon. Akad. te Amsterdam, XXXVIII, no. 2, 1936. Pp. 300.*

This book is too important to be neglected by the student of new comedy. If he does not already read Dutch, he must make shift to do so. The author reconstructs six plays of Menander from Roman adaptations, viz. the four utilized by Terence and two, *Synaristosae* and *Dis exapaton*, that contributed to Plautus' *Cistellaria* and *Bacchides*. A summary in English is provided. This is, however, by no means an adequate substitute for the author's detailed argument, and it omits his reasoned statement of the chronology of the plays involved. There is also a full index and a schematic conspectus of the six plays which serves as a convenient guide to the author's reconstruction. He uses every available method—from deduction where data exist to speculation where the field is unencumbered by facts. The precision of his results is a guarantee that he has shirked no difficulties; he would be the first to admit that when precision is attained, there is a corresponding lack of certainty.

The author is a thorough student of Menander. He is most convincing when he bases his construction on character. It is laudable to rescue the fallen women of Roman comedy and restore them to the respect that they enjoyed in the Greek scene. A surprising number of them are Samians, even Thais of the *Eunuchus* and the two *Bacchides*; hence they are eligible to be recognized as Athenians and to marry. The roystering youths of Roman comedy are serious lovers in the Greek. Thus the rescue of a girl from servitude in Menander's *Adelphi* was praiseworthy; in the Roman play it is sheer dissipation, and the happy ending becomes immoral. I should go further than Kuiper and assume that the slave Syrus is almost pure Roman, and that the revelry which he encourages was not in the Greek play at all. The love of Ctesipho must have been the main theme in the Greek; his progressive enlistment of Aeschinus,

Micio, and Demea in its service would provide a natural development. Menander likes nothing better than to show a helpless babe or a hapless lover winning his way step by step to a final triumph. The debate between Micio and Demea belongs in the center of the play, not in the prologue. Kuiper compares the conversion of Demea to that of Charisius in the *Epitrepontes*. He thinks that a slave's narrative probably served as introduction to the entrance of the changed Demea. This becomes a certainty when we consider that the changed Demea would in the Greek production appear in a new mask; he would have to be introduced. I am inclined to think, however, that the farcical ending of Terence's play may be nearer to Menander's fifth act than Kuiper will allow. It is probably right to insert a recognition scene in the fourth act and to make the discovery of Demea's own misdeeds a motive for his reform, but the note of levity is typical of Menander's endings.

Where reconstruction is based on technical considerations, the results reached are more plausible separately than collectively. Kuiper narrows and universalizes Frank's statement of Terence's new technique, whereby he discarded the omniscient prologue and substituted suspense for comic irony. Kuiper finds a place for a divine prologue in each of the six plays and stresses the requirement that the god must supply a fact unknown to all the characters alike. He also assumes that the Roman dramatists omitted or modified recognition scenes in great numbers in order to avoid the marriage of half-brother and sister that was permissible in Greek comedy. Furthermore, if the Romans chose a *meretrix* for a heroine, they had to forgo the final wedding that is conventional in Menander. Kuiper makes great play with the principle that where there is a ring there must be an *anagnorisis*. This kind of reconstruction is more or less mechanical and inadequate. Menander was a genius and his invention was infinitely varied. Ingenuity in discovering the ends of acts and the gaps of construction in Plautus and Terence cannot create again the living works of art that they dismembered and disguised. It is rather surprising at first to discover that Menander can be constructed more readily from Plautus than from Terence. In the case of the latter the imitations have largely the tone of the original. It is hard to avoid the absurdity of arguing: What I like is Menander; what I don't like is Terence.

The book is well got up; I have noted no errata beyond those cited by the author. He resists the temptation to quote Terence as Menander except when he proves (page 136) from *Eunuchus* and *Heauton* that Menander did not, if he could help it, bring girls of good family on the scene. This may well be true, but what is proved for Terence is by no means proved for Menander. The minute criticism of details must wait for a critic of this

work who can equal the industry, acumen, and experience that are displayed in it. The result will be an even larger book. I can give no idea here of the abundance of fruitful comment that distinguishes Kuiper's work.

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HERBERT C. YOUTIE. *Tax Rolls from Karanis (Michigan Papyri, Vol. IV, Part I)*. University of Michigan Press, 1936. Pp. xv + 437. \$5.00.

Although only three documents are included in this volume, they comprise over 13,450 lines of text, and constitute the most complete record of taxation yet discovered in any Egyptian village. Since they are from successive years (A. D. 171-173), the information concerning the taxes included in the documents is fairly complete. The task of decipherment and transcription was done by Professor Youtie in collaboration with Drs. Pearl and Schuman. The enormous labor involved can only be appreciated by those who have struggled with the difficult chirography of Egyptian scribes, and the editors deserve high praise for the successful accomplishment of an arduous task. For technical reasons the text alone is published in this volume. Indices and commentary will follow later. Until these appear the reviewer will be content to indicate the nature of the documents and their value to scholars.

The registers are in the form of day-books kept in the local office. Payments in multiples of four drachmas evidently deal with the poll-tax, and these form the majority of the entries. Other taxes, specifically named, are the various imposts on garden land, baths, guards, watch-towers, water-guard, donkeys, camels, rental of flocks, beer, trades, ἀριθμητικὸν κατοίκων, and a few entries of other miscellaneous taxes. The γερῶν or γερῶν is not otherwise known, and is evidently a tax paid by priests on temple offerings. The puzzling entry χς, usually paid in tetradrachms, is new. More perplexing is the entry λο χς or λο χς ιερ () without any numeral. In the daily totals, however, the payment is clearly 12 obols for the priests, and 20 obols for the laity. These fees, paid at the end of the year, or as arrears at the beginning of the year, may be the supplementary charges on the poll-tax paid by individuals. At Karanis the guard-tax is not collected from those subject to poll-tax as appears to be the case elsewhere, but is assessed on those who are exempt from the poll-tax because of age or ill health.

The payments of the garden taxes present novel features. The *geometria* was paid in four annual instalments. These

taxes were all calculated on the 6-obol standard and the total was entered on the right margin. On the left margin, however, these sums were converted into the $7\frac{1}{4}$ -obol standard, and the daily totals were also calculated on this basis. The *dragmategia*, paid in money, seems to be collected at Karanis from certain classifications of garden lands, or is at least paid by holders of such property.

Payments in "filthy" (*ῥυπαρά*) drachmas throw some light on this currency, though the evidence is somewhat confused. In payments with this currency the supplementary tax is never mentioned, and this fact may lend support to the theory that *ῥυπαρά* is a term of account to describe tax payments which include the supplement. The tax of a third on baths is usually paid in *ῥυπαρά* drachmas in units of 28 dr. (payments of 12, 20, and 24 dr. 28 ob. occur once each), but in one case payments for three years are made in ordinary currency at the rate of 21 dr. 5 ob. yearly and the total is given as 87 dr. 2 ob. The *dragmategia* is always paid in *ῥυπαρά* drachmas and the amount is usually converted in the left margin to the $7\frac{1}{4}$ -obol standard. The interest on a loan (224, 1671) is paid in ordinary currency without supplement, while interest on the value of land (224, 4857, 5051) is paid in *ῥυπαρά* drachmas without supplement. From this evidence it is apparent, whatever the meaning of the term, that *ῥυπαρά* has nothing to do with the number of obols in the drachma.

The supplementary charges are not recorded for the poll-tax, nor for the various levies for guards. On the *ἐπιστάτικόν ἱερέων* the rate is uniformly one-seventh whereas the other taxes pay the usual rate of a sixteenth, except for the dyke-tax where the rate is a sixth.

These rolls contain a vast number of names and will add much to the prosopography of Karanis. It is worth noting that the majority of holders of garden lands are either Romans or women. Following the entries of these holdings there is frequently a name in parentheses. This may be the lessee from the owner, but in some cases the entry appears to be a place name, and may be the name of the estate. Some of these holdings were once parts of great estates: Antonia, Germanicus, Maecenas, Doryphorus, Pallas, Seneca, Louriis, Severianus, Gallia, and Charm() all had grants of land at Karanis. Money seems to have been advanced by the state for purchase by the present holders, as several entries record interest on loans or payments for the price of land. Possibly these entries reflect an effort on the part of Marcus Aurelius to raise money for his Danube campaigns by the disposal of land in Egypt.

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Papyri Osloenses, Fasc. III, edited by S. EITREM and LEIV AMUNDSEN. Published by Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo on commission by Jacob Dybwad, 1936. Pp. xi + 326, and 12 Plates (separately). Kr. 50.

The third and, thus far, largest fascicule of Oslo Papyri is, like its predecessor, a volume of miscellaneous papyri, containing literary texts (Nos. 65-76), documents (77-165), and minor fragments of both classes (166-200).

The most important piece of the first group is No. 71, the upper half of the first thirteen columns from a late first or early second century roll of Isocrates' *Panegyricus*. The extant portion goes as far as section 54 of the text; the editors therefore calculate that the complete text must have required 48 or 49 columns, making the roll about 4.7 meters in length. The textual variants which the papyrus brings us for the first time are unimportant. With regard to already known variants the papyrus agrees in at least 17 instances with the Codex Urbinas (Γ) and in at least 5 instances with the "inferior" MSS—thus pointing once again the general lesson of the papyri for textual criticism, namely, that no one MS, whether by virtue of its antiquity or for any other reason, can lay claim to an uncorrupted tradition and, therefore, to a uniformly superior text.

The documents begin with a fragment from a "Religious Calendar concerning the Imperial Cult" (No. 77; after 169 A. D.). No. 78 is a fragment of an edict of Hadrian already known from two rather mutilated copies in the Cairo Museum (rereadings of which, by O. Guéraud, are appended). The Oslo fragment serves to confirm the text of the Cairo copies at several points.

More important is No. 79, a fragment from a copy of an edict issued in 134/5 A. D. by the Prefect of Egypt, M. Petronius Mamertinus. Though too much is lost at the right and the left for the reconstruction of a continuous text at any point, it is possible to grasp the provisions of the edict in broad outline. At one of his assizes the Prefect was apprised that many persons had fled their homes because of financial inability to perform the liturgies to which they had been assigned (ll. 6-7). He therefore orders that such flights cease (ll. 8-9), and that "men of means and fitting" be assigned to replace those who had already fled (ll. 11-12). It is difficult to see why the editors think that in this edict "the prefect on the whole expressed sympathy with the oppressed liturgi" (p. 62). The contrary seems rather to be the case. It should not surprise us to find, if by some good fortune the missing portions of this edict are some day brought to light, that the Prefect backed his injunction against flight with a threat of punishment. (The edict of M. Sempronius Liberalis

of 154 A. D. [BGU, 372 — Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*, 19] tells us that fugitive *liturgi* suffered immediate proscription.) In any case, Mamertinus' injunction against flight proved ineffectual. To cite but a single indication, one which the papyrus itself affords: Though the edict was issued originally in 134/5 A. D., the present fragment is from a copy made after July 10, 138. The necessity for reaffirmation of the edict can only signify that the flights continued despite the Prefect's order.

No. 111 consists of portions from a register of "free men and freedmen" (l. 124) of Oxyrhynchos. The register is unique in that it is arranged according to houses in their topographical sequence, and for each house the free and freed male inhabitants, including minors, are set down in the sworn statement of the owner or tenant. Though the register is called *δημ(οσία) ἀπογρα(φή)* (l. 123) and perhaps *κα[τ'] οἰκίαν ἀπογραφή* (l. 5), it is not connected with the regular fourteen-year census but is clearly an extraordinary record compiled in 235 A. D., five years after the last preceding census. Nor is this register a synoptic record compiled from the individual declarations of that census. Of the many differences which the editors point out between this register and those synoptic records, we may note in particular that in many cases (cf. the list, p. 145) the deponents distinctly state that in the last census they were registered as domiciled in a different quarter of the city. Indicative of the economic distress of the times is the fact that in the Western District of the Hermaion Quarter (apparently a well-to-do section of the city, and the only section for which the register approaches completeness), only 22 houses were inhabited as against 27 uninhabited. Of the uninhabited houses, moreover, five (ll. 168, 171, 211, 214, 286) are designated as belonging to the fisc—which means that they were confiscated for non-payment of taxes. The exact purpose of this register remains as yet undetermined. The editors' suggestion that such a register gave the administration a ready-to-hand list of all persons subject to liturgies receives strong support from the omission of women and from the fact that no personal declaration is required of a freedman past the age of 70 (ll. 151-153).

No. 123 (22 A. D.), as the editors correctly point out, adds the weight of its evidence in support of Preisigke's view (*P. Strassb.*, II, pp. 66-69) that there was in the first half of the first century a *στρατηγὸς τοῦ Ἀρσινόου* who was the superior of the three *μεγίστρατοι* and who was concerned *imprimis* with matters of police. The most recent summary of the evidence on this vexed question of the "general" strategos, that of H. Henne, *Liste des stratèges des nomes égyptiens à l'époque gréco-romaine* (Cairo, 1935), pp. *35-*36, seems to have been overlooked by the editors.

In No. 138 (323 A. D.) the note to line 1 on the chronology

of the datings by "the consuls to be designated" should contain a reference to the definitive discussion of the papyrological evidence by E. H. Kase, *A Papyrus Roll in the Princeton Collection* (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 32-36.

The volume shows the same careful preparation that marks the preceding fascicules of this series. The editors continue, however, their regrettable practice of omitting translations of the documents. Teutonisms of expression mar the commentary, but rarely give trouble and are, moreover, hardly to be charged as a fault against authors who, for their readers' sake, have written in a language not their own.

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Apophoreta Gotoburgensia Vilhelmo Lundström oblata. Gothenburg, 1936. Pp. 447; 1 plate.

When Prof. V. Lundström retired from the chair of classical philology at the University of Gothenburg, which he had held for more than thirty years, his friends and disciples honoured him with this magnificent volume. The varied contents of the book, comprising studies in Latin, Greek (classical as well as modern), Comparative Linguistics, and Roman Archaeology, faithfully reflect Prof. Lundström's many-sided interests. That these interests are somewhat out of the ordinary is evident from the imposing list of his lectures and publications which is appended at the close of the volume. The chief subject of Prof. Lundström's scientific research, however, has been Latin philology, to which nine out of the seventeen contributions of the book are devoted; of these, one properly comes under the head of comparative philology. First may be mentioned H. Hagendahl's "Rhetorica" (pp. 282-338, in Latin), perhaps the most important paper of the whole volume, rich in acute observations. It consists of two parts, "In controversias Senecae patris quaestiones" and "In declamationes Quintiliani minores," and gives, besides a series of critical notes, a rehabilitation of the excerptors of Seneca and a reduction of the value of the corrections in Cod. Toletanus. E. Widstrand in "De Vitruvii sermone parum ad regulam artis grammaticae explicato" (pp. 16-52) reasons convincingly that the "vulgarisms" of Vitruvian style are due to his lack of rhetorical education. B. Wijkström's "Clarorum uirorum facta moresque" (pp. 159-168) deals with the tendency to copy illustrious proemia and tries to show that the opening of Tacitus' *Agricola* is borrowed from Cato's *Origines*. G. Wiman, "Behöver Persiustexten ej emenderas?" (pp. 207-225), offers some unlikely new readings, while H. Armini,

"Några Anmärkningar till Copa" (pp. 271-281), suggests a strange interpretation of the little poem. R. Sobel, "En Colu-mellakonjektur" (pp. 169-170), improves Col., II, 2, 9. G. Tingdal in "En humanisthandskrift till Cicerotal i Strängnäs domkyrkobibliotek" (pp. 194-206) describes a late Cicero MS of interest to Swedish history of learning; Anna Röding-Molin, "De codicibus aliquot Petri de Crescentiis" (pp. 186-193), deals with a series of MSS of Piero which she has studied. C. Lindsten's "Lat. (H)arena, Farina, sab. Fasena" (pp. 149-158, in Swedish) is of interest from a linguistic point of view.

Among the papers concerning Greek philology there are some very important contributions. E. Nachmansson's "Galenos' epidemikommentar" (pp. 108-148) contains valuable critical and linguistic notes on Galenos and Hippocrates. I. Düring, "De Athenaei deipnosophistarum indole atque dispositione" (pp. 226-270), defends successfully the original unity of the work, explaining many offences as caused by the author's inability to think the dialogue through logically. Hj. Friisk, "Grekiskan och det egeiska substratet" (pp. 171-185), defends the theory of a common predialectal Greek and limits the influence of the Aegaeian substrate to the vocabulary. T. Kalén's "Ett grekiskt lantbruksord" (pp. 389-404) deals with Greek *ἄγρος* and its relatives. Modern Greek is treated in S. Lindstam's "En nygrekisk parafras till Pseudo-Pythagoras' Dicta aurea" (pp. 339-345), an edition of such a paraphrase from Cod. Mus. Brit. add. 18190 (s. XVII *init.*), and in O. Lagercrantz's "Grekiska i Tunis" (pp. 1-15), which treats three small documents from the Swedish consulate in Tunis (18th century).

Roman archaeology, one of the chief interests of Prof. Lundström in later years, is represented by two important papers. A. Boëthius, "Ardeatina" (pp. 346-388, in Swedish), gives a very instructive survey of the vicissitudes of this old Latin city, based on literary sources and new archaeological evidence. H. Lyngby, "Det republikanska Roms murar i trakten av Tibern" (pp. 53-107), defends on partly new grounds the theory that the Forum Boarium was not included in the republican city-wall and that the much discussed Porta Triumphalis was a gate in that wall, connecting with the Circus Maximus.

As a whole it is a splendid volume, very well printed and rich in interesting matters. It is only to be regretted that so great a part is written in Swedish and therefore unavailable to non-Scandinavian readers.

KRISTER HANELL.

LUND.

SISTER LUANNE MEAGHER, O. S. B. *The Gellius Manuscript of Lupus of Ferrières*. Chicago, private edition distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries (dissertation), 1936. Pp. v + 96; 2 plates.

In 1930 Professor Charles H. Beeson published a complete facsimile of Lupus Servatus' autograph copy of Cicero's *De Oratore* (*Harleianus* 2736): *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic* (Cambridge, Mass., The Mediaeval Academy of America). An ample commentary presented a detailed picture of the methods used by one of the most zealous critics of text in the Middle Ages. Since the appearance of this book Professor Beeson has studied (without complete publication) seven other manuscripts which contain corrections or annotations by Lupus: the Paris manuscript of Cicero's *De Inventione* (*B. N.*, lat. 7774A), the Paris *codex Thuaneus* of Livy, VI-X (*B. N.*, lat. 5726), the Berne Valerius Maximus (366), the Paris codex of the Letters of Symmachus (*B. N.*, lat. 8623), the *Reginensis* (1484) of Tiberius Claudius Donatus' Commentary on Virgil, the Paris codex of Macrobius' Commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis* (*B. N.*, lat. 6370), and the Vienna manuscript (139) which contains the philosophical works of Cicero. He has allowed the author of the present dissertation to make full use of his photographs and notes of these manuscripts and also of the ninth century Vatican codex (*Reginensis* 597) of Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights*, which is the subject of the present palaeographical and philological study.

As one would naturally expect, his pupil has done her work well. The nature of the manuscript and the division of labor among the scribes are reported in detail (though the number of leaves ruled at a time is, unfortunately, omitted). The bulk of the dissertation, however, is taken up with accurate descriptions, first, of Lupus' work as a corrector and annotator (with two plates to illustrate his method) and second, of the activity of the other correctors, whose changes are of minor importance.

Since the manuscript has been revised by Lupus more thoroughly than any other codex in which his hand has been identified and since it therefore furnishes the best example of his activities as a corrector, his work is divided by the author into three categories—technical, editorial, and philological corrections—and minutely examined. The evidence is discussed in the style familiar to students of Professor Beeson's book and carefully tabulated. One discovers that Lupus certainly had access to a codex closely related to X (*Leyden*, *Voss. Lat. F.* 112, *saec. x*), possibly the archetype of X, and probably had access to one or more of the following: (1) Einhard's manuscript, (2) possible variants in a ninth century ancestor of N (*Florence*,

Magliabecchianus 329, saec. xv), (3) possible variants in the archetype of O (*Rome, Vat. Reg. lat.* 597, saec. ix) disregarded by the scribe of O. Though Lupus is apparently no happier in his emendations in the Gellius codex than in the other books which he edits, he practically always preserves the original reading and in consequence does not obscure the manuscript tradition. His method deserves our thanks.

A special section at the end of the dissertation lists approximately three hundred and fifty corrections of misrepresentations of the readings of *Reginensis* 597 in the standard critical texts of the *Attic Nights* by Hertz (1883-85; see also *Jahrbücher für class. Philologie*, Supplementband, XXI, 1894, pp. 1-48) and Hosius (1903). This is a service for which scholars will be grateful.

LESLIE WEBBER JONES.

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ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON. *Roman Egypt to the Reign of Diocletian.* (Vol. II of *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome.*) Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936. Pp. x + 732. \$4.00.

In his preface to Volume I (*Rome and Italy of the Republic*) Professor Frank stated that one of the primary aims of this series was to present the sources, and also remarked that what was especially needed for Egypt was "a good source book of the documents." Professor Johnson has been faithful to this plan: translations of 445 original documents, in full or in part—the great majority from the papyri, of course, are included in the work. Each section of the book consists of a general treatment of its subject followed by illustrative documents, nearly all of which are provided with brief introductions of their own. The general parts of the sections are excellent examples of compression; each one gives a brief and pointed summary of the present state of our knowledge on its subject. This necessary compression has not, however, led to a dogmatic presentation, for Johnson makes no attempt to disguise unsolved problems, or to answer questions which are as yet unanswerable. The selection of documents is carefully made to illustrate the topics discussed; the translations are trustworthy, though not always completely consistent in phrasing, since many of them are taken from the published collections of papyri. The inclusion of the Greek originals, most desirable in itself, would have added enormously to the size and cost of the work. The number of papyrus documents published is now so great that there could

obviously be no attempt to include all the relevant source material, but in many cases very useful lists and summaries of the published examples of a particular type of document are supplied. As no "list of lists" is to be found in the volume, a brief guide to this valuable feature has been included in this review.

Chapter I is naturally devoted to "The Land," the basis of Egyptian economic life. The first sections of the chapter are concerned with the agricultural products of the country and the dependence of Egyptian farming upon the Nile. Then come the governmental and private arrangements concerning agriculture: the different categories into which the land was divided, sales of land, leases, and mortgages. The chapter closes with sections on farm accounts, domestic animals, and mineral resources. The illustrative documents are supplemented by lists and summaries of land registers, leases, sales, and mortgages (pp. 31, 71-4, 83-105, 150-57), and of sales of live stock (pp. 230-32).

The second chapter, devoted to "The People," includes sections on the population and the census, personal property, wages, and the cost of living; and on slavery, nursing contracts, education, marriage and divorce, amusements, and burial expenses. The following lists of documents are provided: leases, sales, and mortgages of houses and miscellaneous property (pp. 257-65), loans on slaves, and their sale and manumission (pp. 279-81), contracts for nursing and for entertainment (pp. 286-7, 299-300), wage-rates (pp. 306-10), and prices of foodstuffs, beverages, clothing, and wool (pp. 310-21).

Chapter III, on "Industry and Commerce," includes treatments of weights and measures, apprenticeship, guilds, transportation, banking, and a detailed discussion of money, one of the author's special fields of interest. The chapter contains lists of mills and oil-presses (pp. 364-6), contracts of loan with *παράμωρη* (pp. 452-4), and miscellaneous costs and accounts (pp. 469-75); also of documents which supply evidence on hunting and fishing (pp. 375-6), apprenticeship (pp. 389-91), and the hire of beasts of burden and draught (pp. 405-7).

Chapter IV supplies a detailed treatment of "Taxation," including customs duties, liturgies, and requisitions. Up-to-date alphabetical lists of taxes are a valuable feature; these are classified as follows: taxes in kind (pp. 507-15), taxes on garden land (pp. 515-21), taxes on trades (pp. 538-44), assessments in money (pp. 545-50), and miscellaneous taxes and fees (pp. 552-81).

The fifth and last chapter, entitled "Miscellaneous," includes treatments of public works, temple accounts, military accounts, and miscellaneous edicts and laws. Under the first heading we find a list of the *testimonia* for public works (pp. 637-8), and

under the last we have translations of such famous documents as the edict of Tiberius Julius Alexander (pp. 705-9), the *gnomon* of the *idiologos* (pp. 711-17), and Caracalla's edict on Roman citizenship (p. 717).

The volume is concluded by a classified bibliography and a brief subject index. It contains, however, no index of Greek words or of technical terms, and no classified list of the documents translated.

The comprehensiveness and value of the work have perhaps been sufficiently indicated by the account given of its contents. Professor Johnson is to be congratulated on the completion of his difficult task and on his great contribution to the study of economic history. Students who have little Greek and no papyrology can now gain a clear insight into the economic life of Roman Egypt, and, at the other extreme, professional papyrologists will use the book constantly as a work of reference.

Naturally a volume of this size and scope is open to criticism on matters of detail, and previous reviewers have noted a number of points of disagreement on topics with which they have particularly concerned themselves. Such criticisms have special point in view of the fact that a new edition will be needed after a few more years of work in the swiftly developing field of papyrology, and therefore I may as well add a comment on one minor point. In his discussion of taxation Johnson says (p. 531): "The poll-tax was called *ἐπικεφάλαιον*, *λαογραφία*, or *συντάξιμον*. The latter term was limited to the Fayum and apparently included certain minor assessments which were levied per capita, in addition to the poll-tax itself." As the total annual amount recorded in the receipts and registers for *λαογραφία* at the rate paid by native Egyptians and for *συντάξιμον* is exactly the same, there seems to be no place for the "minor assessments." The evidence that the term *ἐπικεφάλαιον* was used for the poll-tax, particularly in the Arsinoite nome, seems very questionable. I believe we are now safe in assuming that *λαογραφία* was the general term used for the poll-tax at all rates, while this tax at its highest rate of approximately 44 drachmas was frequently called *συντάξιμον*, especially in tax receipts, in the Fayum (*A. J. P.*, LII (1931), pp. 263-9; cf. *B. G. U.*, 1891).

One notes from the title that this volume is part of an "economic survey," not an economic history. It is not the type of work which lends itself to general conclusions in regard to the economic condition of Egypt under the Romans. Yet one does find significant remarks on the forced drafting of farm tenants (p. 78), and on the flight of peasants from the soil (pp. vi, 81, 210, 482), now known to have been a feature of the whole Roman period (cf. N. Lewis, *Journ. Egypt. Archaeol.*, XXIII (1937), pp. 63-75). Perhaps Johnson comes nearest to

a general conclusion in his remarks in the Preface (p. v): "State control of industry and commerce had developed to a high degree under the Ptolemies. They, however, spent much of their revenue within the country, and their expenditures abroad could easily be met by the favourable balance of their export trade. The tribute exacted by the Romans was a steady drain on Egyptian resources and little was given in return. Under Augustus the tribute in kind, was fourfold the amount exacted by the earlier Ptolemies," No doubt the Roman government was more efficient than that of the Ptolemies, but our economic picture of Roman Egypt suggests that this very "efficiency," applied to the exploitation of provincial labor, was one of the most important factors contributing to the decline of the Empire.

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GRACE HARRIET MACURDY. *Vassal-Queens and some Contemporary Women in the Roman Empire.* The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology, No. 22. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937. Pp. xii + 148. \$3.00.

Readers of Miss Macurdy's *Hellenistic Queens* will welcome this further study in the "woman-power" of antiquity, though it labors under a handicap not infrequently the lot of sequels. The material which made the earlier volume a notable contribution not only to the study of the eternal feminine but to the history of an important period in the world's history is in this case much scantier. Some of the vassal queens were historically important, notably Teuta of Illyria, the earliest, and Zenobia of Palmyra, the latest, as well as the women of the house of Herod, and apparently also Boudicca of Britain, who is little more than a romantic heroine in the Roman sources. Others were extremely obscure, like Gepaepyris of Thrace and Iotape of Commagene. But in almost all cases, except where Josephus has preserved the contemporary sketches of the women of Judaea, drawn by Nicolaus of Damascus, it is impossible to form a satisfactory impression of the personalities of the queens and their significance in their own circles, though coin portraits, and especially the fine bust of Dynamis of Bosphorus, are helpful. Miss Macurdy's gift for the characterizing phrase finds little field for expression. Beside "scornful, much-married Glaphyra," principally striking are the Roman women; Agrippina, the "sophisticated Clytemnestra," and Octavia, who "had gathered under her wing the entire brood of Mark Antony's children." It is to be hoped that Miss Macurdy will continue her studies with the women of the Caesars, where better material awaits her.

As would be inevitable under the circumstances, the author has not missed much relating to these queens; neither can she have added much to our knowledge of them. Her sound scholarship and wide knowledge are here again demonstrated, and it is only a pity that new material was not available for her to use. She has performed a service, nevertheless, in making conveniently available what is known of their careers, and in focusing attention on some of the little known kingdoms which served only as buffer states in Roman policy, but which continued in their small way the traditions of their great Hellenistic predecessors, while their ruling families served in some cases as influential agents in the Hellenization of the Julio-Claudian Emperors. This was their greatest importance, and their relations with Rome constitute the leading motive of the book.

Only one thing might have been added for the convenience of the reader. Genealogical tables would have made it easier to follow the fortunes of some of the families with a more complicated marriage history.

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W. E. WETER. *Encouragement of Literary Production in Greece from Homer to Alexander* (dissertation). Private edition, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1936. Pp. iii + 113.

The discussion of the subject falls roughly into two divisions: individual patronage, with particular emphasis on the tyrants, and encouragement, whether monetary or otherwise, provided by city states and religious festivals. Sections on Sicily (pp. 31-46) and Macedonia (pp. 46-49) give us a useful summary and discussion of literary activity in those places. The author shows a wide and thorough knowledge of Greek literature within the period she has chosen to investigate. Much of the book, however, is little more than a catalogue of Greek authors and Greek literary production.

Encouragement of Literary Production is a very broad term as understood by Miss Weter: "But stimulus to literature is not limited to individual assistance, and in a broader sense the term may include all sources of encouragement to literary activity" (p. 1). In consequence of this free conception of the subject we have, along with much that is interesting and curious, a good deal that is obvious, commonplace, and even irrelevant. One cannot say of Solon without more critical examination than we find here (p. 3), "His poetical ability enabled him to gain the island of Salamis for Athens." The conclusion that religion, with its festivals, was an important factor in the encouragement

of literature (p. 78) is not new, nor does the author bring evidence to support it that is either new or illuminating.

Theoretical aspects of the subject are seldom given more than cursory notice. Is it possible to discover, for example, who among Greek authors were dependent on individual, family or government patronage for a livelihood, or how much the form and content of literature stood at the mercy of its patrons? Did Herodotus receive ten talents from the Athenians (p. 98) because they admired literary ability or because, as Plutarch suggests, Herodotus admired Athenian ability of a very different kind? A chapter on the relation of certain Greek authors to the social, economic and political life of their times would have made a valuable addition to the thesis.

ALISTER CAMERON.

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J. A. G. VAN DER VEER. *Reiniging en Reinheid bij Plato, with a Summary in English.* Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1936. Pp. xii + 139.

This study of purification and purity in Plato is divided into seven chapters, whose subjects are as follows: I. The terminology; II. Material cleansings; III. Purity of Ideas and definition as purification; IV. Intellectual purification of the soul; V. Non-intellectual purification of the soul; VI. Purity in religion (i. e., the place of moral excellence in Plato's religion); VII. Punishment as purification.

The exegesis is on the whole superficial and confused. It is based on the definition of purification as a separation of the worse from the better, which is derived from *Soph.*, 226D. The use of "pure" in the sense of "unmixed," "free from anything foreign," is discussed at some length. Apart from this, little attention is paid to the peculiarities of usage or to the various categories of meaning. Thus Dr. van der Veer infers from *Rep.*, 406D that in Plato's medical theory surgery and cautery were cathartic measures, whereas in fact catharsis was to him as to the medical writers a discharge from within the body or a treatment designed to act internally. The handling of ceremonial purification in religion is equally unsatisfactory. Some of the faults, as they appear to me, are inevitable for anyone who bases his work on the general theories of purity now prevalent. This is the case, for instance, when *Crat.*, 396E is held to show that Plato (or the man in the street, for that matter) could look upon inspiration as a ritual defilement. To the same cause is probably due an ill-advised attempt to elucidate *Laws*, 792CD by forcing on *ἱεῖος* the connotation "pure." On the other hand, a closer

scrutiny of *Crat.*, 405A and *Phaedr.*, 244DE would have revealed a thorough appreciation on Plato's part of the psychological value of formal purifications and of prayer and sacrifice. Again, a desire to maintain the cult of souls is ascribed to Plato as his chief motive in retaining purification after homicide in the *Laws* and especially in requiring it where Attic practice apparently did not. None of the many objections to such a view is considered, and the crucial difficulty presented by *Laws*, 869E, purification after forgiveness by the victim, is avoided by begging the question.

The discussion of various metaphors of purity which occupies the last five chapters is uneven in quality. While the implications of some figures are brought out fully and clearly, those of others are disregarded, and Plato's comparisons of intellectual excellence or moral righteousness to health, to simplicity, and to the purity of holiness are joined together without distinction. Moreover, the practice of interpreting in terms of "reinheid" passages that contain no corresponding term more than once gives the impression that Plato maintains a figure longer and more consistently than he does.

HAROLD J. STUKEY.

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GIULIO BATTELLI. *Lezioni di Paleografia.* (Pont. Scuola Vaticana di Paleografia e Diplomatica.) Città del Vaticano, 1936. Pp. x + 227; 40 small facsimiles.

This excellent manual is a monument to Father Bruno Katterbach, O. F. M., under whose direction the Vatican School reached high distinction as a fruitful center of archival studies; his pupil, author of this book, maintains the scholarly tradition; in his preface, he pays well-deserved tribute to Mgr. Angelo Mercati, Prefect of the Vatican Secret Archives. The Vatican Library makes every effort to remain a chief center for bibliographical and paleographical research workers; it is therefore no surprise to find Battelli abreast of the latest theories, such as Goldschmidt's explanation of the origin of "Arabic" numerals, and familiar with Rand's and Lowe's newest publications. The historical introduction and the descriptions of the various hands are sober and judicious, and particularly authoritative for the development of writing in Italy, from the Praeneste fibula to the Renaissance. The 40 black-and-white facsimiles, each of a few lines, are apparently all taken from published sources; ample references are given, however, to easily accessible repro-

ductions on a larger scale. The whole forms a handy working manual of Latin paleography, and its indications will help the learner to prepare himself adequately for actual MS study.

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W. F. JACKSON KNIGHT. *Cumaeae Gates. A Reference of the Sixth Aeneid to the Initiation Pattern.* Oxford, Blackwell, 1936. Pp. xv + 190, with frontispiece and 14 figures. 7s. 6d.

This book attempts to explain the ultimate implications of *Aeneid* VI, 9-44 and in effect seeks to answer the question why the portal of Apollo's temple at Cumae was decorated with a representation of the Labyrinth. Knight puts together a large body of facts and inferences concerning mazes and their ritual and practical significance, and also concerning journeys to the underworld and initiations which he finds cognate. This must be commended to the attention of students of ancient religion, who will find it interesting, if distinctly uncritical. For my own part, I cannot see what it has to do with the *Sixth Aeneid*. Knight makes a connection by accepting the theory that earlier stages of culture survive in our subconscious. That may be so: even if it is, the labyrinth is only part of the representations on the temple door. They portrayed the Cretan story in a continuous fashion with no special emphasis on the labyrinth, and the whole passage is, as Norden saw, an application of the common motif whereby a digression describing works of art was introduced into a tale.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK.

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NOTICE.

This Journal wishes to call attention to the forthcoming *Concordance of Ovid*. After publication the price (2,400 pages) will be \$20.00. Orders received before August 1, 1938 will be accepted at \$16.00.

Libraries may deduct 10% from \$16.00.

Address orders to Professor Roy J. Deferrari, Catholic University of America, Brookland, D. C.

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WHOLE No. 236

THE NEW INSCRIPTION OF THE SALAMINIOI.

A most lucky find of the Agora excavations in 1936 was an undamaged stele containing the record of an arbitration of the Attic year 363/2 B. C. between the two branches of the γένος of the Salaminioi, οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἑπτὰ φυλῶν and οἱ ἀπὸ Σουνίου, and an enumeration of the cults practiced by this genos. The inscription was published with a very full and learned commentary by Professor Ferguson in the last report on the Agora excavations.¹ The editor has well brought out the point, proved by the name of the genos, that it is not a real *gens*, held by bonds of kinship, and also the interesting fact that it was split up into two halves. The reason of this splitting up was, apparently, that a large part of the genos was concentrated at Sounion while the other members were dispersed over seven phylai. The compact mass of the genos living at Sounion may have tried to reserve the sacrifices and other privileges for itself; against this tendency the dispersed members organized themselves as an opposition party. The litigation was ended for the moment by the arbitration in question, but finally each of the two halves became a separate genos, as a second inscription from about 250 B. C. proves. The Salaminioi were in reality a cult association which posed as a genos, one of the kind which Solon equalized with the *gentes*.²

¹ W. S. Ferguson, "The Salaminioi of Heptaphylai and Sounion," *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 1.

² This is the purpose of the anonymous law that the phrateres are obliged to receive the orgeones, viz. the cult associations, as well as the δημογάλακτας, οὓς γεννήτας καλοῦμεν, Philochoros in Harpokration, s. v. ὀργεῶνες, etc. The law cannot belong to Kleisthenes, as says G. Busolt, *Griech. Staatskunde*³, p. 252, for this is at variance with the statement of Aristoteles, *pol. Ath.*, 21, that he allowed every one to retain the

The editor discusses at length the connection of the *genos* of the Salaminioi with the conquest of the island of Salamis by the Athenians, but it seems to be possible to advance this interesting problem further. Of course the old decree concerning Salamis by the Athenian people³ comes into one's mind. It is badly mutilated and has been much discussed; Professor Wilhelm proved long ago that the preserved sentences do not refer to the Athenian *klerouchs* in Salamis but to the old inhabitants who were allowed to remain in the island, subject to Athens.⁴ The important point is that Athenian *klerouchs* were settled in Salamis, one of whom was Timodemos in whose honour Pindar composed the second Nemean ode.⁵ I shall not enter into a protracted discussion of the struggle of Athens for the possession of Salamis; on the whole Professor Beloch treated it correctly,⁶ according to my opinion. I wish only to stress that the struggle was a long one with several vicissitudes. It was ended by the arbitration of the Spartans which took place not in the time of Solon, as the ancient authors say,⁷ but after the expulsion of the tyrants by the Spartans; the Kleomenes mentioned is of course, as Beloch states, the king who was at the head of the expedition's forces.⁸ Some time earlier, probably in the beginning of the reign of Peisistratos, Athens had conquered Salamis. No state submits to an arbitration after a victorious war, unless it is imposed by mightier states, and there is no trace of such a situation at that time. But the defeated state may take a favourable opportunity to propose its claims, and such an opportunity seemed to the Megarians to have come when the Spartans, of

phratries and the priesthoods according to the custom of the ancestors. The law wears the stamp of Solon who had much regard for the *orgeones*; they were mentioned in his *δξες*, Seleukos, *loc. cit.*; cf. the law in Galus, *Digesta*, 4, 7, 22, 4.

³ *IG*, I³, 1 = Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³, 13.

⁴ *Athen. Mitt.*, XXIII (1898), p. 471.

⁵ *Schol. Pind. Nem.*, II, 19, τῶν τὴν Σαλαμίνα κατακληρουχισάντων Ἀθηναίων; cf. Pausanias, I, 40, 5.

⁶ K. J. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*³, I: 2, p. 309. The only doubtful point is the reconquest by the Megarians about 550 B. C. If it took place it must have been of brief duration.

⁷ Plutarch, *Solon*, 10; cf. Aelian, *Var. hist.*, VII, 19.

⁸ The decree mentioned above is probably to be referred to a regulation after the Spartan arbitration; the script proves that it belongs to the end of the sixth century B. C.

whose league Megara was a member, had laid their hands on Athens, expelling Hippias. On the other hand the Athenians may have had valid reasons, other than the Homeric verses cited by Plutarch, to proffer for their possession of the island. The question is what had happened in the meantime.

We know that Athenian klerouchs were settled in Salamis, and it is most probable that the settling took place soon after the first conquest of the island. For precisely at this moment means were needed in order to secure the grip of the Athenians on the newly conquered territory and to maintain its loyalty to Athens. We do not know how the lands allotted to the klerouchs were procured and may perhaps suppose unreflectingly the usual method of expelling the old inhabitants, but there is another way, an exchange of inhabitants and property, and the peculiar interest of our inscription is that it seems to prove that this way was resorted to. For the fact that a great many Salaminians moved to Attica, that a compact mass of them were settled in one place at Sounion, and that they were organized as a *genos* cannot possibly be explained as the result of a voluntary migration. At this time the Athenians were not so jealous of their citizenship as the democracy of the fifth century B. C. was, a fact for which it had to pay by the ruin of its empire. The thesis which I wish to propose for consideration is that such an exchange really took place. Athenian klerouchs were settled in Salamis; a number of Salaminians were transferred to Attica, received citizenship and property in exchange for that which was given to the Athenian klerouchs. A compact mass was settled at Sounion, where for some reason it was possible to give over a vast tract of land to the Salaminians, while others were dispersed over Attica so that later on they came to belong to seven *phylai*. Such politics are not unparalleled in ancient times; they remind one of the Roman manner of receiving the most prominent men of the Latin towns and colonies into the body of citizens. Herodotus (V, 57) says that the Gephyraei went from Eretria to Tanagra, from there to Athens, and that they received Athenian citizenship.

What strikes the reader who is conversant with the sacred organization is the fact that the Athenian state contributed to the sacrifices offered by the Salaminioi, ll. 20: *ὅσα μὲν ἡ πόλις παρέχει ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου ἢ παρὰ τῶν ὠσκοφόρων ἢ παρὰ τῶν δειπνοφόρων*

γίγνεται λαμβάνειν Σαλαμίνιους. This is, as far as my knowledge goes, unexampled. The state paid for the public sacrifices offered by the priests and procured by the magistrates. Many cults belonging originally to certain *gentes* had been made public; the state did not pay for these but allowed the priests, taken from the *gentes*, certain emoluments deriving from the sacrifices. In every case it is a striking exception for the state to pay for sacrifices offered by a *genos*. But in this case it was apparently an old custom too. We read l. 87: ξύλα ἐφ' ἱεροῖς καὶ οἷς ἡ πόλις δίδωσιν ἐκ κύρβεων. The archaic word κύρβις seems to prove that the prescription was derived from the sixth century B. C., even if it is impossible to refer it to the Solonian κύρβεις which according to some authors contained his sacral laws.⁹ There must have been a strong reason why this exceptional favour was granted to the Salaminioi, i. e. to connect them closely with the Athenian state, and we shall see that this purpose is apparent in their cults too.

These cults are in many respects most interesting. Some of them were transferred from Salamis to Attica. So was the hero Eurysakes, the son of Aias, of whom the editor treats exhaustively (p. 16). He was a late, post-Homeric creation, with a cult in Salamis itself and a hieron in Melite in the city of Athens, the very place where our inscriptions were found. The editor has well brought out the point that the founding of this hieron must be earlier than the creation of the Kleisthenian phyle Aiantis which set up its records in the Eurysakeion. I think that this hieron of Eurysakes represents the first step of the Athenians on their way to win Salamis. When they wished to conquer Aegina the oracle counselled them to assign a temenos to Aias,¹⁰ of course in order to draw the hero of the island over to themselves. In the struggle for Salamis they may have assigned a temenos to the hero of this island, Eurysakes, for the same purpose. The outcome is the legend that the sons of Aias, Eurysakes and Philaios, moved to Attica and received Athenian citizenship, Eurysakes settling in Melite and Philaios at Brauron.¹¹ This legend is a projection into mythology of the means

⁹ Suidas, s. v., and others.

¹⁰ Herodot., V, 89.

¹¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, 10. Herodot., VI, 35, Pherekydes from Athens, fr. 2 Jacoby, and Pausanias, I, 35, 2, mention Philaios only, the eponym

by which the Athenians tried to fuse Salamis with their state, that is, by founding the Eurysakeion and by granting Athenian citizenship to the Salaminians who settled in Attica, and the legend served in the future to assert their claims on Salamis. The last and crowning event was that an Attic phyle was named after Aias himself.

From Salamis also came the cult of Athena Skiras at Phaleron (Ferguson, p. 18), which was connected with the festival of the Oschophoria. Professor Deubner has given voice to the opinion that the Oschophoria belonged virtually to Dionysos, not to Athena Skiras,¹² which is disproved by our inscription. Thereby a new question is raised. Were the Oschophoria brought from Salamis together with the cult of Athena Skiras, or are they an old Attic festival which was connected with this goddess only when she was introduced and her temple at Phaleron founded? The latter alternative seems to be more probable. The Oschophoria appear in the inscription as a gentile festival of the Salaminioi; their archon, designated by lot, appointed the *ωρχοφόροι* and *δειπνοφόροι* together with the priestess and the herald, according to ancestral custom (ll. 47). If the state contributed to the costs of this festival, it seems to be most probable that it was an old Attic festival the care of which was handed over to the Salaminioi. It seems to be relevant that the aetiological legends of the festival apply to Theseus and not to the Salaminian heroes worshipped at Phaleron. Even the heroes Phaiax and Nauseiros to whom, together with Poseidon Hippodromios and Teukros, the Salaminioi sacrificed in Boedromion (l. 91), are incorporated into the Theseus legend.¹³ The Salaminioi performed a sacrifice to Theseus on the sixth of Pyanepsion (l. 92), two days before the state festival in his honour.

Most astonishing is that the Salaminioi furnished the priest-

of the famous house to which Miltiades belonged. Since Miltiades the elder was a contemporary of Peisistratos, it is hard to believe that his family had immigrated from Salamis. The Philaidai were an old Attic *gens* settled at Brauron, which played a great part as early as the beginning of the sixth century (Hippokleides); perhaps it had earlier connexions with Salamis, but we do not know how and why its connexion with Aias came about. It is, however, a piece of the same web.

¹² L. Deubner, *Attische Feste*, p. 142.

¹³ Philochoros in Plutarch, *Theseus*, 17, who says Nausithoos instead of Nauseiros; cf. Ferguson, p. 24.

esses of Aglauros and Pandrosos and of Kourotrophos (ll. 12 and 45); these two cults appear together in an ephebe inscription also.¹⁴ Both cults are located on the slopes of the Acropolis. Kourotrophos usually appears alone; her identification with Ge is late. Aglauros and Pandrosos belong to the native stratum of Athenian cults and myths. Their myth is connected with the old-fashioned rite of the Arrephoria. In the hieron of Pandrosos which joined the Erechtheum grew the holy olive tree. The ephebes took the oath of loyalty to the state in the hieron of Aglauros.¹⁵ It is really astonishing that the priestess of this old cult was taken from the *genos* of the Salaminioi which had only recently immigrated and it shows the great price set upon their allegiance. We do not know how it was possible. If originally, as do most old cults, this cult belonged to some family, the family must have become extinct.

On the other hand the Salaminioi showed their loyalty to Athens by sacrificing to Athena at the Panathenaea (l. 88) as well as to Theseus. This reminds one of the duty imposed on the colony of Brea, and probably other colonies too, of sending a panhoply to the Panathenaea and a phallos to the great Dionysia.¹⁶ The tokens of their belonging to the citizen body are their sacrifices to Zeus Phratrios at the Apatouria (l. 92) and to Apollo Patroos on the seventh of Metageitnion (l. 89). Professor Ferguson estimated these cults justly; they are not common to all *gene*, as is often said (p. 31), but it may be possible to elucidate this matter somewhat more. In the dokimasia of the archons they were asked if they had an Apollo Patroos and a Zeus Herkeios and where these and their tombs were;¹⁷ the *γενῆται* of Apollo Patroos and Zeus Herkeios are said to testify to the citizenship.¹⁸ The purpose is to ascertain the citizenship. In the old times when no citizen rolls existed the simplest means of proving it was the possession of family tombs, property, and a house, in religious terms a Zeus Herkeios, whose altar was in the court-yard, and an Apollo Agyieus before the doors. Both were inherited from the ancestors and for this

¹⁴ *IG*, II², 1039, l. 58.

¹⁵ Demosthenes, *de falsa leg.*, XIX, 303 and the scholia.

¹⁶ *IG*, I², 45 = Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 87, ll. 13; cf. 63, l. 57.

¹⁷ Aristot., *pol. Athen.*, 55; cf. Harpokration, s. v. *Ἐρκεῖος Ζεὺς*.

¹⁸ Demosthenes, LVII, 67.

reason Apollo was called *πατρῶς*. This epithet does not imply that the pedigree was carried back either to Zeus or to Apollo. On the contrary the noble families had their own heroic ancestors. Whosoever belonged to "the people without ancestors" and did not possess landed property had neither a Zeus Herkeios nor an Apollo Patroos. When the supremacy of the landed gentry was broken and the common people were admitted to a part in state affairs, some change became necessary in regard to proving citizenship. The phrateres who were charged with the supervision took over the gods who were invoked in testimony of citizenship. Zeus and Apollo became gods of the phratries which instituted cults for them. So the small people too, viz. the members of the cult associations, who inherited the name of *γενῆται*, got their Zeus Herkeios and Apollo Patroos.¹⁹ Zeus was generally renamed Phratrion. Apollo Patroos became the ancestor of all Athenians at a relatively late time, being identified with Apollo Pythios, the father of Ion, a myth which is well known from the *Ion* of Euripides. And we read in fact that the Salaminioi made a sacrifice to Ion too (l. 87). It is apparent that the group of gods to whom the sacrifice of the seventh of Metageitnion was offered—Apollo Patroos, Leto, Artemis, and Athena *ἀγέλαα*—is a conventional one. Athena also appears sometimes as Phratrion and I agree with Professor Ferguson (p. 29) that in this connexion the epithet is to be understood as "the leader of the people."

Here we have found a conventional group of gods belonging to the common mythology. There is another. The Herakleion was the chief sanctuary of the Sounian Salaminioi and the income of the *genos* was drawn from its lands. The cult was certainly old, for Herakles was very popular in Attica, but to Herakles are added his mother Alkmene and his true friend Iolaos. This connexion is not unexampled in Attika,²⁰ but their addition to the cult of Herakles is obviously of mythological origin. To these are added Kourotrophos, Maia, and

¹⁹ Cf. Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³, 991, *Διὸς Ἑρκέιο Πατρώο* (from Galepsos) and *Revue archéol.*, IX (1935), p. 135, *Διὸς Κρησίο Πατρώο* (from Thasos).

²⁰ Alkmene and Iolaos had a common altar in Kynosarges and Herakles and Hebe as well, Pausanias, I, 19, 3; Alkmene and Hebe in the deme of Aixone, *IG*, II³, 1199.

three local heroes. The group may in part be explained through the wish to include as many of the cults as possible in this festival which was the chief festival of the Sounian Salaminioi. Therefore the three nameless heroes were added and so too it may be understood that Kourotrophos is added. But why Maia? I fail to understand what the mother of Hermes has to do here and I venture to ask if *μαῖα* is not to be understood in the literal sense of mother or nurse. The three local heroes call for some comment. *ἦρως ἐπὶ τῇ ἀλγῇ* is rightly interpreted (p. 54) as the hero of the salt-works; the two others are named from unknown localities. My point is further to stress the prodigious number of local, unnamed heroes exemplified here as well as in the sacrificial calendar of the Tetrapolis.²¹ There were many of them throughout the country-side, more than the small chapels in modern Greece, and only by a steadfast regard for this fact can the vigour of the hero cult be comprehended.

The two groups of gods last discussed are conventional, a sign that these cults are of relatively late creation; the phratry gods are also conventional. This is interesting inasmuch as we can see how the cults of a cult association in the middle of the sixth century B. C. were created. Much more interesting are, however, the Attic cults attached to the *genos* of the Salaminioi and the Salaminian cults transferred to Attica. That mythology served as a means of politics is well known and often mentioned, though it is to be regretted that the materials never have been collected and treated comprehensively. Mythological claims served for the Greek states the same purpose as national claims in our days. We have seen an example in the legend that the sons of Aias emigrated to Attica. It has been less noticed that the cults too were used for political purposes, especially in fusing the petty states of Attica into a unity—the state of Athens.²²

A filial cult of Artemis at Brauron was founded on the

²¹ IG, II², 1358 = von Prott, *Fasti sacri*, 26; four pairs of a hero and a heroine, and two heroes more; most of these are nameless, one is called *ἦρως Φηραίος*, another *ἦρως ἐν . πασιλευαί*.

²² This point of view was emphasized by Wide in Gercke-Norden, *Bibl. in die klass. Altertumswiss.*, I², p. 218 (the passage is left out in the third and fourth editions). The materials are collected by S. Solders, *Die ausserstädtischen Kulte und die Einigung Attikas*, Dissertation, Lund, 1931, but the relevant points are not well brought out.

Acropolis of Athens and a gay procession went every fourth year from Athens to Brauron to the great festival there.²³ The Thesmophoria of Halimus were added to those of Athens as their first day, which explains why the third day was called ἡ μέση.²⁴ Peisistratos brought Dionysos Eleuthereus to Athens from the village of Eleutherai in the borderland of Boeotia. This fact is most noticeable in regard to the Eleusinian mysteries because we know that Eleusis was incorporated into the Athenian state relatively late; at the end of the seventh century B. C. Athens took care of the mysteries although the celebrations were allowed to remain with the old Eleusinian families. An Eleusinion was founded in the city below the Acropolis; the holy things were yearly brought to Athens only in order to be carried back again to Eleusis in the solemn Iacchos procession. It has been guessed that the original intention was to transfer the mysteries to Athens.²⁵

In the light of these examples, which show how the transference of cults was used in order to unite conquered territories with Athens, the cult regulations of our inscription can be better understood. Their purpose was to unite Salamis and the Salaminians with Athens. Therefore Eurysakes received a sanctuary at Athens and Athena Skiras was transferred to Phaleron. But in this case the Athenians went further. They transplanted part of the inhabitants of Salamis to Attica—probably the well-to-do families, for there are many well-known men among the Salaminioi. In order to attach them to the Athenian state they not only gave them citizenship but also handed over to them old Attic cults and assigned to them means for their performance. In order to be able to maintain the cults, the Salaminioi were organized as a new *genos*, viz. cult association. The Athenians must have been very anxious to win the favour of the Salaminians, and they succeeded. Their claims were definitely recognized and Salamis remained in their hands. Thus this inscription sheds light on much-discussed events in the politics of Athens in the sixth century B. C.

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²³ Aristot., *pol. Athen.*, 57; Aristophanes, *Pax*, 873.

²⁴ See Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 317.

²⁵ *Archaeol. Jahrbuch*, XXXI (1916), p. 313.

PLATO'S EPIGRAM ON DION'S DEATH.

The elegiac poem of six lines which Plato is said to have written on the death of Dion of Syracuse¹ provides an interesting example of the inability of scholars to agree on what looks like a simple issue. Of its authenticity two contrary views are current. The one is represented by Wilamowitz, who treated the poem as the genuine work of Plato, written when he heard the news of Dion's death, and said of it: "Noch einmal, ein letztes Mal, zwang ihn die Muse, sein Gefühl unmittelbar in einem Gedichte ausströmen zu lassen."² Indeed to Wilamowitz its authorship seemed so clear that he did not argue about it but stated it as an obvious fact. On the other hand A. E. Taylor, though admitting some uncertainty, tends to hold that the lines are not by Plato and bases his case on their contents which seem to him unsuitable for a man of seventy.³ Between these two positions comes that of Reitzenstein, who, after some scepticism about all the Platonic epigrams,⁴ came to accept some at least as genuine, but felt that in this case a "clumsy beginning" had been prefixed to a genuine last line.⁵ There seems, then, some reason for considering the poem again and for asking whether Plato did or did not write it.

The poem is quoted by Diogenes Laertius, III, 30 and by the *Palatine Anthology*, VII, 99, both of whom refer it to the philosopher Plato. Its first two lines are quoted by Suidas, and its last line by Apuleius (*Apol.*, 10). All four authorities may be using what is ultimately the same source, and the question arises what this is. The text of Diogenes provides a simple answer. The two epigrams on Aster (Nos. 4 and 5, Diehl), which he quotes immediately before it, come from the work of "Aristippus" *Περὶ παλαιῆς τρυφῆς*, and it looks as if this poem came from the same source. This has been questioned by M. Boas,⁶ who, basing his case on the rough methods by which Diogenes assembled his materials from different sources, argues that this poem came from Meleager's *Garland*. He is certainly

¹ No. 6, Diehl. I am indebted to Mr. D. L. Page for helpful criticism, though he must not be assumed to accept my conclusions.

² *Platon*, I, p. 644. For a similar view cf. R. v. Schellha, *Dion*, p. 84.

³ *Plato, the Man and his Work*, p. 554.

⁴ *Epigramm und Skolion*, pp. 181-186.

⁵ *Pauly-Wissowa, R. E.*, VI, 1, p. 90.

⁶ *De Epigrammatis Simonideis*, pp. 121-124.

right in assuming that some of the other epigrams, notably Nos. 9 and 11, cannot have come from "Aristippus," and the text of Diogenes is made considerably smoother if we omit the poem on Dion and pass from the epigrams on Aster to that on Archeanassa. But Diogenes was no artist in the arrangement of his material, and the argument from it cannot be pressed when we look at the words with which he introduces the epigrams,—*Ἀρίστιππος ἐν τῷ δ' περὶ παλαιᾶς τρυφῆς φησιν αὐτὸν* (sc. Platona) *Ἀστέρος μειρακίου τινὸς ἀστρολογεῖν συνασκουμένον ἐρασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δίῳ τοῦ προειρημένου*. This surely indicates that the poem on Dion, no less than the poems on Aster, was taken direct from "Aristippus." Against this the use of the words *ἀλλὰ καὶ* is no argument; for, as J. D. Denniston has shown,⁷ these mean no more than "further," "again," and give no support to any theory of addition from a different source. Moreover, from what we know of "Aristippus" the use of this poem as evidence against Plato's character is exactly what we might expect. He was not concerned with what such poems really meant, but with finding a case against Plato's morals, and for his purpose this poem, and especially its last line, were just the sort of material he liked. Indeed we may see the influence of "Aristippus" in the foolish comment which Diogenes makes after quoting the poem, *τοῦτο καὶ ἐπιγέγραφθαι φασὶν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ*. This is not a record of truth, but an interpretation intended to show how amorous Plato was. It seems then fairly certain that the epigram on Dion comes from "Aristippus" and that its authenticity must first be considered with that of other epigrams from the same source, the poems on Aster, Alexis, Archeanassa, and Agathon.

There seems to be no serious objection to the view that in his youth Plato wrote the two epigrams on Aster. But to those on Alexis and Agathon some doubt attaches, because Phaedrus, who is named in the first, and Agathon, to whom the second is addressed, are both characters in Platonic dialogues who are known to have been older than Plato. A. E. Taylor makes the point plain when he says: "To my own mind, the occurrence of the names Agathon and Phaedrus is proof of spuriousness. The author clearly has in mind the parts taken by Agathon the poet and Phaedrus of Myrrhinus in Plato's great *ἐρωτικὸς λόγος*

⁷ *The Greek Particles*, p. 21.

the *Symposium*, and has forgotten that both were grown men when Plato was under twelve."⁸ To this doubt there is a good answer. It is surely not surprising or improbable that Plato, who spent much of his life writing Dialogues with characters drawn from an older generation than his own, should early have written poetry about the men who belonged to it. He was fascinated by the circle of Socrates and spent his artistic life in recreating it; it is perfectly likely that the impulse which made him put it into his Dialogues asserted itself earlier in making him write poetry about its real or imaginary loves. The poem on Archeanassa is a different matter. For the *Palatine Anthology*, VII, 217 quotes under the name of Asclepiades a four-line epigram on the same subject, in which the first and fourth lines are identical with Plato's, and the second and third show considerable similarities. It is only natural to assume that "Aristippus," eager to prove his malicious case against Plato, used an epigram not written by him and slightly altered it. Against this view, however, there are arguments. Asclepiades was a distinguished poet in his own time, and after his death his works were well known. When "Aristippus" wrote, in the third or second century, it would be difficult to pass off as Plato's lines really written by Asclepiades, and it seems easier to believe that both Plato and Asclepiades wrote lines on the same subject—a proceeding far commoner with the Greeks than with us.

There seems, then, no good reason for denying the epigrams of "Aristippus" to Plato. There are also positive reasons for ascribing them to him. The *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* show that the mature Plato had something of the erotic temperament, and the youthful Plato may have been even more interested in erotic subjects. The identification of the Morning and Evening Star in No. 4 finds a remarkable parallel in *Epinomis* 987b, which must at least be based on Platonic teaching and uses the same star as a symbol of Aphrodite. But better than such arguments is the point made by Reitzenstein that the poems quoted are so good that they cannot be the work of a forger. They are the work of a notable poet, and if they were written by someone else than Plato, it is hard to see why they were not ascribed to him under his proper name. Nor would "Aristippus" case

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 554.

against Plato have been very convincing if the evidence which he marshalled was not known in some degree to be genuinely Platonic. He seems to have drawn on an oral tradition, perhaps that of the Academy, and in that case his source was good. From a similar source we may trace Plato's epigram on Aristophanes, which is not quoted by Diogenes or the *Palatine Anthology* but known only from the Platonist Olympiodorus (*Vit. Plat.*, I, p. 384). Of it Wilamowitz has well said "Da haben wir vielleicht einen Nachhall der Symposien aus der Akademie,"⁹ and it must be to some such source as this that the genuine epigrams of Plato go back.

Reitzenstein, however, who accepted six other poems as genuine because of their excellence, logically rejected the poem on Dion, or most of it, because he did not think it equally good. So far as it goes, this is a fair argument and deserves consideration. Questions of poetical merit are hard to argue and impossible to prove, and if we follow Reitzenstein's method, the subject must now be closed. But there is another way of tackling the problem. The poem on Dion is concerned with an event of which something is known, and it makes assertions which may be considered historically. It must surely be possible to see what relation these have to what Plato says elsewhere. If they can be shown to be characteristic of him, there is at least a reasonable presumption that the poem was written either by him or by someone better acquainted with his thought than "Aristippus" seems to have been. If Plato wrote it, the poem must come from about the year B. C. 353 when Dion was murdered and Plato was seventy years old. We may then look to see if it bears any relation to his later works and especially to *Epistle VII*, part at least of which seems to have been written at this time and which deals with the whole history of Plato's relations with Dion. The poem would then be later than the *Republic* and earlier than the *Laws*, and any points of resemblance which it may show to either are historically relevant.

The text of the poem presents no difficulties, and may be given as Diehl prints it:

Δάκρυα μὲν Ἑκάβῃ τε καὶ Ἰλιάδεσσι γυναῖξι
Μοῖραι ἐπέκλωσαν δὴ τότε γεινομέναις.

⁹ *Hellenistische Dichtung*, I, p. 131.

σοὶ δέ, Δίῳν, ῥέξαντι καλῶν ἐπινίκιον ἔργων
 δαίμονες εὐρείας ἐλπίδας ἐξέχεαν.
 κείσαι δ' εὐρυχόρῳ ἐν πατρίδι τίμιος ἄστοις,
 ὃ ἐμὸν ἐκμήνας θυμὸν ἔρωτι Δίῳν.

It is at once clear that this is not like any other poem attributed to Plato by "Aristippus" or anyone else. In its general form it seems to resemble the Peloponnesian type of elegiac lament in so far as the dead man is addressed in the second person and the cause of his death specified. As such it recalls the elegiacs of Euripides' *Andromache*, 103-116¹⁰ or the epitaph on the Athenians who fell at Coronea.¹¹ Poems of this type are rare in the fourth or any other century, and the rarity of the form is in itself an argument for Plato's authorship. The form would presumably be used in a society where Dorian customs and manners predominated and would hardly occur to a forger. But in Syracuse in Dion's time it would be thoroughly in place. Syracuse prided itself on its Dorian affinities and kept up the spirit which Pindar had praised to Hieron in *Pythian* I, 61-66 in connection with Etna. Nor was this spirit unknown to Plato. In *Epistle* VII, 336c he tells the friends of Dion to make no use of those men who cannot Δωρισιζῆν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, and the words show that he admired the Dorian traditions of the Syracusans. For such a Dorian society, with its ideals in his memory, Plato himself may well have chosen to write lines on the dead friend who was its champion.

The poem indicates certain circumstances which inspired its composition. Dion has died just at the point when his "broad hopes" seemed near to fulfilment, and in death he is honoured by his townsmen. It happens that both these points are made in *Epistle* VII, which supplies some commentary on them. First, the hopes. These must be Dion's own hopes which seemed likely to be fulfilled at the time when he was murdered. What they were is made clear by *Epistle* VII, 327d, where Plato says of Dion that if he had been able to make what he wanted of Dionysius, μεγάλας ἐλπίδας εἶχεν ἀνευ σφαγῶν καὶ θανάτων καὶ τῶν νῦν γεγονότων κακῶν βίον ἀν' εὐδαίμονα καὶ ἀληθινὸν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ χώρᾳ κατασκευάσαι, and a little later at 328a Plato quotes from the

¹⁰ *Greek Poetry and Life*, pp. 206-230.

¹¹ *Classical Quarterly*, XXXII (1938), pp. 80-88.

message which Dion sent to him when he invited him to Syracuse, and in this were the words *εἴπερ ποτὲ καὶ νῦν ἐλπὶς πᾶσα ἀποτελεσθήσεται τοῦ τοὺς αὐτοὺς φιλοσόφους τε καὶ πολέων ἄρχοντας μεγάλων συμβῆναι γενομένων*. Dion, then, had great hopes of what he might do in Syracuse. Plato knew of them and attached importance to them, and it would be natural in him to lament their collapse when he heard of Dion's death. For they lay near to Plato's own heart in so far as they were concerned with the prospect of establishing philosopher-kings such as he had himself desired in *Republic* VII, 473d. Secondly, the *Epistle*, like the poem, is concerned with the question of Dion's honours and reputation. No doubt some said that he was a rebel and deserved his death, and to this kind of complaint the poem is in some sense an answer. Dion's townsmen, it says, honour him. So in *Epistle* VII Plato makes a similar point. At 334e he draws a contrast between Dionysius and Dion, the first of whom is leading an ignoble life, while the second, convinced that men ought not to be enslaved, *τέθνηκεν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ τῶν καλλίστων ἐφίμενον αὐτῷ τε καὶ πόλει πάσχειν ὅτι ἂν πάσχη πᾶν ὀρθὸν καὶ καλόν*. Then at 351a Plato says that Dion wished by conferring benefits on the city *ἐν δυνάμει καὶ τιμαῖσιν γενέσθαι τὰ μέγιστα ἐν ταῖς μεγισταῖς*. The poem after all shows the same idea by indicating that Dion has found in death the honours which he missed in life. Thirdly, the poem shows that Dion fell in his hour of triumph and glory. It gives the impression that there was little time between his victory and his death, which came suddenly and unexpectedly. *Epistle* VII gives the same impression when at 351c it says that Dion *ἐπταίσειν ἐπ' ἄκρον ἐλθὼν τοῦ περιγενέσθαι τῶν ἐχθρῶν*. Here the defeat of his enemies conveys much the same idea as the word *ἐπιπικιον* in the poem, and his fall is said to come when he has reached the height of success. In these three points the poem and *Epistle* VII agree, and the agreement indicates that the poem was written by someone who knew the situation and saw it very much as Plato knew and saw it when he wrote his letter to Dion's friends.

Nor are the ideas of the poem to be found only in *Epistle* VII among Plato's works. Two points of interest may be noted. First, the notion that Dion is rightly honoured by his fellow-citizens after death accords with what Plato says elsewhere in his Dialogues. At *Republic* VII, 540c he describes the honours

which should await the philosopher who has taken his part in politics; after death he will receive public memorials and sacrifices and be honoured even as a demigod, and certainly as blessed and divine. At *Laws* VII, 802a he repeats the idea, when he says that while it is unsafe to honour living men with songs of praise and hymns, such should be paid to good men after they are dead. Secondly, a Platonic trait may be seen in the use of *δαίμονες* in the third line of the poem. In this we may notice first the use of the plural, secondly the ascription of Dion's death to the external power of *δαίμονες*. Both may be illustrated from Plato's works. Normally, it is true, he uses the singular when he wishes to speak of a single man's destiny (*Rep.* X, 617e, 620d, *Phaed.* 108b), but the poem is concerned with something different from this and uses the plural. A parallel may be found in *Republic* X, 619c, where the man who has made the wrong choice of becoming a tyrant and regrets it, is said οὐ . . . ἐαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἂνθ' ἐαυτοῦ. Such a man is of course not a Platonic philosopher, but the fact that he blames *δαίμονες* in the plural shows that for Plato this was at least an intelligible and even familiar position. Moreover Plato's own belief that a *δαίμων* could be responsible for evil is shown by *Epistle* VII, 336b, where he describes the earlier failures to establish a good regime in Syracuse and says that the cause was ἡ πρὸς τις δαίμων ἢ τις ἀλιτῆριος ἐμπεσὼν ἀνομίᾳ καὶ ἀθεότητι καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τόλμῃς ἀμαθίας. No doubt he had reason for ascribing such failures to a *δαίμων* rather than to a *θεός*. For him a *θεός* was too high and too good to be the direct cause of evil, and he blamed a power of lower rank.

The agreement of the main thoughts of the poem with Plato's thought at certain places in his Dialogues and in *Epistle* VII may be supplemented by two other points which need some discussion but lead to a similar conclusion. In the third line of the poem Dion is spoken of as *ρέξαντι καλῶν ἐπινίκιον ἔργων*. The precise meaning of this is not immediately clear. Wilamowitz's verse-translation renders "Doch du standest im Siegerkranze," and J. M. Edmonds gives "when thou hadst triumphed in the doing of noble deeds." Neither makes quite clear what *ἐπινίκιον* and *ρέξαντι* mean. There seem to be two possible interpretations. Either *ἐπινίκιον* is used, as often, to mean "triumph-song," and

then *ῥέξαντι* must have some meaning like "having won," and that surely is impossible. Or, *ῥέξαντι* means, as it should, "having made," and *ἐπινίκιον* has an unusual but not impossible meaning of "sacrifice (or feast) in honour of victory." This would give excellent sense, and the only objection is that we should expect the plural *ἐπινίκια*. But the substitution of the singular for the plural seems a legitimate device in poetry and calls for no further comment. If so, this interpretation is easy. In either case the words must refer to the celebration of victory, and the victory consists of good things done. The celebration is not literal but metaphorical. The words, which belong properly to the games, are transferred to politics. For such a use the prose-works of Plato give excellent parallels. At the end of *Republic* X, 621d men who have acted well win rewards *ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιαιρούμενοι*; at *Laws* V, 730d the good man who helps to maintain order in the city is to be proclaimed *νικηφόρος ἀρετῇ*, and a similar phrase occurs at XII, 953d. The same notion may be seen in the use of *νικητήρια* given to men by the gods in return for good acts at *Republic* X, 613b and *Laws* XII, 964b. These cases show that for Plato the notion of a prize for victory was applied to rewards for well doing, and this is the same idea as in the poem.

Secondly, the remarkable last line of the poem, for which even Reitzenstein felt some tenderness,

ὃ ἐμὸν ἐκμήνας θυμὸν ἔρωτι Δίῳ

is almost intolerable unless it is explained through Plato's own special view of *ἔρως*. If we take it as an ordinary confession of a past love, we can understand why A. E. Taylor says "And it is, perhaps, hardly likely that Plato, writing after he was seventy to a friend who had lived to be over fifty, would use the word *ἔρως* to describe the attachment." It is certainly unlikely,—if *ἔρως* has here its usual meaning. But has it? Is it not much more likely that it has its special Platonic meaning? Plato was deeply attached to Dion, as *Epistle* VII shows, and had expected great things from him. Through him he had hoped to realize his own ideals of a good polity. His attitude towards him seems to correspond very much with what is said about *ἔρως* in the *Symposium*, especially about that kind of *ἔρως* which "engenders wisdom and goodness generally" (209a). There his following words show that this kind of *ἔρως* finds its fruits in

political life—πολὺ δὲ μέγιστη καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακόσμησις. Just as good results may come to a city from an intense personal attachment, so in the poem Dion is regarded as the object of ἔρως through whom Plato had once hoped to realize his ideals. Moreover, the poem regards this love as a kind of madness, and this too is a thoroughly Platonic conception. In *Phaedrus* 253c love is seen as a madness, which is none the less fine and beneficial—προθυμία μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων καὶ τελετή, ἐὰν γε διαπράξωνται ὁ προθυμοῦνται, ἢ λέγω, οὕτω καλὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δι' ἔρωτα μανέντος φίλου τῷ φιληθέντι γίνεται, ἐὰν αἰρεθῇ. In the Platonic view the lover aims at moulding the object of his love into the image of the god whom both serve, and the affection between them grows with the process, finding its realization in the noble acts which both do together. Nor did Plato in his later years reject this kind of love. In *Laws* VIII, 837c he expressly approves of it in the case of the man who loves another's soul and is seen as τὸ σῶφρον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ τὸ φρόνιμον αἰδούμενος ἅμα καὶ σεβόμενος. If such were his views in old age, there would be no impropriety or improbability in his addressing his dead friend in the language used in the poem.

It seems then that the thoughts of the poem agree well with Plato's own thought as we know it from his Dialogues and *Epistle* VII, and that the poem is hardly intelligible unless we interpret it in the light of Plato's philosophy. This certainly rules out any likelihood of it being a forgery by "Aristippus," who seems to have had very little understanding of what Plato really meant. It also makes it unlikely that some late poet wrote the lines and tried to pass them off as Plato's, rather as Mnasalcas wrote in the manner of Simonides. Whoever wrote the poem was thoroughly conversant with the Platonic philosophy and with Plato's own feelings at the death of Dion. The poem is most easily understood if we assume that Plato wrote it in the onslaught of sorrow and disappointment which assailed him at the news of Dion's death, that it gives the first personal and emotional expression of the feelings which he elaborated a little later in *Epistle* VII. It is of course just conceivable that it was not written by Plato himself but by someone else deeply versed in the Platonic literature. But surely this is unlikely. Such a man would have to be a Platonist, even a member of the

Academy, and would be unlikely to claim a poem of his own for Plato, and still more unlikely to use a rare form of lament or to fall into such an echo of the Platonic style as may be seen in the words *ἐλπίδας ἐξέχεαν* in 4 which recalls *Crito*, 49a, *πᾶσαι . . . αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί*. When all is said, Plato seems to be the best candidate for the poem's authorship.

There remain one or two doubts which may roughly be classed as aesthetic and may appeal to those who share Reitzenstein's feeling that the poem is on the whole a poor thing. Such doubts cannot really be set at rest by argument, but some considerations may help to a clearer estimate of their worth. The poem is certainly less polished and less direct than such poems as those on Aster and Agathon. But that is after all to be expected from a man of seventy whose life has been spent on philosophy and who has long ago turned away from the false lures of poetry. It looks as if the poem were written in haste under the stress of a strong emotion, and that would account for such lack of skill as it may show. But it may be surmised that what is claimed as a lack of skill is due simply to Plato following an old literary tradition. This may be seen clearly in the first line where the word *μέν* is lengthened in arsis before *Ἑκάβῃ*. To this there is no parallel in the other Platonic epigrams, but there is an explanation of it. The word *Ἑκάβῃ* had an initial digamma, and this would still be recognized in Syracuse and appropriate to an elegy composed on the Peloponnesian model. In lengthening *μέν* before an initial digamma at this place in the line Plato does what Homer had done with other words ending in *ν* when he wrote:

Il., V, 836 *χειρὶ πάλιν ἐρύσας, ὃ δ' ἄρ' ἐμπαπῶς ἀπόρουσεν*

IX. 56 *οὐδὲ πάλιν ἐρέει· ἀτὰρ οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων*

284 *γαμβρὸς κέν οἱ ἔοις· τέλει δέ σε ἴσον Ὀρέστη*

Plato followed a good precedent, and we cannot reasonably complain or hold the lengthening of *μέν* in evidence against him.

A more complicated problem lies in the construction and thought of the first four lines. The mention of Hecuba and the Trojan women does not seem very relevant to Dion, even though the contrast is clear between those who are unhappy, as they were, from birth, and others, like Dion, whose joy is turned unexpectedly to sorrow. Perhaps the antithetical arrangement is traditional to this kind of elegy; for the elegiacs of the

Andromache describe first the past, then the present. But there seems to be a better reason for the antithesis than this. The lines are surely a variation on the old theme, ascribed to Solon (Hdt., I, 32), that no man can be called *δαίσιος* until he is dead. The Trojan women never had any illusions about their state, but Dion—like Croesus—may have thought that his happiness would endure. The point was often made both by Sophocles (*Trach.*, 1 ff., *O. T.*, 1529-1530, fr. 646) and by Euripides (*Andr.*, 100 ff., *Tro.*, 510, *Heracl.*, 866, *I. A.*, 161). The type of person who was never happy was no subject for tragedy, but the man or woman, like Oedipus or Deianira, who fell from prosperity into ruin, was. Is it not possible that Plato had some such idea in his mind and wished to depict Dion as an essentially tragic figure who fell at the moment of triumph? The fact that he was honoured after death would suit this. For it would place him to some extent in the same company as Aias, Heracles, and Oedipus, who suffered humiliation and death in the hour of pride and were exalted after death to divine or semi-divine honours.

If we view the poem in this light and assume that Plato wrote it, it becomes a document of some relevance for his biography, and it is clear that Wilamowitz was right to attach importance to it. It shows what Plato felt as a man when he saw the final ruin of his hopes for the political life. Before the crisis of Dion's death he had suffered considerable disillusionment about the possibility of establishing a philosophers' state at Syracuse, but, so long as Dion lived, there was still hope. With his murder hope seemed to disappear, and naturally the disappointment was bitter to Plato. He did not live to see the triumph of Timoleon, and he must have died in the conviction that so far as an active political life was concerned, he had failed. Small wonder if he paid a tribute to the man on whom his hopes had rested and saw him as a tragic figure, struck down by implacable supernatural powers in the crisis of success. Poetry was, after all, the simplest and best way to honour Dion's memory, and this epigram, short and strange though it is, well qualifies to be one of those *ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς* which Plato himself admitted even into his ideal state.¹²

¹² *Rep.* X, 607a.

THE PENTATHLUM JUMP.

It is well known how highly the Greeks praised the all-round development of the pentathlon for health and comeliness. Thus Aristotle¹ says the pentathletes, because of their strength and agility, were "the handsomest of all athletes," and Galen² called the pentathlon "the most perfect of exercises." Herodotus³ tells how the Elean Tisamenus, later soothsayer for the Spartans at Plataea, was told by the Delphic Pythia that he should be victorious in "five greatest contests," and how he, mistaking the answer, began training for the pentathlon only to be beaten at Olympia.⁴ Iccus of Tarentum, who won in the pentathlon at Olympia in Ol. 76 = 476 B. C., became "the best trainer of his day."⁵ When Hysmon of Elis, an Olympic and Nemean victor, as a boy had a "rheum" settle on his tendons, he practiced the pentathlon "to become sound and healthy."⁶

More than any other contest the pentathlon has aroused controversy among modern writers on ancient athletics over the order of its events and the rules by which victory was decided.⁷

¹ *Rhetoric*, 1361b.

² *De sanitatē tuenda*, III, 2.

³ IX, 35. Also Pausanias, III, 11, 6 and cf. VI, 14, 3.

⁴ He was beaten before 479 B. C. Pauly-Wissowa, VIII, col. 1536, wrongly fixes the date Ol. 75 = 480 B. C.

⁵ Pausanias, VI, 10, 5 (statue at Olympia): H. Foerster, *Die Sieger in den Olympischen Spielen* (Progr. des Gymn. zu Zwickau), I-II, 1891, 1892, No. 240. For the strictness of his training, see Plato, *Leg.*, 839e-840a (cf. *Protagoras*, 316d) and Aelian, *De nat. anim.*, VI, 1, and *Var. hist.*, XI, 3. Lucian names him among famous trainers, *Hist. quomodo sit conscribenda*, 35.

⁶ Pausanias, VI, 3, 9 (statue with archaic leaping-weights in the hands, by Cleon of Sicyon) and 10. The date of his Olympic victory lies between Ols. 94-103 = 404-368 B. C.; Foerster, No. 347, p. 26.

⁷ Discussed by J. H. Krause, *Gymnastik u. Agonistik der Hellenen* II, Leipzig, 1841, pp. 476-97; E. Pinder, *Ueber den Fuenfkampf der Hellenen*, Berlin, 1867; A. E. J. Holwerda, "Zum Pentathlon," *Arch. Ztg.*, XXXIX, 1881, pp. 206-16; P. Gardner, "The Pentathlon of the Greeks," *J. H. S.*, I, 1880, pp. 210-23; E. Myers, "The Pentathlon," *ibid.*, II, 1881, pp. 217-21; F. Fedde, *Der Fuenfkampf d. Hellenen*, Gym. Progr. Breslau, 1888, and Leipzig, 1889; M. Faber, "Zum Fuenfkampf d. Griechen," *Philologus*, L, 1891, pp. 469-98; H. Haggemueller, *Ueber den Fuenfkampf der Hellenen*, Progr. Kgl. Wilhelmsgym., Muenchen, 1892, pp. 1 f. Ph. Legrand, "Quinquertium," in Daremberg-Saglio, pp. 804-07, and "Saltus," *ibid.*, pp. 1054-6.

Of the five events named in the pentameter verse ascribed to Simonides,⁸

ἄλμα ποδωκείην δίσκον ἄκοντα πάλην,

the first, the jump, which was the most prominent, frequently named for the entire contest, and, as Philostratus⁹ says, the most difficult part, has been the subject of wide-spread discussion. This has been due largely to the long records of two early Greek jumpers, Phaëllus of Croton and Chionis of Sparta, the former said to have jumped 55 feet at Delphi, the latter 52 at Olympia. These records have been either rejected as false or, if accepted, interpreted as multiple jumps. But *prima facie* evidence of the reality of the longer one is shown by the fact that it is coupled with a reasonable discus-throw,¹⁰ and repeated by a line of Greek writers of narrative and epigram over a period of centuries. In fact, these three records—the jumps of Phaëllus and Chionis and the discus-throw of the former—are the only ones which have come down to us from the Greek games. This is an excellent indication that the Greeks, unlike us moderns, were interested only in the style in which a contest was performed. Recently unexpected evidence from Aristotle has been adduced by the well-known Austrian writer on ancient athletics, Professor Julius Juethner of the University of Innsbruck. This, in connection with data already known, points conclusively to a

⁸ *Anth. gr. Planud.*, I, 3 (II, p. 527, Dübner); *Greek Anthology, Planud. App.*, Bk. XVI, no. 3, ed. W. R. Paton (London, 1918 [Loeb]), V, p. 158. The five are given in a different order, the foot-race last but one instead of in second place, by scholiasts on Pindar, *Nem.*, I, 35, and Sophocles, *Elect.*, 691, and by Eustathius, *ad Iliad.*, 23, 621. Philostratus, *De re gymnastica* (recently transl. into English by Thos. Woody, reprinted from *The Research Quarterly*, May, 1936, VII, 2), 3, says Jason at Lemnos united the theretofore independent events into a single contest to please Peleus; see Juethner, *Philostratos ueber Gymnastik*, Leipzig, 1909, pp. 198 f. It was introduced at Olympia along with independent wrestling in Ol. 18 = 708 B. C.: Pausanias, V, 8, 7: Philostratus, 12.

⁹ 55.

¹⁰ 28.10 m. or 95 ft. It cannot be compared with modern records, since the size and weight of the ancient discus varied from 3-9 lbs. in metal to over 15 lbs. in stone, while today a standard weight of 2 lbs. is used. Moreover, the method of the ancient throw differed from ours. See E. N. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World*, Oxford, 1930, pp. 157 f. (with illustrations).

multiple jump. The time is therefore fitting for a review of the material both old and new to show that the long-discussed problem of the Greek jump finally has been solved and the long records in question vindicated. The older evidence was reviewed at length a generation ago in two articles¹¹ by E. Norman Gardiner, the most authoritative English writer on ancient athletics, which we shall frequently quote, showing that he drew wrong conclusions from it.

Phaÿllus' records appear in a late epigram of the Anthology:¹²

πέντ' ἐπὶ πεντήκοντα πόδας πήδησε Φάυλλος·
δίσκευσεν δ' ἑκατὸν πέντ' ἀπολειπομένων.

Gardiner traced this epigram only as far back as Zenobius, the collector of 552 proverbs in the time of the emperor Hadrian (A. D. 117-138), over six centuries after the victories.¹³ Zenobius thus explains the proverb: ὑπὲρ τὰ ἑσκαμμένα· Φάυλλος ἐγένετο πένταθλος ὁ Πόντιος, ὃς ἐδόκει μέγιστα δισκεῖν καὶ ἄλλεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἑσκαμμένους πεντήκοντα πόδας εἰς τὸ στερεὸν ἤλατο, τὸ συμβᾶν εἰς παροιμίαν περιέστη.

That Phaÿllus was no mythical figure is shown by his being mentioned by several Greek writers. Thus Herodotus¹⁴ states that he not only won three victories at Delphi, but later commanded a Crotonian ship at Salamis, the Crotoniates being the only over-seas Greeks to aid against the Medes. This fixes the date of his Pythian victories near the beginning of the fifth century B. C. Plutarch¹⁵ and Pausanias¹⁶ speak of his help at Salamis, and the latter adds that Phaÿllus did not win at Olympia, but only at Delphi, once as runner and twice as pentathlete. Aristophanes¹⁷ twice alludes to a runner of this name, of unknown provenience and date. While the scholiast on the former passage and Suidas¹⁸ both identify him with the

¹¹ "Phaÿllus and his Record Jump," *J. H. S.*, XXIV, 1904, pp. 70-80, and "Further Notes on the Greek Jump," *ibid.*, pp. 179-194.

¹² *Anthol. gr. App.*, III, 28 (III, p. 292 [Dübner] Cougny); also in Th. Preger's *Inscriptiones Graecae metricae ex scriptoribus praeter anthologiam collectae*, Lipsiae, 1891, No. 142.

¹³ Zenobius, VI, 23, p. 384; T. Gaisford, *Paroemiographi Graeci*, Oxonii, 1836 (Proverbia Zenobii, pp. 228 f.).

¹⁴ VIII, 47.

¹⁵ *Alexander*, 34.

¹⁶ X, 9, 2.

¹⁷ *Acharn.*, 213; *Vespes*, 1203.

¹⁸ *S. v.* Φάυλλος.

Crotonian victor, they are certainly different athletes, since Pausanias¹⁹ explicitly says that the Crotonian did not win at Olympia and Herodotus only mentions his Pythian victories.²⁰ Wernicke's attempt,²¹ therefore, to identify the two on the basis of different source material is futile.

Curiously, the epigram quoted does not appear on the recovered base which seems to have borne the statue of Phaëllus at Delphi, though the lettering of its dedication agrees in date with whatever else we know of Phaëllus—the first quarter of the fifth century B. C.²² His famous jump readily passed into the proverb *ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἄλλεσθαι* to denote any extraordinary feat. It is mentioned by several Greek writers and scholiasts from Plato on.²³ Of these, the scholiast on Lucian is best, a part of which we quote: *τῶν οὖν πρὸ αὐτοῦ [Φαέλλου] σκαπτόντων ν' (50) πόδας καὶ τούτους πηδόντων, ὁ Φάυλλος ὑπὲρ τοὺς ν' πάνυ ἐπήδησεν κ. τ. λ.* The wording here shows that several athletes before him had jumped fifty feet, a not unusual feat, but that he alone surpassed them.

Chionis won seven victories at Olympia, four in the stade-race and three in the double sprint (*δίανυλος*) in Ols. 23-31 = 668-656 B. C.²⁴ Africanus alone mentions his jump of 52 feet,

¹⁹ *L. c.*

²⁰ On this Olympic victor of the same name, see Krause, *Olympia*, Wien, 1838, p. 351; Gardiner, *J. H. S.*, XXIV, pp. 78-79; Foerster, No. 794, p. 24.

²¹ *De Pausaniae studiis Herodoteis*, Berolini, 1884, pp. 77 f.

²² *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, fasc. I, No. 1, pp. 1-2, fig. 1 and Pl. I. Here 13 fragments of a circular base of Parian marble, 2.14 m. in diameter and 0.298 m. in height, have been assembled on whose vertical face are the remains of an inscription. Hauvette's restoration has been preferred by Pomtow to Homolle's:

Κροτωνιάται ('Α) [πόλλωνι Φάυ]λλον . . . [— ἀνέθηκ]αν.

See A. Hauvette, *Rev. d. ét. gr.*, XII, 1899, pp. 10-12; Th. Homolle, *B. C. H.*, XXI, 1897, p. 274; H. Pomtow, *Ath. Mitt.*, XXXI, 1906, pp. 444-50 and 564.

²³ E. g., Plato, *Cratylus*, 413 A and Schol.: Lucian, *Somn. seu Gall.*, 6 and Schol.: Libanius, *ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν*. 373 (ed. Reiske); scholiasts on Pindar's *Nem.*, V, 19-20 (without naming Phaëllus), and Aristophanes' *Acharn.*, 213; Suidas, s. v. Φάυλλος; Pollux, III, 151 (without naming Phaëllus); etc.

²⁴ Pausanias, III, 14, 3. Dates: IV, 23, 4 and 10, and VIII, 39, 3; Africanus (*Africani S. Julii 'Oλυμπιάδων ἀναγραφὴ*, ed. J. Rutgers, Leyden, 1802), pp. 10-11; Foerster I, 1891, Nos. 39, 41-46, pp. 4-5;

apparently made in Ol. 29 = 664 B. C.:²⁵ 'Ολ. κθ' Χίλωνος Δάκων στάδιον· οὗ τὸ ἄλμα νβ' ποδῶν. Pausanias²⁶ mentions a tablet in honor of his victories set up at Olympia by the Spartan state with a statue nearby which he does not believe represents Chionis since it was fashioned by Myron of Athens. He also speaks elsewhere²⁷ of another tablet set up by the state in Sparta "close to the tombs of the Agids," similarly recording his prizes at Olympia and other places. The only other historical notice of Chionis is given by Pausanias,²⁸ who recounts that it was reported that he joined Battus of Thera on his expedition and helped him found Cyrene and subdue the neighboring Libyans.

Single jumps of 55 and 52 feet, even with the help of stone or metal weights, which—like the flute²⁹—even down to the time of Pausanias accompanied the jump to accelerate it, as both Aristotle³⁰ and Philostratus³¹ say, are manifestly impossible when we consider that the present record for the running broad jump is only about one-half of the Greek.³² Weights³³

Africanus for the first victory used the name Charmis, a difference in name due to different victor lists; see F. M. Mie, *Quaestiones agonisticae imprimis ad Olympia pertinentes*, Diss. Inaug., Rostock, 1888, Anm. 18.

²⁵ Rutgers, p. 10.

²⁶ VI, 13, 2. The statue, therefore, may have been set up in Ol. 77 or 78 = 472 or 468 B. C. See H. Brunn, *Gesch. d. gr. Kuenstler*, I, Stuttgart, 1853, p. 144.

²⁷ III, 14, 3.

²⁸ III, 14, 3. On Battus and the founding of Cyrene told by Herodotus in two versions, IV, 150-58, see How and Wells, *Commentary on Herodotus*, I, Oxford, 1912, pp. 350-55.

²⁹ See Philostratus, 55; Pausanias, V, 7, 10, V, 17, 10, VI, 14, 10; Plutarch, *De musica*, 26. See flutist on an Attic r. f. pelike (dated c. 440 B. C.) in the British Museum, *B. M. Catalogue*, E 427, reproduced by Gardner, *J. H. S.*, XXIV, p. 185, fig. 6, and *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 150, fig. 104; another on a b. f. kelebe in the British Museum, *B. M.*, 361; *J. H. S.*, XXIV, p. 180, fig. 1; etc.

³⁰ *De incessu anim.*, 3, 705a, 16; *Problem.*, V, 8, 881a, 39b.

³¹ 55; cf. for the same explanation, Theophrastus, *De lassit.*, 13, III, 134 (ed. Wimmer).

³² It is 26 ft. 5 $\frac{1}{8}$ in. (8.06 m.), made by the American negro Jesse Owens at the 11th Olympics, Berlin, 1936. He also jumped 28 ft. 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ in. (8.13 m.) at Ann Arbor, May 15, 1935. See Spalding's *Official Almanac*, New York, 1937, p. 9.

³³ On Greek *halteres*, see Juethner, *Ueber antike Turngeraete*, Wien, 1896, pp. 3-13, and A. de Ridder, "Halter," in Daremberg-Saglio, pp.

are no longer used in championship meets, but were still employed in trick jumping at music-hall performances in England in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A record of 29 ft. 7 in. with five-pound weights is recorded of a running broad jump by J. Howard at Chester in 1854, the take-off from a board two feet long and three inches thick.⁸⁴ The Greek records then would be as fantastic as Brunhild's leap of 72 feet in the *Nibelungenlied*.⁸⁵ Nor could they be explained by assuming the jumper used a raised platform or springboard as earlier writers imagined.⁸⁶ Such devices are yet used by circus gymnasts, but are not recognized by athletic associations and there is no evidence of their use in ancient athletics. The *πέραστρον*, as known from literature and monuments, was used only by acrobats, tumblers and rope-dancers.⁸⁷

There are, then, only two explanations of the Greek records. They are either false or they refer to a multiple jump of some sort. Gardiner was long the protagonist of the former view.⁸⁸ He regarded Phayllus' record as resting only on as good evidence as that of another Crotonian athlete, the famous wrestler Milo, who among other unheard of feats "picked up a four-year heifer at Olympia, and after carrying it about killed it and ate the whole of it,"⁸⁹ that is, on no evidence at all. He explained the

5-7. Metal or stone ones weighed from 2¼ to 10 lbs.; for types, see Gardiner, *J. H. S.*, XXIV, pp. 181 f., *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 146, fig. 100, and *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals*, London, 1910, pp. 295 f.; Hyde, *Olympic Victor Monuments*, Washington, 1921, pp. 214 f.; etc.

⁸⁴ Myers, p. 218, n. 1. Cf. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 164; Hyde, *op. cit.*, p. 216, n. 4. Whether the Greek broad jump was a running or standing one is treated *infra*.

⁸⁵ Strophe 463, ed. Bartsch, Leipzig, 1870; *swölf Klafter* (12 fathoms).

⁸⁶ Pinder, p. 107. On p. 106 he says a German officer in full uniform jumped with weights 23 ft. from a springboard in the Central-Turnanstalt, Berlin. Cf. Hyde, 216, n. 5 and Juethner, *Turngerichte*, p. 16.

⁸⁷ See Juvenal, XIV, 265. Polybius, VIII, 6, 8, speaks of it as a platform or stage. A springboard is seen on an Etruscan wall-painting from Chiusi; Inghirami, *Mus. Chius.*, Pl. CXXXI. On springboards, see Krause, *Gym. u. Agon. d. Hellenen*, p. 325.

⁸⁸ He held it consistently from the date of his two articles in *J. H. S.*, XXIV, and *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals*, 1910, p. 310, down to his last book, *Athletics of the Ancient World*, 1930, p. 153.

⁸⁹ Athenaeus, *Dipnosophistae*, X, 4, pp. 412 f. Pausanias, VI, 14, 6

epigram as an "alliterative jingle" (π occurs five times in line 1) like many similar late sporting epigrams in the Anthology. His solution of Chionis' record was a corruption in the text of Africanus, $\nu\beta'$ (52) for $\kappa\beta'$ (22), since the Armenian Latin text of the latter reads *duos et viginti cubitus*, where *cubitus* is equivalent to *pes*. Such a solution, however, makes the jump too short by many feet compared with jumping records with weights in our time. Nevertheless, Gardiner's argument has profoundly influenced English and American writers on athletics, including the writer, who formerly accepted his change in the text.⁴⁰ The alternative is a multiple jump. It was on this assumption that "*le triple saut*" was introduced into the pentathlon at the revived Olympics in Athens in 1896. While admitting that a triple jump was still known in North Greece, Gardiner emphatically denied it was known to the ancient Greeks.⁴¹ However, as we shall now show, he ran counter to the very evidence which he so carefully discussed.

E. Myers⁴² says that J. B. Martin, then President of the London Athletic Club, who was present at his reading of his paper on "The Pentathlon" before the Society of Hellenic Studies in 1891, later "made the bold suggestion that the Greek jump may have been the hop, step, and jump, and mentioned such a jump of 49 ft. 3 in. made without weights at Harwich as not far from the Greek record." This appears to be the earliest suggestion for a multiple jump. It was soon defended by Wassmannsdorf,⁴³ and was later worked out in detail by Fedée⁴⁴ on the basis of a passage in Bekker's *Anecdota graeca* by an unknown writer, which we here reproduce:⁴⁵

varies the story by having Milo carry his own victor statue of bronze into the Altis at Olympia. Milo won at Olympia six times, and seven at Delphi in Ols. 80-88 = 540-516 B. C. (only Ol. 62 being fixed); see Foerster, Nos. 116, 122, 126, 131, 136, 141, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 216.

⁴¹ P. 76; and in *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 152, he says: "there is not a particle of evidence to support these guesses."

⁴² P. 218, n. 1; also in his article "Pentathlon" in Smith's *Diet. of Gk. and Rom. Antiquities*, 3rd ed., 1891, II, p. 365, n. 1.

⁴³ In *Monatsschrift*, 1885, p. 270.

⁴⁴ First in *Gym. Progr.*, Breslau, 1888, p. 13, then in his book *Der Fuenfkampf*, 1889, pp. 18 f.

⁴⁵ I, p. 224. Gardiner, p. 74, noted that the passage was part of the *Lexica Segueriana* in *Cod. Voislmanus*, 345, of the 10th or 11th century.

βατήρ τὸ ἄκρον τοῦ τῶν πεντάθλων σκάμματος, ἀφ' οὗ ἄλλονται τὸ πρῶτον Σέλευκος· Σύμμαχος δὲ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀλόμενοι πάλιν ἐξάλλονται, ἄμεινον ὥς Σέλευκος. In this passage Seleucus,⁴⁸ with whom the unknown writer agrees, defines βατήρ rightly as "the top of the σκάμμα," i. e. the take-off, while Symmachus⁴⁷ wrongly believed it was the middle of the σκάμμα. But of far more importance are the latter's words ἀφ' οὗ ἀλόμενοι πάλιν ἐξάλλονται which show clearly that the leaper after alighting, jumped again, i. e. a multiple jump. Curiously, Gardiner⁴⁸ rejected this evidence completely, and for a variety of reasons: that the *halteres* would be clumsy in a series of bounds, that a second take-off would be difficult from the soft ground of the σκάμμα, and that πάλιν means "back" rather than "again." He argued that the best that could be suggested by the text was two and not three jumps.

However, Gardiner did settle the long-disputed meanings of βατήρ, σκάμμα, and τὰ ἐσκαμμένα. On the basis of several late writers⁴⁹ he showed⁵⁰ that βατήρ was merely the place from which the jumper took off, a stone sill or threshold similar to the series of such sills, incised with horizontal lines, found at either end of the stadium at Olympia, and not, as Pinder believed, a springboard. Of more importance, he showed⁵¹ that the terms σκάμμα and τὰ ἐσκαμμένα were interchangeable and referred to the soft ground, dug up, leveled, and sanded, on which the leaper alighted. Theretofore there had been only confusion in the meaning of these terms.⁵² To jump, then,

⁴⁸ Surnamed *Homericus*, Alexandrine grammarian teaching at Rome in the time of Tiberius, A. D. 14-37, and titles of his works mentioned by Suidas, s. v. See B. A. Mueller in Pauly-Wissowa, III (2te Reihe), No. 44, cols. 1251-6; and Christ-Schmid-Staehlin, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.*, 1^o, p. 89; II^o, 1, pp. 269, 432, 444. Also Max Mueller *De Seleuco Homericoo*, Diss. Inaug., Götting., 1891.

⁴⁷ See Gudeman in Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. "Symmachus," no. 10, VII (2te Reihe), cols. 1136-40. He wrote commentaries on Aristophanes about A. D. 100, used by Suidas, s. v. ὑπερακορτίζειν and *passim*.

⁴⁸ Pp. 75-76.

⁴⁹ Seleucus, above; Pollux (2nd half of the second century), III, 151; Hesychius (late fourth), s. v. βατήρ and Suidas (tenth or eleventh), s. v. βατήρ.

⁵⁰ Pp. 74-5.

⁵¹ Pp. 70-74.

⁵² Cf. on basis of Schol. on Pindar's *Nem.*, V, 20 the views of F. A. Paley, *The Odes of Pindar*, London, 1868, p. 185, n. 1; J. B. Bury,

ὑπὲρ τὰ ἑκαμμένα was a most unusual feat. Suidas says that Phaÿllus jumped five feet beyond, which, with statements of other writers, shows that the σκάμμα was fifty feet long, and that in landing on the hard ground (στερεόν) beyond he broke his leg. This is understandable, as it is well known that a jumper is apt to break either his knee or ankle when landing on hard ground.

The length of the jump is often indicated on vases by pegs stuck into the ground, as on a b. f. amphora in the British Museum.⁵³ Philostratus⁵⁴ says the length of the leap was not allowed "if the imprint of the feet is not faultless," i. e. no pegs were then used. Vase-paintings show different characteristic moments in the jump. Thus a jumper is shown ready at the take-off with the *halteres* raised in his hands on a r. f. krater.⁵⁵ Another athlete is shown in midair, his legs and arms nearly parallel and the *halteres* held straight out, on a r. f. kylix in Boston.⁵⁶ He is shown just before alighting on the b. f. amphora in the British Museum (B 48) already discussed.

Gardiner's conclusion that "the only evidence" for a series of jumps is the passage in the *Anecdota graeca*, which he unfortunately rejected, is no longer valid, for now it is supplemented by the new evidence adduced by Professor Juethner.⁵⁷

Nemean Odes of Pindar, London, 1890, p. 91; P. Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 213; E. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 218, n. 1 (corrected in Smith's *Diet. of Antiq.*, p. 384).

⁵³ *B. M. Cat. Vases*, B. 48; *Jb. des arch. Inst.*, V, 1890, p. 243; Gardiner, p. 183, fig. 4, and *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 150, fig. 106; Daremberg-Saglio, s. v. "Saltus," fig. 6084 and s. v. "Halter," p. 6, fig. 3692. It dates from the second quarter of the sixth century B. C.

⁵⁴ 55.

⁵⁵ *Annali (Istituto di corrispondenza archeologica)*, Roma, XVIII, 1846, Tav. d'agg. M: *J. H. S.*, XXIV, p. 185, fig. 7; Daremberg-Saglio, s. v. "Saltus," p. 1055, fig. 6082 (1st figure to left).

⁵⁶ *Arch. Ztg.*, XLII, 1884, Taf. XVI 2b; W. Klein, *Euphronios*, 2nd ed., Wien, 1886, p. 286; Daremberg-Saglio, s. v. "Halter," p. 5, fig. 3691; Gardiner, p. 183, fig. 3, and *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 150, fig. 105; J. D. Beazley, *Attic R. F. Vases in American Museums*, Cambridge, 1918, p. 83, fig. 51.

⁵⁷ "Zur Geschichte der griechischen Wettkaempfe," *Wiener Studien*, 53, 1936, pp. 76-8.

He cites a passage from the paraphrase of Aristotle's *Physica* by Themistius, the Paphlagonian philosopher and rhetorician who lived in great honor at Constantinople in the latter half of the fourth century under the emperors from Constantius to Theodosius the Great.⁵⁸ This short passage has so important a bearing on the pentathlon jump, as an indubitable proof that it consisted of some sort of multiple one, that we translate it:

"The thing is said to change continuously which leaves no interval either of time or of the thing in which it moves; for example, anyone singing might sound the lowest string⁵⁹ immediately after the highest; for such a person has left no interval of time or of the thing in which he moves. But this is more obvious in respect of place changes; for the leapers in the pentathlon do not move continuously, since they leave out some part of the space in which they move; or is this not to be stated absolutely? For in this case we would say that race-horses do not move continuously. But we must rather define continuous movement in respect of time and the fact that no interval of it (i. e. time) is left out, since it is possible, perhaps, also to leave out a part of the thing in which it moves, and none the less continuously it seems to change, while continuity *per se* must be defined more precisely."

Here Themistius interprets Aristotle's idea of continuous movement as one in which the entire time interval is filled up with the event concerned, and exemplifies it with place changes. He cites as an example of the non-fulfillment of the assigned condition the pentathlete jumpers who "do not move continuously, since they leave out some part of the space in which they move" (i. e. the *σκάμμα*). To quote Juethner: "A leaper from the moment when he jumps from the take-off to the time when he touches the ground again without doubt executes a continuous movement without any interruption in the space covered." But Themistius says in the case of leapers that there

⁵⁸ His dates are c. A. D. 317-388. He became tutor to Arcadius, son of Theodosius, 387-88. He paraphrased the *Physica* in 8 books c. 355. See Christ-Schmid-Staehlin, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.*, II^a, 2, pp. 1004-14. See *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* (Themistii in *Physica paraphrasis*), ed. H. Schenkl, Berolini, 1900, V, 2, p. 172, lines 26 f. The text of Aristotle is 5, 3, 226b, 31 f. (Prantl, Teubner, 1879).

⁵⁹ I. e., of the harp or lyre, our *highest* pitch.

are interruptions in the movement inside the jumping-space. This passage, hitherto unnoticed, is therefore important in explaining the Greek jump as not one continuous single effort, but as an interrupted effort, i. e. several individual springs. The same conclusion is drawn from Themistius' argument about race-horses that they "do not move continuously," the similarity between leapers and race-horses consisting in this, that as the former reach their goal by multiple efforts, so also do the latter by countless individual jumps. This passage from Aristotle, then, supplementing the earlier evidence discussed, makes it clear that the pentathlon jump was a multiple one. The long line of writers⁸⁰ from Wassmannsdorf to Juethner were, therefore, right in assuming this, while Gardiner was woefully wrong in contending that it was a single effort.

The only question left to be discussed is what sort of a multiple jump is indicated. Only two seem to enter into it, the Anglo-American hop, step and jump, and the modern Greek hop, hop, and jump. At the revival of the Olympics in 1896 the "*triple saut*" was literally a hop, hop and jump, but in practice became a "*saut, pes, saut,*" our hop, step and jump, which has been used exclusively since. My former colleague, Professor Émile Malakis, now of Johns Hopkins University, tells me that in his youth Greek boys only knew the hop, hop and jump, and that the change under the influence of the Olympics to hop, step and jump was gradual. The technique of the two is different: in the latter the jumper lands on the foot from which he made the spring, then takes a giant stride or step and lands on the other foot, and finally on both, while in the hop, hop, and jump, he makes two hops on the same foot and then lands on both.

Let us translate the jump of 55 and 52 feet of Phaëllus and Chionis respectively into meters and English feet and compare them with present records in the "*triple saut.*" Using the Solonian-Attic foot, introduced at the beginning of the sixth century B. C. but not used in Athens until Roman days, of 0.296 m. (= 1 Roman foot),⁸¹ Phaëllus' jump at Delphi would

⁸⁰ It includes Fedde; Ph. Legrand, *op. cit.*, p. 1056, n. 2; F. Hueppe, *Die Leibesuebungen*, 1925, p. 166; Faber, *op. cit.*, p. 478; and others.

⁸¹ More exactly 0.2957 m. See W. Doerpfeld, "Beitraege zur antiken Metrologie, I, Das Solonisch-attische System," *Ath. Mitt.*, VII, 1882, pp. 277-312.

be 16.28 m. or c. 53 ft. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. The foot used in connection with Chionis' jump at Olympia, on the other hand, was the earlier Aeginetan-Attic (Phidonian) one equal to 0.328 m. Doerpfeld calls this foot "der gemeingriechische Fuss" appearing in all Attic inscriptions and writers from Herodotus to Eratosthenes, and in the great fifth-century buildings on the Acropolis, including the Parthenon.⁶² It followed the Aeginetan coinage throughout the Peloponnesus and was especially used at Olympia whose architects preferred it to that of the stadium foot (0.320 m.) there, which latter Doerpfeld calls "das heilige Mass,"⁶³ rarely used. The stadium at Olympia was longer than other Greek stadia, explained as being measured by Heracles' feet, which were larger than those of mortals.⁶⁴ Thus Chionis jumped 16.66 m. or 54 ft. 8 in., so that the two records are not so far apart as they seem. We can now compare these figures with modern records in triple jumps.

An English athlete made a record in the hop, step, and jump of 15.01 m. or 49 ft. 3 in. at Harwich in 1861,⁶⁵ from which date the record has gradually increased, till the present Olympic and world record of 16 m. or 52 ft. 5 $\frac{7}{8}$ in. was made by Naoto Tajima of Japan at the Berlin Olympics, Aug. 6, 1936.⁶⁶ These records are close to the Greek ones of Phaÿllus and Chionis, the use of jumping-weights and the possible omission of the "pace" before the leap well explaining the difference.

Fedde already in 1888⁶⁷ proposed the hop, hop, and jump as a possible solution of the Greek jump. This contest is no longer used in serious athletic contests, though it still appears in minor meets in Greece and elsewhere. A record of 49 ft. $\frac{1}{2}$ in. without weights was made some years ago by J. B. Conolly.⁶⁸

⁶² "Metrologische Beitræge, V, Das aeginaeisch-attische Mass-System," *Ath. Mitt.* XV, 1890, pp. 167-187, especially p. 175. The name Phidonian comes from Aristotle, *Const. Athens*, 10.

⁶³ In *Olympia, Die Ergebnisse*, II (Baudenkmaeler), Berlin, 1892, 19.

⁶⁴ A. Gellius, *Noot. Attio.*, I, 1 (quoting Plutarch, *Relig. ex vitis*, VII, p. 144 [Teubner ed. by Bernardakis]). Cf. also J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, IV, London, 1898, pp. 78-81 (to VI, 20, 8). The Olympic stadium was 192.27 m. long, which makes its foot 0.32045; see Doerpfeld, *l. c.* and R. Borrmann, *Ergebnisse*, II, pp. 63 f. (Das Stadion).

⁶⁵ Noted by Myers in *J. H. S.*, II, 1881, p. 218, n. 1; Hyde, p. 216, n. 6.

⁶⁶ Spalding, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 and 19.

⁶⁷ *Gymn. Progr.* Breslau, pp. 22-4 and 35, n. 5.

⁶⁸ Mentioned in the *Britannica* (11th ed., 1911), XV, p. 554, place and

As far back as 1891 a record of 50 ft. 11½ in. was made by D. S. Shanahan in England, when the hop, hop, and jump was still practiced generally.⁶⁹ The present record is c. 53 feet.⁷⁰ In fact, the record for this jump should be better than that for the more usual hop, step, and jump and for two reasons: the swing of the unused leg and the fact that only one leg is used. Since it was used altogether in Greece until recent years it is probable that the hop, hop, and jump is a lineal descendant of the ancient pentathlon.

Gardiner has argued from various vase-paintings⁷¹ that the Greek pentathlete preceded his jump by only a few short bounds before the take-off in contra-distinction to the modern running long jumper who depends chiefly on a short fast run on a cinder path. This latter he regarded as inconsistent with the use of jumping-weights. Consequently, the pentathlete was no sprinter, but merely limbered his legs with a few springy steps in preparation for the final leap, somewhat as our high jumpers do. However, it seems incredible to the writer that the Greek jumper should not have employed the preparatory "pace," even if encumbered with weights which weighed 2½ pounds or more. But this as yet cannot be determined definitively.

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date omitted; no record is given in the article "Jumping" in the 14th ed., 1929. •

⁶⁹ See M. W. Ford, in *Outing*, XX, 1892, pp. 235 f.

⁷⁰ So Lawson Robertson, Professor of Physical Education at the University of Pennsylvania, in a letter to me on April 27, 1937.

⁷¹ *J. H. S.*, XXIV, pp. 187-90. He here reproduces on p. 191, fig. 11, a r. f. kylix from E. Gerhard, *Auserlesene gr. Vasenbilder*, IV, Berlin, 1858, Taf. 294, 7; and on p. 188, fig. 9, another r. f. kylix from W. Klein, *Euphronios*, p. 306. We add another r. f. Wuerzburg archaic amphora, Gerhard, Taf. 270 (bottom). In the latter stand a discus-thrower, flutist, and a running jumper—though Gerhard explained the third figure as a discouraged jumper; same also in Daremberg-Saglio, "Halter," p. 7, fig. 3694.

CENSUS AND POLL-TAX IN PTOLEMAIC EGYPT.

When Wilcken published his great work on the Greek ostraca in 1899 he was convinced, because of lack of evidence for the poll-tax in Egypt during the Ptolemaic period, that Augustus had introduced that tax as a part of his changes in the financial administration when he took over Egypt as his special province.¹ Since the publication of the *Tebtunis Papyri* and of the third volume of the *Petrie Papyri*, however, most historians have believed that the poll-tax was collected under the Ptolemies.² Nevertheless the complete lack of receipts for this tax before the reign of Augustus has been most disturbing.³ Wilcken, following Grenfell and Hunt, also maintained that the fourteen years census-period, found in Egypt from 10 B. C. until the second half of the third century of our era, was introduced by Augustus, despite Borchardt's attempt to prove the existence of a fourteen years census-period under the Pharaohs of the Middle Kingdom.⁴

¹ *Griechische Ostraka aus Aegypten und Nubien*, I, pp. 245 ff.

² Maspero, *Les Finances de l'Égypte sous les Lagides*, 1906, pp. 93 f.; Rostovtzeff, in *Cambridge Ancient History*, VII, p. 139; Jouguet, *Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East*, 1928, p. 309; Cary, *A History of the Greek World 323-146 B. C.*, 1932, p. 264. Since this paper was written Miss Claire Préaux's discussion of the poll-tax in Egypt has come to my attention. In *Les ostraca grecs de la collection Charles-Edwin Wilbour au Musée de Brooklyn*, 1935, pp. 28-32, Miss Préaux has declared against the existence of a poll-tax under the Ptolemies. She contends that no one of the items of evidence, which are reviewed in this paper, proves the existence of the poll-tax during the Ptolemaic period. This may be granted. Nevertheless, I believe that the individual items of evidence and also their cumulative impression are best explained on the assumption that the poll-tax was introduced in the Ptolemaic period. Miss Préaux's positive argument that the poll-tax could not have been introduced by the Ptolemies because it is a mark of defeat and subjection is not impressive when applied to Egypt, a land recognized as the spear-won property of the Macedonian monarchs. Cf. K. Fr. W. Schmidt's review in *Phil. Wooh.*, LVI (1936), pp. 9-13, rejecting Miss Préaux's arguments.

³ Maspero, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁴ Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, 1912, pp. 173 f., 192; Grenfell and Hunt in *P. Oxyrhynchus*, II, pp. 209 ff.; Borchardt in H. Schäfer, "Ein Bruchstück altägyptischer Annalen" (*Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1902), p. 9, note 1. Maspero, *op. cit.*, p. 94, states that the poll-tax existed under the Middle Empire; but he cannot mean a poll-tax like that collected by the Roman

It is the purpose of this paper to show the probability of the introduction of both poll-tax and fourteen years census-period under Ptolemy IV Philopator. The evidence does not yield absolute proof. But if the argument is accepted, several obscure and puzzling events in the reigns of Philopator and his successors find a rational explanation. In like manner some remarkable features of the tax-system in Roman Egypt become logical inheritances from the Ptolemaic system.

Strabo⁵ states that after the glorious reigns of the first three Ptolemies the rest of the kings of Egypt were corrupted by luxury and their government deteriorated. Of these later incompetents he selects three for special condemnation: Philopator, Physcon, and Auletes. Justin, in his epitome of Pompeius Trogus,⁶ contrasting Philopator with his distinguished contemporaries in Macedonia, Asia, Sparta, and Carthage, says: "solus Ptolemeus, sicut scelestus in occupando, ita et segnis in administrando regno fuit." Polybius, to whom we owe most of our information concerning Philopator, is no more complimentary: after charging the young king with the usual list of dynastic murders he says,⁷ "He began to conduct his government with more pomp of royalty, showing himself inattentive to business and inaccessible to members of his court and the rest who were engaged in the administration of Egypt, and proving himself neglectful and indifferent to the officials in charge of affairs outside Egypt, for which the former kings had shown more concern than for the government of Egypt itself. . . . Thus extending so long an arm and protecting themselves with distant buffer-provinces they were never alarmed about their throne in Egypt. Wherefore they quite naturally showed great concern for foreign affairs. But this king neglected all of these things because of his shameful amours and his senseless and

administration in Egypt, for there was no coinage under the Pharaohs, and the only form of poll-tax which could exist without coinage was the *corvée*. The *corvée* existed from the Old Kingdom through Roman times and had nothing to do with a poll-tax collected in money. Borchart's fourteen year period, therefore, has no bearing upon the question of a poll-tax in Ptolemaic Egypt. On the other hand, A. Calderini's attempt (in *Rend. R. Ist. Lomb.*, LXIV [1931], pp. 551-8) to establish the census of A. D. 19-20 as the first of the fourteen years series has been properly criticized by H. I. Bell (in *Cam. Anc. Hist.*, X, p. 304, note 2).

⁵ XVII, 1, 11 (796).

⁶ XXIX, 1.

⁷ V, 34, 3-5; 9-11.

constant drunkenness, and naturally in a short time found his life and throne threatened by conspirators, of whom the first was Cleomenes the Spartan."

The Jews, as we know from *III Maccabees*, looked back upon the reign of Philopator as one of oppression and injustice, and they took their peculiar revenge by blackening his memory.

The revolts of the Egyptians which began in his reign and were not finally suppressed until some years after his successor came to the throne are an adequate testimonial to the feeling of his native subjects towards Philopator.

Mahaffy⁸ suggested that, "It is not impossible that some of the bad impressions produced upon posterity were due to the anecdotic sketches of the life of Philopator by Ptolemy the Megalopolitan." If, indeed, this Ptolemy the Megalopolitan was the same Ptolemy who was governor of Cyprus under Philopator and his successor, he may well have felt that the king was neglecting foreign affairs: the colonial administrator seldom realizes that a crisis at home can take precedence over an urgent problem on a distant colonial frontier.

Mahaffy alone among historians has attempted a serious defense of the character of the fourth Ptolemy, and his arguments are rejected *in toto* by Bevan.⁹ It is not my purpose to rehabilitate the character of Philopator, to excuse the political murders with which he began his reign, or to condone his notorious private life. I shall, however, attempt to account for the neglect of foreign affairs with which he is charged, for the unrest of the native Egyptians which led to long and bitter revolt, and for the undoubted hatred of his Jewish subjects and the consequent loss of the province of Coele-Syria.

When Ptolemy II Philadelphus and his astute finance minister Apollonius took from the priests and temples of Egypt the *ἀρόμωρα*, the sixth part of the produce of the vineyards and orchards of Egypt, and transferred that revenue to the official cult of Arsinoë Philadelphus, it was a profitable move.¹⁰ The

⁸ *The Empire of the Ptolemies*, 1895, p. 272, note 1.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 279 ff.; *A History of Egypt*—IV, Mahaffy, *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1899, pp. 142 f. The same, Bevan, *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1927, pp. 250 f.

¹⁰ Grenfell and Mahaffy, *Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus*, 1896, Col. 36. Cf. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides*, 1906, III, pp. 195 ff.

priests were compensated for this lost revenue by subsidies from the royal treasury.¹¹ But as the Graeco-Macedonian colonists in the Fayûm and elsewhere increased the acreage of their vineyards to meet the growing demand of the Hellenized portion of the populace for wine, the income from the *ἀπόμωρα* became larger, and the priests must have regretted their lack of foresight. This bad bargain they never forgot, and they made increasingly heavy demands upon the treasury for compensation. In the decree of the synod of the Egyptian priests recorded upon the Rosetta Stone¹² one of the highly praised benefactions of Ptolemy V Epiphanes is that he restored to them the *ἀπόμωρα*.

Ptolemy II Philadelphus had found no difficulty in meeting the demands of the priests. His ingenious system of taxation and royal monopolies, revealed in the famous Revenue Laws, brought in annually the enormous sum of 14,800 talents of silver and one and a half million artabae of wheat.¹³ The fabulous treasure of Philadelphus, stated by Appian¹⁴ to have been 740,000 Egyptian talents, need not concern us here. However great his accumulation of gold and silver may actually have been, it is sufficient to observe that it seems to have disappeared with the death of Philadelphus. The great expenditures of the king upon the development of the city of Alexandria, upon the Museum, the Pharos, the temples in the Delta, and the great gymnasium and library erected in Athens may have used up a large part of the treasure.¹⁵ But even more important is the well known fact that a great bureaucracy, especially when the revenues are collected by tax-farmers, cannot be maintained for

¹¹ Bouché-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, p. 201 f.

¹² *OGI.*, 90, 15. If Epiphanes actually returned the *ἀπόμωρα* to the priests, as this passage implies, it is possible that the priests did not retain it long.

¹³ Jerome, *Ad Dan.*, X, 5. The amount of the revenue in money seems to be confirmed by the statement of Strabo, XVII, 1, 13 (798), on the authority of Cicero, that the revenue of Ptolemy XIII Auletes was 12,600 talents of silver a year. See, however, Milne, *J. R. S.*, XVII, pp. 1 ff.; Frank, *J. R. S.*, XXIII, p. 148; my *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian*, Princeton and Oxford, 1938, pp. 343, 492, notes 25-6. A. H. Thompson, in his unpublished dissertation in the University of Michigan Library, has shown that the revenue in grain given by Jerome is much too low.

¹⁴ *Proem.*, 10.

¹⁵ Cf. Mahaffy, *The Empire of the Ptolemies*, pp. 127 ff.

long at a high point of efficiency. It is possible that a decline in the collections of revenue in his extensive empire may have begun before the end of Philadelphus's long reign, after the king had given up cares of state to devote himself to the enjoyment of all the luxury that his treasure could buy. The removal from office and the disgrace of Apollonius, the great finance-minister of his father, by Ptolemy III Euergetes immediately after his accession to the throne¹⁶ was probably not without due cause. If so, the entire bureaucracy may have been corrupted.

If there was a decline in the royal revenue it did not worry Philadelphus's energetic successor, Euergetes I. Early in his reign Euergetes waged a successful campaign against the disorganized Seleucid empire. The campaign was more of a royal progress than a war, for no army could be found to stand against the king of Egypt. But at the height of his success, after he had received the submission of Syria, Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Media, and far-away Bactriana,¹⁷ he was forced to return to Egypt by what Justin¹⁸ termed a *domestica seditio*. Mahaffy was probably correct in connecting this disturbance with the failure of the Nile and the consequent grain shortage recorded in the decree of Canopus.¹⁹ When Euergetes returned to Egypt he was not at all dismayed by the serious condition brought about by the famine. He had brought with him as the spoils of war 40,000 talents of silver,²⁰ almost the equivalent of three years' revenue from the whole Egyptian empire. Euergetes spent his easily acquired wealth with a lavish hand. The decree of Canopus states that the king purchased at his own expense grain from other countries which was distributed to the populace; furthermore he lightened and remitted taxes both to the people and to the priests. It is not hard for a generous king, who is well supplied with money, to remit taxes. It is more difficult to resume their collection.

After his great "conquest" of the Seleucid empire Euergetes

¹⁶ Cf. Rostovtzeff, *A Large Estate in Egypt*, 1922, pp. 20, 170 f.

¹⁷ *OGI.*, 54, 14-20, with due allowance for exaggeration in a laudatory inscription.

¹⁸ XXVII, 1, 9.

¹⁹ *OGI.*, 56 and Mahaffy, *The Empire of the Ptolemies*, p. 204. But cf. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, 1877-8, II, p. 403; Dittenberger, *OGI.*, 56, *adn.*

²⁰ Jerome, *Ad Dan.*, XI, 8.

settled down to enjoy the fruits of victory. Although he could not possibly hold all of the territory which had submitted to him, nevertheless his empire remained larger than that of his father Philadelphus.²¹ Governors had been left behind to consolidate his conquests,²² and the additional revenue from the new provinces was most welcome to a king who was about to emulate the luxurious tastes of his predecessor. Euergetes carried on the support of the great Museum at Alexandria. Eratosthenes was brought from Athens to succeed Callimachus as Chief Librarian and to be the tutor of the Crown Prince.²³ Many other famous scholars were engaged, with the result that at no time was the Museum more flourishing and famous. Great accessions were made to the Library.²⁴ Euergetes got possession of the original manuscripts of the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides at a cost of fifteen talents.²⁵ Attalus I of Pergamum was perhaps already beginning the collections for the library developed by his successor Eumenes II, and this rivalry may have raised the prices of rare books.

The insatiable greed of the Egyptian priesthood made successful demands upon the treasury of Euergetes. Mahaffy²⁶ felt an implied threat in the phrase of the decree of Canopus, 'in requital for which (succor in time of famine and remission of taxes) the gods have granted that their royalty be well established,' which is, he says, "perhaps an indication that the reverse case was a threatening possibility." Now there was never any love lost between the grasping Egyptian priesthood and the poverty-stricken Egyptian people, but it appears as if at the time of the *domestica seditio* they had stood together in their demands for relief from famine and taxation.²⁷ Every reader of Plato's *Republic* knows that the best way to cope with two allied foes is

²¹ Cf. *Cam. Anc. Hist.*, VII, p. 719.

²² Jerome, *loc. cit.*; *Orig.*, 2905, 5 (C), 4.

²³ Suidas, *sub* 'Επαροσθέρης; Wilamowitz, *Naehr. d. Gött. Ges. d. Wiss.*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., 1894, pp. 30 f.

²⁴ Tzetzes (*Proleg.* to Aristophanes, *Plutus*) ascribes to Callimachus the statement that at the time of Euergetes I the library contained 400,000 'mixed' and 90,000 'unmixed' rolls. It had numbered 200,000 rolls in 285 B. C., according to Demetrius of Phaleron (Pseudo-Aristeas *apud* Euseb., *Praep. Ev.*, viii², p. 350a).

²⁵ Galen, XVII, i, p. 603.

²⁶ *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1899, p. 113, note 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

to come to terms with one of them and with his aid to crush the other; the possessions of the vanquished can then be turned over to the new ally as his reward. Euergetes came to terms with the priests. The imposing lists of his benefactions to priests and temples bears eloquent witness to the growing power of the Egyptian clergy: the beginning of the decree of Canopus²⁸ declares, "King Ptolemy . . . and Berenice, his sister and wife, Benefactor Gods, are continually performing many great benefits to the national temples, and increasing the honors of the gods, and in every respect take good care of Apis and Mnevis and the other renowned sacred animals with great expense and good appointments; and the sacred images carried off from the land by the Persians, the king, having made a foreign campaign, recovered into Egypt and restored to the temples from which each of them had been carried away." The cost of the great temples built by Euergetes must have been very considerable, because even forced labor upon any building operations outside the dike- and canal-system had to be remunerated. There are few remains of buildings of Ptolemy Soter or of Philadelphus. But remains of Euergetes's temple-construction are to be found in most of the great sanctuaries of Egypt.²⁹ He probably built a new temple to Osiris in Canopus; the naos of the temple of Isis on the island of Philae was completed by him, and its great northern pylon bears his inscription; on the neighboring island of Biggeh there are temple ruins on which the name of Ptolemy III is found. At Assuan the façade of a small temple bore his figure and inscriptions; a temple was erected by him at Esneh. But the most imposing monument which remains from the whole Ptolemaic period is his vast temple of Horus at Apollonopolis Magna (Edfu), a temple so great that it could not be completed during his reign. Temples on the grand scale cost proportionately.

Not only at home did the king expend his great revenues. Euergetes's foreign policy following his Syrian expedition was suited to his easy-going temperament, but it was expensive. Content with long years of peace he declined to take active part in the struggles in Greece and Asia, but he gave aid from his treasury to whatever faction seemed likely to further his imperial

²⁸ OGI., 56—Mahaffy's translation.

²⁹ Cf. Bevan, *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1927, pp. 214 ff.

policy. He probably gave financial as well as moral support to Alexander son of Craterus and to Hierax and Attalus.³⁰ For years he subsidized Aratus and the Achaean League against the power of Macedon, and when Aratus failed he transferred his support to Cleomenes. This diplomacy of the purse was a heavy drain upon the royal treasury, and Euergetes suddenly stopped the payments. As soon as the sinews of war were thus withdrawn Cleomenes was crushed and fled for safety to the court of Euergetes.³¹ This would have been an amazing thing for Cleomenes to do, if the Egyptian king had just betrayed him by deliberately cutting off support in the time of greatest need. The simplest explanation is that Ptolemy may have found his treasury unequal to continuing the subsidies.

There is another incident most easily explained by the assumption that Euergetes found himself financially embarrassed. With his characteristic generosity Euergetes led the way in contributing princely gifts to the Rhodians when their city was almost completely destroyed by a disastrous earthquake and their commercial credit was endangered. Polybius³² relates that, "Ptolemy also promised them three hundred talents of silver, a million artabae of corn, timber for the construction of ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, forty thousand cubits (full measure) of squared deal planking, a thousand talents of coined bronze, three thousand talents for the restoration of the Colossus, a hundred master builders and three hundred and fifty masons, and fourteen talents per annum for their pay, and besides all this, twelve thousand artabae of corn for the games and sacrifices and twenty thousand artabae to feed the crews of ten triremes. Most of these things and the third part of the money he gave them at once." We may note that Euergetes did not immediately pay two-thirds of the money, and apparently he had not paid it by the end of his reign, for the incident is related by Polybius in his account of Philopator's reign. Two hundred talents of silver ought to have been but a trifling sum for a king whose empire should have yielded at least 14,800 talents a year, which had been the annual revenue under Philadelphus when the empire was not so extensive as under Euergetes. Perhaps the

³⁰ Cf. *Cam. Anc. Hist.*, VII, pp. 221, 726.

³¹ Polybius, II, 69, 10-11.

³² *Idem*, V, 89.

reason for the delay in forwarding the remaining two-thirds of his gift was that Euergetes did not have it to spare, because he was no longer collecting so large a revenue from his empire.

Ptolemy III Euergetes died of disease, as Polybius³³ expressly tells us. There is no evidence that Ptolemy IV Philopator had been associated with his father on the throne of Egypt before the latter's death.³⁴ We know, however, that Philopator was intended by his father to be the heir, and that he was carefully educated with that in view.³⁵ If Philopator had been formally associated with his father in the government, he might have been able to effect a gradual readjustment of the financial administration. But when in 221 B. C. he ascended the throne the situation in Egypt was desperate. The attack of the fiery young king Antiochus III upon the Lebanon forts, the gateway to the Ptolemaic possessions in Coele-Syria, although abortive, was a sure indication of further danger threatening Egypt.³⁶ By the time of Philopator's accession the once powerful Egyptian army had been allowed to fall into decay.³⁷ The same carelessness of Euergetes had probably permitted the financial administration to slip into inefficiency. It was the first task of Philopator and his able minister Sosibius to reorganize the financial system of Egypt. It is no wonder that the provincial governors complained of the king's neglect of foreign relations; affairs in Egypt demanded undivided attention. Cleomenes, who had been given asylum in Alexandria by Euergetes after the defeat at Sellasia, continually demanded supplies and troops, for the time was ripe for the overthrow of Macedonian supremacy in Greece; but Philopator could not grant his request because he had neither the troops nor the money (Polybius, of course,

³³ *Idem*, II, 71, 3.

³⁴ Blum, in *Bull. Cor. Hell.*, XXXIX (1915), pp. 18 f.

³⁵ See note 23 above.

³⁶ Polybius, V, 45, 7—46, 5.

³⁷ *Idem*, V, 62, 7. Bevan (in *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1927, p. 225, note 2) contends that Euergetes would not have let the army fall into decay, but that the unpreparedness was due to the lack of discipline which developed in the army because of the neglect by Philopator. But if that were the case, there would have been no necessity of building up the army with mercenaries and with the inclusion of 20,000 native Egyptians; it would have sufficed to restore discipline, for the army could not have melted away in so short a time.

attributes this to Philopator's lack of interest in foreign affairs).³⁸ He was likewise unable to give support to Achaens in Asia Minor, although the latter's revolt promised to hold off the threatened attack of Antiochus III against the Syrian provinces of Egypt. Yet the financial reorganization was put through so quickly by Philopator and Sosibius that they obtained funds sufficient for the emergency that Egypt faced. After the failure of his attack on the forts at Lebanon Antiochus III was called away to put down revolts in the eastern part of his disintegrated empire. This gave Sosibius a short respite in which to prepare for the defense of Egypt; by coolly bluffing Antiochus out of an immediate attack in force upon Pelusium he extended the time to two years.³⁹

Sosibius spared no expense in preparing the new army.⁴⁰ Seventy-three elephants were brought from the interior of Africa and trained for battle. The most brilliant military experts of Greece were hired to train and lead twenty thousand Egyptians and twenty-five thousand Graeco-Macedonian troops, including thousands of mercenaries. The Egyptians had to be armed in the Greek manner, a matter of no little expense, and the whole army was kept under arms and thoroughly drilled for a year. Since the army remained in Egypt during this period, it could not live off the country; the entire expense of its support fell upon the treasury. But the result of the battle of Raphia was ample reward for the great outlay. Egypt was saved for two generations from danger of invasion by the Seleucids.

The victory of Raphia was, however, a thing far different from the parade which Ptolemy III Euergetes had made through Syria and Mesopotamia. Raphia was a hard fought battle, and Philopator was almost as anxious as Antiochus to make peace. There was no vast booty, the equivalent of three years' revenue, to bring back to Alexandria. Yet Philopator seems not to have lacked adequate revenue for years thereafter. He must have been able to pay the remaining two hundred talents of silver to the Rhodians, else Polybius would hardly have related Euergetes' promise in the account of Philopator's reign without seizing the opportunity to remark upon the failure of the unworthy son to keep the promise so generously made by his father. Philopator

³⁸ Polybius, V, 35, 2-6.

³⁹ *Idem*, V, 62, 4.

⁴⁰ *Idem*, V, 63, 8 to 65.

also kept up the standards of the Museum and Library at Alexandria, and even built a temple to Homer.⁴¹ He had money to squander upon two ships of gigantic size, one a sea-going vessel whose banks of oars numbered forty and whose length was one hundred and twenty-nine metres, the other a floating villa for the use of the court in excursions up the Nile, with saloons and bed-chambers and colonnades, all carried out in precious woods and ivory and gilt bronze, and decorated by Greek artists with carpets and embroideries.⁴² Perhaps the warship was not very useful nor the pleasure-boat in good taste, but they were certainly expensive. Philopator was also able to meet the demands of the priests for subsidies,⁴³ and his building program rivalled that of his father.⁴⁴ The continued support of the priesthood was imperative because of the series of native revolts which broke out after his return from Raphia and continued into the reign of his successor.

The outbreak of the native revolt occurred soon after the battle of Raphia, according to Polybius.⁴⁵ This historian's full account of the rebellion unfortunately is lost, but in a brief summary he characterizes it as a long guerrilla warfare devoid of notable achievements, but featured by the ferocious cruelty of the peasants with terrible reprisals by the troops sent to reduce them to submission. The cause of the revolt Polybius⁴⁶ states

⁴¹ Aelian, *Var. Hist.*, XIII, 22.

⁴² Athenaeus, V, 37-39 (203e-206c); cf. *Journ. of Hell. Stud.*, IX (1888), p. 255.

⁴³ Spiegelberg, *Demot. Inschr.*, no. 31088, pp. 14-20. •

⁴⁴ Cf. the list of buildings in Bevan, *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1927, p. 238, and Budge, *A History of Egypt*, VII, pp. 237 ff.

⁴⁵ Polybius, V, 107. Mahaffy (*The Empire of the Ptolemies*, p. 284) saw a contradiction in the εὐθὺς and οὐ μετὰ πολλὸν χρόνον of this passage and the οὐκ ἐλάττω, 'at long last,' in the excerpt from book XIV (12) which gives a summary of the revolt, and consequently he dated the outbreak of the revolt about 213 or 212 B. C. No definite conclusion as to the date can be drawn from either passage, because in V, 107 Polybius is emphasizing the alacrity with which the Egyptians took to arms after their participation in the victory at Raphia; whereas in XIV he is giving his usual condemnation of the sluggishness of Philopator in meeting an emergency.

⁴⁶ Polybius, V, 107. The prophecies quoted by Bevan, *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1927, pp. 241 f., to prove the existence of a spirit of nationalism among the natives of Egypt are what we might expect of any suppressed people. I do not deny the existence of such a spirit, but I do not believe

as follows: "This king (Philopator) by arming the Egyptians for the war against Antiochus took counsel that was advantageous for the present but a mistake as regards the future. For the Egyptians took great pride in the victory at Raphia and were no longer disposed to obey orders, but they sought a leader and a representative in order that they might become independent. And they attained this object not long afterward." Modern historians have generally accepted Polybius's statement of the cause of the revolt. It seems to me, however, that Polybius has mistaken the occasion of the revolt for its cause. It would be singularly naïve to suppose that the native soldiers revolted merely because they had shared in a great victory. But during the long years of the rebellion, especially in the time of Epiphanes when the prospects of its suppression seemed doubtful, there must have been many in Alexandria who lamented the day when Philopator had armed the Egyptians, for without their army training the natives could not have prolonged the revolution with such success. This may have been true, but training in arms was hardly the cause of the revolt. The cause, I believe, was the changes in the system of taxation which were introduced by Philopator and Sosibius.

Maspero observed a change in the financial administration between the reign of Euergetes I and that of Euergetes II.⁴⁷ In brief, the change was a much greater centralization of administration in the second century B. C. Maspero was unwilling to hazard a guess as to the author of the change. It is highly improbable that the change came in the reign of Epiphanes or in that of Philometor: Epiphanes was forced to remit taxes rather than to increase the efficiency of their collection, and Philometor was too distracted by the invasions of his uncle Antiochus V Epiphanes to be able to carry through any great administrative reforms. It is probable that this greater centralization was a part of the financial reorganization introduced by Philopator and Sosibius.

that the desire for a native dynasty, which after all meant little more than a change of masters, was strong enough to keep the rebellion alive for more than twenty years. If the peasants had not been suffering from economic as well as political suppression, there would have been but little desire for a change of masters.

⁴⁷ Maspero, *op. cit.*, Part II, chapters III-IV.

It is the contention of this paper that in the year 220-19 B. C. Philopator introduced the fourteen years census-period and the poll-tax called *σύνταξις*, which was paid monthly. I believe that the accounts of this poll-tax were kept in ledgers similar to the *συντάξιμον* ledgers dating from the Roman period and found in the Fayûm.⁴⁸ No receipts were issued by the collectors of this *σύνταξις*, just as after the beginning of the reign of Philopator no receipts were issued for any capitation taxes.⁴⁹ The pig-tax (*ἰσκή*) and dike-tax (*χωματικόν* and *ὑπὲρ διαχωμάτων*) disappear from the receipts at this time because they were transformed into capitation taxes.⁵⁰ These capitation taxes appear again in the receipts of the Roman period.

Receipts for capitation taxes were no longer given after the financial reforms of Philopator, because their omission cut down the expense of tax-collection. Not only was the cost of papyrus

⁴⁸ For the *συντάξιμον* ledgers of the Roman period cf. Preisigke, in *Archiv f. Pap.*, IV, pp. 95-114; *P. Columbia*, I, *reoto* 2. For Ptolemaic ledgers of similar character, but which antedate the introduction of the *σύνταξις*, cf. *P. Petrie*, III, 109.

⁴⁹ This may be checked by running through the list of taxes compiled in Preisigke-Kiessling, *Wörterbuch*, Bd. III, Abschn. 11. It can hardly be an accident that no receipts for capitation taxes have been discovered from the period beginning with the reign of Philopator, since receipts for other taxes from the later Ptolemaic period are not uncommon. The only possible exceptions are (1) a receipt for *σύνταξις* in *O. Meyer*, 9, where the formula *ἀπὸ τῆς συντάξεως* makes it unlikely that this is a receipt for the poll-tax, but as Meyer suggests (*adn. ad loc.*) it may well be a receipt for the *σύνταξις τῶν πορθμίδων*, which was not a capitation tax; (2) the doubtful expansion *ἐπικ(εφάλαιον)* in *O. Bodl.*, 122, dated 84(?) B. C., but the expansion *Ἐπικ(ράτης)*, a signature, is probably correct. That the later Ptolemies collected no capitation taxes is incredible, and there is a reference to *φυλακτικόν* (which was a capitation tax in the Roman period) in *P. Tebtunis*, I, 5, 15, dated 118 B. C. The receipts for *ἀλικά* in *O. Strassburg*, 37 and 176 seem to be amounts too large for an ordinary capitation tax on salt.

⁵⁰ The pig-tax and dike-tax were property taxes in the time of Ptolemy II Philadelphus; cf. *PSI.*, IV, 379; 381; 384, 2; *P. Hibeh*, 112, 13, note. During the first two centuries of our era the dike-tax was assessed throughout Egypt at a uniform rate of 6 drachmae 4 obols a year (for exceptional increases in the assessment of this tax cf. *P. Princeton*, I, 11 and *Theban Ostraca*, p. 129). The pig-tax in Lower Egypt was not a license-fee in Roman times, but it was a capitation tax (cf. the analysis of the pig-tax in my *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian*, chapter IX).

saved throughout the nomes of Lower Egypt,⁵¹ but in the bureaux in all the territory of Egypt the clerks who had made out these receipts could be eliminated or put to better service. If, as I have tried to show above, the financial situation of Egypt was precarious at the beginning of the reign of Philopator, this step towards economizing would have been quite in order; but it is not at all likely that it was popular with the employees of the bureaux whose jobs were threatened or with the populace who lost such security against dishonest tax-farmers as the possession of the receipts may have given. Nevertheless the saving was worth the trouble, for receipts for capitation taxes were not again given until Roman times.

The lack of receipts for poll-tax in the Ptolemaic period, which has troubled every proponent of such a tax, is thus explained. During the reign of the first three Ptolemies, when receipts for capitation taxes were issued by the bureaux, there was no poll-tax. After the introduction of the poll-tax by Philopator no receipts for any capitation taxes were issued.

The census was taken every fourteen years because boys became subject to payment of taxes at the age of fourteen; Philopator and Sosibius wanted the payments to begin as soon as possible. In their discussion of the census in Roman Egypt Grenfell and Hunt demonstrated that the fourteen years period can with certainty be traced back to A. D. 5-6 and probably to 10-9 B. C.⁵² The year 10-9 B. C. they held to be the earliest possible date for the introduction of the fourteen years period, because they supposed that the two reports (*ἀπογραφαί*) of the state tenant (*δημόσιος γεωργός*) Pnephros,⁵³ dating from 19 and 18 B. C. respectively, were typical of an annual census-return before 10-9 B. C., the supposed date of Augustus's reforms. The only examples of *ἀπογραφαί* which have come down to us from the Ptolemaic period are different from the *ἀπογραφὴ κατ' οἰκίαν* of the Roman census-return. The best known of the Ptolemaic *ἀπογραφαί* is a combination of property- and census-return dating from the time of Euergetes I.⁵⁴ But the fragments of

⁵¹ Tax-receipts were ordinarily written on papyrus in Lower Egypt in Ptolemaic and Roman times; in Upper Egypt, where papyrus was hard to obtain and the price prohibitive, the receipts were written on pot-sherds.

⁵² *P. Oxy.*, II, pp. 207 ff.

⁵³ *P. Grenfell*, I, 45-46.

⁵⁴ Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*, 198.

papyri published in *P. Petrie*, III, 59 (b and d) indicate that the same or practically the same conditions in regard to capitation taxes existed at the end of the third century or the beginning of the second century B. C. as we find in the Roman period: the priests are exempt from taxation,⁵⁵ and since the men are counted separate from the whole number of the household, it is evident that men only, as in the Roman period, paid capitation taxes. The character of the abstract of ἀπογραφὰι in the Petrie collection is so like that of documents of similar purpose in the Roman period⁵⁶ that it may be safely concluded that shortly after the reign of Euergetes I the custom of making returns of property and persons together was dropped, and that an ἀπογραφὴ, similar to the ἀπογραφὴ κατ' οἰκίαν familiar in the Roman period, was introduced and was continued through the rest of the Ptolemaic period. The two ἀπογραφὰι of Pnepheros, thought to prove an annual census before the year 10-9 B. C., probably have nothing to do with the census.⁵⁷ It may be remarked that a census is a costly and laborious undertaking; an annual census of the entire population of Egypt would have cost more than it was worth.

The poll-tax in Roman times was called λαογραφία, that is, 'census-tax,' for λαογραφία means 'enrollment of the people.'⁵⁸ *P. Teb.*, I, 103 and 121 from the Ptolemaic period show λαογραφία as the term for 'census,' not as the name of a tax. These two documents are dated by the editors in 94 or 61 B. C. If we begin with 10-9 B. C. and trace back fourteen year periods, we find that one falls in 94-3 B. C. It becomes quite possible that the two documents should be dated in 94 rather than 61 B. C. If we try to trace back the fourteen year periods further,

⁵⁵ The number of priests exempt from taxation was limited in Roman times; cf. Otto, *Priester und Temple*, II, pp. 245 ff.

⁵⁶ *P. Petrie*, III, 59(d). Cf. *P. Ross.-Georg.*, II, 12; *BGU.*, II, 493-510; *P. Oxy.*, VI, 984.

⁵⁷ These two returns are entirely different from any other extant ἀπογραφὰι of either Ptolemaic or Roman period. They were sent in by a certain Pnepheros and are probably concerned chiefly with the report that he is a state tenant (δημόσιος γεωργός). Perhaps Wilcken (*Archiv*, II, p. 395) should not have emended the θέλων σύσταξιν of *P. Grenfell*, I, 45, 8 to <τ>έλων σύσταξιν.

⁵⁸ In the Ptolemaic period λαός designated the native Egyptians as distinguished from Macedonians, Greeks, Jews, Asiatics, etc.

we find that the combined property- and census-return dated 240 B. C.⁵⁹ indicates that the fourteen years census-period cannot be carried back beyond the latter half of the reign of Euergetes I. There is no reason to believe that Euergetes introduced the fourteen years period, since there are no indications that, after he removed Apollonius from the office of dioecetes, he made any important changes in the financial administration during any part of his reign. If, however, the fourteen year periods be carried back only to the reign of Philopator, two fall within the years of his rule (221-203 B. C.)—the first in 220-19 B. C. and the second in 206-5 B. C.

Sosibius came into power immediately after Philopator's accession. It is possible that they had planned changes in the financial system for some time, but since Philopator had not been associated upon the throne with his father even during the latter's illness, such changes had to await his own accession. It would have required at least a year to bring about so radical a change as the introduction of a census of the entire population of Egypt and the separate registration of all males over fourteen years old for the purpose of taxation. Yet there was no time to lose. Antiochus III had begun his attempt to recover Coele-Syria by his attacks on the Lebanon forts. The attacks were repulsed through the determined defense by the Ptolemaic commander, but the energy displayed by the young Seleucid king, when recalled to subdue the rebellious satrapies of his empire, boded no good for Egypt. It was only by adroit diplomacy and the most dexterous bluffing that Sosibius was able to delay Antiochus's attack on Egypt itself until the financial reforms had brought in revenue sufficient for a great Egyptian armament and until the new army had been drilled for service.

It is probable that the poll-tax was introduced with the census of 220-19 B. C.,⁶⁰ that is, the census was held for that very

⁵⁹ See note 54 above.

⁶⁰ Bickermann, in his study of the classifications of the inhabitants of Egypt in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods (in *Archiv*, VIII, pp. 234-9, especially p. 236), has found that the custom of designating the Graeco-Macedonian inhabitants by the place of their origin in Greece, Asia Minor, or elsewhere, gave way to the practice of designation by the place of their residence in Egypt. The date at which this change occurred was about 220 B. C. This change is easily explained by the assumption that the nation-wide census introduced in the year 220-19

purpose. This poll-tax was, as has often been suggested,⁶¹ called *σύνταξις*. *P. Teb.*, I, 189, dated early first century B. C., supplies the evidence from which this conclusion may be drawn. The fragment reads as follows: *Ετους κα [...] ι, λαογρ(αφία) Θεογο(νίδος) τῶν τε[τηλη]κότων τὴν σύντα[ξιν κ]αὶ τὸν ἐπιστατικὸν ἐν τῷ [...] (ἔται), etc. There follows a list of names concluding οἱ πά(ντες) ἀνδ(ρες) Σοβ. The next column is headed ἀφ' ὧν τελ(οῦσιν) Σξγ ἀνὰ ↑ (τάλαντα) λθ' Βψ. καὶ τῶν ἀνὰ ψν, followed by the names of eight persons, thus accounting for two hundred and seventy-one. One individual, Καλὸς Κεφαλῖω(νος) αὐλ(ητής), paid only 500 drachmae. The total paid by the two hundred and seventy-two men was 40 talents 3200 drachmae. These rates for *σύνταξις* are singularly like the poll-tax of the Roman period in Lower Egypt, which was assessed at two rates; a privileged class paid at a lower rate.⁶² Furthermore one form of the poll-tax collected in the Fayûm during the Roman period was known as the *συντάξιμον*.⁶³

The usual translation of *σύνταξις* is 'contribution.' The sums paid by the allies in the second Athenian confederacy in the fourth century B. C. were called *συντάξεις* to distinguish them from the hated *φόρος* of the Delian League, which the Athenians had transformed into an hegemony.⁶⁴ Possibly the term *σύνταξις* was employed in Egypt in 220 B. C. and the years immediately following to give the impression that the tax was a 'contribution' to an emergency war-chest. In any case it is

B. C. gave to the government definite information as to the place of residence of every person in Egypt, and this information was more useful as a matter of record than a statement of the original residence of a man's father or grandfather. If the census had been introduced at an earlier or later date than 220-19 B. C., it is difficult to see why the change noted by Bickermann occurred at that particular time, rather than earlier or later. The reform of Alexandrian citizenship which was carried out by Philopator (cf. Satyrus, fragment 21 in Müller, *PHG.*, III, pp. 164 f.) may well have been connected with the introduction of the nation-wide census.

⁶¹ Wilcken, *Archiv*, II, p. 395; *Ohrestomathie*, 288; Schubart, *Papyruskunde*, 1918, p. 258; Laum in *PWRE*, 23, Sp. 732.

⁶² In the Roman period the privileged class seems usually to have paid at one half the normal rate, except in the Oxyrhynchite nome where they paid three quarters of the normal poll-tax; cf. my *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian*, chapter VIII.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-126.

⁶⁴ Francotte, *Les Finances des cités grecques*, p. 117.

not difficult to collect taxes from a nation threatened with invasion, as was Egypt in 220-19 B. C. Whether or not the Egyptian people had thought that they were 'contributing' to an emergency war-fund, Ptolemy and the wily Sosibius at the end of the war had no intention of letting such a great source of revenue be dropped. It is probable, despite the variation in the rate of assessment of the poll-tax in Roman times, that the tax introduced by Philopator was assessed at a uniform rate throughout the nation, with the exceptions made for such classes as were favored with a lower rate or with exemption, such as the catoeci, priests, and government officials.⁶⁵ After the victory of Raphia in 217 B. C. it was not long before the burden of the new tax became intolerable. The hard-pressed Egyptian peasant could be driven so far and no farther, especially since his recent military experience gave him new courage. This tax-burden I believe to have been the real cause of the long and bloody conflict of civil war waged between Ptolemy's soldiers and the Egyptian peasants—a *Bauernkrieg*, as Mahaffy so aptly remarked.⁶⁶

The amount of the *σύνταξις* recorded in *P. Teb.*, I, 189 is interesting. Two hundred and sixty-three men pay at the rate of 900 copper drachmae each. This is approximately equivalent to 2 or 3 silver drachmae. This sum paid annually may seem large enough for a poll-tax, but it is hardly enough to have roused an entire nation to an armed rebellion which lasted for well over twenty years. There is reason, however, to believe that 900 copper drachmae was not the rate per annum but the monthly rate. Twenty-four (or thirty-six) silver drachmae per annum added to tax-burdens already heavy is a far different matter. The reasons for supposing that 900 copper drachmae was the monthly rate is this: The Roman *συντάξιμον*⁶⁷ was not

⁶⁵ Josephus, *Bell. Jud.*, II, 385, gives the population of Egypt as seven and a half millions, excluding Alexandria, *ὡς ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς καθ' ἐκάστην κεφαλὴν εἰσφορᾶς τεκμήρασθαι*. It would be practically impossible to deduce the number of the population from the revenue of the poll-tax in Roman times, when the various nomes of Egypt were assessed at widely differing rates. It is possible, however, that Josephus drew his figures from a period when the assessment was practically uniform throughout Egypt, i. e., in the time of Philopator.

⁶⁶ *The Empire of the Ptolemies*, pp. 264 f.

⁶⁷ Cf. notes 48 and 63 above. In *P. Petrie*, III, 86 the *σύνταξις* ('quota

a tax but a method of paying in installments the *λαογραφία* (assessed at the 40 drachmae rate) plus other small taxes and the usual supplementary charges. These were monthly payments, sometimes eleven 4 drachmae installments; hence the name *συνράξιμον*, 'like the *σύνραξις*.' It might be argued that the 900 copper drachmae at Thegonis represented a reduction in the annual rate which had been made by Ptolemy V Epiphanes;⁶⁸ but Thegonis was in the Arsinoite nome where the presence of great numbers of Graeco-Macedonian catoci made a successful native revolt impossible. In addition the irrigation projects of the Ptolemies in the Fayûm made that territory so rich that its inhabitants were able to pay a 40-drachmae poll-tax during the first two and a half centuries of Roman rule. The fact that the peasants of the Fayûm paid the highest poll-tax known in Roman Egypt makes it improbable that the abatements of taxation granted by Epiphanes extended to the Arsinoite nome. Ideally the *σύνραξις* of 900 copper drachmae per month paid by the entire male population above the age of fourteen should have yielded an annual revenue of approximately 12,000 talents of silver. Actually that enormous sum was far from being realized, because the many priests and government officials and all of the citizens of Alexandria were undoubtedly exempt from the poll-tax in Ptolemaic times; in addition great numbers of the Hellenic population outside Alexandria were wholly or partially exempt. We have seen that there were a few citizens at Thegonis who paid at a lower rate. In spite of these exemptions, the tax must have brought a most welcome addition to the revenues of the royal treasury. Ptolemy would not relinquish it without a struggle.

We do not know when the civil war broke out, but the rebellion in the Delta, which (as Mahaffy⁶⁹ pointed out) was the earlier phase of it, cannot have been very serious, for the work on the great temple of Horus at Edfu went on without interruption until the sixteenth year of Philopator's reign.⁷⁰ In

to be sold'—cf. Oertel, *Die Liturgie*, 1917, p. 29, note 2) of the merchants selling oil for the state monopoly was on a monthly basis.

⁶⁸ Cf. *OGI.*, 90.

⁶⁹ *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1899, p. 141; Bevan, *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1927, p. 239.

⁷⁰ Cf. the hieroglyphic inscription on the wall of the temple of Horus at Edfu (quoted by Bevan, *op. cit.*, pp. 239 f.).

that year building operations ceased and were not resumed for twenty years. The rebellion had assumed serious proportions, especially since the success of the insurgents meant that the revenue of Upper Egypt could no longer be collected.

The ever ingenious Sosibius, I think, had a remedy for even that situation. He planned to extend the census and poll-tax to include the Jews. There were Jews in Egypt when the first Ptolemy came to the throne, but their numbers had been greatly increased by the favors shown them by Philadelphus, who sought them for his army,⁷¹ and by Euergetes I, who settled on the newly reclaimed land of the Fayûm Jews taken prisoner in the Syrian campaign. It is evident from *III Maccabees* that the favor of Philadelphus and of Euergetes had, in the second and third generations, resulted in a Jewish problem of serious proportions. *III Maccabees*, 2, 28 states that Ptolemy IV Philopator attempted to subject the Jews in Egypt to the census, πάντας δὲ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους εἰς λαογραφίαν καὶ οἰκετικὴν διάθεσιν ἀχθῆναι. Since the object of the λαογραφία was the collection of the poll-tax, we can readily understand the disturbances at Alexandria (persecutions in the eyes of the romancing writer of *III Maccabees*) and the hatred with which the Jews always regarded Philopator, for the aversion of the Jewish people to paying 'the census-tax to Caesar' is well known from the *New Testament*. The attempt to subject the Jews to the census is stated to have occurred after the battle of Raphia; consequently they had not been included in the census of 220-19 B. C., and it is probable that the attempt to enroll them occurred at the second great census in 206-5 B. C.⁷² The Jews in the Ptolemaic province of Coele-Syria were undoubtedly to be enrolled at the same time.⁷³ Within less than eight years Judaea renounced

⁷¹ Pseudo-Aristeas, *Ad Phil.*, 12-13. Cf. Bevan, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-114.

⁷² Cf. Bevan, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁷³ *Idem*, p. 230 (arguing against Mahaffy's view) rejects the story of Ptolemy's attempt to enter the Holy of Holies of the temple at Jerusalem as pure fiction. The only reason for attempting to date the disturbances of the Jews at Alexandria before the year 206-5 B. C. would be Philopator's supposed quick vengeance for his disappointment in Jerusalem, for which the Jews in Alexandria were in no way responsible. If the Jerusalem incident is fiction, that reason disappears.

⁷⁴ *III Maccabees*, 3, 12 states that Ptolemy IV sent the order for the enrollment of the whole race of Jews to his generals in Egypt and every place (τοῖς κατ' Αἴγυπτον καὶ κατὰ τόπον); cf. *III Maccabees*, 4, 14:

its old loyalty to the Ptolemies and surrendered to Antiochus III.

The writer of *Ecclesiastes*, according to Barton,⁷⁵ describes the conditions in Palestine at the end of Philopator's reign:⁷⁶ "Then I returned and saw all the oppressions that are done under the sun: and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of their oppressors there was power, but they had no comforter. Wherefore I praised the dead. . . ." That the oppressions were those of taxation will become evident. The spies of Ptolemy are probably referred to in *Ecclesiastes*, X, 20: "Curse not the king, no, not in thy thought; and curse not the rich in thy bed-chamber; for a bird of the air shall carry thy voice, and that which hath wings shall tell the matter." Despite the writer's feeling expressed in these metaphors Ptolemy had not enough spies in Palestine. The negotiations of the Jews with Antiochus continued and encouraged him to carry on in spite of the early defeats of his army in Coele-Syria at the hands of the Ptolemaic general Scopas, and to complete the conquest of that province by the bloody battle of Panion, the successful siege of Sidon and the capture of Batanaea, Abila, Gadara, and Jerusalem.

Jerusalem voluntarily opened its gates to Antiochus.⁷⁷ The reason for this sudden reversal of a Jewish policy that had begun with the reign of Ptolemy I Soter is not hard to find. Josephus quotes a letter of instructions, alleged to have been sent by Antiochus to Ptolemaeus (his general in charge of the newly acquired province of Palestine), which indirectly reveals the terms upon which the Jews agreed to surrender to Antiochus. I hold no brief for the authenticity of the letter, but I believe that it represents the facts quite accurately. The significant portion reads as follows:⁷⁸ "And let the elders and the priests

ἀπογραφῆναι δὲ πᾶν τὸ φύλον ἐξ ὀνόματος. The romancing writer of *III Maccabees* states that the purpose of this enrollment was to slaughter the Jews; but it was rather to collect the poll-tax; perhaps the Jews felt that it would kill them to pay the tax.

⁷⁵ In *International Critical Commentary, Ecclesiastes*, pp. 58-67.

⁷⁶ *Ecclesiastes*, IV, 1.

⁷⁷ Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.*, XII, 3 (133) quoting Polybius, XVI. Yet some of the Jews remained loyal to Egypt; cf. Jerome, *Ad Dan.*, XI, 14.

⁷⁸ Josephus, *op. cit.*, XII, 3 (142-3).

and the scribes of the temple and the singers in the temple be freed from capitation taxes and from the crown-tribute and other tribute. In order, too, that the city (Jerusalem) may recover its inhabitants, I grant to those who now inhabit it and to those who move into it up to the month of Hyperberetaeus to be tax-free for three years. Thereafter I remit to them a third part of the taxes so that they may recover from the harm done them." The remission of taxes must have been the inducement that drew the Jews away from their old loyalty to Egypt. The death of Philopator in 204 or 203 B. C. and the accession of Epiphanes, while still a child,^{78a} gave Antiochus his opportunity to take advantage of the disaffection of the Jews, and by 198 B. C. Coele-Syria was forever lost to the Ptolemies.

The loss of his Syrian province was but one of the worries of the young king Epiphanes. Rebellion had broken out afresh in the Delta and continued in Upper Egypt. It was finally crushed by the king's soldiers who were able to wear down the resistance of the rebels. But the revolt was not ended without heavy concessions from the king in the matter of taxes, as we may conclude from the testimony of the Rosetta Stone and from the condition of the poll-tax in Roman Egypt during the first two centuries after Christ. The decree on the Rosetta Stone indicates also that Epiphanes had been obliged to make further concessions to the Egyptian priests in order to retain their loyalty during the doubtful times of the revolt. Naturally the congress of priests was chiefly concerned with the remission of temple-taxes, so that this occupies the most important place in the decree. Mahaffy's translation of this section of the decree follows:⁷⁹ "Being benevolently disposed towards the gods, Epiphanes, while still a child,^{78a} gave Antiochus his opportunity and corn, and has undertaken much outlay to bring Egypt into prosperity, and to establish the temples, and has been generous with all his own means, and of the revenues and taxes which he receives from Egypt some he has wholly remitted and others has lightened,⁸⁰ in order that the people (λαός) and all the rest

^{78a} Cf. F. W. Walbank, "The Accession of Ptolemy Epiphanes: A Problem of Chronology," in *J. E. A.*, XXII (1936), pp. 20-34.

⁷⁹ *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1899, pp. 153 ff.; Bevan, *The Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1927, pp. 264 ff.

⁸⁰ "This *lightening* is said to be expressed in the demotic version by

(Macedonians, Greeks, Asiatics, etc.) might be in prosperity during his reign; and has remitted the debts to the crown which they in Egypt and in the rest of his realm owed, being many in number; and those who were in prison, and under accusation for a long time back, has freed of the charges against them; and has directed that the revenues of the temples and the yearly allowances given to them, both of corn and money, likewise also the proper moiety to the gods from vine land, and from gardens, and the other property of the gods, as they were in his father's time, so shall remain; and directed also, with regard to the priests, that they should pay no more as the tax on consecration than what was appointed them in the time of his father and up to the first year (of the present reign); . . . and of the tax of byssus cloth paid by the temples to the crown has remitted two-thirds; . . . and did also free the temples of (the tax of) the artabe for every arura of sacred land, and to Apis and Mnevis did give many gifts, and to the other sacred animals in Egypt, much more than the kings before him," etc., etc.

Another clause of this decree is especially significant: ". . . and likewise has apportioned justice to all, like Hermes the great and great, and has ordained that those who come back of the warrior caste, and of the rest who went astray in their allegiance in the days of the disturbances, should, on their return, be allowed to occupy their old possessions." The victory of Ptolemy V in the civil war was evidently the result of a compromise. In the Roman period the poll-tax was assessed at different rates in the various nomes.⁸¹ This difference in rates probably dates in part, at least, from the reign of Epiphanes and may have had several causes: recognition of a difference in the economic status of the inhabitants of the several nomes and in their consequent ability to pay, rewarding of faithful subjects, and concessions to the revolting peasants. The unique

'gave them control of,' viz., gave back the collection of them to the priests."—Bevan, *op. cit.*, p. 264, note 2.

⁸¹ In the Arsinoite nome the *λαογραφία* in the Roman period was assessed at 40 drachmae and at 20 drachmae per annum; in the Hermopolite nome at 16 drachmae and at 8 drachmae; in the Oxyrhynchite nome apparently at 16 drachmae and at 12 drachmae. For the rates at Elephantine-Syene and at Thebes cf. my *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian*, chapter VIII.

condition of the poll-tax at Thebes in Roman times perhaps goes back to the end of a similar revolt in the reign of Ptolemy X Soter II. A revolt in Upper Egypt forced this king in the year 85 B. C. to march on Thebes and to destroy the city.⁸² The inhabitants were forced to live *κομμηδόν*, and this official distribution of the inhabitants of Thebes among villages was continued in the tax-administration of Roman times, when the poll-tax and other capitation taxes were assessed at different rates in the several villages.⁸³ There is no reason why Augustus's financial agents in Egypt should have assessed the villages of Thebes at different rates, unless they were merely continuing the previous assessments, for, by the time of Augustus, Thebes had recovered sufficient physical unity to be again called Diospolis.⁸⁴ But if the poll-tax was a Ptolemaic institution, Ptolemy X may have seen in a varying incidence of taxation a means of assuring the separation of the city into villages through fostering mutual jealousy; punishment and reward may also have played a part.

Augustus took over the system of financial administration in Egypt just about as he found it. In the same way Soter and Philadelphus had taken it over from the Pharaohs.⁸⁵ Because the Assyrian and Persian conquests and the attempts of the Egyptians, before their conquest by Alexander, to restore a native dynasty had disrupted the efficient working of the system, it was necessary for Philadelphus and his minister Apollonius to formulate detailed regulations in order to put the collection of revenues on an efficient basis. Furthermore the Ptolemies' introduction of coinage into Egypt made necessary some major changes in the methods of collecting taxes. The misrule and incompetence of the later Ptolemies doubtless made further changes imperative, if Augustus was to draw the maximum advantage from his special domain in Egypt. Yet the most important changes that can be observed in the collection of money-taxes during the reign of Augustus are the resumption of giving receipts for capitation taxes and the introduction of

⁸² Pausanias, I, 9, 3. Cf. Strabo, XVII, 1, 46 (816).

⁸³ See note 81 above.

⁸⁴ Cf. O. Brüss.-Berl. 21, a receipt for a tax paid to the bank in Diospolis in A. D. 2.

⁸⁵ Maspero, *Les Finances de l'Égypte sous les Lagides*, p. 172.

the *συμβολικά*, a charge for those receipts, by which the bureaux for the collection of taxes were made partially or perhaps even wholly self-supporting. Possibly the exemption from payment of capitation taxes possessed by men over sixty years of age was granted by Augustus.⁸⁶ Whether Augustus or the later Ptolemies abolished such taxes as the *ιατρικόν*, which disappears from among the receipts along with the other capitation taxes after the beginning of the reign of Philopator and is not found in the Roman period, is not known. What is important is that the system of capitation taxes based upon the poll-tax and fourteen years census-period, which Augustus found adequate for the financial administration of his new province, and which required but slight modification during the first two centuries of Roman rule, was the system which had been perfected by Ptolemy IV Philopator called 'one of the three worst Ptolemies' 'et segnīs in administrando regno' and by his minister Sosibius, 'a subtle instrument and full of years, yet a source of woe to the kingdom.'⁸⁷

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⁸⁶ If Wilcken's emendation of *P. Grenfell*, I, 45 (see note 57 above) is correct, Pnephros declares that he is still paying *σύνταξις* at the age of sixty-three. If that is true, either he was being subjected to extortion or the age of immunity from poll-tax had not yet been fixed at sixty years (if that is the meaning of the phrase *τὸ τῶν ἐξήκοντα* in *BGU.*, IV, 1140, 22, dated in 4 B. C.); the age of immunity was later fixed at sixty-two years (cf. my *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian*, chapter VII).

⁸⁷ Polybius, XV, 25: *σκεῦος ἀγχίρουν καὶ πολυχρόνιον, ἔτι δὲ κακοποιὸν ἐν βασιλείᾳ.*

APOLLONIUS OF RHODES AND THE OLD GEOGRAPHERS.

The sources of Apollonius in the *Argonautica* occupied the attention of scholars at a time when *Quellenkunde* was a favourite branch of classical learning, and the scholia offer abundant material for a critic interested in discovering the extent of the poet's erudition. It is not, however, the aim of this article to point out how Apollonius may have taken this legend from one logographer and that from another, since it can never be satisfactorily proved that the story of the *Argonautica* is a mere patchwork of extracts from earlier writers. The most recent study of the geography of the poem (by Émile Delage¹) is at pains to show the multiplicity of the geographical sources and the willingness of Apollonius to supplement Homeric geography from later authors. But criticism does not end at this point: it remains to discover on what principle the poet selected and combined this information. I propose to show how certain characteristics of Apollonius can be traced back to the Ionian logographers, in many instances to Hecataeus of Miletus in particular.² Some of these characteristics were common to other Alexandrian poets: the combination of geography with mythology, a fondness for the aetiological legend and the archaic name, and the attempt to illustrate myths by reference to geographical landmarks, temples, or curious customs which existed in the writer's own day. Ionian logography, being in the Hesiodic tradition, was doubtless familiar to many Alexandrian poets; but the peculiarly geographical nature of the *Argonautica* suggests that its author was especially dependent on Hecataeus, who was both geographer and mythographer.

Such a discussion would be difficult, if not impossible, were it not for the learned scholia. But these must not be misused: when they name some obscure poet or mythographer as Apol-

¹ *La géographie dans les Argonautiques d'Apollonios de Rhodes* (Bordeaux, 1930). Cf. also R. Walther, *De Apollonii Rhodii Argonauticorum rebus geographicis*, Diss. philologicae Halenses XII (1891), pp. 1-104 (published *in part* as a separate dissertation under the same title in 1890).

² That Ap. knew and used Hecataeus' works was suggested long ago by A. Weichert, *Ueber das Leben und Gedicht des Ap. v. Rhodos* (Meissen, 1821). The evidence has never been collected at length, though Delage has noted some of it.

lonius' source for a particular story, the scholiasts are merely stating an opinion which may be wrong. As earlier critics have properly insisted, it does not follow that when the scholiasts allude to an earlier writer we have definite evidence that Apollonius borrowed from him.³ Their literary knowledge does not necessarily correspond with his; they may refer to works with which he was totally unacquainted and fail to mention others with which he was familiar. Accordingly a reference on their part to Hecataeus may be regarded as relevant only when something in Apollonius' text recalls some characteristic or some statement of Hecataeus about which we have learned from another source. Apart from the seven explicit references to Hecataeus,⁴ there are numerous remarks in the scholia which are probably borrowings from him; geographical commentary is often offered in language strikingly reminiscent of the fragments preserved by Stephanus of Byzantium and others.⁵ There is, however, no possibility of proof here, and no particularly useful purpose would be served by collecting such passages.

Certain general characteristics of the *Argonautica* must be recalled before the argument can proceed. There are no traces in the story of the rationalistic treatment familiar in Herodorus of Heraclea, signs of which are found even in the fragments of Hellanicus of Lesbos. In fact the story is full of *θαύματα*, of which not the least remarkable are the geographical. To imagine that Apollonius seriously believed all the details of his fantastic geography of the fourth book is to insult his intelligence and to misunderstand the character of the poem. The *Argo*, as H. de la Ville de Mirmont has pointed out,⁶ is a Homeric ship, and the methods of handling it are in accordance with Homeric tradition; in this respect Apollonius has shown himself a careful archaeologist. When the heroes on their wanderings enter the territory traversed by Odysseus, the Homeric description of *Aeaea*, the *Planctae*, and *Scylla* and *Charybdis* is reproduced.⁷

³ Cf. E. R. Knorr, *De Apollonii Rhodii fontibus* (Leipzig, 1902).

⁴ I, 256-59, 551a; II, 946-54c, 998-1000; IV, 257-62b, 265-68, 282-91b. These and all other references to the scholia are given according to the edition of C. Wendel (Weidmann, 1935).

⁵ This statement will be illustrated later in the article.

⁶ "Le navire *Argo* et la science nautique d'Apollonios," *Rev. Internat. de l'Enseignement*, XXX (1895), pp. 230-85.

⁷ IV, 659-81, 885-94.

If the familiar regions of Sicily are described according to ancient mythographical traditions and the limited geographical knowledge of early times, similar methods are to be expected in the description of less familiar regions. The Argonauts passed through many seas and countries which find no mention in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*, and here Hesiod and the cyclic poets are occasionally helpful;⁸ but the earliest geographers after Homer, as Eratosthenes pointed out,⁹ were Anaximander and Hecataeus; Hecataeus' *Γῆς Περίοδος* or *Periegesis* is the natural place in which to look for old geographical beliefs and theories.

There is an additional reason why Apollonius might like to refer to Hecataeus. His literary rival, Callimachus, refused to accept the Alexandrian library copy of the *Asia* as genuine, ascribing it to a certain Νησιώτης. The passage of Athenaeus¹⁰ from which we learn this has given rise to frequent misinterpretation. The verdict of Callimachus was thought to throw doubt on the authenticity of the fragments and, despite the spirited and convincing defence put up by Gutschmid¹¹ and Diels,¹² the theory of a forgery was revived by Wells¹³ and after him by Grosstephan.¹⁴ At present, however, Jacoby¹⁵ and Heidel¹⁶ remain uncontradicted in their scorn for such a view. Athenaeus

⁸ Cf. F. Gisinger, "Zur Geographie bei Hesiod," *Rhein. Mus.*, 78 (1929), pp. 315-28.

⁹ Strabo, I, 1, 11: *νυνὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν Ὅμηρος τῆς γεωγραφίας ἤρξεν, ἀρκέτω τὰ λεχθέντα. φανεροὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπακολουθήσαντες αὐτῷ ἄνδρες ἀξιόλογοι καὶ οἰκείοι φιλοσοφίας, ὧν τοὺς πρώτους μεθ' Ὅμηρον δύο φησὶν Ἐρατοσθένης Ἀναξίμανδρόν τε, θαλοῦ γεγονότα γινώσκον καὶ πόλιν, καὶ Ἐκαταῖον τὸν Μιλήσιον· τὸν μὲν οὖν ἐκδοῦναι πρῶτον γεωγραφικὸν πίνακα, τὸν δὲ Ἐκαταῖον καταλιπεῖν γράμμα πιστούμενον ἐκείνου εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης αὐτοῦ γραφῆς.*

¹⁰ II, 70 A: *Ἐκαταῖος δ' ὁ Μιλήσιος ἐν Ἀσίας Περιηγήσει, εἰ γνήσιον τοῦ συγγραφέως τὸ βιβλίον—Καλλίμαχος γὰρ Νησιώτου αὐτὸ ἀναγράφει.*

¹¹ "De rerum Aegyptiacarum scriptoribus Graecis ante Alexandrum magnum," *Philologus*, X (1885), pp. 522-42, reprinted in the author's *Kleine Schriften*, I, pp. 35 ff.

¹² "Herodot und Hekataios," *Hermes*, XXII (1887), pp. 411-44.

¹³ "The genuineness of the *Γῆς Περίοδος* of Hecataeus," *Journ. of Hellenic Studies*, XXIX (1909), pp. 41-52.

¹⁴ *Beiträge zur Periegesis des Hekataios v. Milet* (Diss. Strasbourg, 1915).

¹⁵ *Die Fragmente der griech. Historiker* (F. Gr. Hist.), I, p. 318; *RE*, s. v. *Hekataios v. Milet*, VII, 2872-75.

¹⁶ "Hecataeus and the Egyptian priests in Herodotus Book II," *Mem. of Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sciences*, XVIII, 2 (1935), pp. 53-54.

does not tell us for what reasons Callimachus denied the authenticity of the *Asia*; we do not know who *Νηριώτης* was; in consequence the remark remains both useless and unintelligible. But an explanation might be found if we knew more about the grounds on which Callimachus quarrelled with Apollonius.

In the opening lines of the poem Apollonius reveals its scope:

Ἀρχόμενος σέο, Φοῖβε, παλαιγενέων κλέα φωτῶν
μνήσομαι,

and, after a brief summary of Jason's arrival in Iolcus and the command of Pelias, he says that earlier poets have told how the Argo was built with the help of Athena:

νῦν δ' ἂν ἐγὼ γενεήν τε καὶ οὔνομα μυθησαίμην
ἥρώων, δολιχῆς τε πόρους ἄλός, ὅσσα τ' ἔρεξαν
πλαζόμενοι. Μοῦσαι δ' ὑποφήτορες εἰεν αἰοιδῆς

(I, 20-22).

It is a curious coincidence that his choice of subject-matter exactly corresponds to that of Hecataeus, who wrote *Γενεολογία* and a *Γῆς Περίοδος*, and that like Apollonius Hecataeus in his famous opening sentence uses the verb *μυθεῖσθαι*: *Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν.*¹⁷ It seems as though Apollonius were calling upon the muses to be his mouthpiece in order that he might not himself be blamed for the many *γελοῖοι λόγοι* which his poem contains; for when in the course of the poem he again invokes them, it is before recounting some episode more incredible than usual.¹⁸

To anyone unacquainted with the other touches reminiscent of Hecataeus which appear throughout the poem the parallelism between these lines and the opening sentence of the *Γενεολογία* may seem merely a coincidence. But if it is a coincidence, it is the first of a long series of them. Even if it is not a reminiscence, conscious or unconscious, of Hecataeus, the statement of the poem's scope shows affinity to the fifth century logographers, who were prone to offer geographical commentary on the myths. Hecataeus is not the only logographer who tried

¹⁷ Frag. 1 (Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, I, 1).

¹⁸ II, 845; IV, 552, 1381. The invocations at the beginnings of Books III and IV are each followed by a *γάρ* clause, as though some reason had to be given for invoking them.

to put Homeric stories in their geographical setting. While many of Hecataeus' fragments show that this was a favourite characteristic of his *Periegesis*,¹⁹ there are many entries in the lexicon of Stephanus of Byzantium where it is doubtful if the sentence about the town's mythical history or the origin of its name is to be assigned to Hecataeus or to others.²⁰ To discuss and identify Homeric sites was an occupation characteristic of the school of the Ionian logographers, from whom it passed, by way of the Alexandrians, to Strabo.

Apollonius' expressed intention of combining geography with mythology is no mere conventional introduction arising from the fact that the story of the *Argonautica* is one of adventurous travel. There are a number of passages where the geographical detail is unnecessarily full, adding nothing to the story, merely revealing the poet's interest in geographical knowledge. One notices the striking detail in the description of the view which the heroes have from the top of Dindymus (I, 1112-16). Even the birthplace of Asterion, when he is named in the catalogue of heroes, is given in detail—I, 35-39; and when the heroes go to embark on the *Argo*:

δὴ τότ' ἴσαν μετὰ νῆα δι' ἄστεος, ἔνθα περ ἄκραι
κλείονται Παγασαὶ Μαγνήτιδες (I, 237-38).

The verb κλείονται is an appeal to the reader's own knowledge of the country as it is in his own day. But the most striking purely geographical passages are in the prophecy of Phineus and the subsequent description of how the heroes follow his instructions. The prophecy is too long to quote in full; it will suffice to quote certain sections of it. Its peculiarity is that it contains many sentences which might have come straight out of a *Periegesis*.²¹

After passing the land of the Mariandyni, in which the "swift descent of Hades," the ἄκρη Ἀχερουσιάς and διήεις Ἀχέρων call for mention (II, 353-55), he continues:

¹⁹ Cf. e.g. Frag. 169, 217, 239.

²⁰ E.g. Frag. 114, 120, 138, 255.

²¹ Cf. U. Höfer, "Pontosvölker, Ephoros und Ap. v. Rhodos," *Rhein. Mus.*, 59 (1904), pp. 642-64. He remarks that the list of Pontic tribes in Ap. gives the impression of being an extract from a *Periplus*, and attempts to prove that the author of this *Periplus* is Nymphodorus and that it was written after the time of Ephorus because certain remarks in the poet's description are reminiscent of fragments of Ephorus. On this last point see below p. 449.

ἀγχίμολον δ' ἐπὶ τῇ πολέας παρανείσθε κολωνοὺς
 Παφλαγόνων, τοῖσιν τ' Ἐνετήιος ἐμβασίλευσεν
 πρῶτα Πέλοψ, τοῦ καὶ περ ἀφ' αἵματος εὐχετόωνται.
 ἔστι δέ τις ἄκρη Ἑλλίκης κατεναντίον Ἄρκτου,
 πάντοθεν ἡλίβατος, καὶ μιν καλέονσι Κάραμβιν

(II, 357-61).

The learned remark made in passing about Pelops is quite in the style of the logographers.²² But the true style of a *Periegesis* shows itself best in the description of what comes beyond the mouth of the Halys:

μετὰ τὸν δ' ἀγχίροος Ἴρις
 μειώτερος λευκῇσιν ἐλίσσεται εἰς ἅλα δίνας.
 κείμεν δὲ προτέρωσσε μέγας καὶ ὑπείροχος ἀγκὼν
 ἐξανέχει γαίης· ἐπὶ δὲ ὀτόμα Θερμώδοντος
 κόλπῳ ἐν εὐδιόοντι Θεμισκύρειον ὑπ' ἄκρην
 μύρεται, εὐρείης διαειμένος ἡπείριοιο.
 ἔνθα δὲ Δοϊάντος πεδίον σχεδόθεν δὲ πόλεις
 τρισσαὶ Ἀμαζονίδων, μετὰ τε σμυγερώτατοι ἀνδρῶν
 τρηχέην Χάλυβες καὶ ἀτειρέα γαῖαν ἔχουσιν,
 ἐργατῖναι· τοὶ δ' ἀμφὶ σιδήρεα ἔργα μέλονται.
 ἄγχι δὲ ναετάουσι πολύρρηγες Τιβαρηνοὶ
 Ζηνὸς Εὐξείνιοιο Γενηταίην ὑπὲρ ἄκρην.
 τῇ δ' ἐπὶ Μοσσύνοικοι ὁμούριοι ὑλήεσσαν
 ἐξείης ἡπειρον, ὑπωρείας τε νέμονται,
 δουρατέοις πύργοισιν ἐν οἴκῳ τεκτύναντες
 κάλινα καὶ θαλάμους εὐπηγέας, οὓς καλέονσιν
 μόσσυνας· καὶ δ' αὐτοὶ ἐπώνυμοι ἔνθεν ἔασιν·

(II, 367-83).

Except for the facility of the language, this might be a passage in the *Γῆς Περίοδος* of Pseudo-Scylax or Pseudo-Scymnus or Dionysius Periegetes.

Just as remarkable as the language in these lines and those that follow is their conformity with the geographical tradition of the names and the site of these tribes. This tradition goes back to Hecataeus, as Jacoby shows in a table of the tribes along the Black Sea as given by Hecataeus, Pseudo-Scylax,

²² Hecataeus (frag. 199—Strabo, XII, 3, 25) offered an explanation of the famous Homeric line (*Il.* II, 852):

ἐξ Ἐνετῆς, ὅθεν ἡμῶν γένος ἀγροτεράων.

Ephorus, Xenophon, Apollonius, Dionysius Periegetes, Pliny, and Mela.²³ The correspondence of Apollonius with Hecataeus and Scylax is very close indeed. The names of these tribes—Tibareni, Mossynoeci, Macrones, Becheiri, Sapeires, Byzeres—seem to have been unknown to earlier poets.²⁴ If Apollonius was looking for an early account of the tribes on the south shore of the Euxine, Hecataeus' *Periegesis* was the place for it.

The importance of this last point cannot be stressed too strongly. The antiquarian interest which Apollonius shares with other Alexandrian poets would prevent him from being satisfied with such information as he might find in Xenophon, Ephorus, Theopompus, and other fourth-century writers who offered descriptions of this or other regions. Certainly Xenophon described the habits of the Mossynoeci and of other peoples along the coast of Pontus; Ephorus in his geographical excursus mentioned the promontory of Carambis, the Tibareni and their customs, and gave an explanation of the name of Abarnus;²⁵ Theopompus also comes in for his share of mention in the scholia; Book XXI of his *Philippica* contained a digression on Illyria and the *θαύματα* attributed to that region;²⁶ in fact he mentioned the Adriatic mouth of the Danube.²⁷ So also Ephorus and Theopompus, in common with the older logographers, retained the practice of commenting on Homeric geography.²⁸ The relevant passages in these authors may well have been familiar to Apollonius, but nothing is gained by losing sight of the fact that Ephorus and Theopompus (if not Xenophon) were using older geographical sources which were equally accessible to Apollonius; and it was these old sources, not the information of fourth century writers, which interested the poet in search of the old geographical tradition.

Apart from any indication in the scholia, the text of these

²³ *F. Gr. Hist.*, I, pp. 356-57. Höfer (*op. cit.*, pp. 559-60) seems to be content with tracing back the tradition as far as Ephorus and Pseudo-Scymnus.

²⁴ The articles in *RE* contain no allusions to an earlier author than Hecataeus; the references, apart from Apollonius, are restricted to Herodotus, Xenophon, and geographical writers.

²⁵ Frag. 41, 43, 46 (*F. Gr. Hist.*, II, 70).

²⁶ Frag. 128-31 (*F. Gr. Hist.*, II, 115).

²⁷ Frag. 129—Strabo, VII, 5, 9.

²⁸ E. g. Ephorus, frag. 128, 134, 146.

passages in Book II points very definitely to an old Periegesis and in particular to Hecataeus'. It is therefore worth while to examine the scholia to see if they confirm this impression. Though the scholia do not, it is true, actually mention Hecataeus, the comment on line 347 is a perfect example of the style of an old Periegesis: *μετὰ γὰρ τὴν Φινέως νῆσον ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ μέρη ἐστὶ Βιθυνία παρὰ τὸν Βόσπορον. ταχέως ἄρα ἐκπλεύσαντι τὸ στόμα τοῦ Πόντου ἢ ἑτέρα πλευρὰ τῆς Βιθυνίας· ἢ γὰρ Βιθυνία, ὡς προεῖρηται, περὶ τὸν Βόσπορον ἐστὶν ἐν δεξιᾷ, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Σαλμυδησοῦς Θρακῶν ἀγρίων. ὠνομάσθη δὲ Σαλμυδησοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ συρρέοντος εἰς αὐτὸν ποταμοῦ.* The note on Ἀχερουσιάς in 354 refers, among other authorities, to Herodorus of Heraclea and the *Periplus* of Andron of Teos, but the comment on the Chalybes is more striking: *οἱ δὲ Χάλυβες ἔθνος Σκυθικὸν μετὰ τὸν Θερμῶδοντα, οἱ μέταλλα σιδήρον εὐρόντες μοχθοῦσι περὶ τὴν ἐργασίαν. ἐκλήθησαν δὲ Χάλυβες ἀπὸ Χάλυβος τοῦ Ἀρεως υἱοῦ.* This note might have been taken straight out of Hecataeus, characteristic of whose style are the *μετὰ τὸν Θερμῶδοντα* ²⁰ (an additional proof, if proof be needed, that Hecataeus in describing this coast went from west to east) and the etymology from Chalybs.

Similar characteristics mark the subsequent description of their voyage, which follows the prophecy of Phineus. There are some additions to the prophecy, for the sake of variety and completeness, which it is not necessary to enumerate here. One remark in the scholia, however, deserves mention: on Sesamus, in 941, is the note: *Σήσαμος· πόλις Παφλαγονίας. Ὅμηρος (B 853) 'καὶ Σήσαμον ἀμφενέμοντο.' τὸ δὲ Σήσαμον μετωνομάσθη Ἀμαστρίς ἀπὸ Δαρείου ἀδελφοῦ θυγατρὸς. ἐκλήθη δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σήσαμον λαβεῖν* (after which there is a lacuna). Here no authority is mentioned, but the note is in the style of Hecataeus, including the Homeric reference; and the change of name to Amastris would have taken place within his lifetime. If the scholiast goes back to an old Periegesis to find a statement about the Chalybes, though the tradition about them was perfectly familiar from later authors, and if he does the same when commenting on Sesamus, he is surely doing so in order to show how Apollonius conformed to the old traditions.

²⁰ Cf. frag. 48: *μετὰ δὲ τοῦ πόλις, μετὰ δὲ Λεσυρὸς ποταμός*; frag. 73: *μετὰ δὲ Κατάνη πόλις, ὑπὲρ δὲ ὁρος Αἰτνῆ*; frag. 106: *μετὰ δὲ Βούθρωτος πόλις, μετὰ δὲ Ὀρικὸς λιμὴν*. Cf. also frags. 265, 266, 275.

So also in other geographical passages, describing parts of the voyage uninterrupted by any incident, it is likely that Apollonius is following the itinerary of an old *Periegesis*. It is indeed probable that he would do so, just as a modern poet writing about Elizabethan or earlier explorers would inevitably refer to Hakluyt's voyages and would very probably reproduce something of the flavour of the original. A passage worthy of examination is I, 580-608, which describes the voyage from Iolcus to Aphetæ and thence to Lemnos. Here too the scholiasts have consulted various geographical authors: on *Τισαίη ἄκρη* (568) is the note *Τισαίη ἀκρωτήριον Θεσσαλίας ἢ Μαγνησίας, τινὲς δὲ τῆς Θεσπρωτίας*, and there are also some notes on the etymology of place names; the note on Lemnos and Myrina (601), with the remark about the origin of its name, recalls a fragment of Hecataeus.³⁰ Another geographical passage of the same kind is I, 922-35, which describes the voyage through the *Μέλας κόλπος* and the Hellespont. The scholiast's description of the Chersonese as *ἡ μετὰ Θράκην κειμένη* (925) is evidently borrowed from a *Periegesis* which went from west to east as Hecataeus' did. Interesting also is the poet's phrase *Ἀβαρινίδος ἡμαθόεσσαν ἥλιον* (932). The text of Stephanus *s. v.* *Ἀβαρινος* runs *Ἐκαταῖος δ' ὁ Μιλήσιος Λαμψάκου ἄκρην εἶναι φησιν* (frag. 220). Walter Leaf³¹ sought in vain for this *ἄκρη*, and it seems highly probable that Hecataeus wrote not *ἄκρη* but *ἀκτὴ* and that this is the source of Apollonius' *ἥλιον*.³²

Two further reminiscences of Hecataeus in geographical

³⁰ Schol., I, 601-04a: . . . πόλις δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ Μυρίνη πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς Λήμνου. διότι πόλις γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ Λήμνος· ἔχει γὰρ Ἑφαιστίαν καὶ Μύριναν. ἐκλήθη δὲ ἀπὸ Μυρίνης τῆς Θόαντος γυναικός, Κρηθέως δὲ θυγατρὸς. Hecataeus, frag. 138a: Steph. Byz., *s. v.* *Λήμνος*: νῆσος πρὸς τῇ Θράκῃ, δύο πόλεις ἔχουσα, Ἑφαιστίαν καὶ Μύριναν, ὡς Ἐκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ. Frag. 138c: *ibid.*, *s. v.* *Μύρινα*: πόλις ἐν Λήμνῳ. Ἐκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ. ἔστι καὶ τῆς Αἰολίδος ἄλλῃ. ἀπὸ Μυρίνης ἀμφοτέραι ἢ ἀπὸ Μυρίνου.

³¹ Strabo on the Troad, pp. 93-94.

³² Xen., *Hell.*, II, 1, 29 writes as follows: *Κόνων δὲ ταῖς ἐννέα ναῦσι φεύγων, ἐπεὶ ἔγνω τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὰ πράγματα διεφθαρμένα, κατασχὼν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀβαρινίδα τὴν Λαμψάκου ἄκραν ἔλαβεν αὐτόθεν τὰ μεγάλα τῶν Λυσάνδρου ρεῶν ἱστία*. Thus it is not a rocky promontory but more like a sandy beach, though he does call it an *ἄκρα*. Steph. Byz., after quoting Hecataeus, continues: *Ἐφορος δὲ (frag. 46) ἐν τῇ ε' λέγει κληθῆναι αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν Φωκῇ Ἰδῇ Ἀβαρινίδος ὑπὸ Φωκαέων τὴν Λαμψάκον κτιζόντων*. It is unfortunate that Ephorus' actual words are not recorded.

passages call for special attention. In IV, 660 Apollonius speaks of the heroes as

Αὔσονίης ἀκτὰς Τυρσηίδος εἰσπορόντες,

and we know that Hecataeus called Nola, which in his time was held by the Etruscans, πόλις Αὔσονων.³³ Again the Καυλιακὸς σκόπελος in the Ister (IV, 324) recalls the Illyrian tribe of the Καυλικοί mentioned by Hecataeus.³⁴ Apollonius would naturally want to use words that suggested the ancient condition of the western world; it was natural that he should take such words from an author like Hecataeus and use them in a similar though not precisely identical way.

The affinity between Apollonius and Hecataeus is, however, not confined to the purely geographical passages. The two authors share a taste for aetiological legends explaining the origin of a city's name. This branch of mythology was also a favourite one among early logographers, some of whom wrote books on Κτίσεις, the legends associated with the founding of cities. Though the scholia contain far more of these legends than does the text of the *Argonautica*, it is not lacking in them: the foundation of Pellene by Pelles (I, 177), the λιμὴν Ἀργῶος in Aethalia (IV, 658), the origin of the water-carriers' race in Aegina (IV, 1765-72). The story of the foundation of Miletus, which Hecataeus must have mentioned, is confined to the scholia;³⁵ but Apollonius pays the city the compliment of calling it προλιέθρον ἀγανού Μιλήτρου as the city of Erginus (I, 186).

A development of this love of aetiological legends is the delight which Apollonius takes in pointing out geographical landmarks, especially σήματα and tombs, which recall and purport to prove the truth of legends. So also Herodotus claims to prove the truth of the miraculous repulse of the Persians from Delphi by pointing out the stones in the τέμενος of Athena Pronaea which were said to have fallen upon them from the

³³ Frag. 61: Steph. Byz., s. v. Νῶλα· πόλις Αὔσονων. Ἑκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ. For the terminology used by Hecataeus in describing Italian towns see B. Schulze, *De Hecataei Milesii fragmentis quae ad Italiam meridiionalem pertinent* (Diss. Leipzig, 1912).

³⁴ Frag. 92: ἰδίδ., s. v. Καυλικοί· ἔθνος κατὰ τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον. Ἑκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ. The scholiast maintains Ap. learnt about the Καυλιακὸς σκόπελος from Polemon ἐν Κτίσεσι Ἰταλικῶν καὶ Σικελικῶν πόλεων.

³⁵ Schol., I, 185-88a.

crag above.³⁶ This device of illustrating past history or legend by a landmark or monument that any traveller might see must have been a favourite one of the logographers. Even Thucydides uses it in his rare digressions, which are in the style of the logographers.³⁷ By referring to these *σήματα* in such various regions Apollonius shows his acquaintance with the type of literature that combined geography with mythology. At the beginning of the poem, for example, in introducing Orpheus, he speaks of the power of his song in Thrace:

φῆγοι δ' ἀγριάδες, κείνης ἔτι σήματα μολπῆς,
ἀκτῆς Ὀρηκίης Ζώνης ἐπὶ τηλεθόωσαι
ἐξείης στιχόωσιν ἐπήγριμοι, ἅς δ' ἐπιπρὸ
θελγομένας φόρμυγχι κατήγαγε Πιερὶήθεν (I, 28-31).

One may recollect that Hecataeus called Ζώνη a πόλις Κικόνων,³⁸ a name which recalls the *Odyssey* and might easily introduce further discussion of other myths. Again the tomb of Cyzicus is described as *σῆμα καὶ ὀψιγόνουσιν ἰδέσθαι* (I, 1062), and the customs of the Ionians living in Cyzicus *ἔτι νῦν* recall the story of this king.³⁹ Where else but from an old geographer was Apollonius likely to have learned about the monument of Polyphemus in the land of the Chalybes (IV, 1476), the altar of Hecate in Paphlagonia set up by the Argonauts (IV, 250-52), or the tomb of Sthenelus, whose story the scholiast says he took from Promathidas (II, 911-14)?⁴⁰

His taste for using archaic place-names is another characteristic which he shares with the logographers, but this kind of antiquarianism is a common feature of Alexandrian writing and not very much stress can be laid on Apollonius' tendency to it. A few individual instances are nevertheless worth mentioning. *Εὐρυμέθυ* in Thessaly, which the Argonauts see from the sea, is found in this form only in Hecataeus;⁴¹ other authors use the

³⁶ VIII, 39.

³⁷ E. g. his reference to inscriptions still readable in his digression about the Peisistratidae, VI, 54, 59.

³⁸ Frag. 161: Steph. Byz., s. v. Ζώνη· πόλις Κικόνων. Ἐκαταῖος Εὐρώπη.

³⁹ It is quite a mistake to argue (as Höfer does, *op. cit.*, p. 502) that this reference to customs prevalent *εἰσέτι νῦν* denotes the poet's use of a contemporary source.

⁴⁰ Cf. also II, 855; IV, 535, 550, 1151, 1473, 1618-20.

⁴¹ I, 595; Hec., frag. 136.

form Ἐρύμναι.⁴² Ephrya as an old name for Corinth is found in Hecataeus,⁴³ and in a digression describing the later colonization of Coreyra by the Corinthians Apollonius speaks of the

Βακχιάδαι, γενεὴν Ἐφύρηθεν ἔόντες (IV, 1212).

The scholiast in telling the story at greater length mentions no authority, but it is noteworthy that the style of his note conforms in a remarkable manner to the narrative style of Herodotus (though it is not written in the Ionic dialect): Μέλισσος εὐεργετήσας τοὺς Κορινθίους—μέλλοντας γὰρ ὑπὸ Φείδωνος τοῦ τῶν Ἀργείων βασιλέως διαφθαρῆναι ἐρρύσατο—τιμῆς ἡζιώθη παρ' αὐτοῖς. <...> καὶ ποτε οἱ Βακχιάδαι νυκτὸς ἐπελθόντες τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοῦ Ἀκταίωνος ἐβούλοντο ἀποσπᾶν τὸν παῖδα· τῶν δὲ γονέων ἀντεχόντων συνέβη διασπασθῆναι τὸν Ἀκταίωνα. μελλόντων δὲ τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἀγεσθαι, στὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ὁ Μέλισσος πολλὰ τοῖς Κορινθίοις κατηράσατο, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν τοῦ παιδὸς ἐκδικήσωσι θάνατον. ταῦτα εἰπὼν εἰς τὸν προκείμενον κρημὸν ἑαυτὸν ἔβαλεν. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι εὐλαβούμενοι ἀνεκδίκητον καταλείπειν τὸν τοῦ Ἀκταίωνος θάνατον, ἅμα μὲν καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κελεύοντος, ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Βακχιάδας.⁴⁴ This story is told with more liveliness and more literary grace than is commonly found in the scholia, and it may be remembered that Dionysius of Halicarnassus points out how the old logographers were not without a certain charm and grace.⁴⁵ Again the use of Apis as an old name for the Peloponnese prompts the scholiast to write a note which very closely resembles the style of other fragments of Hecataeus: Ἀπὶς νῆσος κειμένη πρὸ τῆς Κρήτης· Μινώιον δὲ πέλαγος πρὸ τῆς Κρήτης, αὕτη γὰρ Μίνωος ἦν βασιλεία· ἡ ἐπεὶ θαλαττοκρατῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸν τὰς νήσους ἐποίησε. μετὰ δὲ τὸ Κρητικὸν τὸ Αἰγύπτιον.⁴⁶ The note which follows, raising the old question of the division into continents, likewise recalls Hecataeus as well as the polemic in Herodotus: ἡ δὲ Αἰγυπτος κατὰ μὲν τινὰς τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστὶ, κατὰ δὲ τινὰς τῆς Λιβύης.⁴⁷ Hecataeus was famous for regarding Egypt as part of Asia, because he accepted only two continents, Europe and Asia.

⁴² Cf. Delage, *op. cit.*, p. 81; Philippson in *RE*, s. v. Ἐρρυμέναι.

⁴³ Frag. 120: Steph. Byz., s. v. Κόρινθος· πόλις ἔσω τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ τῆς Πελοποννήσου. Ἐκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ. ἡ αὕτη ἐκαλεῖτο Ἐφύρα ἀπὸ Ἐφύρας τῆς Μύρμηκος τῆς Ἐπιμηθέως γυναικός.

⁴⁴ Schol., IV, 1212-14a.

⁴⁵ Schol., IV, 1564a.

⁴⁶ *De Thuo.*, 5.

⁴⁷ Schol., IV, 1569; Hdt., II, 16.

Purely mythological details taken from the *Genealogies* of Hecataeus are not easily established, though there are two which the scholia explicitly claim: the ram of Phrixus which spoke with a human voice⁴⁸ and Athena's title of Itonis in Thessaly which Apollonius gave her when calling the Argo *ἔργον Ἀθηναίης Ἰτωνίδος*.⁴⁹ It is important to note that his version of the homeward voyage of the Argonauts is certainly different from that of Hecataeus. The scholiast writes: *Ἐκαταῖος δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ἐκ τοῦ Φάσιδος διελθεῖν εἰς τὸν ὠκεανόν, εἶτα ἐκέθεν εἰς τὸν Νεῖλον, ὅθεν εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν θάλασσαν*.⁵⁰ Thus we have no reason to suppose that the fantastic geography of Europe, with its amazing river system, which Apollonius presents is based on Hecataeus. But there are a number of very interesting points in this description, beginning at IV, 259, which call for careful consideration. This passage, more than any other, seems to show the use which Apollonius made of earlier writers and how he was able to profit from what they wrote without merely copying from them.

Apollonius introduces his fantastic geography as follows:

ἔστιν γὰρ πλόος ἄλλος, ὃν ἀθανάτων ἱερεῖς
πέφραδον, οἱ Θήβης Τριτωνίδος ἐκγεγάασιν.
οὐπω τεῖρεα πάντα, τά τ' οὐρανῷ εἰλίσσονται,
οὐδέ τί πω Δαναῶν ἱερὸν γένος ἦεν ἀκοῦσαι
πειθομένους. οἳ δ' ἔσαν Ἀρκάδες Ἀπιδανῆες,
Ἀρκάδες οἳ καὶ πρόσθε σεληναίης ἰδέονται
ζῶειν, φηγὸν ἔδοντες ἐν οὐρεσιν (IV, 259-65).

This mention of the Egyptian priests as the source of a fantastic story will come as a shock to those who have recently read Professor Heidel's remarkable monograph on "Hecataeus and the Egyptian priests in Herodotus Book II,"⁵¹ for the thesis of this essay is that, when Herodotus quotes the authority of

⁴⁸ Schol., I, 256-59: *ἡ δὲ ἱστορία κεῖται παρ' Ἐκαταίῳ, ὡς ὁ κριὸς ἐλάλησεν* (Hecataeus, frag. 17).

⁴⁹ Schol., I, 551a: *Ἰτωνίης Ἀθηναῖς ἐστὶν ἱερὸν ἐν Κορωνείᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας. ὁ μὲντοι Ἀπολλώνιος οὐκ ἂν λέγοι τὴν Ἀθηναῖαν ἐπὶ κατασκευῇ τῆς Ἀργοῦς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν Κορωνείᾳ ἐπικλήσεως, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπὸ Θεσσαλικῆς Ἰτωνίας, περὶ ἧς Ἐκαταῖος μὲν ἐν τῇ α' τῶν Ἱστοριῶν* (Hec., frag. 2).

⁵⁰ Schol., IV, 257-62b (Hec., frag. 18a). The other scholion on the same point (IV, 282-91b, Hec., frag. 18b) is almost certainly corrupt.

⁵¹ See note 16 above.

these priests, he is in reality following Hecataeus, who in his turn quoted them—though without ever himself having had conversation with them any more than Herodotus had! This passage, then, if it could be shown that it had its origin in Hecataeus, might be used in support of such a thesis. But there are other and simpler explanations possible. Plato introduces the legend of Atlantis by making Egyptian priests tell it to Solon, and there was nothing unusual in pretending that their knowledge of prehistoric times was more trustworthy than that of the Greeks. Apollonius, then, is deliberately setting out to give a specious appearance of antiquity to his description. So he refers to the Egyptians, calls the Nile Triton (supposedly an older name than Νεῖλος), uses other archaic terms like Πελασγίς χθών (265), Ἡερίη for Egypt (270), and so leads on to the story of Sesostris which, like Herodotus, he represents as a purely Egyptian story.⁵²

Indeed this whole introduction resembles a parody or a humorous adaptation of the logographer's style, the kind of thing that was doubtless written by Dionysius Scytobrachion,⁵³ and may have been attempted by many other Alexandrian writers. The map set up in Aeaea (279-81) recalls the famous map of Hecataeus⁵⁴ and the map which Aristagoras showed to Cleomenes;⁵⁵ and the appeal to such a graven monument is intended to give the story an air of antiquity. The introduction is in fact an elaborate device to give a pretence of genuineness to the fantastic geography which follows. Curious ideas about the Danube may have been frequent enough, but none quite so curious as those which make possible the story of the Argonauts' return. Words deliberately reminiscent of old Ionian writers are chosen, like διετεκμήραντο⁵⁶ (which recalls Herodotus'

⁵² Heidel (*op. cit.*, pp. 71-75) argues that this story is of Greek origin and that Herodotus (II, 102-11) got it from Hecataeus. See also his earlier article, "A suggestion concerning Plato's Atlantis," *Proc. of Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sciences*, 68, pp. 217 ff.

⁵³ Cf. E. Schwartz in *RE*, s. v. *Dionysius* (109) *Skytobrachion*.

⁵⁴ Strabo, I, 1, 11: γράμμα πιστούμενον ἐκείνου εἶναι ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλης αὐτοῦ γραφῆς.

⁵⁵ Hdt., V, 49: . . . χάλκεον πινάκα ἐν τῷ γῆς ἀπάσης περιόδῳ ἐνετέμνητο καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

⁵⁶ 282-84: ἔστι δὲ τις ποταμός, ὑπατον κέρας Ὀκεανοῖο, εὐρύς τε προβοθής τε καὶ ἀλκάδι νῆι περῆσαι.
Ἴστρον μιν καλέοντες ἐκὰς διετεκμήραντο.

remarks about the Nile and Danube)⁵⁷ and παρακέλνται⁵⁸ (a word used by Hecataeus in describing the position of Media relative to the Caspian Gates).⁵⁹

The scholia reveal, moreover, that Apollonius has taken various names from various geographical authorities. Their attempt to trace down the sources of the story of the flight and to sort out the various geographical opinions results merely in a collection of irrelevant information. They certainly present a formidable array of names, authors of *Γῆς Περίοδοι* and *Κτίσεις*, but nothing emerges from a study of these names. It is their notes on the individual names of places that are illuminating. They can cite Aeschylus as a source for the Rhipaeian mountains; and Eratosthenes, so they tell us, mentioned the island of Peuce in the Danube,⁶⁰ which according to him was as large as Rhodes—but Herodotus had already spoken of islands in that river as large as Lesbos.⁶¹ But Apollonius has many details in his description for which the scholiasts can find no authority, though they do their best, striving to trace the Σινδοί (321-22), the Ἀγγοῦρον ὄρος, and the Καυλιακὸς σκόπελος (323-26).⁶² It is unfortunate that it is not made clear how much use Apollonius made of Timagetus' *Περὶ λιμένων*.⁶³

The scholia offer no authority for the Βρύγοι, calling them simply ἔθνος Ἰλλυρίας,⁶⁴ or for the island of Electris⁶⁵ or for the story of how the Colchians who survived the massacre settled:

οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῶν νήσων ἔβαν, ἦσιν ἔπεςχον.
ἦρπες, ναίουσι δ' ἐπώνυμοι Ἀψύρτοιο.
οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἐπ' Ἰλλυρικοῖο μελαμβαθέος ποταμοῖο,

⁵⁷ II, 33: τοῖσι ἐμφάνεσι τὰ μὴ γνωσκόμενα τεκμαιρόμενος.

⁵⁸ The Trinaerian sea

γαίῃ δὲ ὑμετέρῃ παρακέλνται, εἰ ἐτεὸν δὴ
ὑμετέρης γαίης Ἀχελώϊος ἐξανήσιν (292-93).

⁵⁹ Frag. 286: χώρα ταῖς Κασπίαις παρακεκλιμένη πύλαις.

⁶⁰ Schol., IV, 282-91b.

⁶¹ Schol., IV, 311; Hdt., I, 202.

⁶² Cf. *RE*, s. v. Σινδοί, Ἀγγοῦρον ὄρος, Καυλιακὸς σκόπελος.

⁶³ The scholia refer to this author six times (see Wendel's index).

⁶⁴ IV, 470.

⁶⁵ IV, 505: αὕτη ἡ Ἠλεκτρίς ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ Ἠριδάνου ποταμοῦ. The fact that Theopompus mentioned the Ἠλεκτρίδες is indeed an argument that they were mentioned by older geographers (Frag. 130—Ps.-Scymnus, 369-74).

τύμβος ἰν' Ἀρμονίης Κάδμουό τε, πύργον ἔδειμαν
 ἀνδράσιν Ἑγγελέσσω ἐφέστιοι· οἱ δ' ἐν ὄρεσσιν
 ἐναίουσιν, ἅπερ τε Κεραύνια κυκλήσκονται (514-19).

Of the Ὑλλῆες, the first tribe which the heroes reached after the rout of the Colchians (524), the scholiast says only *ἔθνος περὶ τὴν Ἰλλυρίαν ἀπὸ Ὑλλου*. Certainly the style of these notes is reminiscent of the fragments of Hecataeus; and the Enchelees, among whom some of the Colchians settled, find their place among the Illyrian tribes in the *Periegesis*.⁶⁶ But the scholiasts are evidently mystified by the fantastic story, and after a while give up the attempt to explain what its sources may be, since the details appear to come from such various quarters; in the end they are content to point out that this name or that is familiar.

So also modern scholars studying the story are inclined to conclude that Apollonius takes various details from various sources. Delage⁶⁷ points out how Timagetus (this mysterious author frequently cited in the scholia) believed in a Mediterranean mouth of the Danube; and one can well believe that even in the time of Apollonius, when Central European geography was still a closed book to the Greeks, this belief was still entertained by some and scoffed at by others. It is harder to believe that the existence of the Alps was unknown in Alexandrian circles and that educated people believed in the joining of the Rhône and the Po;⁶⁸ but Euripides, according to Pliny,⁶⁹ lent literary authority to this belief. It is possible to go right through the text of the *Argonautica* and, with the help of the scholia, tabulate information of this kind, some of which is probably not relevant. But Apollonius has to add some original invention of his own before he can combine the details, and the mixture of fable and science which results is inexplicable except on the supposition that it is designed to represent early ideas of geography. Apollonius is enough of an Alexandrian not to invent something *ἀμάρτυρον* when he can find authoritative testimony. Some of the details, therefore, are taken from

⁶⁶ Frag. 103.

⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 225.

⁶⁸ But cf. J. Partsch, "Die Stromgabelungen der Argonautensage," *Berichte der sächsischen Akad.*, phil.-hist. Klasse, 71 (1919), Heft 2.

⁶⁹ Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXVII, 2. Cf. Schol. Dion. Perieg., 289.

geographical sources; and it is his acquaintance with geographical literature that enables him to use these as a means of giving an air of reality to the story.

If this conclusion is correct, the use which Apollonius made of his knowledge of early geographical literature is clearly revealed. The idea of combining geography and mythology goes as far back as Hecataeus (possibly even beyond him to Aristaeus of Proconnesus, who finds no mention in the scholia). A number of geographical details were taken by Apollonius from old geographers, and with these details went certain characteristics of style and even of vocabulary. The use of this information from old sources lent an air of antiquity to his description. When he came to Central Europe, however, his sources failed him. There is no indication that Hecataeus and the other early authors of *Periegeses* ever went far beyond the coast of Western Europe, except in speaking of the circumambient ocean and the great rivers like the Ister and the Eridanus; but even here there was no detailed information to be found and, since the country was in any case unfamiliar to the Greeks of Alexandria, the poet could give free rein to his imagination; which indeed he did, calling upon the muses to bear the burden of his story and quoting the imaginary authority of Egyptian priests, whose knowledge was supposed to antedate the ages when the Greeks first came to the Mediterranean.

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CONCERNING GOTHIC INTRANSITIVE VERBS.

I. Gothic *siukan* "to be sick" : *siuks* "sick"; an Isolated Type of Strong Verb.

The Goth. verb *siukan* is strong (cf. *hwass siukip*, *ῥίς ἀσθενεί*, k. 11, 29). It represents a semantically isolated type of verb in that verbs denoting a state of mind or body are otherwise regularly weak.¹ Since the corresponding adjective *siuks* existed, we should expect the strong verb *siukan* to have been supplanted by a weak verb² derived from the adjective just as in the later Germ. languages (cf. OHG *siuhhan* < **siuhjan* : *siuhhēn* : *siechōn* from the adj. *siuh* : *sioh*; MHG *sochēn* < **sukēn* : ON *sokna* from the stem **suk-* with low grade vowel; ON *sjúkna* from the adj. *sjúkr*).

The Goth. verb *siukan* occurs only in the present tense. The question therefore arises as to why in the past tense the adjective *siuks* plus the substantive verb entirely supplanted the verb *siukan*, especially since both translated the same Grk. verb *ἀσθενεῖν* (cf. *hwass siukip*, *jah ni siukau*, *ῥίς ἀσθενεί*, καὶ οὐκ ἀσθενῶ, k. 11, 29; *siuks was*,³ *ἡσθέει*, J. 11, 2).

This substitution for the verb *siukan* of the adjective *siuks* plus the substantive verb in the past tense points towards the conclusion that the strong verb *siukan* denoting a state of body ("sick") was already felt as an anomaly⁴ and hence the pre-

¹ Cf. *faúrhtjan* (without the reflexive *sik*) "to be afraid" : adj. *faúrhts*; [ga-] *bleipjan* "to be merciful, have mercy" : adj. *bleips*, etc.

² That is, either by **siukjan* = OHG *-siuhhan* or by *siukan* : **siukaida* (cf. OHG *riohēn* "to be rich" ; adj. *riohi* "rich" ; *armēn* "to be poor" : adj. *arm* "poor" = Goth. *-arman* : *-armaida* : adj. **arms*).

³ This phrase *siuks was* (*ἡσθέει*) is omitted by M. Metlen, *JEGPh.*, 32, 535-7, in his list of *More Words in One Language than in the Other for the Same Idea*. The phrase occurs J. 11, 2; 3; 6; R. 8, 3; k. 11, 21; Ph. 2, 27.

⁴ This is supported by the fact that the strong verb *siukan* was in the later Germ. languages (OHG-MHG) entirely supplanted by the denominative weak verb.

Compare the strong verb *keinan*, **kai*, [us-] *kijanata* (L. 8, 6) which developed the weak preterite form [us-] *keinōda* (L. 8, 8). The strong form **kai* was an anomaly because otherwise the stem of verbs belonging to the 1st ablaut series did not end in a vowel. The reason for the disappearance of **sauk* is, of course, not parallel to that of **kai* but it

terite forms **sauk*: **sukum* with ablaut variation were avoided. Its retention in the present tense may be explained as due to the influence of the corresponding adjective *siuks* with the same ablaut vowel as in *siukan*, possibly enhanced by the adjectival usage of the present participle *siukands* (κακῶς ἔχων L. 7, 2; νοσῶν T. 6, 4).

If the phrases *siuks wās* (ἡσθένει J. 11, 2, R. 8, 3; ἀσθενεί J. 11, 6; ἡσθένησεν Ph. 2, 27): *siukai wēseima* ἡσθενήσαμεν k. 11, 21) for **sauk*: **sukeima* represent a case of stylistic variation, this variation may be due to the anomalous character of the verb *siukan*.

II. Gothic *wakan*, **wōk*: **wakaida*?

Jellinek (*Geschichte der got. Sprache*, § 201) raises the question whether Goth. *wakan* represented the strong verb in spite of ON *vaka*, *vakta*: OHG *wahhēn*, but without justification.

The tendency to the *ē*-formation evident in ON *vaka*: OHG *wahhēn* appears in Goth. **wōkan*, **wōkaida* which must be postulated from the verbal substantive *wōkains** (*wōkainim* k. 6, 5; 11, 27). If the Gothic had preserved PG **wakēn* (= *vaka*: OHG *wahhēn*) we should have expected a verbal substantive **wakains* instead of *wōkains**.

It is evident then that Goth. **wōkan*, **wōkaida* took the place of PG **wakēn* and therefore that ON *vaka*: OHG *wahhēn* do not support a Goth. *wakan*, **wakaida*. Since Goth. **wōkan* represented a durative *ē*-verb there is no reason for postulating another durative *ē*-verb *wakan*: **wakaida*, alongside **wōkan*; especially since we have no verbal substantive **wakains*. The WGerm. *ō(j)*-verb OHG *wahhōn*: OS *wakon*, OE *wacian* does not represent another weak durative verb in addition to **wakēn* (ON *vaka*: OHG *wahhēn*) but simply the secondary tendency for *ō*-verbs to interchange with *ē*-verbs.

Jellinek has not mentioned in connection with this question the verbal substantive *wōkains** which affords the only evidence within the Gothic of the *ē*-verb. The verb **wōkan*, **wōkaida* supports the strong conjugation of *wakan*, **wōk* (= OE *wóc*)—**wōkan*, an *ē*-verb, derived from **wōk*, originally a perfect

shows, like **kai*, that an anomalous form gives rise to a substitute form or expression.

tense⁵—and at the same time lends evidence against the existence of a Goth. verb *wakan*, **wakaida* inasmuch as the durative *ē*-verb could hardly have existed in two forms, one with the low grade vowel *a* and the other with the high grade vowel *ō*, and with exactly the same meaning. If this had been the case, one or the other would have disappeared (cf. *wōkains** not **wakains*).

III. Gothic *-waknan*, **wōk* : **waknōda*?

Jellinek (*ibid.*) likewise raises the question whether the inchoative verb *-waknan* corresponds to ON *vakna* or to OE *wæcnan*, *wóc* but again, as it seems to me, without justification.

OE *wæcnan* : *wóc* (< **waknan* : *wōk*) "awaken" represents the original inchoative function of the verb. Since, however, the inchoative *n*-suffix was restricted to the present tense (cf. Goth. *frathnan*, *frah*) the preterite form **wōk* could have represented a durative function ("I watched; was on the watch; was watchful, awake") as well as the original inchoative function ("I became awake, watchful; I awoke" = OE *wóc*).

From the preterite form **wōk* a new present strong form *wakan* (without the inchoative *n*-suffix) was formed in Goth., denoting the corresponding durative function of **wōk*. The result of the new present tense *wakan* was that the preterite form **wōk* could no longer function as an inchoative verb but remained restricted to its durative function. This restriction necessarily led to a new preterite form of the inchoative *-waknan*. The original preterite form **wōk* was therefore discarded in favor of **waknōda* (= ON *vaknaða*) after the example of the

⁵ Cf. F. Specht, "Zur Geschichte der Verbalklasse auf -ā" *Zfogl. Sprachf.*, 62, 71-2. Specht here refers to ON *vakinn* as evidence of a strong verb **vaka*. This represents the current view but I do not believe that ON *vak-inn* "awake" necessarily represents a past part. of a lost verb **vaka* str. The lack of the palatal *ki*-umlaut—we should have expected **vekinn*—points towards a secondary formation. There is nothing in the way of assuming that *vak-inn* represents an adj. outside the verbal system, derived from the stem *vak-* as in the inf. *vaka* (*ē*-verb), i. e., *vak-inn* "watchful, awake" : *vak-a* "to watch" (cf. *geym-inn* "heedful, attentive" : *geym-a* "to heed"; *gæt-inn* "watchful" : *gæt-a* "to watch over, attend," etc.). Cf. my article "Old Norse *tig-inn* : *tig-inn* : *fú-inn* : *lú-inn*," *SEN*, 10, 50-55.

inchoative *nōn*-verbs. OE *wacnode* (for *wóc*) shows a parallel development.

In WGerm., on the other hand, the durative strong verb (= Goth. *wakan*) did not exist but was represented by the *ē*- or the *ō(j)*-verb; OHG *wahhēn*, *wahhōn* = OS *wakon*, OE *wacian*. Hence, it is clear why OE *wóc* retained its inchoative function and why *wæcnan* (= Goth. *-waknan*) did not follow the example of the *nōn*-verbs, i. e., because the preterite form *wóc* remained inchoative. Besides, the *nōn*-class in WGerm. was not so distinctively developed as in Gothic⁶ - ON.⁷

The discrepancy to which Jellinek calls attention is, therefore, only apparent. OE *wæcnan*: *wóc* represents the original status (prehistorical Goth. **waknan*, **wōk*) whereas ON *vakna*, *vaknaða* represents the secondary status which developed in Goth. (*-waknan*, *-*waknōða*) in order to differentiate the preterite form of the inchoative verb *-waknan* from that of the new durative verb *wakan*.

IV. Gothic *riqizjan** "finster werden, sich verfinstern"?

According to the current view the denominative intransitive verb **riqizjan* (*riqis-z*) has an inchoative sense "finster werden, sich verfinstern."

The verb occurs only once (Mk. 13, 24): *sauil riqizeip*, ὁ ἥλιος σκοτισθήσεται. The Grk. original means "The sun will be made dark." If the Goth. verb *riqizeip* corresponds in sense to the Grk. verb σκοτισθήσεται (future passive of σκοτίζω "make dark": σκότος "darkness"), then *riqizeip* must have an inchoative sense "will be made (= will become) dark."

Since, however, we have no evidence that intransitive *jan*-verbs are primarily inchoative,⁸ it is a question whether *riqizeip* here has an inchoative sense "will become dark." The intransitive denominative *jan*-verbs are otherwise without exception durative in sense (cf. *bleip*: [ga-] *bleipjan* "sich erbarmen, to be merciful"; *fulls*: *ufar-fulljan* (K. 15, 58) "überfüllt sein, to be full to overflowing"; *ufarassus*: *ufarassjan* "im

⁶ Cf. *us-keinan*, **-kai*: *keinōða*.

⁷ Cf. *fregna*, *frá*: *fregnaða*; *sporna*, *sparn*: *spornaða*.

⁸ The inchoative sense of intransitive *jan*-verbs is due to their usage with a prefix (cf. *in-rauhitjan* "get into a state of anger, become angry," *in-gramjan* "to become bitter," etc.).

Überfluss vorhanden sein, to *be* in excess"; *siponeis* : *siponjan* "Schüler sein, to *be* a disciple"; *rign* : *rignjan* "regnen, to rain," *balps* : *balþjan* "kühn sein, to *be* brave," etc.).

It is hardly possible that *riqizeip* here represents a causative *jan*-verb, in which case it would represent an impersonal usage with *sauil* as its object (i. e., *sauil riqizeip*, "It will darken the sun = The sun will be darkened"), for we have no such examples of an impersonal causative verb denoting *natural* phenomena.⁹

The evidence then points to the conclusion that the verb *riqizeip* here represents the regular *durative* intransitive denominative *jan*-verb "will *be* dark" and that the Goth. translator has thus inaccurately rendered the Grk. original. Otherwise why was the regular inchoative *n*-suffix not utilized (i. e., *sauil *riqizniþ*)?¹⁰ If Goth. *riqizeip* is of IE origin and with Feist (*Etym. Wtb. der got. Spr.*, 217) to be equated with OI *rajasyāti* "es *wird* dunkel," it seems strange that the Goth. translator did not discard the form *riqizeip* in favor of **riqizniþ*¹¹ in which the *n*-suffix clearly differentiates the inchoative from the durative sense, especially since the intransitive *jan*-verbs were otherwise always durative in sense.

V. Gothic *judaiwiskōn* "to live like a Jew."

The verb *judaiwiskōn* (**judaiwisks* : *judaiwiskō*) was coined to translate the Grk. verb *louðatēv*. Since the Goth. verb was

⁹ *Rignjan** in M. 5, 45, *rigneip* (βρέχει) *ana garaihtans* is personal; [sa *atta*] *rigneip*, "He [the Father] rains (= makes it rain) on the just."

¹⁰ Cf. the corresponding phrase in the ON *Völusp.* 57, 1: *sól tēr sortna* "The sun will *become* dark."

ON *rǫkkva*, — : — *rǫkkvit* "to grow dark," although the extant forms (*rǫkkv* 3rd pers. sing. pres.) are ambiguous, most likely represents a strong verb of the 5th ablaut series (cf. Noreen, *Aisl. Grm.*, § 498) and not a *jan*-verb parallel to Goth. **riqizjan*.

¹¹ That Wulfila, however, did not always differentiate the durative intransitive verb from the inchoative verb of the Grk. original is clear from L. 1, 53 *gabignands* ("those who have *become* rich") = *πλουτοῦντας* "those who *are* rich" (*πλουτεῖν* "to be rich") over against k. 9, 11 *in allamma gabignandans*, *ēn þarri ploutizόμενοι* "being enriched (= becoming enriched) in everything."

The verb *gabignan* cannot in the first passage mean "reich sein" in conformity with the Grk. but "reich werden." In his *Vocabulary of Die Got. Bibel* Streitberg gives the meaning of *gabignan* as "reich sein" but in his *Got. Grm.* (§ 219, b) correctly as "reich werden."

intransitive and durative in sense it naturally was formed as an *ōn*-verb after the pattern of such intransitive denominative verbs (with suffix syllable) as *þiud-an-ōn* (*þiud-ans*) "to be king," *frauj-in-ōn* (*frauja*) "to be lord, reign," etc. which likewise denote a manner of living or being.

Aside from *judaiwiskōn* we have in Gothic only one other *iskōn*-verb, viz. *aiwiskōn*, ἀσχημονεῖν, "to treat shamefully" and its compound *ga-aiwiskōn*, κατασχύνειν "to put to shame, abuse" (*aiwiski*, n. *ja*-stem, αἰσχύνη "shame"; *un-aiwisks*, ἀπερασχυντός "without shame, unblemished").

The formal resemblance between these two verbs *aiwiskōn* and *judaiwiskōn* consists not only in the suffix *-isk* but also in the previous syllable *-aiw-* (*-áiw-* : *-ēw-*). This formal resemblance may have been a contributing factor to the coining of *judaiwiskōn* as an *ōn*-verb, but as shown above, the *ōn*-verb *judaiwiskōn* is, on account of its intransitive durative character, justified without assuming any influence on the part of the verb *aiwiskōn*. However, since both are *isk*-verbs they cannot formally be separated from each other and this fact leads us to the question as to why the native denominative verb from *aiwiski* was an *ōn*-verb (*aiwiskōn*).

Since the substantive *ja*-stem *aiwiski* "shame" existed (but no *ō(n)*-stem **aiwisk-a*, *-ō*) we should have expected a *jan*-verb **aiwiskjan* "to treat shamefully." Since *aiwiskōn* represents the only native *iskōn*-verb in Gothic we must turn to the other Germ. languages for a solution of the *iskōn*-verb. Here the conditions in ON afford us some light.

In ON all the denominative *isk-* (> *sk-*) verbs are *ōn*-verbs; viz. *elska* "to love," *heimska* "to make a fool of, mock," *lymskask* "to act cunningly," and *illska* "to be ugly, wicked," four in number. In my article "The Suffix *-sk-* in Old Norse *Elska*," (*A. J. P.*, XLIX (1928), pp. 188-195) I explained the *ōn*-conjugation of these verbs as due to the fact that they were derived not from the corresponding adjectives (*elskr*, *heimskr*, *lymskr*, **illskr*) but from the corresponding *ōn*-substantives (*elska*, *heimska*, *lymska*, *illska*). With this secondary *iskōn*-type in ON we may compare the original *sk*-verbs¹² (with IE *sk*-suffix), OHG *eiscōn* (*eisca*), *forscōn* (*forsca*).

¹² Cf. Goth. *fiskōn* : ON *fiska*, *-aða* : OHG *fiskōn* (Lat. *piscāri*) with original *-sk-* of the stem. This IE denominative *ājō*-type may have (on

These conditions in ON point to the conclusion that the *isk*-verbs in Gothic were likewise *ōn*-verbs derived from the corresponding *ō(n)*-substantives. This original *iskōn*-type does not occur in our Gothic texts but the assumption of its existence (in common with ON) could explain the *ōn*-verb *aiwiskōn* as an analogical formation; i. e., that *aiwiskōn* was formed after the pattern of these *iskōn*-verbs (preserved in ON) derived from the corresponding *ō(n)*-substantives in spite of the corresponding *ja*-stem *aiwiski*. At any rate, Goth. *aiwiskōn* cannot formally be separated from the ON *ska*-type which always appears as an *ōn*-verb.

To return to *judaiwiskōn*, whether this newly coined verb stood under the influence of *aiwiskōn* and thus followed the (lost) *iskōn*-type or not, the *ōn*-formation was in keeping with the intransitive durative sense of the verb. It is, however, most likely that both these factors (the *iskōn*-type and the intransitive usage) were involved, especially since *judaiwiskōn*, like *aiwiskōn*, contained a *w* before the *isk*-suffix. The *-aiwiskōn* of *judaiwiskōn* was phonetically identical with *aiwiskōn*¹³ except for the vowel *ai* = *ē*.

The whole question of the denominative *isk*-verbs in Germ. should receive a thorough treatment. I find no mention of this verbal type in Wissmann's monograph "Nomina Postverbalia in den germ. Sprachen, I. Teil: Deverbative *ō*-Verba," *Ergänzungsheft zur Zfogl. Sprachf.*, Nr. 11, 1932.

VI. Gothic *blōtan* (λατρεύειν, σέβειν) "to worship."

The verb *blōtan* is used transitively in T. 2, 10 *gub blōtan* (*gub* object of the substantivized inf. *blōtan*) = Grk. θεοσέβεια "godliness" and in Mk. 7, 7 *ip sware mik blōtand, μάτην δὲ σέβονταί με*, "But in vain do they worship me."

account of the *-sk-* of the stem) had a contributory influence on the later verbal formations with suffix *-skō* and *-iskō* (cf. ON *fiska*, *-aða* : *elska-aða*; OHG *fiscōn* : *eiscōn* : *forscōn*).

¹³ It will be noted that the Goth. scribe has translated the Grk. *μητιάειν* "to be like a child (*νήπιος*), be childish," by *barnisks wisan* not **barniskōn* (cf. *μητιάετε, barniskai sijaiþ*, K. 14, 20), which is additional evidence that the newly coined verb *judaiwiskōn* stood under the influence of *aiwiskōn*; otherwise we should have expected *judaiwisks wisan* = *louθαίειν*, "be like a Jew, be Jewish."

In L. 2, 37 *biðom blōtande*, δειῖσσι λατρεύουσα, "worshipping in prayer" the verb is used without an object and hence may be construed either transitively with an object (*gub*) understood or in the so-called "absolute" function, equivalent to a *durative intransitive* verb "performing worship, rendering religious service" (cf. OE *goðum blōtan* "to render service to the gods").

There is no reason why we should not assume that the Goth. verb *blōtan* could be used in this intransitive durative sense of "performing a religious sacrifice" (cf. ON-OE *blót*, "sacrifice") especially since it is possible that the verb *blōtan* may represent a weak verb of the *ai*-class¹⁴ which may denote the intransitive function.

Assuming then that *blōtan* could be used in this intransitive sense, we may easily explain the irregular verbal abstract *blōt-inassus* (θηροκεία, λατρεία) "worship" as due to the influence of the type *gudj-inassus* derived from *gudj-inōn* (*gudja*). The *inōn*-verbs denoted primarily a durative intransitive function¹⁵ "to carry out an office"; *gudja* "priest," *gudj-inōn* "to act in the capacity of priest," *gudj-inassus* "acting in the capacity of a priest" > "priesthood"; hence *blōtan* "to perform the service of a heathen priest" (cf. ON *blót-maðr*) : *blót-inassus* "performing the service of a priest" > "worship."

Von Bahder (*Verbalabstracta*, 116) rightly doubts the existence of a verb **blōtinōn* but he has failed to give the reason for this, viz. that the form *blōtan* could have exactly the same meaning as **blōtinōn* "to perform a religious service," which fact renders the assumption of a verb **blōtinōn* unnecessary.

Since the verbal suffix *-inassus* was derived from *inōn*-verbs, it is quite natural that this suffix should be extended to any verbal stem which, like the *inōn*-verbs, denoted a durative intransitive usage. We have, e. g., the adjective *wans* "lacking," *wan-ains* "a lacking, want" (verb **wanan*, **wanaida* "to lack," cf. ON *vana*, OE *wanian*, OHG *wanōn*, all *ōn*-verbs), hence *wan-innassus* "a lacking, want." Here again Von Bahder (*ibid.*) rightly doubts the existence of a verb **waninōn* but he

¹⁴ Cf. the ON denominative verb *blóta*, *blótaða* (from the subs. *blót*) which could originally have meant only "to perform a *blót* = heathen sacrifice" > "to worship."

¹⁵ The intransitive *inōn*-verbs could, of course, become transitive (cf. *leikeis* "doctor," *leikinōn* "to be a doctor" > "to cure" = θεραπεύειν).

fails to see that it is the intransitive durative sense of the verbal stem *wan-* "to lack" which renders the assumption of a verb **waninōn* unnecessary for the formation of the verbal abstract *wan-inassus*.

The evidence then points towards the conclusion that both *waninassus* and *blōtinassus* are of analogical origin due to the intransitive force of the verbal suffix *-inassus*. The verb *blōtan* was therefore most probably used not only in a transitive but also in an intransitive sense which constituted the bridge between *blōtan* and the *inōn*-verbs. The semantic element¹⁶ involved in this problem of verbal suffixes has not been sufficiently emphasized.

VII. Gothic *þragjan* "to run."

Grienberger (*ibid.*, 217) considers *þragjan* a denominative verb from a substantive **þraga-* or **þragō-*. This is of course possible (cf. OE **þrægan* "to run" from *þræg* "lapse of time"). But there is another possibility which Grienberger has overlooked, viz. that the *j*-suffix is original.

If we connect *þrag-jan* with Grk. *τρέχω* : *τρόχος*¹⁷ we must assume that the radical vowel *ā* in *þrag-jan* represents an IE *ō*. According to Brugmann¹⁸ the iterative-causative suffix *-éjō* : *-éjē-ti* was used with verbs containing the radical vowel IE *ō* (cf. Grk. *φέρω* : *φορέω*, Lat. *decet* : *docēo*) in which case the *j*-suffix in *þrag-jan* could be original just as, e. g., in *far-jan* (cf.

¹⁶ It will be noted that the verbal abstract *us-blōteins*, *παράκλησις*, "prayer, entreaty" is transitive in force. The *jan*-verbs (from which the *eni*-suffix is derived) were predominantly transitive. Therefore it is not necessary to postulate with Grienberger (*Untersuchungen zur got. Wortkunde*, 51) a verb **us-blōtjan*—Grienberger writes *uf-blōteins*, **uf-blōtjan*—(which would most probably be causative in force), for a verb **us-blōtan* could be transitive (*παράκαλέω*) "beseech." The transitive function of this verb could form the bridge connecting the verbal abstract with the *jan*-verbs, just as the intransitive function of *blōtan* (*λατρεύειν*) "to perform a religious ceremony" connected this verb with the *inōn*-class and hence with the verbal abstracts in *-inassus*. With *us-blōteins* compare *ga-skaideins* (*διαστολή*) "difference" : *ga-skaidan* [*sik*] trans.

¹⁷ Cf. Grienberger (*ibid.*) and Feist, *Etym. Wtb. der got. Sprache*, 278-9.

¹⁸ *Grundriss*, II, 3^a, 122.

Grk. *περάω* : *πόρος*, *πορεύομαι*) and the weak conjugation of *þrag-jan* may be explained as due to the *j*-suffix just as in the case of *far-jan*.

It will be noted that whereas the durative intransitive verbs *ligan* "to lie," *sitan* "to sit" have entirely lost the original *j*-suffix, the iterative intransitive verbs of motion *farjan* (alongside *faran*) "to travel [by ship]" and *þragjan* "to run" have retained it. I believe that the retention of the *j*-suffix in the latter type is due to at least *two* causes; viz. (1) to association with the denominative *jan*-type (cf. *farjan* : ON *ferja*, *far* "ship"; *laistjan* "eine Spur (*laists*) verfolgen" > "folgen"; and perhaps also **gaggjan*, *gaggida* (L. 19, 12) "einen Gang (*gagg*) machen") and (2) to association with the intransitive usage of *jan*-verbs denoting motion of the type *waltjan* "to toss [of waves]," *ga-wandjan* (without *sik*) "to turn," etc.

If we may assume that these factors account for the retention of the *j*-suffix in *farjan* and *þragjan*, we may perhaps explain the retention of the *j*-suffix in *wahsjan* (over against ON *vaza*, WGerm. **wahsan*) "to grow." It is possible that the *j*-suffix¹⁹ in *wahs-jan* was identified with the *j*-suffix of the type *farjan* : *þrag-jan* because of the semantic similarity between the two types, i. e., both types represented intransitive verbs denoting a *change*, one of *place*, the other of *condition* (cf. Goth. *wairþan* "to become" : Lat. *vertere* "to turn"; Eng. *turn* = *move around* : *turn gray* = *become gray*). The retention of the *j*-suffix in *wahs-jan* may then perhaps be due to the example of the intransitive verbs of motion of the type *far-jan* : *þrag-jan*. This seems all the more likely in that the durative intransitive verbs *sitan* "to sit" and *ligan* "to lie" have, on the other hand, entirely lost the *j*-suffix. However, there is the possibility that *wahs-jan* stood under the formal influence of the verbs of the seventh ablaut series with *j*-suffix in the present tense (cf. *hlah-jan*, *haf-jan*, *skap-jan*, etc.). But this possibility seems more remote when we consider that Goth. *wahs-jan* (with *j*-suffix)

¹⁹ The *j*-suffix in *wahs-jan* is generally explained as causative (*wahseip* = Sansk. *vakṣayati* "he causes to grow" < IE **waks-éie-ti*); see Kieckers, *Handb. der got. Sprache*, 203, 219. But the original causative force of the suffix became iterative in conformity with the intransitive sense which the verb assumed in Germanic.

can hardly be separated from North ²⁰ and West Germ. **wahsan* (without *j*-suffix). If the analogy in question obtained in Gothic, why did it not obtain in North and West Germ., where the *j*-suffix in the seventh ablaut series was likewise preserved (cf. Goth. *haf-jan* : ON *hefja*, OHG *heffen*; Goth. *skapjan* : ON *skepja*, OHG *skepffen*)?

At any rate, the semantic factors of this problem concerning the retention of an original *j*-suffix should be considered in conjunction with the purely phonetic aspects. The verb *pragjan*, if not denominative in origin, belongs to the type *farjan*. That the *j*-suffix in *wahsjan* was retained because of its meaning and thus identified with the *j*-suffix in the type *farjan* is not at all certain but at least possible. The example of the durative intransitive verbs *sitan* and *ligan* favors this hypothesis.

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THE ISLANDS OF PEISISTRATOS.

One of the more confused passages in Pliny's geographical books (*Nat. Hist.*, V, 136-8) mentions the Islands of Peisistratos. Pliny is enumerating the islands off Asia, starting from Egypt (128, *insularum ante Asiam prima est in Canopico ostio Nili—Pharos*) and ending at the Hellespont (141). The main items are Cyprus (129), Rhodes (132), Samos (135), Chios (136), Lesbos (139). The general direction, we see, is northwards. He concludes his notice of Chios with the words: *posita est inter Samum et Lesbum, ex adverso maximè Erythrarum*. The next two sections I quote complete, from Mayhoff's text, whose punctuation only I modify:

(137) *Finitimae sunt Tellusa quam alii Daphnusam scribunt, Oenusa, Elaphitis, Euryanassa, Arginusa cum oppido—iam hæc circa Ephesum—et quæ Pisistrati vocantur Anthinae, Myon-*

²⁰ Cf. OSwed. *væxa* : OIcel. *væxa* (Noreen, *Aschw. Grm.*, § 540, Anm. 4). Kleckers (*ibid.*, 203) says of Goth. *wahsjan*: "Andere Sprachen weisen kein *j* auf."

nesos, Diarrheusa—in utraque oppida interciderē—Poroselene cum oppido, Cerciae, Halone, Commone, Illetia, Lepria, Aethre, Sphaeria, Procusae, Bolbulae, Pheate, Priapos, Syce, Melane, Aenare, Sidusa, Pele, Drymusa, Anhydros, Scopelos, Sycusa, Marathusa, Psile, Perirrheusa, multaeque ignobiles, (138) clara vero in alto Teos cum oppido, a Chio LXXII D, tantundem ab Erythris: iuxta Zmyrnam sunt Peristerides, Carteria, Alopece, Elaeusa, Bacchina, Pystira, Crommyonnesos, Megale: ante Troada Ascaniae, Plateae tres, dein Lamiae, Plitaniae duae, Plate, Scopelos, Getone, Arthedon, Coele, Lagusae, Didymae.

Mayhoff puts a full stop before *iam haec circa Ephesum*, and so refers those four words to what follows instead of to what precedes: I do not think the words *iam haec* could bear that meaning. I have removed another full stop at the end of 137, before *clara vero*: those two words answer *ignobiles* and I mean my comma to allow for that.

Two corrections of names I offer at once: for *circa Ephesum* in § 136 read *circa Lesbum*, and for *Teos* in § 138 read *Tenedos*. These changes, if accepted, give a decidedly northerly bias, and the reader should not accept them till more of the argument has been developed. Provisionally I justify them (a) because Arginusa is near Lesbos, not near Ephesos, (b) because Teos is not an island and though Pliny sometimes mistakes a peninsula for an island, the emphatic *in alto* points very strongly to Tenedos, though the distances which follow are false.

The names which can be placed are: Oenusa, Arginusa, Poroselene, Sidusa, Pele, Drymusa, Marathusa, Teos or Tenedos, Carteria, Bacchina(?), Lagusae(?). Getone reappears in IV, 74 (Gethone, seemingly near the Chersonese). It is not necessary to equate Alopece with Alopecconnesos (IV, 74), nor Halone with the Propontis island of that name (V, 151); the latter might conceivably be equated with Halonnesos near Embata (Strabo, XIV, 1, 33) south of Erythrai, but since two Halonnesoi and one Halone are already distinguishable, it seems simplest to distinguish one more here. For Myonnesos, see below.

If we follow the known names, the first list of islands (§ 137) starts northwards from Chios city to Oinoussai, passes up east of Lesbos, past Arginousai to Poroselene, then comes south, past Sidousa (somewhere in Erythrean territory (Thuc., VIII, 24, 2; cf. Stephanos, s. vv. Σίδουσα and Σίδους) to Pele, Drymoussa, and Marathousa, all three in the Gulf of Smyrna, just north of

Klazomenai (Thuc., VIII, 31, 3). Neither Teos nor Tenedos is exactly in this route, but Tenedos seems to me a more intelligible footnote to it than Teos would be. Second list (§ 138), headed "*iuxta Zmyrnam*": of these names two (Karteria, Bakcheion) are near Phokaia (Thuc., VIII, 101, 2; Livy, XXXVII, 21), and Elaiousa is off Lebedos just south of Arginousai (Strabo, XIII, 1, 67); i.e., the list emerges from the Gulf of Smyrna and meets the list in 137. I think it probably goes up to the Hekatonnesoi (see below). Third list (§ 138), headed "*ante Troada*," begins, I believe, where the second leaves off. In this, if Lagousai is rightly equated with the small island north of Tenedos which Philippson (*Topographische Karte des westlichen Kleinasiens*, Blatt 1) marks "Rabbit Island (Lagusae?)," then the absence of Tenedos is noteworthy; otherwise, one might think the list did not go north of Cape Lekton. I note finally that both Arginousai and Tenedos are given in 140, among the islands off Lesbos. This gives us a fourth list (Arginusae, Phellusa, Pedna, Tenedus) which crosses the first and third.

The reader should now consider the corrections: "*iam hae circa Lesbum*" and "*clara vero in alto Tenedos*," proposed above. None of the three lists goes south of Chios city, and the third ends up near the Hellespont. Neither Ephesos nor Teos is in the picture at all.

What then of the islands of Peisistratos? They come between Arginousai and Poroselene. If we look at the map, we see that they can hardly be other than the *Ἐκατόνησοι* opposite Aivalyk at the entry to the Adramyttian Gulf: Poroselene is one of them.

Strabo (quoted below) says of the Hekatonnesoi that they are 20 in number, or (as Timosthenes says) 40: they are called Hekatonnesoi not because there are 100 of them, but after Apollo = Hekatos. If, as seems possible, we have here a partial list of them, then Nesos, the largest of the group, must be mentioned. Nesos, known from coins, from a decree of the city of Nesos, from the Athenian Assessments, and from an archaic dedication in Athens, is never named in literature.¹ Never, that is, in the texts as we have them; but it must I believe be

¹ Coins in Head, *Hist. Num.*, p. 563; the decree, *I. G.*, XII, 2, no. 645, = *O. G. I.*, 4; Assessments, *I. G.*, I², 64 (cf. Meritt and West, *The*

restored in Strabo certainly, and perhaps in "Skylax," and here. The curious name which looks like a common noun was likely to puzzle copyists.

Strabo, XIII, 2, 5: κατὰ δὲ τὸν πορθμὸν τὸν μεταξύ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Δέσβου νησία ἐστὶ περὶ εἴκοσιν (ὡς δὲ Τιμοσθένης φησί, τετταράκοντα), καλοῦνται δ' Ἑκατόνησοι—πλησίον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ Πορδοσελήνη πόλιν ὁμώνυμον ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ἄλλη νῆσος [πόλις] μείζων αὐτῆς <καὶ Νῆσος πόλις> ὁμώνυμος ἔρημος. The first πόλις must go, as all editors agree; on the other hand, ὁμώνυμος needs πόλις, and the conjunction νῆσος πόλις is too good to sacrifice altogether. Pliny (as I think we shall see) confirms this sense, the city of Nesos had perished by Roman times.

"Skylax" 97:² κατὰ δὲ ταύτην (sc. Δέσβον) νῆσός ἐστι καὶ πόλις, ὄνομα δὲ ταύτης <Νῆσος, καὶ> Πορδοσελήνη. The superfluous ὄνομα δὲ ταύτης would be very singular in "Skylax" unless there were some special reason, such as the use of a common noun as a proper name supplies. Alternatively, we might perhaps write κατὰ δὲ ταύτην Νῆσός ἐστι καὶ Πορδοσελήνη, and regard [πόλις ὄνομα δὲ ταύτης] as a gloss on Νῆσος.

Coming back to Pliny: it is possible they were called Peisistratos' islands, but we know that one explanation of their usual name was that they were Hekatos' islands, and I suspect we should understand *quae Hecati vocantur*, or something of that sense, however we may explain the corruption.³ One of the two islands whose cities have perished must be Nesos (cf. Strabo); we are left with *Anthinae myon* (and variants, see Mayhoff's apparatus) for the first name of all. It has been thought that Stephanos, s. v. Χάλκις: ζ' νῆσος ἔχουσα πόλιν ὁμώνυμον πρὸς τῇ Δέσβῳ, may give the name of one of our group:

Athenian Assessment, p. 81); archaic dedication, *I. G.*, I², 547; "never in literature," see Schwahn, s. v. Nesiotai (1) in Pauly-Wissowa.

³ I use the section numbers of *G. G. M.* (not those of the MSS and of Fabricius). I write "Skylax" as one might "Baedeker," "Debrete," "Webster." I take the periphrasis we have to be a many times re-edited version of the original Skylax.

⁴ I suspect that Pliny wrote *Pisistrati* and that the corruption goes back to a Greek source (Isidoros?): αἰπερ Ἑκάτου καλοῦνται could, not inconceivably, come out as αὐτὰ Πεισιστράτου καλοῦνται. ΠΕΡΕΚ: ΠΕΙCIC<TP>.

perhaps it hides in *Cerchia*. To make these considerations concrete:

Finitimae [sc. Chio] sunt: Thallusa;⁴ . . . Oenussae; Elaphitis, Euryanassa, Arginusa cum oppido (iam hae circa Ephesum); et *αἵ περ Ἐκάτου νῆσοι καλοῦνται*: Anthemion;⁵ Nesos, Diarrheusa (in utraque oppida intercideret); Poroselene cum oppido; Chalcis; Halone; Crommyonesos; . . . Sidusa; Pele . . . multaeque ignobiles, clara vero in alto Tenedos.⁶ . . . iuxta Zmyrnam sunt: Peristerides; Carteria; Alopece; Elaeusa; Bacchion; Pystira; Crommyonesos; Megale. ante Troada: Ascaniae . . .

I have restored Crommyonesos not only (as Mayhoff does) for Comminesos in 138, but also for Commone in 137. Crommyonesos: Crommyonesos. I take them to be the same island (as *Arginusae* in 140 are the same as *Euryanassa Arginusa* in 137). The "second list," headed *iuxta Zmyrnam*, passes Phokaia with *Carteria* and Lebedos with *Elaeussa*, and it is altogether likely that with *Crommyonesos Megale* it reaches the Hekatonnesoi: the "third list" then begins *ante Troada*. Crommyonesos is no doubt the island marked Krommydonisi on Philippson's map. (Megale is possibly Pordoselene: cf. Stephanos, s. v. *Σελήνης πόλις*.)

It is premature to speculate what this curiously convoluted course has to tell us about Pliny's method of contaminating his sources. A really geographical edition of his geographical books is wanted first; and that will not be easy to get. There are few more delicate tasks than reconstituting a geographer's text, where corruption is constant in the mass of proper names, but the restorer must always use the dangerous method of harmonization. And he must dare sometimes to correct not Pliny's text, but Pliny himself. I offer my suggestions above, not as a text,

⁴ MS *Thellusa* suggests Thallusa rather than Tellusa.

⁵ Anth[im]emyon. I am rather shy of suggesting "Anthine <Crommyon>nesos" making a third mention of Onion Island—or with Bolbulae a fourth!

⁶ The distances (a Chio *ἸXXXII* D, tantundem ab Erythris) are utterly false for Tenedos, but not far out for Teos. I do not think Teos can have been meant originally (sc. by Pliny's original). But Pliny does not in fact mention Teos elsewhere in his geography; he may have excerpted the distances for use with Teos, and inserted them here; i. e., the error Te[ned]os occurred already in Pliny's own MS.

but as a basis for discussion. Perhaps I am proposing to obliterate precious evidence of Peisistratos' Sigeion wars, or his family's later sojourn under Persian rule.⁷

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B. G. U. II, 475.

A fresh interpretation of B. G. U. II, 475 (2nd cent. A. D.) has recently been proposed by Dr. Naphtali Lewis.¹ The papyrus is a report of rent obtained from the lessees of an estate formerly in private possession but now under the control of the imperial treasury. Dr. Lewis has given a useful recension² of the text, and I repeat it here for the reader's convenience.

- συνήχθη ἐκ διαμισθωτικοῦ [πρό]τερον . . . α[. . .]
 Ἀματίας, νυνὲ δὲ τοῦ ἱε[ρωτάτο]υ ταμε[ίο]υ ζ (ἔτους)·
 ἔστι δὲ
 ἀπὸ ἀργυρίου (ταλάντων) η (δραχμῶν) Ἀμβ ÷
 5. μετὰ τὸ ἀποποιηθὲν ὑπὲρ τε τόπων
 αἰκιήτων μεμενηκότων καὶ ἄλλων
 δηλωθέντων εἶναι ἐν συμπτώσει καὶ
 ἀμπελικῶν κτημάτων μεταδοθέντων
 εἶναι ἐν τάξει αὐτουργομένων ἐνίων μι-
 10. σθωτῶν ὧν μὲν τετελενηκότων ὧν δὲ
 ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀργυρίου (τάλαντον) α (δραχμας) Ἐργκ ÷
 λοιπὰ ἀργυρίου (τάλαντα) ζ (δραχμαὶ) Ἀθκς
 • • ἐξ ὧν εἰσπράχ[θη ὑ]πὲρ λημμάτων
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζ (ἔτους) (τάλαντα) δ (δραχμαὶ) Ἐυνς =

For the first time since the text was originally published by

⁷No use has been made in the above of the evidence of the Attic Quota-lists. In them, Σιδούσιοι and Ἐλαιούσιοι both appear with the modifier Ἐρυθραίων, and should no doubt be identified with Pliny's Sidusa and Elaeusa. See the forthcoming *Athenian Tribute Lists* by Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, in the "Gazetteer," s. v. Ἐρυθραῖοι.

¹*Classical Philology*, XXXIII (1938), pp. 98 f.

²The papyrus has substantially the same text on *recto* and *verso*.

Wilcken³ in 1885, Dr. Lewis has arrived at a clear and correct statement of the accounting of the report. In accepting ζ (ἕτους), the obvious reading of the papyrus in l. 2, he has eliminated the distortion introduced by (τάλαντα) s, a reading projected by Rostovtseff⁴ in his discussion of the text. Although he makes no statement to that effect, Dr. Lewis's successful treatment of the arithmetic is dependent on his recognition of the fact that the sum which is expected at the end of l. 2 was not entered even after it was obtained in l. 14.⁵ ἔστι δέ, which constitutes the whole of l. 3, marks the beginning of the detailed account, and there is unavoidably, in the present state of the text, an anacoluthon between ll. 2 and 3.

The reasons, however, assigned in ll. 5-11 for the reduction of the rent from 8 tal. 4049 dr. 1 ob. to 7 tal. 1926 dr. need to be reëxamined. The property from which no return is expected is described in the following terms: (1) τόπων ἀουκῆτων μεμενηκότων, (2) ἄλλων δηλωθέντων εἶναι ἐν συμπτώσει, and (3) ἀμπελικῶν κτημάτων μεταδοθέντων εἶναι ἐν τάξει αὐτουργουμένων ἐνίων μισθωτῶν ὧν μὲν τετελεστηκότων ὧν δὲ ἀνακεχωρηκότων. In (1) and (2) the participial phrase gives the reason why the property does not produce

³ Ulrich Wilcken, "Beitrag zur Kenntnis der römischen Bodenverwaltung Aegyptens," *Études archéologiques, linguistiques et historiques, dédiées à Mr. le Dr. C. Leemans* (Leyden, 1885), pp. 87 f.

⁴ Michael Rostowzew, *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates* (*Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, Beiheft 1, Leipzig and Berlin, 1910), p. 188.

⁵ The method of bookkeeping is illustrated by P. Tebt. I, 89 (113 B. C.), where the total recorded in l. 8 checks with the total recorded in l. 32. Similarly, in P. Tebt. II, 339 (224 A. D.), the words γ (ἰσότητας) αὶ π (ποκείμεναι) in l. 16 refer to the amount recorded in l. 11. (Both texts may be consulted in A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, *Select Papyri* II ["Loeb Classical Library," Cambridge and London, 1934], Nos. 398 and 400.) Cf. P. Mich. III, 200 (181-180 B. C.), 17, note. For the contribution of Ptolemaic policy to this type of accounting see W. L. Westermann, "Hadrian's Decree on Renting State Domain in Egypt," *J. E. A.*, XI (1925), pp. 166 f. Its influence continues to be felt in the accounting methods of the sixth and seventh centuries A. D.; cf. E. R. Hardy, Jr., *The Large Estates of Byzantine Egypt* (New York, 1931), pp. 100 f.; Michael Schnebel, "An Agricultural Ledger in P. Bad. 95," *J. E. A.*, XIV (1928), pp. 34 ff. A detailed technical study of the papyrus accounts is very much needed to clarify the relation between government accounting and that used on the private estates on the one hand, and between these and ordinary private bookkeeping on the other.

rent. With regard to (3), Dr. Lewis is quite right in feeling that μεταδοθέντων requires εἶναι κτλ. to complete it,⁶ but in making a unit of αὐτουργουμένων . . . ἀνακεχωρηκότων, dependent on τάξει, and understanding the words to mean "in the roster of certain lessee-cultivators some of whom have died and others fled," he misses the point.⁷ Both Wilcken⁸ and Preisigke⁹ recognize that ἐν τάξει αὐτουργουμένων is a complete phrase. Expressions of this type are regularly used to indicate classes of persons¹⁰ or of land.¹¹ Since vineyards are in question, ἐν τάξει αὐτουργουμένων marks the category of land to which they belong.¹² Once this fact is established, the category can be readily identified. On this point Preisigke is of no real help since he restricts his translation to the bare meaning of the words.¹³ The explanation offered by Wilcken¹⁴ in 1885 is not tenable in the light of present knowledge. It is not credible that neighboring peasants could have exploited abandoned vineyards to their own profit without making the due payments to the treasury, especially if their activity were so well known to officials as to be mentioned in a report of rent. Rostovtseff has understood completely the bearing of the phrase, but his statement gives no

⁶ The same construction was placed on these words by Preisigke; cf. note 9.

⁷ Apart from the Berlin papyrus, Preisigke (*Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden*, s. v. αὐτουργέω) lists 13 occurrences of the word, among which there is no example of the middle.

⁸ Wilcken, *op. cit.*, 67, places a comma after αὐτουργουμένων.

⁹ Preisigke, *op. cit.*, s. v. τάξις 5, c, cites ἀμπελικά κτήματα μεταδοθέντα εἶναι ἐν τάξει αὐτουργουμένων, which he explains as follows: "die Weingärten stehen laut Bericht in den Listen verbucht als selbständig bewirtschaftete Grundstücke."

¹⁰ E. g., *P. Mich.* III, 172, 15 ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθητῶν τάξει; cf. Preisigke, *op. cit.*, s. v. τάξις 5.

¹¹ E. g., the well-known ἐν κατοικικῇ τάξει; cf. Preisigke, *ibid.*

¹² This relation is clearly recognized in Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, new edition, s. v. αὐτουργέω, where B. G. U. II, 475 is cited for κτήματα αὐτουργούμενα. Cf. note 9, above.

¹³ Cf. note 9.

¹⁴ Wilcken, *op. cit.*, 68: "Einige der kaiserlichen Pächter waren in diesem Jahre gestorben, andere hatten sich ihren drückenden Verpflichtungen durch die Flucht entzogen, die kaiserlichen Weingärten den Bauern preisgebend, die nun darüber herfielen und zu ihrem eigenen Gewinn den Boden auszunutzen suchten." Wilcken's interpretation has doubtless altered considerably in the years since 1885.

clue to the exact construction of *αὐτουργομένων*. In commenting on the papyrus,¹⁵ he remarks: "Es scheint auch, dass die Pächter alle direct vom Staate gepachtet haben ohne Afterpächter." The *ἀμπελικὰ κτήματα* belonged in that category of land which was cultivated by *οὔσιακοὶ γεωργοί* or *μισθωταί*¹⁶ without the privilege of sublease.¹⁷ The following genitive absolute *ἐνίων . . . ἀνακεχωρηκότων* accounts for the failure of the vineyards to yield rent.

Dr. Lewis has rejected Preisigke's translation¹⁸ of *τόπων ἀοικήτων μεμενηκότων* as "unbewohnt gebliebene Zimmer" in favor of the view taken by Wilcken,¹⁹ who, under the influence of Strabo, xvii, 786, thought of the *τόποι* as "'die unbewohnt gebliebenen' Landstriche," i. e., "die höher gelegenen; vom Nil in diesem Jahre nicht befruchteten Felder." A study of the usage of *ἐν συμπτώσει*, which occurs in l. 7, does not support this conclusion. If from the examples listed by Preisigke in his *Wörterbuch*, s. v. *σύμπτωσις*, we exclude those that refer to bodily degeneration, the objects stated to be *ἐν συμπτώσει* are the following: *οἰκία*, *θύρα*, *λάκκος*, *ἰδροδοχεῖον*, *ληνὼν σὺν πίθῳ*, *ψιδὸς τόπος*,²⁰ *οἰκόπεδον*.²¹ These comprise houses, parts of houses, cisterns, wine-presses, and building-sites, but not arable land.²² For the last, Greek relies on *χέρσος* and its compounds.²³ Ancient usage, therefore, supports the conclusion that *τόπος* in

¹⁵ Rostowzew, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹⁶ It is evident from the context that the *μισθωταί* of the Berlin papyrus are not "Groospächter"; cf. Rostowzew, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

¹⁷ Ulrich Wilcken, *Grundzüge der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1912), pp. 292, 299 f.

¹⁸ Preisigke, *op. cit.*, s. v. *δοκήτος*; cf. *τόπος* l, i: "unbewohnt gebliebene Wohnräume."

¹⁹ Wilcken, *Études Leemans*, p. 68.

²⁰ Preisigke, *op. cit.*, s. v. *τόπος* l, h: "Grundstück mit einem verfallenen, unbrauchbaren Hause, oder ein für Hausbarzwecke bestimmtes Grundstück, welches zur Zeit noch unverwendet daliegt."

²¹ *οἰκόπεδον* is either a building-site or the building standing on it; cf. Liddell and Scott, *op. cit.*, s. v.; P. Mich. III, 188, 9-10, note.

²² The same situation is found to obtain in the passages cited by Preisigke, *op. cit.*, s. v. *συμπίπτω*, *-πτώσιμος*; Liddell and Scott, *op. cit.*, s. v. *συμπίπτω*, *-πτωμα*, *-πτωσις*.

²³ Michael Schnebel, *Landwirtschaft im Hellenistischen Agypten* (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung u. antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, Heft 7, Munich, 1925), pp. 9 ff.; for definition of *χέρσος* see pp. 19-20.

this text is an object comparable with οἰκία, θύρα, etc. The word is attested in the sense of "room," but τόπος is as vague as English "place" and in the present instance may be thought of as "dwelling-place," whether room or house. The tenants on an estate needed living-quarters, and for these they doubtless paid rent. ἀόκητος is then acceptable in its literal signification of "unoccupied." Certain dwellings have remained unoccupied and others have collapsed.

These considerations justify the following translation of the long prepositional phrase that extends over ll. 5-11: "on account of dwellings which have remained unoccupied; others which have been shown to have collapsed; and tracts of vineyard, reported to be in the category of land cultivated by lessees without privilege of sublease, of which a certain number of lessees have died and others have fled."

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DE ATTIO ET PRAXIDICO: PLIN., *N. H.*, XVIII, 200.

Satis constat turbas aliquando motas esse loco Plinii *N. H.*, XVIII, 200. Ibi enim inter ea quae e *Geoponicis* profert ieiuna praecepta post locum Catonis, quem enotaverat quemque aliquo loco inculcare volebat, de satione inseruit haec: *adiexit his Attius in Praxidico, ut sereretur cum luna esset in ariete, geminis, leone, libra, aquario; Zoroastres sole scorpionis duodecim partes transgresso, cum luna esset in tauro.* In indice autem Plinius haec: (*ex*) *Attio qui Praxidica scripsit.*

Attium non esse Accium et in verbis, ut ea exhibui, nihil mutandum esse post Crusii et Wilamowitzii notas constat (cf. Teuffel, § 134, 12). Didicimus enim ex codicibus astrologorum graecorum Praxidicum fuisse mathematicum. Duobus enim quod sciam locis ibi Praxidici nomen occurrit: in *Catalogo Codicum Astrolog. Graec.*, I, 97, tractatus Τιμαίου Πραξίδου (sic) περί δραπέτων καὶ κλεπτῶν, *ibid.*, V, 3, 87 alter Ζωροάστρου κατὰ Πραξίδικον περί πολέμου προσδοκωμένου publici iuris factus est. Hae inscriptiones quomodo interpretandae sint dubites; certe Timaeus (quem saeculo fere primo a. Chr. n. fuisse posui [*R.-E.*, s. v.]), se Praxidico usum esse dicere potuit, Zoroaster se ex Praxidico

haurire dicere non potuit, sive hoc verum hominis nomen fuit sive fictitium et a *Ἰππαξίδης* derivatum (qua in re commemorandum est Praxidicam inter decanorum nomina apud Cosmam apparere: W. Gundel, *Dekane und Dekansternbilder*, 73 et 354). At qui caput illud excerpserit fortasse dicere voluit Praxidicum Zoroastris auctoritate uti.

Ut res se habet, Attium nihil fecisse puto nisi Praxidicum vertisse; et quoniam Persius (1, 50) *Niadem* ieiunam Attii Labeonis perstringit (cuius genus Sabinum fuisse titulis probatur; cf. Bücheler, *Kl. Schrift.*, III, 17 et 384), hunc eundem fuisse suspiceris qui etiam Praxidicum [poetam, ut opinor] transtulit. Quod si recte se habet, in iis scriptoribus recentibus est, quos Plinius opere fere absoluto evoluit excerptaque eis inseruit quae ex fontibus primariis transcripserat. Mathematicos autem curasse quam vim stellae in re rustica haberent cognosces ex egregio Heegii de Orphei *ἔργων* libello (München, 1907); cf. *Orphei fragm.* 280-283, Kern.

Restat alia observatio. Et apud Plinium et in tractatu illo de bello Praxidicus et Zoroaster simul adferuntur: sumas igitur Attium diversae Zoroastris opinionis mentionem iniecisse. Quod tamen minus verisimile videtur; neque enim est mathematicorum contrarias sententias adferre, et si vere poeta fuit Attius ut suspicatus sum, certe id non fecit. Quod si verum est, Plinius in fine § 200 duo excerpta adnexuit, alterum ex ipso Attio petitum, alterum ut opinor apud Bolum inventum, quem Zoroastreus usum esse Wellmann (*Abh. Akad. Berl.*, 1928, 14) probavit.

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REVIEWS.

A. VON PREMERSTEIN(†); ed. Hans Volkmann. Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats. (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Abteilung, n. F., Heft 15.) München, Beck, 1937. Pp. xii + 290.

The most significant contribution to the study of the principate which has appeared in connection with the Augustan bimillennium is almost certainly this posthumous work by von Premerstein. If his death deprived the book of much which he might have added and of his final judgment on many points, the editor, Prof. Volkmann, with the aid of Prof. Otto, has skillfully welded into a coördinate whole material left in varying degrees of preparation and he has supplemented von Premerstein's rich documentation with references to literature which has appeared since 1935. The result without doubt presents von Premerstein's interpretation of the principate as he himself would have wished it to appear. The publication by the Munich Academy leaves nothing to be desired for accuracy and dignity.

The book falls into three main sections. The first, on the philosophic basis of the principate, constitutes only a fragment of what would have been a very profound appreciation of the ideas which motivated Augustus. von Premerstein on the whole discounts the influence of Greek thought, especially as transmitted to Rome through the Middle Stoa, i. e. Panaetius, and through Cicero. The four virtues inscribed on the shield of honor bestowed upon Augustus in 27 B. C. (*Res Gestae*, ed. Gagé, ch. 34, 2) are more Roman than Stoic and are perhaps connected with the presentation of Augustus as a second Romulus which is also reflected in Dionysius' account of the founder of Rome. The present tendency in most fields of Roman studies is to emphasize the native elements at the expense of foreign influences. In certain fields, such as art, this tendency antedates contemporary efforts to establish "pure" nationalistic cultures. Nevertheless it is tempting to see in it a similar blindness to the impossibility of local exclusiveness in the intellectual, if not in the political and economic, realm. Scholars, however, who, like von Premerstein, explain the principate in terms of purely Roman ideology or, like Martino (*Lo Stato di Augusto*, p. 4), think that Augustus was too busy with the practical needs of the situation to pay much attention to theories, neglect a very important factor in any change of political structures. Although the precise form of such change must usually be adapted to the previously existing institutions and to the traditional prejudices of the people whom it affects, nevertheless the general plan or concept which exists in

the minds of those responsible for the innovations cannot help but be influenced by the intellectual atmosphere in which they have been educated. Buchan is hardly justified in saying of Augustus (*Augustus*, American edition, p. 168): "he was no philhellene, as indeed were few of the governing Romans." Juvenal's gibe about the *Graeculus esuriens* has often been taken as representative of the attitude of all Romans towards all Greeks, but from the time of the Scipionic Circle outstanding Greeks had been regarded as honored guests and friends of noble Roman families. In view of the importance of Greek philosophy in Roman education during the last century of the Republic and the admiration which the Romans felt for Greek culture, it is as absurd to deny that Augustus was familiar with Greek political theory as well as with Roman traditions and practices as to hold that because the framers of the American Constitution based their governmental machinery on English precedents, they were not at the same time conscious of the democratic ideals of the French liberals. Specifically, it is probable that the story of Romulus largely grew out of a desire to create for Rome the dignity of a founder-legend like those of Greek city states, and that the picture of him as the ideal ruler originated in the same moralizing interpretation of mythology which the Stoics applied to Heracles. Moreover, though von Premerstein (p. 7) holds that Augustus chose as a means to his end not the philosophic ethic familiar only to a narrow circle but a national and religious revival of Romanism which would appeal to the masses, Cicero had already sought to adapt Greek theory to Roman practice and it would be difficult to show that Augustus as a young man had not known Cicero's writings or views, which, their author shows, circulated fairly immediately and widely among thoughtful people at Rome. Though Oltramare himself ("La réaction Ciceronienne, etc.," *Rev. des Études Lat.*, X [1932], p. 90) minimizes the direct effect of Cicero's writings on Augustus and emphasizes rather their popularity in the reactionary circle at Rome which Augustus sought to win over by his constitutional program, yet his remark (p. 59) about Cicero's relation to his Greek models might partially apply to Augustus: "Ce sont les expériences et les opinions personnelles de Cicéron qui donnent une couleur originale à ce tableau politique dont le dessin est inspiré par la pensée hellénique."

The second and much fuller section on the sociological basis of the principate presents von Premerstein's alternative, and Roman, explanation of its ideological background. By a penetrating analysis of the use made in the later Republic of the patron-client relation for political purposes he seeks to show that Augustus became the patron *par excellence* not only of the Roman populace but of the provinces and, because clients had often been called upon to serve in private armies during the last

century of the Republic, of the troops as well. The political struggles of the declining Republic had witnessed the introduction into the client's relation to his patron of an oath by which he bound himself to regard the interest of his patron and of his patron's family as paramount to his own. From this oath, von Premerstein derives the *coniuratio Italiae* of 32 B. C. (*RG.*, 25, 2) and the oath thereafter taken to the emperor. This latter oath, von Premerstein holds (pp. 60-61), did not become annual until the reign of Gaius. He distinguishes between this oath of loyalty as taken by the troops and their regular oath of service, and he maintains that by the oath of loyalty they were brought into a personal relation with the emperor. Because the oath was taken before the legionary shrine, in which, among the standards, stood a statue of the emperor, it helped in the development of the worship of the living emperor. Furthermore, von Premerstein indicates that the oath as taken in the west had a more purely Roman, and hence cliental, character than that taken in the east, where it was influenced by the traditions of Hellenistic monarchism. Almost immediately, however, the oath, which had at first been at least outwardly a voluntary "devotion" of oneself to the leader, became throughout the empire a required test of loyalty to the ruler. Despite von Premerstein's penetrating analysis of patronage and of the oath, it is hard to accept his contention (p. 16) that the *principes* of the later Republic were the great patrons. A patron stood in a well-defined relation to a specific group of clients, upon whom, in return for his protection, he could call for services and support. The position of a *princeps*, especially in Cicero's eyes, seems to have been much less precise. A *princeps* was a person whose status, character, and abilities so commanded the respect of the whole population that they would follow his lead not from a sense of obligation but of respect. The emperor, to be sure, assumed responsibility for the well-being of the Roman populace, of the provincials, and of the army; and in consequence the importance of the patronage of the other noble families declined. But no ancient author or source actually interprets his position as a *patrocinium*. Possibly the emperor's care for the population of Rome, especially the free grain distribution, the *congiaria*, and the bequests, originated in Caesar's desire, as democratic leader, to act as patron to the mob. Yet free grain had been distributed by the state under the Republic; and the mob continued to seek out private patrons during the Empire, though presumably a client should confine himself to one patron. Hence it is perhaps more likely that beginning with the Gracchi there had developed, under the influence of Greek ideas, the feeling that the state had an obligation to care for its citizens and that one who was prominent in the state should, even out of his own resources, meet this responsibility.

From the position of the *princeps* as supreme patron, von Premerstein develops his third section on the constitutional basis of the principate. The tribunician power and the proconsular *imperium* do not, as is well known, cover all the spheres in which the sources indicate that Augustus acted independently. Moreover, they were bound up with republican traditions and limitations. von Premerstein therefore concludes that there was a third, more comprehensive, element in the principate, the *cura legum et morum*. This was first granted in 27 B. C. (Dio, LIII, 12, 1; Strabo, XVII, p. 840 C) by a decree of the senate, whose sweeping terminology is reflected in the "discretionary clause" of the *Lex de imperio Vespasiani*. Upon this grant depended the *auctoritas* of which Augustus himself speaks (*RG.*, 34, 3)—an *auctoritas* no longer formless, like that of the republican *principes*, but specific, like that of the senate, and, because derived from the senate, parallel to the *senatus auctoritas* in its universal scope. The *cura legum et morum* justified Augustus' reform of the city of Rome and his censorial acts. In virtue of the *cura*, he was like a father overseeing the family; he was *pater patriae*. From the *auctoritas* involved in the *cura* stemmed his extraordinary jurisdiction, his licensing of jurisconsults, his interference in senatorial provinces and free cities, often through the agency of his "friends," and similar activities.

After this sweeping solution of the problems connected with the exercise of the *imperium*, von Premerstein can interpret the *imperium* itself conservatively. He denies the existence of any vague *imperium* or of any general *imperium consulare* and admits only a military *imperium proconsulare maius*. The name *imperator* did not indicate the holder of a supreme *imperium*, but was a republican title adopted by Caesar as hereditary for his monarchical position. As such it was taken by Augustus about 38 B. C., but upon the surrender of his monarchical powers in 27 B. C. it was confirmed as a personal distinction by the senate. It was ordinarily not assumed by his immediate successors without authorization and it became a hereditary designation of the ruler only after Nero. In one respect only is von Premerstein's concept of the *imperium* novel; he concludes that in 23 B. C. Augustus assumed it for life and that he renewed only the *cura legum et morum* periodically. Thus von Premerstein harmonizes the accounts in Dio (LIII, 16, 2; 32, 5).

Opposed to his view of the *cura* stands Augustus' own statement (*RG.*, 6, Greek) that when it was offered to him he received no office contrary to ancestral customs. Von Premerstein applies this not to the *cura* itself, the acceptance of which is asserted by Dio (LIV, 10, 5; 30, 1) and Suetonius (*Aug.*, 27, 5), but to the exaggerated and dictatorial form in which it was offered. This plausible harmonizing of the contradiction meets with several objections. Augustus' denial follows exactly the form which he

uses (*RG.*, 5) for the dictatorship and the annual and perpetual consulship save that since the offer of the *cura* is expressed by a clause, the words "no office contrary to ancestral custom" are introduced as object of the main verb. Moreover the dates of the offers which Augustus gives, 19, 18, and 11 B. C., correspond only roughly to Dio's 19 and 12 B. C. and neither set falls readily into the five or ten year periods of renewal of the imperial power. von Premerstein (p. 152) emphasizes the fact that Suetonius, who is held to have used the *Res Gestae* directly (Gagé, *RG.*, pp. 39-40), specifically states (27, 5) that Augustus assumed the *cura* and in virtue of it conducted his censuses of 29 and 8, B. C. and 14 A. D. He explains Augustus' own statement (*RG.*, 8) that he conducted these either as consul (*censoria potestate*, *Fast. Ven.*) or *consulari cum imperio* as applying to the rites connected with the closing of the *lustrum*, for which he revived these republican powers. But Augustus' words sound polemical in both this instance and that of the *cura*. Possibly he was attempting to conceal his irregular powers; but in general the *Res Gestae* do not misstate fact, however much they are colored by suppression and selection. Dio goes on to say that he did take a censorship for five years and a consulship for life, both of which von Premerstein himself (pp. 160-162, 230), faced by Augustus' denials, admits to be at least exaggerations, perhaps of some special privileges connected with these offices which he did accept. It may equally be that Dio's "proconsular power once for all" in 23 B. C. (LIII, 33, 5) represents a similar exaggeration of the privilege of retaining it within the pomerium and that, therefore, the periodic renewals which Dio mentions under 27 B. C. (LIII, 12, 2) refer not to the *cura*, but as the context suggests, to the grant of the provinces and hence to the proconsular *imperium*. It is equally possible that neither Suetonius nor Dio was following the *Res Gestae* directly but some literary account based on the senatorial records. This would explain the similarity of phraseology and at the same time, if only the original votes and not Augustus' refusal of the powers figured in the records, would account for the discrepancy. In fact, it might even be argued that Augustus' own polemic was directed against similar misrepresentations of his position which were already circulating in his later years. At least, Tacitus (*Ann.*, I, 9-10) presents as topics of common talk at his death conflicting versions of his position and actions.

With regard to the tribunician power, von Premerstein deals rather drastically with Dio's accounts of three separate grants (36 B. C., XLIX, 15, 5; 30 B. C., LI, 19, 6; 23 B. C., LIII, 32, 5) by arguing that a full grant was made in 36, with an extension of the *ius auxilii* to the first milestone in 30, but that Augustus surrendered the power in 27 as un-republican. In 23, however, to implement the reforms which he was undertaking in virtue

of the *cura legum et morum*, he again assumed an annual tribunician power extending throughout the empire. About the inherent probability of such a view, as against the usual one that Dio inaccurately preserves a record of a steady extension of privileges first granted in 36, each must decide for himself. Modern historians no longer dismiss Dio as late and therefore worthless and von Premerstein (pp. 152-154, and especially p. 193) ardently champions his value. But even he cannot accept Dio's accuracy on all points. Thus it becomes a matter of judgment whether Dio, or, in fact, any authority, is to be accepted in the face of other evidence. To say that Dio was misled by his sources or that he misunderstood them or even that he interpreted them in the light of the development of the Empire is not wholly to disown him. If, with von Premerstein (p. 109), the Restored Republic be regarded as a fiction, then the *Res Gestae* and other contemporary material may be discounted in favor of later writers who saw through this fiction into the monarchical essence of the principate. If, however, some credence be given to the sincerity of Augustus' program, then the contemporary evidence must be weighed more heavily than that of subsequent historians, who present a picture colored by changes which the principate underwent.

In a concluding chapter, von Premerstein argues that Augustus sought to base the hereditary character of his position upon the hereditary relation of patron to client. This explains the importance which he attached to family relationship in the selection of his colleagues, the significance of *Caesar* as a family name, and the value to a possible successor of designation in the will as heir of the emperor's private property. At the same time it makes possible the outward fiction of the selection of a successor by the senate and people. Against this view, however, it may be argued that the importance of heredity is not confined to Rome or to the relation of client and patron. It is dubious how far the Greek east, or the still unromanized provinces of the west, or even the army or the mixed population of Rome would have comprehended such a relationship, especially in respect to a ruler. Certainly the group which showed the strongest loyalty to the house of the Caesars was not the fickle Roman mob, or even the legions, but the eastern provincials, in whom the tradition of monarchy was strong, and the German body-guard, with their great sense of personal devotion to their chieftains.

Though von Premerstein's general thesis may stir doubts like those expressed above, his points are argued with such depth of scholarship, acuteness of interpretation, and power of imagination that this book must be read, marked, and inwardly digested by all those who are concerned with the principate. Augustus himself, one sometimes feels, might smile tolerantly at scholars' efforts to define his position by rule and line and might say that

yes, he had sought to restore the Republic; but after all, there was this and that to be done, and the senate was hard to move, and people looked to him to do it. Nevertheless, any attempt to reconstruct from the scattered surviving ruins the fabric of a government which brought unity and peace to a torn world must command respectful attention in these troubled times. This study, with its insight into Roman mentality, its broad knowledge of the material, and its lucid presentation forms a worthy memorial of its author.

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PIERRE BOYANCÉ. *Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs: Études d'histoire et de psychologie religieuses.* (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, Fascicule 141.) Paris, Boccard, 1937. Pp. 375.

Nothing more fallacious has appeared in recent times than the tendency to ignore the religious objectives of the Greek philosophers, to look in them only for material of the sort congenial to modern philosophical ways of thought: nothing more fallacious, perhaps, than the modern historical timidity which dates all anonymous philosophical material as late as possible, and then tries to reconstruct the history of ideas on the framework of such chronology, assuming that the ideas in a document must be as late as the latest date for its composition. But perhaps one thing has been still more misleading, the tendency to treat the history of religion as a record of myths and cult practices without an attempt to reconstruct the religious experiences of men of the past—what these cults and myths, or philosophical doctrines, meant to the persons who practised or believed them.

Through these basic fallacies the work of Boyancé cuts with telling sureness. The primary line of his investigation is to find the reason for the cult of the Muses among the Greek philosophers, and with it to show the meaning of Orpheus the musician. In works on Orphism Orpheus the musician is largely neglected. Actually there is a singular disagreement on this point between the literary evidence and the monuments. In the former there seems, at first, little to explain the fact that Orpheus in figured representations is universally one who charms beasts and men with his lyre. This Boyancé investigates, and turns up a surprising body of literary evidence to explain it. In brief, his thesis is that Pythagoras had at the outset two things: first, Dionysiac magical dance and music to conjure from men's bodies the evil spirits of disease and depression, and secondly, a magical use of number for similar ends. Pythagorean philosophy really

began with the discovery of the tetractys and the presence of a law of number in music. Now the two magical implements could be united and together become the subject of philosophic and scientific investigation. Without ceasing to use songs for religious purification in Pythagorean *θιάσσοι*, they found the truest music in the contemplation of the law of number as it presented itself in the abstract, in nature, and in the cosmic number-music of the spheres. Philosophy was music, and, as such, philosophy was the mystic catharsis *par excellence*.

The Orphics Boyancé tends to regard as a bastard branch of this movement, with Orpheus the musician as the real center of the cult. It was a descendant in that it kept some of the higher ideology of music and ethics from the Pythagoreans, but was of bar sinister in that it presented itself chiefly as a catharsis by incantation, though much more refined than the Dionysiac original. On this point the evidence is suggestive but not, to my mind, conclusive. The exact relation of Pythagoreans and Orphics is still an open question. Similarly his discussion of the influence of Orphism upon the Eleusinian mystery seems to me inconclusive.

The chief contribution of the Pythagoreans, in Boyancé's opinion, was, together with their treatment of music and number, their refining of the idea of catharsis from being a magical exorcism of demons in man to a conception more ethical and mystical. The demons may still cause illness or wickedness, but catharsis is a purification of states of one's own soul or body, not an expulsion of alien spirits. In this elevation of Greek thought to the ethical and mystical the gods were not abandoned: rather by the invention of allegorical interpretation of Homer and other sacred poetry the old incantations could be used to new effect. Sung at the ceremonial banquets of the Pythagorean *θιάσσοι*, and especially in *articula mortis*, these chants promised the Pythagorean unique hope in that next world which itself had been changed from the obscurity of Hades to the luminosity of the sun and moon. To support all of this the active appeal by Pythagoreans to the Muses and Apollo as the patron deities is used with great skill.

The second part of the study discusses the evidence for the myths and festivals in Plato and Aristotle. Boyancé shows that the purpose of the myth in Plato was to appeal to the "child within each man," and to educate that child which reason could not touch and which must be won to higher things, like all children, by fancy and incantation-music. For the myth is basically music, which is only transposed when it is rationalized into what was for Plato as for the Pythagoreans the higher or purer music, the philosophy of number. So in Boyancé's discussion I have understood for the first time the peculiarly difficult detail which Plato gives to the regulation of drinking,

music, and religious festivals for his ideal city in the *Laws*, as well as the dedication of that city to Apollo, Dionysus, and the Muses. The regulations are strikingly appropriate with the background of Pythagoreanism which Boyancé has gone far toward proving, and which he is right in saying we should have had to assume if the evidence he brings forward did not exist. He faces squarely the obvious fact that the Plato of the *Laws* is keenly interested in regulating religious cults on the ground that they themselves, when properly executed, are the *sine qua non* of a successful city. Boyancé is fully justified in saying that students of Plato's religion have been so interested in his ethics and doctrine of God that they have omitted this aspect almost entirely. For to Plato, it is clear, properly organized cults, with chants, dances, and wine, were an indispensable part of the philosophic discipline at which the organization of the city, and of the Academy, aimed.

Purgation in Aristotle's use of the term is still basically akin to the Pythagorean and Platonic mystic idea. It is the introduction of order into the soul and its passions by exposing the soul to the order of music or dramatic art. It releases the passions to put them in order. With Aristotle this is not based upon the earlier antithesis of soul and body, for the psychic belongs to the physical, and hence psychic catharsis is akin to physical or mechanical purgation. But in Aristotle's terms, as in those of the Pythagoreans, the soul is put into its highest state when it is harmonized with the order of the universe. The school which succeeded Aristotle continued this idea. It did not, any more than the Pythagoreans or Platonists, reject the established cults. Like them it rejected bloody sacrifice, but taught in general the connection of inner discipline with cult acts, while it definitely recognized the religious value of music when properly used. For late Peripatetic views of festivals, Boyancé relies chiefly on Strabo and Philo. Whether these reflect Peripatetic or Pythagorean inspiration seems to me still doubtful. (Boyancé is certainly correct in rejecting the traditional reference of these to Posidonius!)^{*} One wonders why he uses so little of Philo for his purpose. It is clear that Philo's explanation of Judaism is based precisely upon this mystic idea of philosophy as a saving force; for to him also external acts of ritual (in his case Jewish rites) are disciplines, when rightly understood and practised, leading to the true mystery of philosophy, since philosophy, for him as for Plato and the Pythagoreans, was ultimately an experience rather than an intellectual concept.

The third part of the study treats in detail an aspect of the subject frequently touched upon before, the matter of the organization of the philosophic schools into religious *θίασκοι*.

First in Pythagoreanism Boyancé traces a tradition back as far as Aristotle himself that that sect in Italy gave honors to

Pythagoras as the incarnate Apollo and as the representative of Demeter and the Muses. The connection with Demeter he explains as a sign of Pythagoras' power in the future life, since Demeter was the chief goddess in Magna Graecia for the fate of the soul after death. So, with this cult in the sect, Pythagoreanism contributed a synthesis between the traditional idea of the hero, which was mythical and social, and the new idea, mystical and moral.

In the discussion of the question whether the Academy was a religious *θλασος* it is shown that very early, perhaps during Plato's life, his pupils set up an altar to him. The author also argues, with excellent evidence, that the Academy was a real *θλασος* of the Muses, in which philosophy was the perfect music because it was the perfect elucidation of number, and hence was the perfect catharsis. Ceremonial banquets were a regular part of the meetings of the Academy in the sense of the Pythagorean and other mystical banquets. After Plato's death this practice was developed by the true heroization of Plato, the belief that he was the son of Apollo, the erection of a statue to him along with the Muses, and the observance of funeral banquets and eulogies as part of the Academic *θλασος*. The evidence for these latter points is late, but is very ably handled. What is even more striking is the impressive evidence assembled that the Peripatetics and Epicureans had a similar organization, similar views of the nature of their founder, and similar conceptions of the purpose of their philosophy.

It has seemed best to use this review to present the thesis of the author rather than to dispute details. That there are a good many pages which did not convince has been indicated clearly enough. But the work as a whole is so novel, not to say revolutionary, in its ideas, and at the same time is so closely studied and documented, that what is of primary importance is that it be widely read; for its general exposition of the religious content and objective of the Greek philosophers seems to me unassailable.

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J. D. DENNISTON. *The Greek Particles*. Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1934. Pp. lxxxii + 600.

In the age of classical scholarship which preceded our own, questions to be answered concerned words and their transmission to us in the texts. Now the questions are wider: about the full meaning of the great works of antiquity; and more minute as well: about quite tiny things—wisps of thought held momentarily

together in a poet's mind, and those grains of words, the Greek particles. Mr. Denniston's book on them is in the best tradition of to-day. It is like a great coral-reef, massive at first sight, but built of the most delicate precisions of intuitive art, combined by myriad toil.

Mr. Denniston's book is already known widely, alike for its accuracy and completeness and for the sensitivity and force with which alone nearly six hundred meanings of particles and combinations of particles could have been explained and classified. The 682 pages, representing the sustained effort of many years, required the collection and minute examination of 25,000 references.

The plan of the book is this: After a few pages of Preface and "Aid to the Reader" comes a long and elaborate Table of Contents, occupying twenty-five pages. Here the particles, their combinations, and the uses of them are listed. The Table of Contents serves, therefore, the purpose of an index—an excellent solution of a difficult problem, for an index of the usual kind would have lengthened the book to two volumes, perhaps adding hundreds of pages, with no advantage over the expedient actually adopted. Next follows a long Introduction, itself almost a book on the Greek particles, in which the nature and history of the particles and their usage by different authors are indicated. Then comes the Text. Last of all there is a Bibliography, preceded by "Addenda and Corrigenda" which ends with the words "Πολλά γ' ἡμᾶς λανθάνει"—rather like Scaliger's "Utinam essem bonus grammaticus!"

The method used in compiling the text is empirical and inductive. After all the occurrences of a particle or combination are collected (but not, of course, printed), the meanings, as the contexts prove them to be, are determined and classified. This method requires immense work; but it is the most, and indeed, for the simple particles, the only scientific method possible. Full explanations of the meanings are printed and for all of them plentiful examples are furnished.

The results are progressive and sometimes surprising. It is proved that there is only one *ἄρα* in Thucydides and that Plato postpones *ἄρα* far more often than the poets; that *ἄρα μή* positively does not expect a negative answer, is never used by the orators, and is, in fact, an exceedingly rare combination; that the orators never use *ἄτε*; that *δ' ἀλλά* is always followed by an imperative; that the essential force of *γε* is concentration, whereas limitation (the restrictive use, with a meaning of "at least") and also intensification are secondary (here Mr. Denniston distinguishes three different meanings of the italics in "He is a *good* man," all adequately to be rendered by *γε*; and brilliantly explains that "*γε* shuts itself up in the house, while

μέν, even when it is termed 'solitary,' looks at a neighbour, real or imaginary, over the garden wall"); that Euripides' habit of using *δή* with verbs goes beyond ordinary Greek practice; that the "self-contained *quidvis* ('anything') is regularly *οτιοῦν*, not *οτι δή*," though "self-contained *οστιςδήποτε* is frequent"; that "unlike *γε* but like *μήν* . . . *δή* does develop into a full-blown connection," and connective *δή* gains ground rapidly in the fourth century until in Demosthenes the connective sense is far the commonest; that *οἰκοῦν* invariably has an interrogative tinge; and that *τοίγαρ* belongs wholly to the grand style. Much that is proved will confirm the intuitions of reasonably good scholars who have a sense of particles but who have hitherto had to hope that their intuition could be trusted. Much the larger part of the intricate facts of detail, however, lies beyond the reach of intuition.

For combinations of particles the inductive method is not so obviously the only eligible method as it is for simple particles. A deductive method, by which the meanings of the combinations are deduced from the inductively established meanings of the simple particles combined, also offers prospects of success, but at some risk of subjectivity of judgment. Mr. Denniston adheres to the inductive method, one advantage of which is that he does not have to postulate long ellipses, and thus can use the space saved for exact definitions of minutely distinguished meanings (cf. e. g. p. 264, "*Δῆθεν* . . . (1) After final conjunctions, implying, like *δή*, that the desired object is undesirable or contemptible, or not genuinely desired . . . (7) Expressing, not incredulity, but contempt or indignation: 'forsooth'"). Another advantage is that the risk of depending on theories of the origin of particles and combinations, which are often uncertain, is avoided; Mr. Denniston refers to the possible derivations, but does not usually rely on them.

I think, however, that sub-classification might sometimes have been saved and multiplicity reduced to unity by checking the inductively reached results by the deductive method. For example, p. 108 on *καὶ γάρ* and *καὶ* . . . *γάρ* Mr. Denniston says, "I. Normally *γάρ* is the connective, and *καί* means either (1) 'also' or 'even': or (2) 'in fact': or (3) 'both,' being answered by another *καί*." Later, however, on p. 109 he continues, "II. But sometimes, in answers, *καί* is the connective, and *καὶ γάρ* means 'yes, and,' or 'and further.'" The deductive method would, I think, have insisted on retaining "for" for *γάρ*, not reducing it to pure "yes," "further," or similar meanings. Aesch., *Ag.*, 1256: *καὶ μὴν ἄγαν γ' Ἑλλήν' ἐπίσταμαι φάτιν.*—*καὶ γάρ τὰ πυθόκραντα· δυσμαθὴ δ' ὅμως* would then have been, not " . . . Aye, and so are Pytho's oracles <spoken in Greek>," but something like "For (*γάρ*) in fact (*καί*), <as an example

and proof that I (Cassandra) know Greek, and incidentally as a new consideration at the present moment, > those oracles from Pytho . . .” Eur., *Phædr.*, 611: ὦ πάτερ, κλύεις ἃ πάσχω;—καὶ γὰρ οἷα δρᾷς κλύει would have been, not “ . . . Yes, and besides . . .,” but “<Yes, probably he does,> for in fact . . .” That is, if one, why not the other? Though οἷα δρᾷς κλύει is said formally as a reason why κλύεις may well be true, by implication it adds something in contrast. Eur., *I. A.*, 641: ὦ πάτερ, εἰσείδον σ’ ἄσμενῃ πολλῷ χρόνῳ.—καὶ γὰρ πατήρ σέ would have been, not “Yes, and your father is glad to see you too,” but “<Naturally—as obviously the feelings would be reciprocal—> for in fact your father is glad . . . <so that we can all guess how glad you are>.” That is, he expresses a natural desire to say how glad he is, in addition to saying that he can well believe that she is glad. As before, a new thing is said under cover of a reason advanced for something said already. An alternative here would be to say that γάρ affects καί only, and that the meaning is, “<You certainly are glad and *that* is true,> for (γάρ) it is quite apart from that (καί) that your father is glad. . . .” That is, “Your father knows that he is not the only one pleased”; he uses this form to insist that he *is* pleased also. So also p. 113, Mr. Denniston says that for one classification of καὶ γάρ τοι “the notion of consequence is almost always appropriate. . . . Isoc., V, 108, ‘Philip the Great knew how to treat Hellenes and barbarians. καὶ γάρ τοι συνέβη διὰ τὸ γινῶναι περὶ τούτων αὐτὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν γεγενῆσθαι πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξηλλαγμένην.’” Here “and in consequence . . .” is clearly enough the virtual meaning, and to the empirical, inductive method it is the intrinsic meaning also. But the deductive method would take that to be a secondary meaning, the primary meaning being “Philip knew . . . ; for (γάρ) in fact (καί), as you remember or ought to remember (τοι), <not only *did* he know, but> the *result* of his knowledge <and a *fortiori* his knowledge itself> is a real fact, that his kingdom . . .” Other combinations might perhaps be explained on a similar principle. But how much trust should be given to each of the two methods is a question which no one is so well qualified to decide as Mr. Denniston himself.

The effect of Mr. Denniston’s interpretation of the particles reaches far beyond them. The knowledge gained proves that the *P. V.* is late, not early, and almost certainly the work of Aeschylus himself at the end of his life (a result confirmed by a metrical analysis by Mr. Denniston himself, and also by another by Mr. E. Harrison, not to mention an analysis of the ideas of the *P. V.* by myself). The particles also help to date many of Plato’s dialogues. Readings wrongly suspected or approved through ignorance of particles are enabled again and

again to be corrected (for example, when repetitions of the same particle, now shown not to have offended the Greeks, are concerned; and in many passages where questions have been raised about γε, οὐκουν, οὐκοῦν). One of the most important decisions is the new certainty that when Arist., *Poet.*, 1453 b 28 says καθάπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐποίησεν, the meaning "also" is quite misleading, since "καὶ" refers not to the content of the main clause, but to other, unspecified examples—a final solution of an old problem.

I have only one adverse criticism. The text of the book is carefully organized in sections, sub-sections, and further subdivisions internal to them. But unless the reader remembers the figures and letters used to designate them, and looks very carefully, he will not realize to which classification a paragraph belongs. The only escape from this would have been either by more pages, and so two volumes, not one, or by a larger format, which would allow wider and varied margins. This larger format I should have preferred.

There are, however, likely to be few, if any, greater works of scholarship in our generation.

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TH. REINACH AND A. PUECH. *Alcée, Sapho. Texte établi et traduit.* (Collection des Universités de France, l'Association Guillaume Budé.) Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1937.

The preface and the introductions to the two parts (pp. v, 23, 184 ff.) indicate the history of this edition. We learn that Théodore Reinach had undertaken the edition and worked on it for many years, but had not yet completed it when death overtook him. He had not even been able to make full use of the editions by Lobel (published in 1925 and 1927), which have laid an entirely new foundation especially for the papyrus material. M. Puech has prepared the work for publication; he had the assistance of M. Julien Reinach, son of Théodore Reinach, in arranging the leaflets of the original manuscript. M. Puech professes extreme piety in dealing with the posthumous work of so eminent a Hellenist, and he has been careful to keep his own contributions apart from Th. Reinach's legacy.¹

The result of this procedure, however, as it appears from some sampling, is rather disconcerting.

¹ A. Meillet, who had promised to revise the texts from the linguistic point of view, was also prevented by death from completing his share of the task, which was then taken over by M. Chantraine.

Alcaeus frag. 123 Diehl (= no. 10 Lobel) is presented in the following various shapes:

(1) under no. 45 the text of the papyrus is reprinted from the editio princeps, with only a (false) restoration transferred from Hunt's notes to the text. The critical notes quote the results of Lobel's revision.

(2) under no. 45a the same text is reprinted from Lobel. The difference is indeed considerable in that now Lobel's better readings appear not in the notes but in the text, and three previously known fragments, which had been identified as being in part extant on the papyrus, are incorporated. An additional note from the hand of M. Puech discusses the fragment and translates what can be translated.

(3) under no. 131a the same text is reprinted from Lobel a second time, with critical notes and with a new translation by M. Puech.

(4, 5, 6) The three previously known fragments, which had twice (45a and 131a) been exhibited embodied in the text to which they had been shown to belong, are again edited each by itself. One is listed as no. 131 so that it precedes the comprehensive edition 131a, but the two others are set apart and bear the numbers 134 and 135. Under no. 135 the critical notes already given under 131a are repeated but not in identical wording. On nos. 134 and 135 the reader is referred to no. 131a, but not vice versa. In the notes on no. 45a the two fragments edited in this book as nos. 131 and 134 are quoted as nos. 59 and 97 Bergk; the third (98 Bergk = 135 Reinach) is here forgotten and no authority mentioned for it.

It seems obvious that loose leaflets have been published much as they were found among the papers of Th. Reinach and some of them brought to a kind of completeness with little respect to the others.²

On Alcaeus frag. 123 (= 55 Lobel = 35 Diehl) we find the remark: "Textum a Diels restitutum ap. Diehl qui—sicut Lobel—hoc fragmentum cum nostro 124 coniunxit." The facts hidden in this cryptic statement are these: (1) Frag. 123, which was edited for the first time by Reinach himself, was soon recognised as belonging to the same poem as frag. 124. Diels (in 1920) restored the two fragments with admirable ingenuity and skill, but as less than half of every line is extant his restoration is largely imaginative. (2) Diehl, in his edition of 1923, followed Diels. These two facts are of little interest today, and the new edition is right in not reprinting the restoration of Diels.

² A similar mistake (viz. frag. 142 Diehl edited twice as nos. 23 and 90) is attributed by M. Puech, in a note on frag. 90, to "une hésitation de M. Reinach." No. 23 makes the fragment a hymn to Poverty, no. 90 a poem on poverty.

But relevant is the following: (3) Lobel (in 1927) showed that the assumed gap between the two parts of the poem does not exist. The first line of 124 and the last but one line of 123 combine into one line, and the two papyrus pieces join here. The edition under review takes no account of this. It still not only lists the continuous sections of the poem under two numbers but also severs the two continuous parts of the same line. It is true that in the critical note on the one part of the line (123, 17) Lobel's reading of the combined parts is quoted, but with no indication that the other part is identical with 124, 1 and taken from there. And then again we read in a note by M. Puech: "Il y a quelque vraisemblance que le fragment doit, comme le pense Lobel, être réuni au précédent auquel il est métriquement analogue."

In working on his redaction of the text, his translation and notes for Sappho frag. 93 (= 96 Diehl = pp. 42 and 79 Lobel), Th. Reinach apparently overlooked an addendum in Lobel's edition. Lobel had succeeded in fitting in a new piece of papyrus and had thus enriched the text by a considerable number of words. True to his principle, M. Puech prints everything as prepared for publication by Th. Reinach, and it is only through an affixed note that he gives information of the valuable additional evidence, leaving it thus to the reader to adjust the preceding text, translation and critical notes to the new material and to discard restorations refuted by it.³ Presumably many readers will be less anxious for a conscientious edition of Th. Reinach's papers than a practical presentation of the evidence on Alcaeus' and Sappho's poetry.

Recent literature on the subject has been entirely disregarded. Advantage has not been taken even of such a good and convenient tool as the second edition of Diehl's *Anthologia lyrica*, published in 1935 and covering approximately the same ground. Only the first edition is cited.⁴ The passages quoted from other authors have not been revised according to more recent editions. Omissions, misstatements, inconsistencies and misprints abound; clarity and precision are often missing.

I have confined myself to discussing the treatment of simple facts in this edition, because this is the basic question and no appreciable progress can be made unless minimum requirements in that respect are met. But I take pleasure in emphasizing that the lay-out of the edition, especially in the Sappho part, is sound

³ Nevertheless, the rediscovery of Lobel's addendum to no. 93 (Reinach) has not led the editor to investigate further and find two other substantial addenda to nos. 56 and 96 (Reinach), printed by Lobel on the preceding and following pages respectively (pp. 78 and 80). Thus the rich new material which the addenda offer is missing from the text of fragments 56 and 96 (= 55 and 98 Diehl = pp. 20 and 45 Lobel).

⁴ Occasionally, however, the siglum "Diehl" (with no.) covers not the *Anthologia Lyrica* of 1923 but the *Supplementum Lyricum* of 1917.

and circumspect, and that M. Puech has succeeded in correcting several of Th. Reinach's misinterpretations. Furthermore, the cooperation of MM. Meillet and Chantraine is evident in the deletion of objectionable word-forms.

It certainly is no enviable task to revise and finish a work begun by someone else. Yet one cannot but regret that the uncompleted and entirely antiquated notes left by Théodore Reinach have not either been discarded or brought into a shape fit for publication, and that the fragments of Sappho's and Alcaeus' poems have not found a more adequate presentation in the Collection des Universités de France which includes editions like that of the *Bellum Gallicum* by the late L.-A. Constans.

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LOUIS ROBERT. Collection Froehner: I, Inscriptions Grecques. Paris, 1936. Pp. ix + 160 with 51 plates.

At the suggestion of M. Jean Babelon, Robert has undertaken to publish the collection of Greek inscriptions left by Wilhelm Froehner to the Cabinet des Médailles of the Bibliothèque Nationale. This admirable and very welcome volume is the result. It is not the sort of undertaking that Robert would have set for himself, for the Froehner collection is a most miscellaneous assortment, much of it of only mediocre quality, and it is well known that Robert is a strong advocate of the study of related documents. The life of the epigraphist would indeed be a happy one if he could study always only those documents in which he is most interested. The appearance of this volume shows that Robert does not hesitate to undertake a task that should be done, even though it leads him away from Hellenistic epigraphy, particularly that of Asia Minor, to which he has devoted most of his attention.

Even so, the documents in this book are handled with extraordinary skill and dispatch, which one has come to expect of Robert, though they range over the whole ancient world from Egypt to Sicily. As might be expected, he is at his best in Karia, and the chapter on Theangela is perhaps the high point of the volume. For the present reviewer, it is marred only by an unnecessary display of personal feeling (cf. especially p. 66). The mistakes of one less well informed can always be effectively corrected without resort to general condemnation.

It is perhaps natural that a reviewer should seek out from such a collection as this those documents that lie closest to his own field of interest, so I append here a few notes which bear more particularly on the Athenian inscriptions in Froehner's collection.

No. 1. The reading is given by Robert as. [h]αγγορίδες ἀνέθεκε τὰ θεναίαι. A glance at the photograph (Plate X) shows that if this reading is correct a space of one letter must be assumed between ἀνέθεκε and τὰ θεναίαι. Unfortunately the photograph is so unsatisfactory that one cannot be sure whether this space was or was not inscribed. This is probably the fault of the bronze rather than of the photographer, but nevertheless the uncertainty exists. It has seemed to me that traces of nu are visible, but these would have to be verified on the original in Paris before being claimed as certain. In the collection of dedicatory inscriptions on bronze from the Acropolis at Athens published in the *Corpus* (*I. G.*, I², 401-462) the form ἀνέθεκεν is far more frequent than ἀνέθεκε, occurring almost invariably where considerations of meter in a metrical text do not demand the shorter form. The same is true of the dedications on stone (*I. G.*, I², 463-837). In the present text one expects the normal form ἀνέθεκεν, and I suggest the reading ἀνέθεκεν with no uninscribed space left between the last two words of the dedication. In spite of Robert's text, I believe that the photograph supports this interpretation.

No. 2. Photographs of this fragment of a naval catalogue are now published also by D. M. Robinson in *A. J. A.*, XLI (1937), p. 295.

No. 3. The skeleton restorations which Robert proposes for this Athenian decree involve contradictions that render his exact form impossible. Robert notes, and his Plate III shows clearly, that the inscription was stoichedon. Granting the longest possible tribal name (*A[καμαντίδος]) and the longest possible ordinal numeral (δωδεκάτης) to line 2, the maximum number of letters may be 35. Since line 3 was of the same length, only 8 letters are left for the date by month and the date by prytany. One or the other of these dates must be omitted; for reasons of space alone they cannot both be supplied. If both are supplied, then there is no possible restoration for line 2, and the difficulties are enormously increased for lines 4 and 5. The enigmatic letters ΜΗΔΕΙΑ —, for which Robert offers no explanation, must be part of a proper name, the patronymic of the chairman of the board of proedroi; his name appeared at the end of line 4 and his demotic in the middle of line 5. No restoration of line 3 should be so long as to render the restoration of these names impossible.

One may observe that the preamble of the decree is unusual in that it omits mention of the secretary. This is a fact of considerable significance, which Robert has not attempted to value. In view also of the character of the lettering (fourth century) and the phrase τῶν προέδρων ἐπιτήφειζεν νομῆν, νομῆν

patriis, demoticum, καὶ συμπρόεδροι, this absence of the secretary's name makes almost obligatory a date between 318/7 and 308/7 B. C. This new inscription from the Froehner collection is, in fact, valuable additional evidence that in this period the omission of the secretary's name was the normal rule and not the exception. No secretary is mentioned in *I. G.*, II², 449, 450, 451, and 453 (318/7, 314/3, 313/2, and 310/09 B. C.). I owe to a communication from Dow the suggestion that *I. G.*, II², 454 should be restored with a stoichedon line of 38 letters and the archon's name ἐφ' Ἡγησίου (324/3 B. C.); this document can no longer be cited for the secretary of 308/7 B. C. Also, I think it now evident that *I. G.*, II², 452 (which names a secretary from Hagnous) should be assigned to the year 328/7 B. C. with the archon's name restored [ἐπὶ Εὐθυκρίτου in line 1. The full name of the secretary was Πυθόδηλος Πυθοδήλου Ἀγνούσιος (cf. *I. G.*, II², 354), to be restored in *I. G.*, II², 452, possibly with one uninscribed letter space at the end of line 2. Robert's new fragment is part of the cumulative proof that the secretary was not named in the preamble of Athenian decrees during the régime of Demetrios of Phaleron.

The two decrees now assigned to the year of Euthykritos define more exactly its calendar character. The year was intercalary (cf. Dinsmoor, *Archons*, pp. 371 and 429) beginning with hollow Hekatombaion. The first three prytanies had 39 days each and the next four had 38 days each. *I. G.*, II², 452 was passed on the 222nd day of the year: [ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀκαμαντίδος ἑκτῆς πρυτανείας ἢ Πυθόδηλος Πυθοδήλου Ἀγνούσιος [ἐ]γρ[αμμάτευεν. Γαμηλιῶνος ἑκτ]εῖ ἐπὶ δέκα, [ἐ]νάτε[ι καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανείας. (The new reading of the date is clear on the squeeze.) *I. G.*, II², 354 was passed on the 295th day of the year: ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀντιοχίδος ὀγ[δόης πρυτανείας ἢ Πυθόδηλος Πυθοδήλου [Ἀγνούσιος ἐγρα]μμάτευεν. ἔνη καὶ νείαι, ἑ[κτῇ καὶ εἰκοστ]ῇ τῆς πρυτανείας.

No. 5. Robert's restoration of this small epitaph fails to take account of those physical considerations of the stone which the epigraphist cannot disregard with impunity. The symmetrical arrangement of the inscription above the sculptured relief (see Plate III) shows that the name Δαυ[δίκη], as Robert has restored it, would extend so far to the right that the figure of the man in the relief would become the central figure of the composition. Such an arrangement is inconceivable; the correct proportion is given by the restoration Ξάνθου [γυνή] in line 3, which posits just enough stone to allow a balanced composition in the relief below. The median line of the inscription must fall approximately on the second rho in Μυρρ — of line 2. It is thus evident that the reading Δαυ[δίκη] cannot be correct, and indeed Robert could not have proposed it if he had exam-

ined the stone with his usual care. The initial gamma of the name has left its trace in the first letter space of line 1, so that (with due regard to the width of the stele) the name may be read as Γλαυ[κίς]. The second line should be read Μυρρ[⁸⁻⁴], and I suggest no restoration. The third line is correctly shown in Robert's text.

No. 34. The text as given by Robert reads—ἀνέθεκε Δι
Κρονίονι ΕΔΔΔ. The final letters, for which Robert can offer no explanation, depend upon a false reading of the inscription. If one may judge from the photograph published in Plate XXXII, the letters visible are actually FANA, and the restoration of course should be φάνα[κτι]. The phrase occurs frequently in hexameter verse. Wernicke's belief that the line forms part of a metrical inscription is thus confirmed (*Röm. Mitt.*, IV, 1889, p. 171), though not with the division he proposes between hexameter and pentameter lines. The exact parallel is found in an inscription discovered at Nemea in 1926 and first published by Blegen in *A. J. A.*, XXXI (1927), p. 433 (see also Peek, *Arch. Eph.*, 1931, p. 103): 'Αρίστis με ἀνέθεκε Δι
Κρονίονι φάνακτι. The fragment here published belongs to the end of a hexameter verse, from which the name of the dedicator has been lost. Froehner's belief that the bronze was found at Olympia was denied by Furtwängler, who gave the provenance as Epidaurós. In view of the close parallel with the other inscription from Nemea, I suggest that no. 34 was also a dedication to the Nemean Zeus, and the "Epidaurian" provenance is thus easily explained.

No. 39. "Le graveur a écrit un N au lieu d'un H." This observation is erroneous (see Plate XVI), and the eta in ἀνέθηκε may be read without parentheses. From the single dot between the uprights of the letter, one cannot define the slope or direction of the transverse line.

No. 44. The Amphipolitans named here are not included in the Amphipolitan prosopography given by Papastavrou, *Amphipolis*, pp. 59-146. The list there should be augmented by reference to this inscription.

In an appendix Robert gives a catalogue of the inscriptions in the Cabinet des Médailles not in the Froehner collection and not transferred to the Louvre when most such stones were moved in 1918. The list is small: nos. 92-97 only, and I do not believe that it is complete. Robert makes no mention, for example, of the Paris fragment of *I. G.*, I², 256-257. The stone contains part of the records of the treasurers of Athena of objects preserved in the Hekatompedon in 484/3 and 433/2 B. C. It belonged to the collection of the Duc de Luynes (no.

820) and I made a squeeze and transcript of it in the Cabinet des Médailles in 1925. Whether it is there now I do not know, but I suspect that Robert would have found it if his search had been thorough. There is little to add to the text as published in the *Corpus*. I note merely δέ for [δ]έ in line 2, τούτοις for τ[ο]ύτοις in line 4, Ἀθηνά[ς] for [Ἀ]θηνά[ς] in line 8, and Ἀνα[φλ]ύσ[τι]ος for Ἀν[αφλ]ύσ[τι]ος in line 8. Of more importance for the disposition of the inscription is the fact that an uninscribed space of one line (not shown in *I. G.*, I², 256) was left between the lines now numbered 5 and 6.

Robert lists as no. 92 another fragment of the Hekatompedon records, also from the collection of the Duc de Luynes (no. 821), and publishes a photograph of one face of the stone on Plate XLVIII. The inscription deserves a better photograph, and one would welcome also a good photograph of the other face, which contains parts of the records of three years (*I. G.*, I², 264, 265, and 266). Robert has paid no attention to this side of the stone. From my squeeze I note by line the following readings: 55, [ἐ]κ and Παναθένα[ια]; 56, [Πρεσβ]ίας Σεμίο Φ[εγα-]; 57, ἐργ[αμ]μάτε[υε]; 58, [ἑκατο]μπέδ[οι] and σ[ταθμ]όν; 60, [φιδ]λ[αι] ἀργυρα[ί]; 63, [Π]ρεσβία-; 64, [σταθ]μόν τ-; 75, [ἐπε]γέγε[το]; 76, [ταύτ]ες ΗΔΓ[ΗΗΗ]; 80, [ἡ]εκα[τομπεδοί]; 81, [σταθμ]ος ἀ[πορραντέριον]; 82, [ἡδ]ν ἡ[ε] Νίκε; 83, [σ]ταθμόν; 84, [το]ύτο; 85, [στ]έφ[ανος]; 86, [σταθμ]όν].

From the reverse face (*I. G.*, I², 268, 269, and 270) I note also the following readings: 101, ἀρχαὶ ἡα[ί]; 102, ἡαλαί; 103, -εύς and ἡοῖς; 104, Ἀνασικράτει; 105, -πάλιος ἐγραμμάτευεν; 106, ἀσταθ[μος]; 107, -σὸ Ι[ι] and χρ[υσός]; 108, καρχέσιο[ν]; 110, Ι[ι] || σ[ταθμόν]; 114, χρ[υσός]; 115, -[σ]ύτο ΔΔΔΓ; 116, [ἡο]ι ταμίαι; 117, Εὐ[χ]σενος; 121, ἀπορ[α]ντέριον ἀ[ργυρὸ]ν; 122, Ν[ί]κε; 125, Ι || ΗΔΔΔΓ ||; 127, ΔΔΓ[ΗΗ]; 128, χρ[υσός]; 133, Περγασθεν ἐγραμμάτε[υε]; 134, τῶν and ἡ[οῖς] Ε[ὐ]χσενος; 135, χρυσ[αί]; 138, σταθμόν τούτο Η[Η]; 140, Η[ΔΔΔΓ Η].

No. 93. This is almost certainly a list of the prytaneis of Kekropis (cf. *I. G.*, II², 1743) and is evidence for the representation of the deme Sypalettos in the fourth century B. C.

The book is well manufactured by the Bontemps Press at Limoges, and contains a minimum of printer's errors. One should perhaps note that C. Vanderpool (p. 7) should be E. Vanderpool, that ἐντυ[χ]ανοῦσι (twice) on p. 28 should be ἐντυ[χ]άνουσι, that *Cyzikus* on p. 61 should be *Cyzicius* as elsewhere correctly quoted, and that the prytany list on Plate III is no. 93 and not no. 92. But these are minor matters. Robert has produced a very learned publication of the strange assortment of inscriptions gathered by Wilhelm Froehner, made easily useful by its photographs and its full indexes. The

Bibliothèque Nationale is to be congratulated on having secured so competent an epigraphist for a task which must have entailed considerable sacrifice.

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INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

MARTIN GRABMANN. *Mittelalterliche Deutung und Umbildung der aristotelischen Lehre vom ΝΟΥΣ ΠΡΩΤΗΤΙΚΟΣ nach einer Zusammenstellung im Cod. B III 22 der Universitätsbibliothek Basel.* (*Sitzb. der Bayer. Akad. der Wiss., Phil.-hist. Abt.*, 1936, Heft 4.) Munich, Beck, 1936. Pp. 106.

The last 18 pages of this monograph contain the text of an anonymous *quaestio* which is preserved in a codex first noted by P. Germain Morin in 1927 and described by P. Raymond Martin in 1930. The *quaestio* is formally: *Utrum beatitudo consistat in intellectu agente, supposito quod consistat in intellectu?* The tractate is in reality, however, a collection of 16 theories concerning the active intelligence,—the opinions represented being those of Plato, *quidam theologizantes*, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, Averroës, Themistius (2), John Philoponus, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, James of Viterbo, Durand, an anonymous interpreter, Dietrich of Freiburg (2), and Thomas Aquinas. Since it is the opinion of Thomas which the author adopts, he was apparently a Dominican; the space given to consideration of Dietrich inclines Grabmann to the belief that he was a German. The tractate was apparently composed between 1308 and 1323 (Thomas is called "frater Thomas," not "sanctus Thomas").

The first section of the monograph is a free translation of the tractate with the addition, after the translation of each opinion and criticism, of some remarks indicating the source and characteristics of the opinion considered. The middle section (pp. 53-84) is designed to place the tractate in its proper position in the history of philosophy; here the author discusses the connection of the tractate with other scholastic treatments of the active intelligence, the concern of the 13th and 14th centuries with the interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of the *νοῦς ποιητικός*, and the attitude of the *quaestio* toward German mysticism as indicated by its extensive consideration and rejection of the doctrine of Dietrich.

The monograph is a worthy addition to the long series of the author's contributions to the history of mediaeval thought.

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J. SVENNUNG. *Kleine Beiträge zur lateinischen Lautlehre.* Uppsala, Lundequist, 1936. Pp. 71. Kr. 2.25.

This slender volume comprises four careful studies in the field of late Latin. In Chapter I is traced the history of consonantized *i*, as in *medius*. Sometimes *i* fuses with a preceding consonant, which is then assibilated or palatalized. Sometimes it disappears and leaves no trace. One example of the loss of *i*, by dissimilation, *aes cyprum*, occurs (p. 23) in Vitruvius, VII, 11, 1 (p. 167, 3 Krohn). Svennung argues, against Romance philologists, that the omission of *i* after *r* in the Italian dialects, as in *gennaro* (Tuscan *gennaio*), is a survival from vulgar Latin (pp. 25-27).

Chapter II traces the history of *oi* in Greek loan words in Latin. In Chapter III examples are given, from late Latin, of the interchange of *g* and *u* before *or*, rarely, after a back vowel; and parallels are cited from Germanic languages and Russian. Svennung points out (pp. 44-45) that the occurrence of such changes in late Latin renders unnecessary Grandgent's explanation of those which appear in Italian and Roumanian—e. g., Italian *ugola* < Latin *uvula*—by the assumption of an improbable kind of "confusion between two sets of endings, as a point of departure" (p. 41).

In Chapter IV the author, fully aware that a mistake in copying may easily be misinterpreted as an indication of phonetic change, lists a large number of *possible* examples of the phonetic phenomenon of "dittology." Nearly all of these examples are derived from inscriptions.

While Svennung's indices of subjects and of words are adequate, his index of passages is far from complete. The following misprints have been noted: "*acutarus*" for "*actuarus*" (p. 20); "*qu'on à affaire*" for "*qu'on a affaire*" (p. 26); "*Beispinle*" for "*Beispiele*" (p. 46); "*ober*" for "*oben*" (p. 50).

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W. STETTNER. *Die Seelenwanderung bei Griechen und Römern* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, XXII). Stuttgart-Berlin, W. Kohlhammer, 1934. Pp. viii + 92.

In three chapters Stettner outlines the ancient theories concerning the migration of the soul, classified according to Cumont's division of the subject (p. 44, 4): those of the Pythagoreans, Pindar, Empedocles, and Plato (pp. 7-41), of the Hellenistic and Roman centuries (pp. 42-66), finally those from the

second century A. D. until the end of antiquity (pp. 67-88). As an introduction, he gives a collection of passages in which the words *μετεμύχῳσις*, *μετεμύχουσθαι*, *μετενσωμάτωνσις*, *μετενσωματοῦσθαι*, *καλιγενεσία*, *μεταγγισμός*, *μεταγγίζειν* occur (pp. 5-6). This material is a very valuable addition to the lexicographical comprehension of the terms in question which have been so strangely neglected (cf. H. St. Jones in Liddell-Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford, 1925, Preface, p. ix). From the evidence which Stettner was able to gather it seems to follow that, contrary to Rohde's contention, *μετεμύχῳσις* was the most common expression for the migration of the soul (pp. 3-4).

Stettner says that his study is only the beginning of an inquiry into a subject to which no adequate attention has been given (p. 1). This statement is astonishing in view of the books of Rohde and Cumont. Yet Stettner, in disagreement with both these writers, holds it necessary to isolate his problem. One would think that the doctrines regarding the migration of the soul cannot properly be understood except in connection with the belief regarding immortality as such. The way in which Stettner proceeds accounts for the fact that his short study of such a difficult question is less instructive as an interpretation of the various theories than it is as a survey of the dispersed statements; I doubt that this method can ever produce a satisfactory solution of the problem.

Among other passages there are two in which Stettner proposes solutions that seem to me unacceptable. Herodotus' report of those Greeks who believed in the migration of the soul (II, 123) is considered by him to be evidence for the Pythagorean doctrine, since Pindar, Empedocles, and Plato espoused different dogmas (p. 9). But the conception of the *κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως* which, as Stettner himself points out, is decisive in Herodotus' description, is also Orphic (cf. Kern, fr. II, 229-230). The statement, therefore, may be a reference to the Orphics as well, a possibility which Stettner does not take into account. Following the latest theories of Wilamowitz, he postpones any discussion of the Orphic theories until the end of his book and goes so far as to state that the Orphic literature is for the most part nothing but the transformation of Platonic myths (p. 87). His argumentation in this case is not cogent. Next, Stettner again adopts the deletion of Vergil, *Aeneid* VI, 745-747 (pp. 51 f.). According to his view, Vergil's opinion is composed of incoherent ideas; the thought expressed in these three verses is foreign to the original conception; furthermore, there is no parallel to the assumption that the souls of the pious are to be purified in Elysium. Stettner does not explain how the tradition should, then, be understood. After Norden's interpretation of the text (*P. Vergilius Maro, Aeneis Buch VI* [1926], pp. 16 f.) the only pertinent argument lies in Stettner's stressing

that Norden does not cite any parallels to Vergil's statement. The Pindar passage (*Olympian*, II, 67-74) is not a parallel, as Norden himself, after Malten's objection, admitted in the second edition in one place (p. 19) although still retaining it as such elsewhere (p. 20)¹; Plato (*Gorgias*, 523 B-524 A; *Phaedrus*, 249 A; *Republic*, 614 C-615 A) does not mention Elysium either. Yet there is a parallel to Vergil's theory in Plutarch: in the myth *De facie in orbe lunae*, Plutarch says that the souls of the pious come to the moon (XXVIII, 943 D). There they are purified till there remains only reason which was bestowed on the human being by the sun (XXX, 944 E; XXVIII, 943 A). This process apparently takes place in the parts of the moon which face the sun, called by Plutarch Elysium (XXIX, 944 C). Even if one would not dare to accept the opinion of Vergil without having a parallel, there is, in view of this corresponding passage in Plutarch, no reason to alter the unanimous reading of the manuscripts.

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W. BEDELL STANFORD. *Greek Metaphor* (Studies in Theory and Practice). Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1936. Pp. 156.

In the first five chapters of his book Mr. Stanford examines ancient and modern theories of metaphor, at the same time stating his own thesis. The remaining two chapters present the application of this thesis, first to the question of basic meaning in Greek, and second, to Homer's use of metaphor. There is a short appendix on metaphor in Aeschylus. The author is to be commended for an able and provocative study in literary criticism to which he brings the point of view and technique of modern semasiology. However, he leaves much to be desired.

Ancient critics made definitions of metaphor, they classified its varieties, they held certain theories of its function, but, as the author sees it, their appreciation of its real value was in almost all cases inadequate and in some ridiculous. Aristotle, for example, is taken to task again for his attachment to *ἐπτατό διορός* (pp. 12, 138), because, says Mr. Stanford, there never was a time when arrows did not fly. The truth of this assertion is immediately clear to the semasiologist: that feathered arrows had been flying long before Homer; that in Homer's time all arrows flew; that therefore in the poet's employment of such a figure there is no change in meaning and no addition to meaning. It is this *intentional* change in meaning, deliberately brought about by the literary artist which is essential to all metaphor worth the name (p. 88). Such metaphors therefore

¹ He does the same in the edition of 1934.

as Homer's *ὅπα λειρώσσαν* (pp. 54, 57, 140) and Aeschylus' *σάλπιγξ αὐτῇ πάντ' ἐκείν' ἐπέφλεγεν* win the author's approval as conscious metaphors. There is no such thing as unconscious metaphor. Ancient and modern critics from Aristotle on, including Max Müller (with Cicero and Hermogenes of Tarsus as exceptional cases), we are shown, were virtually unaware of the effect of metaphor on meaning. Such was the "sheepish orthodoxy" of Aristotle's disciples.

"Poets alone preserve the primeval vitality of language (p. 58)," Mr. Stanford says. Some of that vitality of Greek which has been explained away by grammarians, philologists, and logicians he hopes to recapture in this study. The cause is certainly a good one, the thesis is good. The author's ideas are never dull. But from such vehemence of argument and high-handed treatment of earlier critics one might have expected a greater enlightenment than the brief and general application of the thesis brings forth. Native intelligence and some attention to context has, for example, taught us before now that: *ἄθος* does not always = a flower (pp. 111-114); *γελᾶν* does not in every case = to laugh (pp. 114-117). Nor can one have much confidence in the laboratorial picture of a cautious Homer (in a sort of *φροντιστήριον*?) fixing the poetic connotations of words (p. 122). That Homer did use simile more than metaphor, that he was the poet of clarity, no one would care to deny. Moreover, the assertion may be true that Homer in a time when speech and language were in a state of flux carefully avoided metaphor in the interests of clarity. But that this is the explanation either of clarity or metaphor in Homer is not demonstrated to this reviewer's satisfaction. No consideration is given other points of view. Homer's audience, it is true, did not have that same richness of reference which we must suppose those had who listened to Aeschylus. But had the earlier one not another, perhaps different body of reference and of language, rich in its own way? Was not Homer the poet who knew "how to make use of the traditional," who sang to those who "knew the old by birthright" (M. Parry, *Cl. Ph.*, XXVIII [1933], pp. 42 f.)? He was not in any artificial sense a legislator of meaning but a poet of his time who, within his subject, within his medium, and in his fashion strove, as does every good poet including Aeschylus, to clarify his meaning.

The writing is sometimes obscure (pp. 17, 18), and sometimes unnecessarily harsh. Mr. Stanford might have been kinder to Müller's root, "brightness" (p. 82), in view of his own pleasure in the "brightness" of *γελᾶν* (p. 115). Finally, one can point to the use of simile in *Iliad*, XIV, 388-401 or IV 422-456, as achieving an intensity such as the author reserves for metaphor (p. 128).

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